Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 01.05.2025 vs State Of Himachal Pradesh And Another on 8 May, 2025
2025:HHC:13252
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MMO No. 1065 of 2024
Reserved on: 01.05.2025
Date of Decision: 08.05.2025.
Hira Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh and another ...Respondents
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting? No
For the Petitioner : Ms. Niranjana, Advocate
vice Mr. Subhash Mohan
Snehi, Advocate.
For the Respondents/State : Mr. Lokender Kutlehria,
Additional Advocate
General for respondent
No.1/State.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition for
quashing of F.I.R. 0034 of 2022 dated 19.11.2022, registered for
the commission of offences punishable under Sections 420,
467, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) at Police
Station Udaipur, District Lahaul & Spiti, H.P. (The parties shall
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hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they are arrayed
before the learned Trial Court for convenience)
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
petition are that the informant made a complaint to the police,
asserting that the accused is an illiterate person and had
supplied fake certificates at the time of his recruitment to the
Indian Army. He served in the Indian Army based on such fake
certificates. He cheated the government with these forged
certificates. The police registered the F.I.R., conducted the
investigation and filed a charge sheet before the learned Trial
Court after completion of the investigation.
3. Being aggrieved by the registration of F.I.R. and filing
of the charge-sheet, the petitioner has filed the present petition
for quashing of the F.I.R. and consequent charge-sheet. It was
asserted that the petitioner was recruited in the Indian Army on
13.07.1984 after studying up to the 6th class. He served the
Nation for 17 years in different parts of the country. The houses
of the informant and the petitioner are located adjacent to each
other. The informant/respondent No.2 extended the roof of his
house towards the house of the petitioner, which caused serious
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damage during the rainy season to the house of the petitioner.
The petitioner brought this fact to the notice of the informant
and requested him to make proper arrangements for the proper
discharge of the water, however, the informant quarrelled with
the petitioner. The petitioner made a complaint to the Pradhan
Gram Panchayat of Udaipur. Pradhan visited the spot and
advised the informant to remove the extended portion of the
roof. However, the informant did not adhere to this advice.
Hence, the petititoner filed a civil suit against the informant.
The informant also misbehaved with the petitioner on
16.09.2022. He reported the matter to the Executive Engineer,
HPPWD, Udaipur; however, no action was taken, and the
petitioner approached the Chairman-cum-Managing Director,
HP Ex-servicemen Corporation, Hamirpur. The informant filed
a false complaint as a counterblast to the complaints made by
the petitioner. The petitioner has studied up to sixth class, and
Prem Singh Thakur, who taught him during his primary
education issued a certificate to this effect. The police had also
written a letter to the Army authorities, who replied that the
authenticity of the certificates was examined by the Enrolling
Officer. The certificates of the petitioner were lost during the
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accident in 2005. Therefore, it was prayed that the present
petition be allowed and the F.I.R., as well as consequential
proceedings, be quashed.
4. The petition is opposed by filing a status report
reproducing the contents of the F.I.R. It was asserted that a
certified copy of the admission and withdrawal register from
1971 to November 1994 was obtained from the school; however,
the name of the petitioner/accused was not found in the record.
The Army officials stated that certificates were returned to the
petitioner at the time of his discharge. The accused was asked to
produce the certificate, but he failed to produce it. . It was
found after the investigation that the petitioner had produced a
forged document regarding his qualifications. Hence, the charge
sheet was filed before the learned Trial Court against the
petitioner. The matter was listed before the learned Trial Court
on 08.01.2025.
5. I have heard Ms. Niranjana, learned vice counsel, vice
Mr. Subhash Mohan Snehi, learned counsel for the petitioner
and Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, Additional Advocate General, for
respondent No.1/State.
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6. Ms. Niranjana learned vice counsel representing the
petitioner/accused submitted that the petitioner is innocent. He
was falsely implicated due to the land dispute with the
informant. The petitoner had filed various complaints against
the informant, and the informant filed the present complaint as
a counterblast to the complaints filed by the petitioner. The
Army authorities had issued a letter certifying that the
documents submitted by the petitioner were valid. Therefore,
she prayed that the present petition be allowed and the F.I.R., as
well as consequential proceedings arising out of the F.I.R., be
quashed.
7. Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate
General for respondent No.1/State, submitted that the petitioner
had produced false documents at the time of his recruitment to
the Army. Police seized the record from 1971 to November 1994,
but the name of the petitioner was not found in the record. He
failed to produce certificates, therefore, he prayed that the
present petition be dismissed.
8. I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
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9. The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC
OnLine SC 7 as under: –
“7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned,
it is now more or less well settled as regards the
principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one
may refer to the decision of this Court in State of
Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein
this Court has summarized some of the principles under
which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed
in the following words:
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the
various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter
XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this
Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of
the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the
inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which
we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the
following categories of cases by way of illustration
wherein such power could be exercised either to
prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise
to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be
possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and
sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or
rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad
kinds of cases wherein such power should be
exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they
are taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence
or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first
information report and other materials, if any,
accompanying the FIR do not disclose a
7
2025:HHC:13252cognizable offence, justifying an investigation
by police officers under Section 156(1) of the
Code except under an order of a Magistrate
within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made
in the FIR or complaint and the evidence
collected in support of the same do not disclose
the commission of any offence and make out a
case against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only
a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is
permitted by a police officer without an order of a
Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2)
of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently
improbable on the basis of which no prudent
person can ever reach a just conclusion that
there is sufficient ground for proceeding against
the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in
any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned
Act (under which a criminal proceeding is
instituted) to the institution and continuance of the
proceedings and/or where there is a specific
provision in the Code or the concerned Act,
providing efficacious redress for the grievance of
the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the
accused and with a view to spite him due to a
private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added)
8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6)
would be of relevance to us in this case.
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In clause (1) it has been mentioned that where the
allegations made in the first information report or the
complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute
any offence or make out a case against the accused, then
the FIR or the complaint can be quashed.
As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a
non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by
a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate
as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in
such a situation, the FIR can be quashed.
Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an
express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of
the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal
proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be
quashed.”
10. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of
Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed:
“8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising
its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC,
may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes
or to secure the ends of justice.
These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited
by any other statutory provision. However, given the
broad and profound nature of this authority, the High
Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for
invoking such powers are embedded
within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High
Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or
where intervention is essential to uphold the
ends of justice.
9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the
course of several decades, has laid down the principles
and guidelines that High Courts must follow before
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2025:HHC:13252quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby
pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case
before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter
alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the
criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the
FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii)
no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil
in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus
allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and
compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v.
Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335)
11. The present petition is to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
12. It was specifically mentioned in the status report
that police seized the admission and withdrawal record of the
Government Senior Secondary School, Madgran w.e.f. May 1971
till November 1994. The name of the petitioner was not found
in the record. This prima facie shows that the petitioner had not
studied in the school, and the plea that he had produced a false
certificate has to be accepted as correct. A heavy reliance was
placed upon the fact that the army authorities wrote a letter to
the police stating that the petitioner was enrolled in the Indian
Army with valid documents. However, this letter will not help
the petitioner. The authenticity of the letter has not been
established, and it is a piece of evidence to be looked into by the
learned Trial Court along with other evidence.
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13. A heavy reliance was placed upon the certificate
issued by Prem Singh Thakur, in which it was mentioned that he
had imparted the education to the petitioner and other persons.
This certificate is to be tested by examining the witnesses;
however, prima facie, when the name of the petitioner is not
mentioned in the admission and withdrawal register of the
school, the plea that the certificate produced by the accused is
not valid is acceptable.
14. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
MCD v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi, (1983) 1 SCC 1: 1983 SCC (Cri) 115 that
the proceedings can be quashed on the face of the complaint and
the papers accompanying the same, no offence is constituted. It
is not permissible to add or subtract anything. It was observed:
“10. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that proceedings
against an accused in the initial stages can be quashed
only if, on the face of the complaint or the papers
accompanying the same, no offence is constituted. In
other words, the test is that taking the allegations and
the complaint as they are, without adding or subtracting
anything, if no offence is made out, then the High Court
will be justified in quashing the proceedings in exercise
of its powers under Section 482 of the present Code.”
15. Madras High Court also held in Ganga Bai v. Shriram,
1990 SCC OnLine MP 213: ILR 1992 MP 964: 1991 Cri LJ 2018, that
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the fresh evidence is not permissible or desirable in the
proceedings under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. It was observed:
“Proceedings under Section 482, Cr.P.C. cannot be
allowed to be converted into a full-dressed trial. Shri
Maheshwari filed a photostat copy of an order dated
28.7.1983, passed in Criminal Case No. 1005 of 1977, to
which the present petitioner was not a party. Fresh
evidence at this stage is neither permissible nor desirable.
The respondent, by filing this document, is virtually
introducing additional evidence, which is not the object of
Section 482, Cr.P.C.”
16. Andhra Pradesh High Court also took a similar view
in Bharat Metal Box Company Limited, Hyderabad and Others vs.
G. K. Strips Private Limited and another, 2004 STPL 43 AP, and
held:
“9. This Court can only look into the complaint and the
documents filed along with it, and the sworn statements
of the witnesses, if any recorded. While judging the
correctness of the proceedings, it cannot look into the
documents, which were not filed before the lower Court.
Section 482 Cr.PC debars the Court to look into fresh
documents, in view of the principles laid down by the
Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa
and another, 2002 (1) Supreme 192. The relevant portion
of the said judgment reads as follows:
“The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it
appears that on consideration of the allegations, in
the light of the statement made on oath of the
complainant that the ingredients of the offence or
offences are disclosed and there is no material to
show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or
vexatious, in that event there would be no
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2025:HHC:13252justification for interference by the High Court.
When information is lodged at the Police Station
and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of
the informant would be of secondary importance. It
is the material collected during the investigation
and evidence led in Court which decides the fate of
the accused person. The allegations of mala fides
against the informant are of no consequence and
cannot by itself be the basis for quashing the
proceedings”.
17. A similar view was taken in Mahendra K.C. v. State of
Karnataka, (2022) 2 SCC 129: (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 401, wherein it
was observed at page 142:
“16. … the test to be applied is whether the allegations in
the complaint, as they stand, without adding or
detracting from the complaint, prima facie establish the
ingredients of the offence alleged. At this stage, the High
Court cannot test the veracity of the allegations, nor, for
that matter, can it proceed in the manner that a judge
conducting a trial would, based on the evidence collected
during the course of the trial.”
18. This position was reiterated in Supriya Jain v. State of
Haryana, (2023) 7 SCC 711: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 765, wherein it
was held:
13. All these documents which the petitioner seeks to rely
on, if genuine, could be helpful for her defence at the
trial, but the same are not material at the stage of
deciding whether quashing as prayed for by her before
the High Court was warranted or not. We, therefore, see
no reason to place any reliance on these three
documents.
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19. A similar view was taken in Iveco Magirus
Brandschutztechnik GMBH v. Nirmal Kishore Bhartiya, (2024) 2
SCC 86: (2024) 1 SCC (Cri) 512: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1258, wherein
it was observed:
“63. Adverting to the aspect of the exercise of
jurisdiction by the High Courts under Section 482CrPC, in
a case where the offence of defamation is claimed by the
accused to have not been committed based on any of the
Exceptions and a prayer for quashing is made, the law
seems to be well settled that the High Courts can go no
further and enlarge the scope of inquiry if the accused seeks
to rely on materials which were not there before the
Magistrate. This is based on the simple proposition that what
the Magistrate could not do, the High Courts may not do. We
may not be understood to undermine the High Courts’
powers saved by Section 482CrPC; such powers are
always available to be exercised ex debito justitiae , i.e. to
do real and substantial justice for the administration of
which alone the High Courts exist. However, the tests laid
down for quashing an FIR or criminal proceedings
arising from a police report by the High Courts in the
exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482CrPC not being
substantially different from the tests laid down for
quashing a process issued under Section 204 read with
Section 200, the High Courts on recording due
satisfaction are empowered to interfere if on a reading of
the complaint, the substance of statements on oath of the
complainant and the witness, if any, and documentary
evidence as produced, no offence is made out and that
proceedings, if allowed to continue, would amount to an
abuse of the legal process. This, too, would be
impermissible if the justice of a given case does not
overwhelmingly so demand.” (Emphasis supplied).
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20. Therefore, it is not permissible to look into the
documents produced by the petitioner with the petition.
21. It was submitted that the allegations in the F.I.R. are
false. This submission will not help the petitioner. It was laid
down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643,
that the Court exercising inherent jurisdiction to quash the FIR
cannot go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations.
It was observed: –
“13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court
would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to
the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the
allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage
of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr.
P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint,
if taken at their face value, must disclose the commission
of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At
the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations
made in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at their face
value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or
make out a case against the accused. We are of the
considered view that the present case would fall under
Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in
the case of Bhajan Lal (supra).
14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this
Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of
Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC
1060:
“14. First, we would like to deal with the
submission of the learned Senior Counsel for
Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed,
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2025:HHC:13252the petition for quashing of the FIR is untenable.
We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping
in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj
A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of
Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23].
In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of
Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this
Court while deciding the question of whether the
High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition
for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was
filed by the police during the pendency of the
Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16)
“16. Thus, the general conspectus of the
various sections under which the appellant is
being charged and is to be prosecuted would
show that the same is not made out even
prima facie from the complainant’s FIR. Even
if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned
Single Judge [Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of
Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365] could have
still examined whether the offences alleged to
have been committed by the appellant were
prima facie made out from the complainant’s
FIR, charge-sheet, documents, etc. or not.”
22. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2025) 1 SCC 392:
2024 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court cannot conduct a mini-
trial while exercising jurisdiction under section 482 of CrPC. It
was observed at page 397:
“17. This Court, in a series of judgments, has held that
while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482
of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court is
not supposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable reference
16
2025:HHC:13252can be made to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan
Singh [CBI v. Aryan Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399: 2023 SCC
OnLine SC 379]. The relevant paragraph from the
judgment is extracted hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7)
6. … As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of
discharge and/or quashing of the criminal
proceedings, while exercising the powers under
Section 482CrPC, the Court is not required to conduct
the mini-trial. …
7. … At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising
the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court has very
limited jurisdiction and is required to consider
‘whether any sufficient material is available to
proceed further against the accused for which the
accused is required to be tried or not’.”
23. It was submitted that civil litigation is pending
between the parties, and the petitioner had made complaints
against the informant. The informant filed the present
complaint as a counterblast to the litigation and the complaints
made by the petitioner. This submission will not help the
petitioner. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
State of Chhattisgarh vs Amar Kumar Singh 2023(6) 559 that when
an investigation was conducted and a charge sheet was filed, the
question of mala fide would become meaningless. It was
observed:
“78. Thirdly, it must be remembered that when
information is lodged at the police station and an offence
is registered in respect of a disproportionate assets case,
17
2025:HHC:13252it is the material collected during the investigation and
evidence led in court that is decisive for determining the
fate of the accused. To our mind, whether the first
information report is the outcome of mala fides would be
of secondary importance. In such a case, should the
allegations of mala fides be of some prima facie worth,
they would pale into insignificance if sufficient materials
are gathered for sending the accused up for a trial; hence,
the plea of mala fide may not per se form the basis for
quashing the first information report/complaint.
79. Finally, following the above, what is of substantial
importance is that if criminal prosecution is based upon
adequate evidence and the same is otherwise justifiable,
it does not become vitiated on account of significant
political overtones and mala fide motives. We can say
without fear of contradiction that it is not in all cases in
our country that an individual, who is accused of acts of
omission/commission punishable under the PC Act but
has the blessings of the ruling dispensation, is booked by
the police and made to face prosecution. If, indeed, in
such a case (where a prosecution should have been but
has not been launched) the succeeding political
dispensation initiates steps for launching prosecution
against such an accused but he/she is allowed to go scot-
free, despite there being materials against him/her,
merely on the ground that the action initiated by the
current regime is mala fide in the sense that it is either to
settle scores with the earlier regime or to wreak
vengeance against the individual, in such an eventuality
we are constrained to observe that it is criminal justice
that would be the casualty. This is because it is difficult to
form an opinion conclusively at the stage of reading a
first information report that the public servant is either
in or not in possession of property disproportionate to
the known sources of his/her income. It would all depend
on what is ultimately unearthed after the investigation is
complete. Needless to observe, the first information
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2025:HHC:13252report in a disproportionate assets case must, as of
necessity, prima facie, contain ingredients for the
perception that there is fair enough reason to suspect the
commission of a cognizable offence relating to “criminal
misconduct” punishable under the PC Act and to embark
upon an investigation.”
24. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Ramveer Upadhyay v. State of U.P., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 484, that a
complaint cannot be quashed because it was initiated due to
enmity. It was observed:
“30. The fact that the complaint may have been initiated
because of a political vendetta is not in itself grounds for
quashing the criminal proceedings, as observed by
Bhagwati, CJ in Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar
(1987) 1 SCC 2884. It is a well-established proposition of
law that a criminal prosecution, if otherwise justified and
based upon adequate evidence, does not become vitiated
on account of mala fides or political vendetta of the first
informant or complainant. Though the view of Bhagwati,
CJ in Sheonandan Paswan (supra) was the minority view,
there was no difference of opinion with regard to this
finding. To quote Krishna Iyer, J., in State of Punjab v.
Gurdial Singh (1980) 2 SCC 471, “If the use of power is for
the fulfilment of a legitimate object, the actuation or
catalysation by malice is not legicidal.”
Xxxx
39. In our considered opinion, criminal proceedings
cannot be nipped in the bud by the exercise of
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. only
because the complaint has been lodged by a political
rival. It is possible that a false complaint may have been
lodged at the behest of a political opponent. However,
such a possibility would not justify interference under
Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal
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2025:HHC:13252
proceedings. As observed above, the possibility of
retaliation on the part of the petitioners by the acts
alleged, after the closure of the earlier criminal case,
cannot be ruled out. The allegations in the complaint
constitute an offence under the Atrocities Act. Whether
the allegations are true or untrue would have to be
decided in the trial. In the exercise of power under
Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., the Court does not examine
the correctness of the allegations in a complaint except
in exceptionally rare cases where it is patently clear that
the allegations are frivolous or do not disclose any
offence. The Complaint Case No. 19/2018 is not such a
case which should be quashed at the inception itself
without further Trial. The High Court rightly dismissed
the application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.”
25. Thus, it is impermissible to quash the FIR on the
ground of mala fide.
26. A charge sheet has been filed before the learned Trial
Court. The learned Trial Court is seized of the matter. It was laid
down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P.,
(2023) 8 SCC 734: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge
sheet has been filed, the learned Trial Court should be left to
appreciate the same. It was observed:
“At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the
investigation has been completed and the charge sheet is
ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the
FIR do not inspire any confidence, particularly in the
absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged
offences, we are of the view that the appellants should
prefer a discharge application before the trial court under
Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We
20
2025:HHC:13252say so because even according to the State, the
investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be
filed before the competent court. In such circumstances,
the trial court should be allowed to look into the
materials which the investigating officer might have
collected forming part of the charge sheet. If any such
discharge application is filed, the trial court shall look
into the materials and take a call whether any discharge
case is made out or not.”
27. The FIR discloses the commission of cognizable
offences, and it cannot be quashed at this stage.
28. No other point was urged.
29. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and
the same stands dismissed.
30. The observations made herein before shall remain
confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing,
whatsoever, on the merits of the case.
( Rakesh Kainthla )
08th May 2025 Judge
(ravinder)
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