Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 03.03.2025 vs Sita Devi And Others on 10 March, 2025
2025:HHC:5345
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Appeal No. 315 of 2010
Reserved on: 03.03.2025
Date of Decision: 10.03.2025
Nirat Singh …Appellant
Versus
Sita Devi and others …Respondents
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes.
For the Appellant : Mr. S.D. Vasudeva, Advocate.
For the Respondents : Ms. Kusum Chaudhary,
Advocate.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The present appeal is directed against the judgment
dated 26.03.2010, passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Kullu, District Kullu, H.P., (learned Trial Court), vide which the
complaint filed by the appellant (complainant before the learned
Trial Court) was dismissed and respondents (accused before
learned Trial Court) were acquitted of the charged offences.
(Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they
were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience).
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
appeal are that the complainant filed a complaint before the
learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of
offences punishable under Sections 324 and 506 read with
Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted that the
complainant is an agriculturist and is residing at Village and Post
Office Kotla, Sub Tehsil Sainj, District Kullu, H.P. Accused No.1 is
the wife of the complainant and accused No.2 and 3 are his sons.
They reside in Village Hurla, Sub Tehsil Sainj, District Kullu, H.P.
Accused No.1 has inherited the property of her father in Village
Hurla where she used to reside with accused No.2 and 3. The
complainant is residing in Village Kotla. The accused came to the
house of the complainant at Village Kotla on 8.7.2006 at 8.00 PM
armed with sticks. They abused and threatened the complainant.
They asked the complainant to transfer the property in their
names. The complainant refused to do so. The accused gave him
a beating with fist blows and sticks. The complainant shouted for
help. Smt. Bhadri Devi, Baldev Singh, Tek Singh and Bali Ram
reached the spot and rescued the complainant from the accused.
The accused ran away from the spot. They threatened the
complainant to kill him at a suitable time. The complainant
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sustained injuries on his head and body. He reported the matter
to Police Station, Banjar but no action was taken by the police.
Hence the complainant filed a complaint before the learned Trial
Court for taking action against the accused.
3. The learned Trial Court recorded the preliminary
evidence and found sufficient reasons to summon the accused.
Statements of complainant Nirat Singh (PW1), Baldev Singh
(PW2), Tek Singh (PW3) and Bali Ram (PW4) were recorded
before framing the charges.
4. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to
frame charges against the accused for the commission of
offences punishable under Sections 323 and 506 read with
Section 34 of IPC.
5. The complainant Nirat Singh (PW1) was recalled for
further examination after framing the charges.
6. The accused in their statements recorded under
Section 313 of Cr.P.C. denied the case of the complainant in its
entirety. They claimed that the witnesses deposed against them
falsely. Initially, they stated that they wanted to lead defence
evidence, however, no evidence was led subsequently.
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7. Learned Trial Court held that the incident occurred on
8.7.2006 and the complaint was filed on 28.7.2006 after a gap of
20 days. The complainant explained that he had reported the
matter to the police but there was no evidence in support of this
fact. The delay in filing the complaint would make the case of the
complainant suspect. The complainant stated that Bhadri Devi
had reached the spot and rescued him from the accused. The
statement of Bhadri Devi was not recorded. The complainant
admitted that the village had around 80 houses but no person
from the vicinity was examined to prove the complainant’s
version. No medical evidence was brought on record to
corroborate the complainant’s version. Bali Ram (PW4) was
related to the complainant. He was residing seven kilometres
away from the place of the incident. He was a chance witness and
his presence was not satisfactorily established on the spot. The
complainant and accused were inimical to each other and the
possibility of false implication could not be ruled out. The
weapon of offence was not produced before the Court. These
facts created reasonable doubt in the complainant’s case.
Accordingly, the accused were acquitted.
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8. Being aggrieved from the judgment passed by the
learned Trial Court, the complainant has filed the present appeal
asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the
accused. The statements of the complainant’s witnesses were
ignored without any justification. Learned Trial Court erred in
discarding testimony of Bali Ram (PW4). The accused wanted the
complainant to transfer his property in their names and they
gave him beatings to compel him to do so. This aspect was
ignored by the learned Trial Court. Therefore, it was prayed that
the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the
learned Trial Court be set aside.
9. I have heard Mr. S.D. Vasudeva, learned counsel for
the appellant/complainant and Ms. Kusum Chaudhary, learned
counsel for the respondents/accused.
10. Mr. S.D. Vasudeva, learned counsel for the
appellant/complainant, submitted that the learned Trial Court
erred in acquitting the accused. The evidence was not properly
appreciated and the statements of the complainant’s witnesses
were discarded without any justification. Hence, he prayed that
the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the
learned Trial Court be set aside.
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11. Ms Kusum Chaudhary, learned counsel for the
respondents/accused supported the judgment passed by the
learned Trial Court. She submitted that the learned Trial Court
had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused and
this Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the
learned Trial Court unless there is some perversity in the
judgment. There is no such perversity. Hence, she prayed that the
present appeal be dismissed.
12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
13. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment
of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176
that the Court should interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it
is patently perverse or is based on misreading/omission to
consider the material evidence and no reasonable person could
have recorded the acquittal based on the evidence led before the
learned Trial Court. It was observed:
11. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda
Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka 2024 SCC OnLine SC
4035, a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a
Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the
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2025:HHC:5345legal position with regard to the scope of interference in
an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus:
“38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles
laid down by this Court governing the scope of
interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by the
State for challenging the acquittal of the accused
recorded by the trial court.
39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar [Rajesh
Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471: (2022) 2 SCC
(Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal position covering the
field after considering various earlier judgments and
held as below : (SCC pp. 482-83, para 29)
“29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this
Court culled out the following general principles
regarding the powers of the appellate court while
dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal
in the following words: (Chandrappa
case [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC
415: (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325], SCC p. 432, para 42)
’42. From the above decisions, in our considered
view, the following general principles regarding
the powers of the appellate court while dealing
with an appeal against an order of acquittal
emerge:
(1) An appellate court has full power to review,
reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon
which the order of acquittal is founded.
(2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 puts no
limitation, restriction or condition on the
exercise of such power and an appellate court
on the evidence before it may reach its own
conclusion, both on questions of fact and of
law.
(3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial
and compelling reasons”, “good and
sufficient grounds”, “very strong
circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”,
“glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to
8
2025:HHC:5345curtail extensive powers of an appellate court
in an appeal against acquittal. Such
phraseologies are more in the nature of
“flourishes of language” to emphasise the
reluctance of an appellate court to interfere
with acquittal than to curtail the power of the
court to review the evidence and to come to its
own conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in
mind that in case of acquittal, there is double
presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly,
the presumption of innocence is available to
him under the fundamental principle of
criminal jurisprudence that every person shall
be presumed to be innocent unless he is
proved guilty by a competent court of
law. Secondly, the accused having secured his
acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is
further reinforced, reaffirmed and
strengthened by the trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible
on the basis of the evidence on record, the
appellate court should not disturb the finding
of acquittal recorded by the trial court.'”
40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka [H.D.
Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581: (2023) 3
SCC (Cri) 748] this Court summarised the principles
governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while
dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section
378CrPC as follows: (SCC p. 584, para 8)
“8. … 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further
strengthens the presumption of innocence;
8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal
against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral
and documentary evidence;
8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal
against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence,
is required to consider whether the view taken by
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the trial court is a possible view which could have
been taken on the basis of the evidence on record;
8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate
court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the
ground that another view was also possible; and
8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order
of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only
conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the
evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused
was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other
conclusion was possible.”
41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of
interference by an appellate court for reversing the
judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in
favour of the accused has to be exercised within the
four corners of the following principles:
41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent
perversity;
41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission
to consider material evidence on record; and
41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and
only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is
possible from the evidence available on record.”
12. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position
that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded
by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High
Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent
perversity; that the same is based on a
misreading/omission to consider material evidence on
record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and
only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is
possible from the evidence available on record.”
14. The present appeal has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
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15. The complainant had asserted in the complaint that
he was rescued by Bhadri Devi and other persons. He had
abandoned this version when he was recalled for cross-
examination. He specifically stated in his statement dated
3.12.2009 that Bhadri Devi was not present at the time of the
incident. This admission falsifies the contents of the complaint
that Bhadri Devi was present on the spot and had rescued the
complainant from the accused.
16. The informant stated that he had reported the matter
to the Police Station, Banjar on 9.7.2006, however, no action was
taken by the police. He stated in his cross-examination that he
had made a written complaint to the police but he had not
retained any record with him. Learned Trial Court had rightly
held that the complainant had not summoned any record from
the Police Station, Banjar to establish his version regarding the
making of the complaint. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had
rightly held that there was no explanation for the delay in
making the complaint before the Court. It was laid down in
Mehraj Singh v. State of U.P. (1994) 5 SCC 188 that the delay in
lodging FIR leads to embellishments, concoction and fabrication
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and therefore, the court should see the prosecution case with
utmost care and caution in case of delay. It was observed:
“FIR in a criminal case and particularly in a murder case is
a vital and valuable piece of evidence to appreciate the
evidence led at the trial. The object of insisting upon
prompt lodging of the FIR is to obtain the earliest
information regarding the circumstance in which the
crime was committed, including the names of the actual
culprits and the parts played by them, the weapons, if any,
used, as also the names of the eyewitnesses, if any. Delay
in lodging the FIR often results in embellishment, which is
a creature of an afterthought. On account of the delay, the
FIR not only gets bereft of the advantage of spontaneity,
but danger also creeps in the introduction of a coloured
version or exaggerated story. With a view to determining
whether the FIR was lodged at the time it is alleged to have
been recorded, the courts generally look for certain
external checks. One of the checks is the receipt of the copy
of the FIR, called a special report in a murder case, by the
local Magistrate. If this report is received by the
Magistrate late, it can give rise to an inference that the FIR
was not lodged at the time it is alleged to have been
recorded unless, of course, the prosecution can offer a
satisfactory explanation for the delay in dispatching or
receipt of the copy of the FIR by the local Magistrate. The
prosecution has led no evidence at all in this behalf. The
second external check equally important is the sending of
a copy of the FIR along with the dead body and its
reference in the inquest report. Even though the inquest,
prepared under Section 174 CrPC, is aimed at serving a
statutory function, to lend credence to the prosecution
case, the details of the FIR and the gist of statements
recorded during inquest proceedings get reflected in the
report. The absence of those details is indicative of the fact
that the prosecution story was still in an embryo state and
had not been given any shape and that the FIR came to be
recorded later on after due deliberations and consultations
and was then ante-timed to give it the colour of a
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2025:HHC:5345promptly lodged FIR. In our opinion, on account of the
infirmities as noticed above, the FIR has lost its value and
authenticity, and it appears to us that the same has been
ante-timed and had not been recorded till the inquest
proceedings were over at the spot by PW 8.”
17. This position was reiterated in P Rajagopal vs State of
Tamil Nadu 2019 (5) SCC 40, wherein it was observed: –
“12. Normally, the Court may reject the case of the
prosecution in case of inordinate delay in lodging the first
information report because of the possibility of a
concoction of evidence by the prosecution. However, if the
delay is satisfactorily explained, the Court will decide the
matter on merits without giving much importance to such
delay. The Court is duty-bound to determine whether the
explanation afforded is plausible enough given the facts
and circumstances of the case. The delay may be condoned
if the complainant appears to be reliable and without any
motive for implicating the accused falsely. [See Apren
Joseph v. State of Kerala, (1973) 3 SCC 114; Mukesh v. State
(NCT of Delhi), (2017) 6 SCC 1].”
18. A similar view was taken in Sekaran v. State of T.N.,
(2024) 2 SCC 176: (2024) 1 SCC (Cri) 548: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1653
wherein it was observed at page 182:
“14. We start with the FIR, to which exception has been
taken by the appellant urging that there has been no
satisfactory explanation for its belated registration. It is
trite that merely because there is some delay in lodging an
FIR, the same by itself and without anything more ought
not to weigh in the mind of the courts in all cases as fatal
for the prosecution. A realistic and pragmatic approach
has to be adopted, keeping in mind the peculiarities of
each particular case, to assess whether the unexplained
delay in lodging the FIR is an afterthought to give a
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2025:HHC:5345coloured version of the incident, which is sufficient to
corrode the credibility of the prosecution version.
15. In cases where delay occurs, it has to be tested on the
anvil of other attending circumstances. If on an overall
consideration of all relevant circumstances it appears to
the court that the delay in lodging the FIR has been
explained, mere delay cannot be sufficient to disbelieve
the prosecution case; however, if the delay is not
satisfactorily explained and it appears to the court that
cause for the delay had been necessitated to frame anyone
as an accused, there is no reason as to why the delay
should not be considered as fatal forming part of several
factors to vitiate the conviction.”
19. Therefore, learned Trial Court was justified in
doubting the case of the complainant due to the delay in
reporting the matter to the Court or the police.
20. Bali Ram (PW4) stated that he had gone to Bazar for
purchasing household articles. On 8.7.2006, he was going to his
home when he heard the cries. He went to the spot and saw that
the accused were beating the complainant with sticks and fist
blows. When he inquired from them, they replied that the
accused was not transferring the land in their names. The
accused threatened to kill the complainant in case the land was
not transferred in their names by the complainant. He stated in
his cross-examination that his house is located at a distance of
6-7 kilometres from the place of the incident. The complainant is
his real uncle. This shows that he was a chance witness. It was
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laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Harbeer Singh v.
Sheeshpal, (2016) 16 SCC 418: (2017) 4 SCC (Cri) 503: 2016 SCC
OnLine SC 1164 that the chance witnesses have a habit of
appearing suddenly on the place of incident and thereafter
disappearing. Their testimonies should be seen with due care and
caution. It was observed at page 427:
23. The defining attributes of a “chance witness” were
explained by Mahajan, J., in Puran v. State of Punjab [Puran
v. State of Punjab, (1952) 2 SCC 454: AIR 1953 SC 459: 1953 Cri
LJ 1925]. It was held that such witnesses have the habit of
appearing suddenly on the scene when something is
happening and then disappearing after noticing the
occurrence about which they are called later on to give
evidence.
24. In Mousam Singha Roy v. State of W.B. [Mousam Singha
Roy v. State of W.B., (2003) 12 SCC 377: 2004 SCC (Cri) Supp
429], this Court discarded the evidence of chance
witnesses while observing that certain glaring
contradictions/omissions in the evidence of PW 2 and PW
3 and the absence of their names in the FIR has been very
lightly discarded by the courts below. Similarly, Shankarlal
v. State of Rajasthan [Shankarlal v. State of Rajasthan,
(2004) 10 SCC 632: 2005 SCC (Cri) 579] and Jarnail Singh v.
State of Punjab [Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab, (2009) 9
SCC 719: (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 107] are authorities for the
proposition that deposition of a chance witness, whose
presence at the place of incident remains doubtful, ought
to be discarded. Therefore, for the reasons recorded by the
High Court, we hold that PW 5 and PW 6 were chance
witnesses and their statements have been rightly
discarded.
21. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Rajesh Yadav v. State of U.P., (2022) 12 SCC 200: 2022 SCC OnLine
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SC 150 that the testimony of a chance witness is to be seen with
due care and caution and his presence on the spot should be
satisfactorily established. It was observed:
“Chance witness
29. A chance witness is one who happens to be at the place of
occurrence of an offence by chance, and therefore, not as a
matter of course. In other words, he is not expected to be in the
said place. A person walking on a street witnessing the
commission of an offence can be a chance witness. Merely
because a witness happens to see an occurrence by chance, his
testimony cannot be eschewed though a little more scrutiny
may be required at times. This again is an aspect which is to be
looked into in a given case by the court. We do not wish to
reiterate the aforesaid position of law which has been clearly
laid down by this Court in State of A.P. v. K. Srinivasulu
Reddy [State of A.P. v. K. Srinivasulu Reddy, (2003) 12 SCC 660:
2005 SCC (Cri) 817]: (SCC pp. 665-66, paras 12-13)
“12. Criticism was levelled against the evidence of PWs 4 and
9 who are independent witnesses by labelling them as
chance witnesses. The criticism about PWs 4 and 9 being
chance witnesses is also without any foundation. They have
clearly explained as to how they happened to be at the spot
of occurrence and the trial court and the High Court have
accepted the same.
13. Coming to the plea of the accused that PWs 4 and 9 were
“chance witnesses” who have not explained how they
happened to be at the alleged place of occurrence, it has to be
noted that the said witnesses were independent witnesses.
There was not even a suggestion to the witnesses that they
had any animosity towards any of the accused. In a murder
trial by describing the independent witnesses as “chance
witnesses” it cannot be implied thereby that their evidence
is suspicious and their presence at the scene doubtful.
Murders are not committed with previous notice to
witnesses; soliciting their presence. If murder is committed
in a dwelling house, the inmates of the house are natural
witnesses. If murder is committed in a street, only passers-
by will be witnesses. Their evidence cannot be brushed aside
or viewed with suspicion on the ground that they are mere
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“chance witnesses”. The expression “chance witness” is
borrowed from countries where every man’s home is
considered his castle and everyone must have an explanation
for his presence elsewhere or in another man’s castle. It is
quite unsuitable an expression in a country where people are
less formal and more casual, at any rate in the matter
explaining their presence.”
30. The principle was reiterated by this Court in Jarnail
Singh v. State of Punjab [Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab, (2009) 9
SCC 719: (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 107]: (SCC p. 725, paras 21-23)
“21. In Sachchey Lal Tiwari v. State of U.P. [Sachchey Lal
Tiwari v. State of U.P., (2004) 11 SCC 410: 2004 SCC (Cri)
Supp 105] this Court while considering the evidentiary
value of the chance witness in a case of murder which
had taken place in a street and a passer-by had deposed
that he had witnessed the incident, observed as under:
If the offence is committed in a street only a
passer-by will be the witness. His evidence cannot
be brushed aside lightly or viewed with suspicion
on the ground that he was a mere chance witness.
However, there must be an explanation for his
presence there.
The Court further explained that the expression “chance
witness” is borrowed from countries where every man’s
home is considered his castle and everyone must have an
explanation for his presence elsewhere or in another
man’s castle. It is quite unsuitable an expression in a
country like India where people are less formal and more
casual, at any rate in the matter of explaining their
presence.
22. The evidence of a chance witness requires very
cautious and close scrutiny and a chance witness must
adequately explain his presence at the place of
occurrence (Satbir v. Surat Singh [Satbir v. Surat Singh,
(1997) 4 SCC 192: 1997 SCC (Cri) 538], Harjinder
Singh v. State of Punjab [Harjinder Singh v. State of Punjab,
(2004) 11 SCC 253: 2004 SCC (Cri) Supp
28], Acharaparambath Pradeepan v. State of
Kerala [Acharaparambath Pradeepan v. State of Kerala,
(2006) 13 SCC 643 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 241] and Sarvesh
Narain Shukla v. Daroga Singh [Sarvesh Narain
Shukla v. Daroga Singh, (2007) 13 SCC 360 : (2009) 1 SCC
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2025:HHC:5345
(Cri) 188] ). Deposition of a chance witness whose
presence at the place of incident remains doubtful should
be discarded (vide Shankarlal v. State of
Rajasthan [Shankarlal v. State of Rajasthan, (2004) 10 SCC
632: 2005 SCC (Cri) 579] ).
23. Conduct of the chance witness, subsequent to the
incident may also be taken into consideration
particularly as to whether he has informed anyone else in
the village about the incident (vide Thangaiya v. State of
T.N. [Thangaiya v. State of T.N., (2005) 9 SCC 650: 2005
SCC (Cri) 1284]). Gurcharan Singh (PW 18) met the
informant Darshan Singh (PW 4) before lodging the FIR
and the fact of conspiracy was not disclosed by
Gurcharan Singh (PW 18) and Darshan Singh (PW 4). The
fact of conspiracy has not been mentioned in the FIR.
Hakam Singh, the other witness on this issue has not
been examined by the prosecution. Thus, the High Court
was justified in discarding the part of the prosecution
case relating to conspiracy. However, in the fact situation
of the present case, the acquittal of the said two co-
accused has no bearing, so far as the present appeal is
concerned.”
22. This witness stated in his cross-examination that he
did not know the names of English months and thereafter
clarified that the incident had taken place on 8.7.2006. His
testimony that he did not know the names of English months and
thereafter his statement that the incident had taken place on
8.7.2006 shows that the name of the month was supplied to him
by some person. There is nothing to show that he had taken any
steps to take the complainant to the hospital. He is the real
nephew of the complainant and would have been concerned
about the health of his uncle after the beating. Hence, the non-
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taking of the complainant to the hospital will cast doubt on his
testimony that he had witnessed the incident and the learned
Trial court had rightly discarded his testimony.
23. Baldev Singh (PW2) stated that on 8.7.2006, at 8.00
PM, he was going to his home when he heard some noise from
the house of Nirat Singh. He visited the spot and saw the accused
asking the complainant to transfer the land. They threatened to
kill the complainant. Nirat Singh sustained injuries. Tek Singh
(PW3) and Bali Ram (PW4) reached the spot and rescued the
complainant from the accused. The accused threatened to kill the
complainant. He stated in his cross-examination that 100-150
people reached the village on the spot. They advised the accused
not to beat the complainant. The accused heeded this advice and
left the spot. Houses of Gian Chand, Ved Prakash and Dashmi
Ram are located adjacent to the place of incident.
24. His testimony regarding the arrival of 100-150
villagers at the spot is not supported by Tek Singh (PW3), who
stated in his cross-examination that no other person except him,
Bali Ram and Baldev had reached the spot in their presence. This
shows that witnesses have given different versions regarding the
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arrival of the witnesses on the spot and this makes their
testimonies highly doubtful.
25. Baldev Singh (PW2) stated in his cross-examination
that the complainant sustained injuries on his head and back. He
did not sustain any injury on the chest or the arm. Tek Singh
(PW3) on the other hand stated that Nirat Singh sustained
injuries on his arm and leg, therefore, both these witnesses have
given a different description of the injuries sustained by the
complainant which would make their testimonies highly suspect
and the learned Trial Court was justified in rejecting their
testimonies in these circumstances.
26. The learned Trial Court had rightly pointed out that
no witness from the vicinity had appeared on the spot which is
highly improbable because Baldev Singh (PW2), who was
residing at some distance had reached the spot after hearing the
cries. It is highly unlikely that the witness residing at a different
place would have heard the cries and reached the spot but no
person from the immediate vicinity would have reached the spot.
Learned Trial Court was justified in adversely commenting upon
this circumstance.
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27. There was no corroboration of the testimony of the
informant from the medical evidence. The complainant had
sustained various injuries and it is difficult to believe that he had
not visited any hospital for treatment regarding the injuries
sustained by him.
28. Therefore, there were various circumstances on
record which cast doubt on the complainant’s case. The learned
Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the
accused and this Court will not interfere with the reasonable view
of the learned Trial Court even if another view is possible.
29. In view of the above, the present appeal fails and the
same is dismissed.
30. Records be sent back forthwith. Pending applications,
if any, also stand disposed of.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
10th March, 2025
(Chander)