Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 04.07.2025 vs Cbi on 29 July, 2025
2025:HHC:24709
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Appeal No. 467 of 2022
.
Reserved on: 04.07.2025
Date of Decision: 29.07.2025
Tara Chand ...Appellant.
Versus
CBI ...Respondent.
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No.
For the Appellant : Mr. S.K. Banyal, Advocate.
For the Respondent : Mr. Janesh Mahajan, Advocate,
Special Public Prosecutor.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The present appeal is directed against the judgment
of conviction dated 4.5.2022 and order of sentence dated
6.5.2022, passed by learned Special Judge (CBI Court), Shimla,
H.P. (learned Trial Court), vide which the appellant (accused
before learned Trial Court) was convicted of the commission of
offences punishable under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)
(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act) and
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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Sections 120-B, 419, 420, 471, 467 and 468 read with Section
120-B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and sentenced as under: –
.
Under Section 13(1)(d) of PC To suffer rigorous imprisonment
Act, punishable under for four years, pay a fine ofSection 13(2) read with ₹50,000/- (₹Fifty Thousand only),
Section 120B of IPC. and in default of payment of fine,
to further undergo rigorousimprisonment for a term of six
r months.
Under Section 419 of IPC, To suffer rigorous imprisonment
read with Section 120B of for three years, pay a fine of
IPC. ₹10,000/- (₹Ten Thousand only),
and in default of payment of fine,to further undergo rigorous
imprisonment for a term of sixmonths.
Under Section 420 of IPC, To suffer rigorous imprisonment
read with Section 120B of for three years, pay a fine of
IPC. ₹10,000/- (₹Ten Thousand only),
and in default of payment of fine,
to further undergo rigorous
imprisonment for a term of six
months.
Under Section 467 of IPC, To suffer rigorous imprisonment
read with Section 120B of for seven years, pay a fine of::: Downloaded on – 29/07/2025 21:23:45 :::CIS
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and in default of payment of fine,.
to further undergo rigorous
imprisonment for a term of six
months.
Under Section 468 of IPC, To suffer rigorous imprisonment
read with Section 120B of for three years, pay a fine ofIPC. ₹10,000/- (₹Ten Thousand only),
and in default of payment of fine,
to further undergo rigorousimprisonment for a term of six
months.
Under Section 471 of IPC, To suffer rigorous imprisonment
read with Section 120B of for three years, pay a fine of
IPC. ₹10,000/- (₹Ten Thousand only),and in default of payment of fine,
to further undergo rigorous
imprisonment for a term of sixmonths.
The substantive sentences of imprisonment were directed to run
concurrently.
(Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they
were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.)
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2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
appeal are that the CBI had filed a report before the learned Trial
.
Court asserting that the accused S.D. Bodh joined Punjab
National Bank (PNB) as Clerk-cum-Cashier on 30.3.1981 at
Akhara Bazar, Branch, Kullu. He remained posted as Branch
Manager in PNB, Sultanpur Branch, Kullu between 20.10.2008 to
2.7.2011. He was also functioning as a Director, Rural Self
Employment Training Institute (RSETI), PNB, Dhalpur, Kullu.
Simanchal Sahu (PW5) joined PNB as Agriculture Officer on
25.8.2008 and remained posted as Agriculture Officer (LBO),
PNB, Kullu, between 11.2.2010 to 28.5.2011. PNB was issuing
Kisan Credit Card (KCC) to agriculturists for cultivation,
maintenance and marketing of various crops. The requirement
for the sanction of a loan under KCC is that the borrower should
have the land, and he should return the amount within one year
with interest. The rate of interest was 7% per annum for loans
up to ₹3.00 lacs and 12.5% per annum for loans above ₹3.00 lacs.
The loan was sanctioned on the basis of the land possessed by
the borrower. Bank’s lien/charge is created in the revenue
record. The documents of the land issued by the concerned
Patwari and other documents are to be submitted for obtaining
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the loan. The Loan Officer obtains a search report/Non-
Encumbrance Certificate (NEC) from the empanelled Advocates
.
who have to carry out proper verification before issuing the
certificate. The documents of the land are sent to the Tehsildar
for recording the lien of the Bank. Tehsildar forwards the
documents to the Patwari, who makes an entry of the loan in the
record. A Field Officer/Appraising Officer/Recommending
Officer processes the loan application, and a Manager/Senior
Manager/Chief Manager sanctions the loan. The Field Officer
has to carry out the survey of the villages and submit the
recommendation. It was found that 26 crop loans (KCC) of ₹1.12
crore were sanctioned to various borrowers based on fake/bogus
revenue documents and non-encumbrance certificates. In one
such case, Tara Chand (present accused) impersonated himself
as Jagdish Kumar and availed KCC Loan of ₹3.5 lakhs from PNB,
Sultanpur Branch, based on a fake/forged Jamabandi, dated
22.4.2011, showing the ownership of 12-04-00 bigha in the
name of Jagdish Kumar. A fake charge creation report, fake
Voter ID Card and Ration Card were submitted with the
application. Chuni Lal Sharma (PW15) was the empanelled
Advocate. A Non-Encumbrance Certificate dated 23.4.2011,
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stated to have been issued by him, was also produced. The loan
was proposed and appraised by Simanchal Sahu (PW5). The
.
money was transferred to the account of Jagdish Kumar on
29.4.2011. Budh Ram, Patwari (PW12), stated that he had not
issued any Jamabandi or charge creation report. Tehsildar,
Kullu, stated that he had not put the endorsement and
signatures on Form-VI (1). The handwriting of accused Tashi
Funchong was found on the Jamabandi and Charge Creation
Report by the handwriting expert. Anjana Mahant (PW19),
Panchayat Sahayak, stated that Ration Card in the name of
Jagdish Kumar was fake and was not issued by Gram Panchayat,
Neul. Teja Singh (PW20), posted in the office of Electoral
Registration Officer, stated that signatures on Voter ID Card
were not put by him. Chuni Lal Sharma also denied the issuance
of NEC. Simanchal Sahu stated that he had recommenced the
proposal in good faith at the instance of S.D. Bodh, who said that
he had verified the revenue record and inspected the land
physically. In this manner, the loan was wrongly obtained and
disbursed. Offences punishable under Section 120-B, 419, 420,
467, and 471 of IPC and Sections 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d)
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of the PC Act were committed. Hence, the final report was filed
before the learned Trial Court for taking action as per the law.
.
3. Learned Trial Court charged the accused Tara Chand
with the commission of the offences punishable under Sections
120-B, 419, 420, 467, 468, and 471 of IPC and Sections 13(2)
read with Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act, to which he pleaded not
guilty and claimed to be tried.
4. CBI examined 27 witnesses to prove its case. Rajiv
Kumar Khanna (PW1) made the complaint to the CBI. Rohit
Thakur (PW2), Ajay Kumar (PW6), Rahul Kaushik (PW7), Bal
Krishan Verma (PW8), Rajesh Bodh (PW9) and Vivek Gupta
(PW10) are the witnesses to the taking of the specimen
signatures. K.C. Raink (PW3) proved the procedure for
disbursing the KCC loan and furnished the documents to the CBI
during the investigation. Rajiv Vaidya (PW4) produced various
documents and identified the signatures on various documents.
Simanchal Sahu (PW5) was posted as Agriculture Officer in the
PNB, who identified the signatures of the accused. Budh Ram
(PW12) and Shyam Chand (PW14) were posted as Patwari, who
stated that they had not issued Jamabandi and other documents.
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Thakur Dass (PW13) stated that his signatures were forged on 15
documents out of 26 shown to him. He also explained the
.
procedure for making an entry of the charge. Chuni Lal Sharma
(PW15) is an Advocate, who stated that NEC was not issued by
him. Ram Krishan (PW16) and Anju Kumari (PW18) identified
the signatures of S.D. Bodh on various documents. Ram Kishan
also identified the accused, Tara Chand, as the person who had
visited the Bank as Jagdish and submitted various documents.
Hari Shankar Acharya (PW17) explained the procedure of
issuance of the crop loan. Anjana Mahant (PW19) was posted as
Panchayat Sahayak and stated that Ration Card was not issued
by the Gram Panchayat in which she was working. Teja Singh
(PW20) proved that the Voter ID Card issued in the name of
Jagdish was fake. Mahesh Kapoor (PW21) explained the duties of
Agriculture Officer. Anoop Sood (PW22) advanced ₹1.50 lacs to
Tashi Fun Chong, and Tashi Fun Chong returned the amount
with the help of a cheque issued by Jagdish. Madan Lal (PW23)
and Krishan Chander (PW24) conducted the investigation. Anil
Kumar (PW25) produced the documents. Rakesh Kumar Sharma
(PW26) issued the prosecution sanction. Dr. Ravinder Sharma
(PW27) is the Handwriting Expert, who analysed the
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handwriting and signatures on the admitted signatures and
questioned documents and issued a report.
.
5. Learned Trial Court held that the prosecution’s
version was duly established on record. The testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses were corroborated by the various
documents on record. It was duly proved that Tara Chand had
impersonated himself as Jagdish. Documents were forged by
Tashi Fun Chong and S.D. Bodh had conspired with them.
Therefore, the accused were convicted and sentenced as
aforesaid.
6. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by
learned Trial Court, the appellant/accused Tara Chand filed the
present appeal, asserting that learned Trial Court erred in
convicting and sentencing him. The various provisions of IPC
were not properly appreciated. There was no evidence to show
that the petitioner had impersonated Jagdish Kumar. Many
formalities have to be completed before disbursal of the loan.
Tara Chand is an illiterate and simpleton person. He could not
have forged the documents. There is no evidence to show
forgery by Tara Chand. Provisions of Section 13(2) and 13(1)(d)
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do not apply to Tara Chand because he was not a public servant.
Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and
.
the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court be set
aside.
7. I have heard Mr. S.K. Banyal, learned counsel for the
appellant/accused and Mr. Janesh Mahajan, learned Special
Public Prosecutor for the CBI.
8. Mr. S.K. Banyal, learned counsel for the
appellant/accused, submitted that the appellant/accused is
innocent and was falsely implicated. There is no evidence that
the accused had forged the documents. The learned Trial Court
erred in convicting and sentencing the accused. The report of
the handwriting expert is a weak type of evidence and should not
be relied upon to record the conviction. Therefore, he prayed
that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment and order
passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. He submitted in
the alternative that an excessive sentence was imposed. The
accused is in custody, and the period already undergone by the
accused be treated as the period of imprisonment.
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9. Mr. Janesh Mahajan, learned Special Public
Prosecutor for the respondent-CBI, submitted that the learned
.
Trial Court had rightly appreciated the evidence. It was duly
proved on record that Tara Chand impersonated himself as
Jagdish. He produced the documents stated to have been issued
by Patwari, electoral officer, and Panchayat Secretary; however,
they denied that any document was issued by them. Therefore,
all the ingredients of the commission of offences were satisfied,
and there is no infirmity in the judgment and order passed by
the learned Trial Court. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal
be dismissed.
10. I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
11. Simanchal Sahu (PW5) stated that he had
recommended the loan case of Tara Chand. This loan was
sanctioned by Branch Manager, S.D. Bodh. The signatures on the
Schedule under Section 6(1), (Ex.PW1/J), transfer voucher
(Ex.PW5/C to Ex.PW5/D3) were put by S.D. Bodh. Rule Based
Landing Model (RBLM) (Ex.PW5/E), Proposal Form (Ex.PW5/F),
Ration Card and Voter ID Card were signed by S.D. Bodh. He
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checked the record in the year 2014 and found that Devi Chand
had introduced one of the loanees. He contacted Devi Chand and
.
searched for Jagdish Kumar. He found Jagdish Kumar, who
identified himself as Tara Chand. He stated in his cross-
examination that he had recommended 18-19 cases out of 26.
The specimen signature/handwriting of S.D. Bodh was not taken
in his presence. He had not made any complaint regarding the
role of S.D. Bodh. He admitted that it was his duty to fill up the
form. He found that Tara Chand had impersonated Jagdish
Kumar in May 2014. He admitted that it was his duty to visit the
spot and evaluate the land. He volunteered to say that this duty
is also discharged by the Branch Manager.
12. Nothing was suggested to this witness as to why he
should be making a false statement. He positively identified as
Tara Chand, who was introduced to the Bank as Jagdish Kumar.
13. Ram Krishan (PW16) corroborated his version. He
stated that he was posted as Bank Officer in PNB, Sultanpur
Branch from December 2010 till July 2011. S.D. Bodh was posted
as Branch Manager in PNB, Sultanpur. His duty was to assist the
customers in opening a savings bank account. Account Opening
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Form (Ex.PW3/B25) bears the signatures of S.D. Bodh. This
account was opened by Jagdish. Voter ID Card and copy of family
.
register were submitted with the form, and the borrower had put
his signatures on these documents in his presence. S.D. Bodh
directed him to attest the copies of Voter ID Card and copy of
Ration Card. He also attested the photocopy of Election Voter
Card and copy of Ration Card. Account holder had not brought
the original documents, and he attested the photocopies in good
faith. He identified Tara Chand as the person who had appeared
before him as Jagdish. He also identified the signatures of
Jagdish on various documents.
14. He stated in his cross-examination that KYC
documents attached to a loan file are verified when the original
is brought by the borrower. He denied that Tara Chand had not
opened the account in the Bank.
15. His testimony regarding the signatures of Tara
Chand on the Account Open Form and various documents is
corroborated by the statement of Dr. Ravinder Sharma (PW27),
who stated that the person who wrote S-115 to S-119 (Tara
Chand) and purported signatures A-55 to A-64 (Jagdish
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Kumar), wrote Q-115 to Q-117, (application for agriculture
credit) (Ex.PW3/B), Q-118, (Interview-cum-Assessment), Form
.
(Ex.PW3/B1), Q-122 to Q-126, signatures on Hypothecation
Agreement (Ex.PW3/B7), Q-122 to Q-125, Q-126 (declaration
regarding agriculture loan) (Ex.PW3/B-24), Q-128, Q-129
(Letter of Consent) (Ex.PW3/B23), Q-130, Q-132 (Proposal Form
for Kisan Crop Card Holder) (Ex.PW5/A), Q-134 Rule Based
Lending Model (RBLM) (Ex.PW5/E), Q-137, Q-138, Q-140,
(Schedule Declaration under Section 161 (Ex.PW5/B), Q-149
Jamabandi (Ex.PW12/A), Q-157 (Copy of Ration Card)
(Ex.PW16/A), Q-160 (Voter Identity Card) (Ex.PW20/A). He
stated in his cross-examination that it is difficult to give an
opinion when the signatures are illegible. He volunteered to say
that signatures were very clear in the present case. He admitted
that the science of handwriting is a progressive science.
16. It was submitted that the statement of the
handwriting expert is not sufficient and cannot be used for
recording conviction. This submission is not acceptable. It was
laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in C. Kamalakkannan v.
State of T.N., (2025) 4 SCC 487: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 476 that the
Court need not act with an initial suspicion while examining the
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opinion of a handwriting expert. The Court should carefully
probe the reasons for the opinion, and if there is no reason to
.
doubt the testimony of the handwriting expert, conviction can
be based upon the statement of the handwriting expert. It was
observed:-
“13. The locus classicus on this issue is Murari Lal v. State
of M.P. [Murari Lal v. State of M.P., (1980) 1 SCC 704: 1980SCC (Cri) 330], wherein this Court laid down the principles
with regard to the extent to which reliance can be placed
on the evidence of an expert witness and whencorroboration of such evidence may be sought. The
relevant paragraphs are extracted hereinbelow: (SCC pp.
707-709, 711-12, paras 4, 6 & 11)
“4. We will first consider the argument, a stale
argument often heard, particularly in criminal courts,that the opinion evidence of a handwriting expert
should not be acted upon without substantial
corroboration. We shall presently point out how theargument cannot be justified on principle or
precedent. We begin with the observation that theexpert is no accomplice. There is no justification for
condemning his opinion evidence to the same class of
evidence as that of an accomplice and insisting uponcorroboration. True, it has occasionally been said on very
high authority that it would be hazardous to base a
conviction solely on the opinion of a handwriting expert.
But, the hazard in accepting the opinion of any expert,
handwriting expert or any other kind of expert, is not
because experts, in general, are unreliable witnesses
— the quality of credibility or incredibility being one
which an expert shares with all other witnesses — but
because all human judgment is fallible and an expert
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2025:HHC:24709conclusion. The more developed and the more perfect
the science, the less the chance of an incorrect opinion
and the converse if the science is less developed and
imperfect. The science of identification of fingerprints.
has attained near perfection, and the risk of an
incorrect opinion is practically non-existent. On the
other hand, the science of identification of handwriting isnot nearly so perfect, and the risk is, therefore, higher. But
that is a far cry from doubting the opinion of a
handwriting expert as an invariable rule and insisting
upon substantial corroboration in every case, however,the opinion may be backed by the soundest of reasons.
It is hardly fair to an expert to view his opinion with an
initial suspicion and to treat him as an inferior sort of
witness. His opinion has to be tested by the acceptabilityof the reasons given by him. An expert deposes and not
decides. …
***
6. Expert testimony is made relevant by Section 45 of the
Evidence Act, and where the court has to form an opinionupon a point as to the identity of handwriting, the opinion
of a person “specially skilled” in questions as to the
identity of handwriting is expressly made a relevant fact.
… So, corroboration may not invariably be insisted upon
before acting on the opinion of a handwriting expert, andthere need be no initial suspicion. But, on the facts of a
particular case, a court may require corroboration of avarying degree. There can be no hard-and-fast rule,
but nothing will justify the rejection of the opinion of
an expert supported by unchallenged reasons on the
sole ground that it is not corroborated. The approach of
a court while dealing with the opinion of a handwriting
expert should be to proceed cautiously, probe the reasons
for the opinion, consider all other relevant evidence and
decide finally to accept or reject it.
***
11. We are firmly of the opinion that there is no rule of law,
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must never be acted upon unless substantially
corroborated. But, having due regard to the imperfect
nature of the science of identification of handwriting, the.
approach, as we indicated earlier, should be one of
caution. Reasons for the opinion must be carefully
probed and examined. All other relevant evidence mustbe considered. In appropriate cases, corroboration
may be sought. In cases where the reasons for the
opinion are convincing and there is no reliable
evidence throwing doubt, the uncorroboratedtestimony of a handwriting expert may be accepted.
There cannot be any inflexible rule on a matter which,
in the ultimate analysis, is no more than a question of
testimonial weight. We have said so much because thisis an argument frequently met with in subordinate
courts, and sentences torn out of context from the
judgments of this Court are often flaunted.” (emphasis
supplied)
17. Therefore, the Court cannot start with the
presumption that the statement of a handwriting expert is to be
discarded. In the present case, nothing was elicited in the cross
examination of the handwriting expert to show that his
statement is unreliable. Therefore, learned Trial Court had
rightly relied upon the evidence of Tara Chand and the
handwriting expert to hold that Tara Chand had impersonated
himself as Jagdish.
18. The specimen handwriting of Tara Chand was taken
in the presence of Rajesh Bodh (PW9). He stated that specimen
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signatures and handwriting of borrower Tara Chand (S-115 to
S-119), consisting of 05 sheets (Ex.PW9/C), were taken in his
.
presence. He identified the signatures of Tara Chand. He was not
cross-examined on behalf of accused No.2, and the cross-
examination made on behalf of accused No.1 was adopted.
Learned Trial Court had rightly pointed out that no suggestion
was given to this witness that Tara Chand had not put his
signatures in his presence.
19. Inspector Mohan Lal (PW23) also stated that he had
taken the specimen signatures of Tara Chand (Ex.PW9/C)
collectively on 21.9.2015. Again, no suggestion was made to him
that Tara Chand had not given any specimen signatures in his
presence. The only suggestion which was given to him was that
Tara Chand never impersonated Jagdish Kumar. It was laid down
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh Versus
Nahar Singh 1998 (3) SCC 561 that where the testimony of a
witness is not challenged in the cross-examination, the same
cannot be challenged during the arguments. This position was
reiterated in Arvind Singh v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 11 SCC 1:
(2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 208: 2020 SCC OnLine SC 4 and it was held at
page 34:
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“58. A witness is required to be cross-examined in a
criminal trial to test his veracity; to discover who he is
and what his position in life is, or to shake his credit, by
injuring his character, although the answer to such.
questions may directly or indirectly incriminate him or
may directly or indirectly expose him to a penalty or
forfeiture (Section 146 of the Evidence Act). A witness is
required to be cross-examined to bring forth
inconsistencies, and discrepancies, and to prove the
untruthfulness of the witness. A-1 set up a case of his
arrest on 1-9-2014 from 18: 50 hrs, therefore, it was
required for him to cross-examine the truthfulness of the
prosecution witnesses with regard to that particular
aspect. The argument that the accused was shown to be
arrested around 19: 00 hrs is an incorrect reading of the
arrest form (Ext. 17). In Column 8, it has been specifically
mentioned that the accused was taken into custody on 2-
9-2014 at 14: 30 hrs at Wanjri Layout, Police Station,
Kalamna. The time i.e. 17: 10 hrs mentioned in Column 2,
appears to be when A-1 was brought to Police Station,
Lakadganj. As per the IO, A-1 was called for interrogation
as the suspicion was on an employee of Dr Chandak since
the kidnapper was wearing a red colour t-shirt which was
given by Dr Chandak to his employees. A-1 travelled from
the stage of suspect to an accused only on 2-9-2014.
Since no cross-examination was conducted on any of the
prosecution witnesses about the place and manner of the
arrest, such an argument that the accused was arrested
on 1-9-2014 at 18: 50 hrs is not tenable.
59. The House of Lords in a judgment reported
as Browne v. Dunn [Browne v. Dunn, (1893) 6 R 67 (HL)]
considered the principles of appreciation of evidence.
Lord Chancellor Herschell, held that it is absolutely
essential to the proper conduct of a cause, where it is
intended to suggest that a witness if not speaking the
truth on a particular point, direct his attention to the fact
by some questions put in cross-examination showing
that imputation is intended to be made, and not to take
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his evidence and pass it by as a matter altogether
unchallenged. It was held as under:
“Now, my Lords, I cannot help saying that it seems to
.
me to be absolutely essential to the proper conduct of a
cause, where it is intended to suggest that a witness is
not speaking the truth on a particular point, to direct
his attention to the fact by some questions put incross-examination showing that that imputation is
intended to be made, and not to take his evidence and
pass it by as a matter altogether unchallenged, and
then, when it is impossible for him to explain, asperhaps he might have been able to do if such
questions had been put to him, the circumstances
which it is suggested indicate that the story he tells
ought not to be believed, to argue that he is a witnessunworthy of credit. My Lords, I have always
understood that if you intend to impeach a witness you
are bound, whilst he is in the box, to give him an
opportunity of making any explanation which is open
to him; and, as it seems to me, that is not only a rule ofprofessional practice in the conduct of a case, but is
essential to fair play and fair dealing with witnesses.
Sometimes reflections have been made upon excessivecross-examination of witnesses, and it has been
complained of as undue, but it seems to me that cross-
examination of a witness which errs in the direction of
excess may be far more fair to him than to leave himwithout cross-examination, and afterwards, to
suggest that he is not a witness of truth, I mean upon a
point on which it is not otherwise perfectly clear that
he has had full notice beforehand that there is an
intention to impeach the credibility of the story which
he is telling.”
60. Lord Halsbury, in a separate but concurring opinion,
held as under:
“My Lords, with regard to the manner in which the
evidence was given in this case, I cannot too heartily
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2025:HHC:24709the mode in which a trial should be conducted. To my
mind, nothing would be more absolutely unjust than
not to cross-examine witnesses upon evidence which
they have given, so as to give them notice, and to give.
them an opportunity of explanation, and an
opportunity very often to defend their own character,
and, not having given them such an opportunity, toask the jury afterwards to disbelieve what they have
said, although not one question has been directed
either to their credit or to the accuracy of the facts they
have deposed to.”
61. This Court in a judgment reported as State of
U.P. v. Nahar Singh [State of U.P. v. Nahar Singh, (1998) 3
SCC 561: 1998 SCC (Cri) 850], quoted
from Browne [Browne v. Dunn, (1893) 6 R 67 (HL)] to hold
that in the absence of cross-examination on the
explanation of delay, the evidence of PW 1 remained
unchallenged and ought to have been believed by the High
Court. Section 146 of the Evidence Act confers a valuable
right of cross-examining the witness tendered in
evidence by the opposite party. This Court held as under:
(Nahar Singh case [State of U.P. v. Nahar Singh, (1998) 3 SCC
561: 1998 SCC (Cri) 850], SCC pp. 566-67, para 13)“13. It may be noted here that part of the statement of
PW 1 was not cross-examined by the accused. In the
absence of cross-examination on the explanation of
the delay, the evidence of PW 1 remained unchallengedand ought to have been believed by the High Court.
Section 138 of the Evidence Act confers a valuable right
of cross-examining the witness tendered in evidence
by the opposite party. The scope of that provision is
enlarged by Section 146 of the Evidence Act by
allowing a witness to be questioned:
(1) to test his veracity,
(2) to discover who he is and what his position in
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2025:HHC:24709(3) to shake his credit by injuring his character,
although the answer to such questions might tend
directly or indirectly to incriminate him or might
expose or tend directly or indirectly to expose him.
to a penalty or forfeiture.”
62. This Court, in a judgment reported as Muddasani
Venkata Narsaiah v. Muddasani Sarojana [Muddasani
Venkata Narsaiah v. Muddasani Sarojana, (2016) 12 SCC
288: (2017) 1 SCC (Civ) 268], laid down that the party is
obliged to put his case in cross-examination of witnesses
of the opposite party. The rule of putting one’s version in
cross-examination is one of essential justice and not
merely a technical one. It was held as under : (SCC pp.
294-95, paras 15-16)
“15. Moreover, there was no effective cross-
examination made on the plaintiff’s witnesses with
respect to the factum of execution of the sale deed. PW
1 and PW 2 have not been cross-examined as to the
factum of execution of the sale deed. The cross-
examination is a matter of substance, not of
procedure. One is required to put one’s own version in
the cross-examination of the opponent. The effect of
non-cross-examination is that the statement of the
witness has not been disputed. The effect of not cross-
examining the witnesses has been considered by this
Court in Bhoju Mandal v. Debnath Bhagat [Bhoju
Mandal v. Debnath Bhagat, AIR 1963 SC 1906]. This
Court repelled a submission on the ground that the
same was not put either to the witnesses or suggested
before the courts below. A party is required to put his
version to the witness. If no such questions are put,
the Court would presume that the witness account has
been accepted as held in Chuni Lal Dwarka
Nath v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. Ltd. [Chuni Lal
Dwarka Nath v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. Ltd., 1957 SCC
OnLine P&H 177: AIR 1958 P&H 440]
16. In Maroti Bansi Teli v. Radhabai [Maroti Bansi
Teli v. Radhabai, 1943 SCC OnLine MP 128: AIR 1945 Nag
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2025:HHC:24709
60], it has been laid down that the matters sworn to by
one party in the pleadings not challenged either in
pleadings or cross-examination by another party must
be accepted as fully established. The High Court of
.
Calcutta in A.E.G. Carapiet v. A.Y. Derderian [A.E.G.
Carapiet v. A.Y. Derderian, 1960 SCC OnLine Cal 44: AIR
1961 Cal 359] has laid down that the party is obliged to
put his case in cross-examination of witnesses of the
opposite party. The rule of putting one’s version in
cross-examination is one of essential justice and not
merely a technical one. A Division Bench of the Nagpur
High Court in Kuwarlal Amritlal v. Rekhlal
Koduram [Kuwarlal Amritlal v. Rekhlal Koduram, 1949
SCC OnLine MP 35: AIR 1950 Nag 83] has laid down that
when attestation is not specifically challenged and
witness is not cross-examined regarding details of
attestation, it is sufficient for him to say that the
document was attested. If the other side wants to
challenge that statement, it is their duty, quite apart
from raising it in the pleadings, to cross-examine the
witness along those lines. A Division Bench of the
Patna High Court in Karnidan Sarda v. Sailaja Kanta
Mitra [Karnidan Sarda v. Sailaja Kanta Mitra, 1940 SCC
OnLine Pat 288: AIR 1940 Pat 683] has laid down that it
cannot be too strongly emphasised that the system of
administration of justice allows of cross-examination
of opposite party’s witnesses for the purpose of testing
their evidence, and it must be assumed that when the
witnesses were not tested in that way, their evidence is
to be ordinarily accepted. In the aforesaid
circumstances, the High Court has gravely erred in law
in reversing the findings of the first appellate court as
to the factum of execution of the sale deed in favour of
the plaintiff.”
20. Thus, the learned Trial Court did not err in holding
that the accused, Tara Chand, had put his signatures in the
presence of the CBI and the witnesses.
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21. It was submitted that the signatures were put by Tara
Chand during investigation, and Section 73 of the Indian
.
Evidence Act only authorises the Magistrate to take the
specimen signatures. Therefore, these signatures are
inadmissible and no reliance can be placed upon the same. This
submission cannot be accepted. It was laid down by Hon’ble
Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Boota Singh, (1979) 1 SCC 31, that
taking of the signatures by the police during the investigation is
not violative of the Constitution of India. It was observed:-
41. Reference to the evidence of expert PW 32 Shiv Ram
Singh would show that all these signatures fully tallied
with the specimen signatures of the respondent BootaSingh taken during the investigation, and the signatures
of J.P. Singh are Exs. Ka-53 and Ka-54. Thus, the
prosecution has adduced conclusive evidence to provethat the car seized by the Police at Bombay was the same
which was hired by the respondent Boota Singh andothers from PW 2 Inder Singh at Dehra Dun. This fact is
proved both by oral and documentary evidence discussedabove, and a very well-reasoned finding on this point has
been given by the Sessions Judge, which runs thus:
“In Ex. Ka-2 agreement entered into between Lal
Singh and Jasbir Singh of Auto Linkers Financiers, the
particulars of the car are given as Fiat 1100, 1962
Model, Chassis No. 950261. These particulars are
identical with those of UPM-3236 seized by the
Bombay Police. Thus, the prosecution has been able to
establish that the car seized by the Bombay Police was
the one which the accused Boota Singh, along with his
companions, hired from Punjab Taxi Service.
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The learned Sessions Judge has also pointed out that the
original plate Ex. Ka-51 had been recovered by PW 18
Vikram Singh from the Car UPM-3236 and sent to PW 26
Shariq Alvi, who found that there was tampering with the.
number of the plate. Brij Kishore of R.T.O.’s office Bareilly
stated that UPM-3236 was a fake number inasmuch as it
related to a station wagon belonging to a JuniorGovernment High School, Pakkwara, District Moradabad.
Harcharan Singh, Inder Singh and Mahendra Kaur have
also identified the car in question to be the same car
which was hired by the respondent Boota Singh onDecember 8, 1963. These facts have not been challenged
by the defence. Even the High Court has not reversed the
finding of the Sessions Judge on this point. Before closing
this part of the case, we might advert to an argumentadvanced before us by Mr Mulla, regarding the specimen
signature of the respondent Boota Singh taken by the
police during investigation. Mr Mulla submitted that the
act of the investigating officer in taking the specimen
signature of the respondent Boota Singh was hit bySection 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code and also
amounted to testimonial compulsion to violate the
guarantee contained in Article 20(3) of the Constitution.
The matter is no longer res integra and is concluded by a
decision of this Court in the case of State ofBombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad [AIR 1961 SC 1808 : (1962) 3
SCR 10 : (1961) 2 Cri LJ 856] where the Court observed as
follows:
“That is why it must be held that by giving these
impressions or specimen handwriting, the accused
person does not furnish evidence against himself. So
when an accused person is compelled to give a
specimen handwriting or impressions of his finger,
palm or foot, it may be said that he has been compelled
to be a witness.”
It cannot, however, be said that he has been compelled to
be a witness against himself. It was also held that merely
taking a specimen handwriting does not amount to giving
a statement so as to be hit by Section 162 of the CrPC. In
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view of this decision of the Court, Mr Mulla did not
pursue the point further.
22. This position was reiterated in State (NCT of Delhi) v.
.
Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600, wherein it was observed:-
222. Another item of purchase was a motorcycle of the
Yamaha make bearing Registration No. HR-51-E-5768.
PW 76 stated that on 18-12-2001, the accused Afzal took
the investigating team to Gupta Auto Deals at Karol Bagh,
from where the said motorcycle was purchased, and he
pointed out the shopowner, PW 29. The memo of pointing
out is Ext. PW-29/1. This conduct of Afzal is relevant
under Section 8 of the Evidence Act. PW 29 deposed that
four persons, including a lady, came to his shop at noon
to see the motorcycle. After taking a trial run, they went
away, and in the evening, two persons came and
purchased the motorcycle for Rs 20,000. As already
noticed, the said motorcycle was found at A-97, Gandhi
Vihar and the same was seized by the IO. The witness
handed over the book containing the delivery receipt
(Exts. 29/2 and 29/3) to the police, which were filed in the
court as PW-29/2 and PW-29/3. The witness identified
Afzal and Shaukat in court and the deceased terrorist,
Mohammed, from the photograph (Ext. 29/5). He was,
however, unable to identify the lady in view of the fact
that she was at a distance. The High Court rightly took the
view that, in view of what was narrated by the witness,
the identification of the accused and the deceased
terrorist was quite probable. It was not a case of “fleeting
glance”. This is a discrepancy between the seizure memo
(PW-29/4) dated 19-12-2001 and the statement of PW 29
under Section 161 CrPC that he handed over the papers on
18-12-2001. This apparent contradiction was not pointed
out to the witness, and no question was asked about it.
The next important circumstance against the accused
Afzal is his association with Mohammed in purchasing
the Ambassador car with Registration No. DL 3 CJ 1527
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from PW 20. The fact that the said car was used by the
slain terrorists for entering Parliament with arms and
explosives is not in dispute. PW 20, after hearing the news
that the car with the said number was used by the
.
terrorists, went straight to Parliament Street Police
Station along with the copies of documents. Having
learned that the SHO was at the Parliament House, he
went there and met the SHO at the gate and passed on
information to him that the car was sold by him on 11-12-
2001 to one Ashiq Hussain Khan. He identified the car,
which was lying at Gate No. 11, then, he handed over the
documents pertaining to the car, which were seized under
the memo Ext. PW-1/7. The documents were later filed in
the court. PW 20 correctly identified the accused Afzal as
the person who had come with Ashiq Hussain Khan for
the purchase of the car. The delivery receipt of the car
issued by Ashiq Hussain Khan is Ext. PW-1/6. The
delivery receipt was signed by Afzal as a witness. The
signature of Afzal on the delivery receipt is proved by the
analysis of his handwriting by an expert, PW 23. This is
apart from the testimony of PW 20. In the course of
examination under Section 313 CrPC, Afzal admitted that
on 11-12-2001, he accompanied Mohammed to the shop
of PW 20 for purchasing a second-hand car, but later he
denied it. It is also worth noting that Afzal did not let the
amicus put a suggestion that he had not visited the shop
of PW 20. PW 20 deposed that he had taken a photocopy
of the identity card and a coloured photo of Ashiq Hussain
Khan, which are Exts. PW-25/4 and PW-20/3. PW 20
further deposed that the dead body lying at Gate No. 1 was
of the same person who had introduced himself as Ashiq
Hussain Khan while purchasing the car. When he was
shown Ext. PW-4/3, which is the identity card in the
name of Ashiq Hussain Khan, recovered from the
deceased terrorist Mohammed, PW 20 confirmed that it
was the same identity card that was shown to him. The
High Court held that the evidence of PW 20, who was an
independent witness, was in no manner tainted and held
that Afzal was involved in the purchase of the car used by
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the terrorists to enter the Parliament House. This
conclusion was reached by the High Court even after
excluding the evidence of PW 23, Principal Scientific
Officer, who confirmed that the signatures on the delivery
.
receipt, Ext. PW-1/6 tallied with his specimen signatures.
In this context, a contention was raised before the High
Court that in view of Section 27 of POTA, specimen
signature should not have been obtained without the
permission of the court. In reply to this contention urged
before the High Court, Mr Gopal Subramanium, the
learned Senior Counsel for the State clarified that on the
relevant date, when the specimen signatures of Afzal
were obtained, the investigation was not done under the
POTA provisions and dehors the provisions of POTA,
hence there was no legal bar against obtaining the
handwriting samples. The learned counsel relied upon the
eleven-Judge Bench decision of this Court in State of
Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad [(1962) 3 SCR 10 : (1961) 2 Cri
LJ 856] in support of his contention that Article 20(3) of
the Constitution was not infringed by taking the
specimen handwriting or signature or thumb impressions
of a person in custody. Reference has also been drawn to
the decision of this Court in State of U.P. v. Boota
Singh [(1979) 1 SCC 31: 1979 SCC (Cri) 115]. We find
considerable force in this contention advanced by Mr
Gopal Subramanium. In fact, this aspect was not seriously
debated before us.
23. Therefore, the submission that signatures during the
course of investigation were admissible and learned Trial Court
erred in relying upon the same cannot be accepted.
24. The statement of Simanchal Saho (PW5) regarding
the Voter Identity Card, Ration Card and Jamabandi having been
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annexed to the application is duly corroborated by the report of
the handwriting expert.
.
25. Budh Ram (PW12) was posted as Patwari in Patwar
Circle, Bajora. He stated that Jamabandi (Ex.PW12/A) was not
written by him. It also did not bear his signatures. Similarly, he
had not issued the scheduled declaration under Section 6(1)
(Ex.PW5/B). As per Jamabandi brought by him. Khata/Khatauni
No. 11/12 to 14 do not belong to Mehar Chand, Kehar Singh and
others, but they belong to Bhagat Ram and others. Similarly,
Rapat No. 1125 dated 22.4.2011 encircled in (Ex.PW5/B) does not
figure against Khata/Khatauni No.11/12 to 14. He had also given
his specimen signatures to the police. He was not cross-
examined on behalf of accused Tara Chand, which means that
his testimony that Jamabandi was not issued by him was
accepted to be correct.
26. Anjana Mahant (PW19) stated that she was posted as
Panchayat Sahayak of Gram Panchayat, Neul. An entry of Dhale
Ram, son of Hukam Ram, was made at Serial No. 173. Therefore,
the entry of 173 cannot be in the name of Jagdish and is forged.
She stated in her cross-examination that the register brought by
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her did not have any paging, and the ration card register
brought by her was not in her name. It was nowhere suggested
.
to her that accused Tara Chand or Jagdish were residing at Neul
or that a ration card was issued in the name of Jagdish or his
family members. Hence, her testimony shows that the ration
card was fake.
27. Teja Singh (PW20) stated that he was working as a
Clerk in Sub Divisional Election Office, Kullu. He used to prepare
Voter Identity Cards and make an entry in the register. The Voter
Identity Card (Ex.PW20/A) was not issued by the Election Office
of District Kullu. The number of constituencies in the Voter
Identity Card (Ex.PW20/A) was wrongly mentioned as 68 Banjar.
Village Nuen was under 57 of Banjar Vidhan Sabha area. The
Initial HP/04/057 was wrongly mentioned and should have been
HP/02/057. There was no entry as mentioned in (Ex.PW20/A) in
the original register brought into the Court. He was not cross-
examined at all, and his testimony that the Voter Identity Card
was fake has gone unrebutted. Hence, the learned Trial Court
had rightly concluded that accused Tara Chand had produced
forged fake Voter Identity Card and Ration Card.
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28. Therefore, it was proved on record that Tara Chand
appeared before the Bank and represented himself to be Jagdish
.
Kumar. He opened an account, filled the application form and
other documents and submitted forged Voter Identity Card and
Ration Card in support of the application. Thus, he had
impersonated himself as Jagdish and the findings recorded by
the learned Trial Court are based upon the evidence.
29. It was submitted that putting the signatures in the
name of a fictitious person does not constitute an offence. This
submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by Madras High
Court in Rathnavel v. State, 2018 SCC OnLine Mad 212, that
submitting an application for loan in the name of a fictitious
person constitutes the offences of cheating and forgery. It was
observed:-
“23. Insofar as the guarantor Mr. Sivaguru is concerned,
he is a fictitious person; the signatures in Ex. P9 and
ExP.14 are proved to be forged by A2[Palanivel]. The
prosecution has also proved through witnesses that the
guarantor, Mr. Sivaguru, S/o Munusamy, 4th Street, Ran-
ganathapuram, Tambaram, is a fictitious person. The
house tax receipt bearing No. 15279 is duplicated and used
for several loans by A2[Palanivel]. The land document
given to create an equitable mortgage is not that of
A4[Ranthnavel]. The handwriting expert Pw-24, in his
opinion, marked as Ex. P34 has opined that A2 has signed
in Ex. P9 and Ex. P14 as Sivaguru.
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24. Thus, the prosecution has established that a housing
loan in the name of Rathnavel [A4] has been sanctioned
by A1[Prabhu] based on forged documents. A1 [J.S.
Prabhu] before advancing the loan has not made a pre-
.
sanction inspection. A2 [Palanivel] had set up A4 [Rath-
navel] to avail the loan of Rs. 3 lakhs in connivance with
A1[J.S. Prabhu]. The accompanying documents presentedby A4[Rathnavel] are proved to be forged, and they have
been procured by A2[Palanivel] with the help of A3[Gu-
nasekaran] and A6[N. Balasundaram].”
30. Therefore, the submission that no forgery was
31. to
committed in the present case is not acceptable.
It was submitted that, as per the prosecution,
accused Tara Chand had not forged Voter Identity Card, Ration
Card and Jamabandi, and he was wrongly held guilty of the
commission of offences under Sections 467 and 468 of IPC. This
is not acceptable. Section 464 of IPC (Explanation-II) provides
that making of a false document in the name of a fictitious
person intending it to be believed that the document was made
by a real person may amount to forgery. The illustration
provides that ‘A’ draws a bill of exchange upon a fictitious
person and fraudulently accepts the bill in the name of such
fictitious person with an intent to negotiate it; he commits
forgery.
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32. In the present case, it has been proved by the
statement of Budh Ram (PW12), Anjana (PW19) and Teja Singh
.
(PW20) that no person by the name of Jagdish was residing at
Neul. Therefore, the signatures were put in the name of a
fictitious person (Jagdish) supported by the forged document,
intending that the bank would act upon the representation that
Jagdish exists and had made the application. Hence, the present
case will fall within the purview of Section 464 (Explanation-II),
and the accused Tara Chand was rightly held guilty of forging
the application in the name of Jagdish and supporting it with the
forged Jamabandi, Voter Identity Card and Ration Card.
33. Learned Trial Court convicted the accused of the
commission of offences punishable under Sections 419 and 420
of IPC. Section 419 of IPC specifically provides for cheating by
impersonation. In the present case, Tara Chand had
impersonated Jagdish, a fictitious person. Therefore, he was
rightly held guilty and the commission of an offence punishable
under Section 419 of IPC. He induced the Bank to sanction a loan
for him and disburse the loan amount by way of the
representation so made by him. Therefore, he was rightly
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convicted of the commission of an offence punishable under
Section 420 of IPC.
.
34. It was submitted that the accused was not a public
servant and could not have been convicted of the commission of
an offence punishable under Section 13(2) of the PC Act. This
submission ignores the fact that the conviction was recorded
with the aid of Section 120-B of IPC. It is apparent from the
statement of Simanchal Sahu (PW5) that accused S.D. Bodh had
told him (Simanchal Sahu) that he had verified the papers and
the land of Jagdish, which shows that the accused Tara Chand
could not have impersonated Jagdish without conspiring with
S.D. Bodh. Otherwise S.D. Bodh had no reason to make such a
statement. Hence, the conspiracy was writ large and Tara Chand
was rightly held guilty of the commission of an offence
punishable under Section 13(2) of PC Act read with Section
120-B of IPC. By way of clarification, it is necessary to state that
this finding is confined to the role of Tara Chand and not to S.D.
Bodh since S.D. Bodh is not before this Court.
35. Learned Trial Court sentenced the accused to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years and to pay a
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fine of ₹10,000/- for the commission of an offence punishable
under Section 467 of IPC. The offence under Section 467 of IPC
.
can be punished with imprisonment for life or with
imprisonment for either description for a term which may
extend to 10 years. The accused, Tara Chand, had represented
himself to be Jagdish to obtain a loan from the bank. He had
annexed the forged documents with the loan application. Thus,
the act was deliberately done with prior preparation. The act was
not done on a spur of the moment. It was meant to benefit the
accused and deprive the public of their money. It was an
economic offence, and an economic offence is not to be viewed
lightly, as the monetary gain is higher. Therefore, the sentence
of seven years cannot be said to be excessive.
36. The rest of the sentences are less than seven years
and are not excessive. Therefore, no interference is required
with the sentences imposed by the learned Trial Court.
37. No other point was urged.
38. In view of the above, the present appeal fails and the
same is dismissed.
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39. A copy of the judgment and the record of the learned
Trial Court be sent back forthwith.
.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
29th July, 2025
(Chander)
r to
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