Himachal Pradesh High Court
Date Of Decision: 05.08.2025 vs State Of H.P. And Others on 5 August, 2025
2025:HHC:26522
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MMO No. 1302 of 2024
.
Date of Decision: 05.08.2025.
Rakesh Kumar Singh and others ...Petitioners
Versus
State of H.P. and others ...Respondents
Coram
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No.
For the Petitioners : Mr. Sakandh Sharma, Advocate,
vice Mr. Vikas Rathore, Advocate,
for the petitioners.
For Respondent No.1 : Mr. Jitender Sharma, Additional
Advocate General.
For Respondent No.2 : Mr. Shiv Pal Minhas, Advocate, for
Respondent No.2.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge (Oral):
Perusal of the FIR (Annexure P-1) shows that the FIR
has been registered for the commission of an offence punishable
under Section 420 of the IPC. Section 320 of Cr.P.C. provides that
an offence punishable under Section 420 of IPC is
compoundable. Therefore, the petitioner has an alternative
remedy to approach the learned Trial Court.
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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2. It was held in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra
(1977) 4 SCC 551: 1978 SCC (Cri) 10 that inherent power should not
.
be exercised when a specific remedy exists. It was observed:
“At the outset, the following principles may be noticed
concerning the exercise of the inherent power of the
High Court, which have been followed ordinarily and
generally, almost invariably, barring a few exceptions:
(1) That the power is not to be resorted to if there is
a specific provision in the Code for the redress of
the grievance of the aggrieved party;
(2) That it should be exercised very sparingly to
prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise
to secure the ends of justice;
(3) That it should not be exercised as against the
express bar of law engrafted in any other provision
of the Code.”
3. It was laid down by the Full Bench of Delhi High
Court in Gopal Dass vs State AIR 1978 Del 138 that the jurisdiction
under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is vested in the Court to make such
order as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the
Code, prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to
secure the ends of justice. This jurisdiction cannot be exercised
when a specific remedy is available under the other provisions of
the Code. It was observed: –
“8. In order to determine the question under
consideration, as to consider the scope of the inherent
powers of the High Court becomes relevant. The::: Downloaded on – 06/08/2025 21:27:32 :::CIS
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2025:HHC:26522inherent powers of the High Court inhere in it because of
its being at the apex of the judicial set-up in a State. The
inherent powers of the High Court, preserved by section
482 of the Code, are to be exercised in making orders as.
may be necessary to give effect to any order under the
Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Section 482envisages that nothing in the Code shall be deemed to
limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court
exercised by it with the object of achieving the above-
said three results. It is for this reason that section 482does not prescribe the contours of the inherent powers
of the High Court, which are wide enough to be exercised
in suitable cases to afford relief to an aggrieved party.
While exercising inherent powers, it has to be borne inmind that this power cannot be exercised in regard to
matters specifically covered by the other provisions of
the Code. (See R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 S.C.
866) (1). This principle of law had been reiterated
succinctly by the Supreme Court recently in PalanippaGounder v. The State of Tamil Nadu, (1977) 2 SCC 634: AIR
1977 S.C. 1323 (2) therein examining the scope of section
482 it was observed that a provision which saves theinherent powers of a Court cannot override any express
provision in the statute which saves that power. Puttingit in another form, the Court observed that if there is an
express provision in a statute governing a particular subject,
there is no scope for invoking or exercising the inherentpowers of the Court because the Court ought to apply the
provisions of the statute which are made advisedly to govern
the particular subject matter.” (Emphasis supplied)
4. It was held in Arun Shankar Shukla v. State of U.P.,
(1999) 6 SCC 146: 1999 SCC (Cri) 1076: 1999 SCC OnLine SC 647 that
jurisdiction under section 482 of Cr.P.C. is extraordinary and
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should not be exercised when a specific remedy has been
provided under the Code. It was observed:
.
“2. It appears that, unfortunately, the High Court, by
exercising its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of
the Criminal Procedure Code (for short “the Code”), hasprevented the flow of justice on the alleged contention of
the convicted accused that it was polluted by the so-
called misconduct of the judicial officer. It is true that
under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court hasinherent powers to make such orders as may be necessary
to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent
the abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure
the ends of justice. But the expressions “abuse of the processof law” or “to secure the ends of justice” do not confer
unlimited jurisdiction on the High Court, and the alleged
abuse of the process of law or the ends of justice could only be
secured in accordance with law, including procedural law
and not otherwise. Further, inherent powers are in the natureof extraordinary powers to be used sparingly for achieving
the object mentioned in Section 482 of the Code in cases
where there is no express provision empowering the HighCourt to achieve the said object. It is well-nigh settled that
inherent power is not to be invoked in respect of any mattercovered by specific provisions of the Code or if its exercise
would infringe any specific provision of the Code. In the
present case, the High Court overlooked the procedurallaw which empowered the convicted accused to prefer a
statutory appeal against the conviction for the offence.
The High Court has intervened at an uncalled-for stage
and soft-pedalled the course of justice at a very crucial
stage of the trial.
xxxxx
9. In our view, the order passed by the High Court
entertaining the petition of the convicted accused under
Section 482 of the Code is, on the face of it, illegal,
erroneous, and, to say the least, unfortunate. It was::: Downloaded on – 06/08/2025 21:27:32 :::CIS
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2025:HHC:26522known to the High Court that the trial court passed
proceedings to the effect that a final judgment and order
convicting the accused were pronounced by the trial
court. It was also recorded by the trial court that, as the.
accused were absent, the Court had issued non-bailable
warrants. In such a situation, instead of directing the
accused to remain present before the Court for resortingto the steps contemplated by the law for passing the
sentence, the High Court has stayed further proceedings,
including the operation of the non-bailable warrants
issued by the trial court. It is disquieting that the High Courthas overlooked the important legal aspect that the accused
has a right of appeal against the order of conviction
purported to have been passed by the trial court. In such
circumstances, the High Court ought not to have entertaineda petition under Section 482 of the Code and stonewalled the
very efficacious alternative remedy of appeal as provided in
the Code. Merely because the accused made certain
allegations against the trial judge, the substantive law
cannot be bypassed.
5. It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hamida
v. Rashid (2008) 1 SCC 474 that the inherent jurisdiction under
Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is to be exercised sparingly and should not
be exercised when an alternative remedy is available. It was
observed:
“7. It is a well-established principle that inherent power
conferred on the High Courts under Section 482 CrPC has
to be exercised sparingly with circumspection and in rare
cases, and that too to correct patent illegalities or when
some miscarriage of justice is done. The content and
scope of power under Section 482 CrPC were examined in
considerable detail in Madhu Limaye v. State of
Maharashtra [(1977) 4 SCC 551: 1978 SCC (Cri) 10: AIR 1978
SC 47], and it was held as under: (SCC p. 555, para 8)::: Downloaded on – 06/08/2025 21:27:32 :::CIS
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2025:HHC:26522The following principles may be stated in relation to
the exercise of the inherent power of the High Court:
(1) that the power is not to be resorted to if there is
.
a specific provision in the Code for the redress of
the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(2) that it should be exercised very sparingly to
prevent abuse of the process of any court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice;
(3) that it should not be exercised as against the
express bar of law engrafted in any other provision
of the Code.
8. In State v. Navjot Sandhu [(2003) 6 SCC 641: 2003 SCC
(Cri) 1545], after a review of a large number of earlier
decisions, it was held as under: (SCC p. 657, para 29)
“29. … The inherent power is to be used only in cases
where there is an abuse of the process of the court or
where interference is absolutely necessary for securing
the ends of justice. The inherent power must be
exercised very sparingly, as cases which require
interference would be few and far between. The most
common case where inherent jurisdiction is generally
exercised is where criminal proceedings are required
to be quashed because they are initiated illegally,
vexatiously or without jurisdiction. Most of the cases
set out hereinabove fall in this category. It must be
remembered that the inherent power is not to be
resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code
or any other enactment for redress of the grievance of
the aggrieved party. This power should not be
exercised against an express bar of law engrafted in
any other provision of the Criminal Procedure Code.
This power cannot be exercised as against an express
bar in some other enactment.”
9. In Arun Shankar Shukla v. State of U.P. [(1999) 6 SCC 146:
1999 SCC (Cri) 1076] the High Court had entertained a
petition under Section 482 CrPC after an order of
conviction had been passed by the Sessions Judge and::: Downloaded on – 06/08/2025 21:27:32 :::CIS
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2025:HHC:26522before the sentence had been awarded and further
proceedings in the case had been stayed. In appeal, this
Court set aside the order of the High Court after
reiterating the principle that it is well settled that.
inherent power is not to be invoked in respect of any
matter covered by specific provisions of the Code or if its
exercise would infringe any specific provision of the Code.
It was further observed that the High Court overlooked
the procedural law which empowered the convicted
accused to prefer a statutory appeal against conviction of
the offence and intervened at an uncalled-for stage andsoft-pedalled the course of justice at a very crucial stage
of the trial. The order of the High Court was accordingly
set aside on the ground that a petition under Section 482
CrPC could not have been entertained as the accused hadan alternative remedy of an appeal as provided in the
Code. It is not necessary to burden this judgment with other
decisions of this Court, as the consistent view throughout has
been that a petition under Section 482 CrPC cannot be
entertained if there is any other specific provision in the Codeof Criminal Procedure for redress of the grievance of the
aggrieved party.
10. In the case in hand, the respondents-accused could
apply for bail afresh after the offence had been converted
into one under Section 304 IPC. They deliberately did not
do so and filed a petition under Section 482 CrPC in order
to circumvent the procedure whereunder they would have
been required to surrender, as the bail application could
be entertained and heard only if the accused were in
custody. It is important to note that no order adverse to
the respondents-accused had been passed by any court,
nor was there any miscarriage of justice or any illegality.
In such circumstances, the High Court committed a
manifest error of law in entertaining a petition under
Section 482 CrPC and issuing a direction to the
subordinate court to accept the sureties and bail bonds for
the offence under Section 304 IPC. The effect of the order
passed by the High Court is that the accused after getting
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bail in an offence under Sections 324, 352 and 506 IPC on
the very day on which they were taken into custody, got
an order of bail in their favour even after the injured had
succumbed to his injuries and the case had been
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converted into one under Section 304 IPC without any
court examining the case on merits, as it stood after
conversion of the offence. The procedure laid down for
the grant of bail under Section 439 CrPC, though available
to the respondents-accused, having not been availed of,
the exercise of power by the High Court under Section 482
CrPC is clearly illegal and the impugned order passed by it
has to be set aside.” (Emphasis supplied)
6. Similarly, it was held in B.S. Joshi vs. State of Haryana
2003 (4) SCC 675 that the High Court can quash the F.I.R. for
non-compoundable offences based on compromise, indicating
that the jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. should not be
exercised regarding offences that are compoundable under
Section 320 of Cr.P.C., except in exceptional cases.
7. In the present case, it has been asserted that the FIR
has been registered for the commission of offences punishable
under Sections 467, 468, 471, 120B of IPC, which is incorrect as
the FIR does not show any other Section except Section 420 of
IPC. Therefore, the remedy of the petitioner is to approach the
learned Trial Court where the matter is pending for seeking the
composition.
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8. In view of the above, the present petition fails and
the same is dismissed, so also the pending miscellaneous
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application(s), if any.
9. The observations made hereinafter shall remain
confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing,
whatsoever, on the merits of the case.
5th August, 2025
(Chander)
r to (Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
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