Himachal Pradesh High Court
Decided On: 07.03.2025 vs National Highways Authority Of India & … on 7 March, 2025
Author: Tarlok Singh Chauhan
Bench: Tarlok Singh Chauhan
2025:HHC:5738
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH SHIMLA
Arbitration Appeal No.8 of 2025
Decided on: 07.03.2025
Lalit Kumar and others …..Appellants
Versus
National Highways Authority of India & another
….Respondents
[
Coram:
The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes
For the Appellants: Mr. Sanjeev Kumar Suri, Advocate.
For the Respondents: Mr. K.D. Shreedhar, Senior
Advocate with Ms. Sneh Bhimta,
Advocate for respondent No.1.
Mr. I.N.Mehta, Senior Addl.A.G
with Ms. Sharmila Patial, Addl. A.G
and Mr. Raj Negi, Dy. A.G for
respondent No.2.
____________________________________________________________________
Justice Tarlok Singh Chauhan (oral)This appeal under Section 37 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short, the Act of 1996) is directed
against the judgment dated 02.09.2024 passed by the learned
District Judge, Mandi whereby he dismissed the application
filed by the appellants for setting aside the arbitration award
dated 30.05.2023 passed by the Arbitral Tribunal on the
ground of limitation.
1 Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2 2025:HHC:5738
2 The material facts necessary for the disposal of the
present appeal are that the land and building of the appellants
were acquired for construction/widening of the National
Highway No.21. After completion of codal formalities award No.
46/4 dated 03.05.2018 came to be passed. Since the
appellants were aggrieved by the award passed by the
competent authority, they filed an application under Section 3
(G)(5) of the National Highway Act, 1956 (for short, ‘the Act of
1956) for enhancement and determination of compensation.
3 The respondents contested the said application by
filing reply, which eventually led to passing of the arbitration
award.
4 Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the arbitration
award, the appellants preferred an application under Section 34
of the Act of 1996 before the learned District Judge, who vide
judgment dated 02.09.2024 dismissed the same on the ground
of limitation.
5 It is not in dispute that the award was received by
the appellants on 10.11.2023 and the courts at Mandi were
closed for winter vacations w.e.f. 22.01.2024 to 18.02.2024 and
reopened on 19.02.2024 when the objections came to be filed by
the appellant.
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6 Learned court below as observed above, dismissed
the objections on the ground of delay by concluding that
Section 4 of the Limitation Act, which extends the period when
the court is closed, applies to the period of 90 days and not to
the extendable period of 30 days.
7 The aforesaid conclusion as per the learned Court
below was based upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court
rendered in Bhimashankar Sahakari Sakkare Karkhane
Niyamita versus Walchandnagar Industries Limited, 2023
(8) SCC 453.
8 Learned counsel appearing for the appellants
submitted that the period of limitation for filing an application
under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act ought to have been
calculated in a manner prescribed under the Act read with
Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, which would clearly show
that objections have been filed within the prescribed period of
limitation. The findings recorded by the court below be set-
aside.
9 On the other hand, Mr. K.D. Shreedhar, learned
Senior Advocate duly assisted by Ms. Sneh Bhimta, Advocate,
appearing for the respondents would support the findings along
with the reasons recorded by the learned court below. He
submitted that in any event, benefit of Section 4 of the
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Limitation Act is available only if the proceedings are within the
prescribed period of limitation, which shall be three months in
this case, in terms of Section 34 (3) of the Act of 1996. He
would strongly rely upon the decision in Bhimashankar
Sahakari Sakkare Karkhane Niyamita case supra, and the
judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court referred to therein.
10 The facts are undisputed. As observed above, the
award was received by the appellants on 10.11.2023 and the
courts at Mandi were closed for winter vacations w.e.f.
22.01.2024 to 18.02.2024 and reopened on 19.02.2024 when
the petition under Section 34 came to be filed.
11 The period of limitation for filing a petition under
Section 34 of the Act of 1996 is governed by subsection (3) of
Section 34.
12 Subsection (3) of Section 34 of the Act of 1996 reads
as under:
“(3) An application for setting aside may not be made after
three months have elapsed from the date on which the
party making that application had received the arbitral
award or, if a request had been made under section 33,
from the date on which that request had been disposed of
by the arbitral tribunal:
Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant
was prevented by sufficient cause from making the
application within the said period of three months it may
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entertain the application within a further period of thirty
days, but not thereafter.”
13 The period of limitation for filing petition under
Section 34 of the Act of 1996 is three months and not 90 days
which period admittedly expired on 09.02.2024, when
admittedly the courts at Mandi were closed for winter vacations,
which commenced from 22.01.2024 to 18.02.204 and reopened
on 19.02.2024 upon which date, the appellants filed the
objections, meaning thereby that the prescribed period of
limitation of 90 days for filing the objections expired when there
were winter vacations in the Courts at Mandi.
14 Section 4 of the Limitation Act reads thus:-
“4. Expiry of prescribed period when court is closed.–
Where the prescribed period for any suit, appeal or
application expires on a day when the court is closed,
the suit, appeal or application may be instituted,
preferred or made on the day when the court reopens.
Explanation.–A court shall be deemed to be closed
on any day within the meaning of this section if
during any part of its normal working hours it
remains closed on that day.”
15 The crucial word in Section 4 of the Limitation Act,
as noticed is “prescribed period”. What is the meaning of these
words is to be found in Section 2(j) of the Limitation Act, which
defines the ‘period of limitation’ to mean the ‘period of
6 2025:HHC:5738
limitation’ prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by the
Schedule, and ‘prescribed period’ would find in the later party of
Section 2(j) of the Limitation Act.
16 It shall be apt to reproduce Section 2(j) of the
Limitation Act which reads as under:-
“2. (j) ‘period of limitation’ [which] means the period of
limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by
the Schedule, and ‘prescribed period’ means the period of
limitation computed in accordance with the provisions of
this Act”.
17 Section 2(j) of the Act Act when read in the context of
Section 34(3) of the 1996 Act, makes it amply clear that the
prescribed period for making an application for setting aside an
arbitral award is three months. The period of 30 days
mentioned in the proviso that follows subsection (3) of Section
34 of the 1996 Act is not the “period of limitation” and,
therefore, not the “prescribed period” for the purposes of
making the application for setting aside the arbitral award.
18 The period of 30 days beyond three months which
the court may extend on sufficient cause being shown under the
proviso appended to subsection (3) of Section 34 of the 1996 Act
being not the “period of limitation” or, in other words, the
“prescribed period”. Therefore, once the prescribed period of
limitation had not expired prior to closing of the courts for
7 2025:HHC:5738
vacation and came to expire during the vacation, therefore, the
provisions of Section 4 of the Act were clearly applicable to
such proceedings.
19 As observed above, period of three months provided
by the Limitation Act expired during the court vacations which
commenced from 22.01.2024 to 18.02.2024, thus, the
prescribed period within the meaning of Section 4 of Limitation
Act would be deemed to have ended on 19.02.2024. Therefore,
the appellants were entitled to take the benefit of Section 4 of
the Limitation Act.
20 As regards the applicability of the judgment in
Bhimashankar Sahakari Sakkare Karkhane Niyamita case,
the admitted facts therein were that an arbitration award was
passed on 24.08.2016. Ninety days period expired on
24.11.2016. The parties were entitled to an extended period of
30 days till 24.12.2016. Therefore, the courts were closed
because of the winter/Christmas vacation we.f. 19.12.2016 to
01.01.2017 and the period of 30 days expired on 24.12.2016
when the courts were closed.
21 It was in the aforesaid background that since the
prescribed period of limitation of 90 days had expired prior to
the commencement of the vacations that the Hon’ble Supreme
Court held the objections to be beyond the period of limitation
8 2025:HHC:5738
where the provisions of Section 4 of the Limitation Act could not
have been invoked by the appellant. It was observed that the
benefit of exclusion of period (under Section 4 of the Limitation
Act) would only be available when the vacations fall within 90
days. It was held that the benefit of exclusion of 90 days when
the court is closed is only available within 90 days and not the
extendable period of 30 days, which is at the sole discretion of
the court.
22 In view of the aforesaid discussiosn and for the
reasons stated above, I find merit in the instant appeal and the
same is accordingly allowed. Consequently, the impugned
judgment is set-aside and the case is remanded back to the
learned court below for its disposal afresh in accordance with
law.
23 Parties to appear before the learned court below on
4.4.2025.
(Tarlok Singh Chauhan)
07.03.2025 Judge
(pankaj/yogesh))
