Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 07.03.2025 vs Rakesh Singh on 11 March, 2025
Bench: Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Sushil Kukreja
1 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5610-DB )
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA
Cr. Appeal No. 359 of 2015
Reserved on: 07.03.2025
Decided on: 11.03.2025
_____________________________________________________
State of Himachal Pradesh …..Appellant.
Versus
Rakesh Singh ......Respondent.
_____________________________________________________
Coram
The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge.
The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sushil Kukreja, Judge.
1
Whether approved for reporting?
_____________________________________________________
For the appellant: Mr. I.N. Mehta, Senior Additional
Advocate General, with Ms. Sharmila
Patial, Additional Advocate General
and Mr. Raj Negi, Deputy Advocate
General.
For the respondent/State: Mr. Surya Chauhan, Advocate.
Sushil Kukreja, Judge.
The instant appeal has been preferred by the
appellant/State under Section 378 of Criminal Procedure Code
against judgment dated 10.04.2015, passed by learned Special
Judge, Mandi, District Mandi, H.P., in Sessions Trial No. 02/2011,
whereby the accused (respondent herein) was acquitted from the
charges under Section 20 of the Narcotic Drugs & Psychotropic
Substance Act (for short “the NDPS Act“).
2. The facts giving rise to the present appeal, as per the
prosecution story, can be summarized as under:
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
2 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5610-DB )
2(a). On 08.05.2010 a police team was patrolling at Mehar-
Dhar and also checking the vehicles. Around 08:30 p.m., a maruti
car, having registration No. CHF-4499, came from Joginder Nagar
side and it was stopped. Accused Rakesh Singh was sitting on
rear seat and he tried to flee, but he was nabbed. The accused
was baffled and he was hiding something under his T-shirt. On
being directed to show as to what he was hiding, charas in the
shape of sticks was recovered from him. The recovered
contraband, on being weighed, was found to be 150 grams.
Thereafter, the police completed all the codal formalities, viz.,
recovered contraband was taken into possession, spot map was
prepared, statements of the witnesses were recorded and NCB
forms, in triplicate, were filled in. After completion of the
investigation, police presented the challan in the learned Trial
Court.
3. The learned Trial Court took cognizance against the
accused and charge under Section 20 of the NDPS Act was
framed against him. The prosecution, in order to prove its case,
examined eight witnesses. Statement of the accused under
Section 313 Cr.P.C. was recorded, wherein he stated that he was
falsely implicated. However, he did not examine any witness in his
defence.
3 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5610-DB )
4. The learned Trial Court, vide impugned judgment dated
10.04.2015 acquitted the accused, hence the instant appeal
preferred by the appellant/State.
5. We have heard the learned Senior Additional Advocate
General for the appellant/State, learned counsel for the
accused/respondent and carefully examined the entire records.
6. The learned Senior Additional Advocate General for the
appellant/State contended that the learned Trial Court has ignored
the relevant material and not appreciated the statements of the
witnesses in its right perspective. He further contended that the
Trial Court took a hyper technical view and the impugned judgment
is based on surmises and conjectures, thus liable to be quashed
and set-aside. Lastly, it is prayed that the impugned judgment of
acquittal, passed by the learned Trial Court, be quashed and set-
aside.
7. Conversely, the learned counsel for the
accused/respondent contended that the judgment passed by the
learned Trial Court is the result of proper appreciation of the
material on record and the same was passed after appreciating the
evidence and law to its right and true perspective. He further
contended that there are material contradictions in the statements
of the prosecution witnesses. He also submitted that prosecution
4 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5610-DB )
has miserably failed to ensure compliance of Section 50 of NDPS
Act. The investigating officer had failed to inform the accused that
he had a legal right to get his search conducted before a Gazetted
Officer or a Magistrate.
8. The scope of power of appellate court in case of
appeal against acquittal has been dealt with by the Hon’ble Apex
Court in case titled Muralidhar alias Gidda & another vs. State
of Karnatka reported in (2014)5 SCC 730, which reads as under :
“10. Lord Russell in Sheo Swarup[1], highlighted the
approach of the High Court as an appellate court
hearing the appeal against acquittal. Lord Russell
said, “… the High Court should and will always
give proper weight and consideration to such
matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the
credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presumption of
innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption
certainly not weakened by the fact that he has
been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the
accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (4) the
slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a
finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the
advantage of seeing the witnesses.” The opinion of
the Lord Russell has been followed over the years.
11. As early as in 1952, this Court in Surajpal Singh[2]
while dealing with the powers of the High Court in
an appeal against acquittal under Section 417 of
the Criminal Procedure Code observed,“7………..the High Court has full power to review
the evidence upon which the order of
acquittal was founded, but it is equally well
settled that the presumption of innocence
of the accused is further reinforced by his
acquittal by the trial court, and the findings
of the trial court which had the advantage of
seeing the witnesses and hearing their
evidence can be reversed only for very
substantial and compelling reasons.
12. The approach of the appellate court in the appeal
against acquittal has been dealt with by this Court
in Tulsiram Kanu[3], Madan Mohan Singh[4],
Atley[5] , Aher Raja Khima[6], Balbir Singh[7], M.G.
Agarwal[8], Noor Khan[9], Khedu Mohton[10],
Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade[11], Lekha Yadav[12],
Khem Karan[13], Bishan Singh[14], Umedbhai
5 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5610-DB )Jadavbhai[15], K. Gopal Reddy[16], Tota Singh[17],
Ram Kumar[18], Madan Lal[19], Sambasivan[20],
Bhagwan Singh[21], Harijana Thirupala[22], C.
Antony[23], K. Gopalakrishna[24], Sanjay
Thakran[25] and Chandrappa[26]. It is not
necessary to deal with these cases individually.
Suffice it to say that this Court has consistently
held that in dealing with appeals against acquittal,
the appellate court must bear in mind the
following:
(i) There is presumption of innocence in
favour of an accused person and such
presumption is strengthened by the order
of acquittal passed in his favour by the trial
court,
(ii) The accused person is entitled to the
benefit of reasonable doubt when it deals
with the merit of the appeal against
acquittal,
(iii) Though, the power of the appellate court in
considering the appeals against acquittal
are as extensive as its powers in appeals
against convictions but the appellate court
is generally loath in disturbing the finding
of fact recorded by the trial court. It is so
because the trial court had an advantage of
seeing the demeanor of the witnesses. If the
trial court takes a reasonable view of the
facts of the case, interference by the
appellate court with the judgment of
acquittal is not justified.
Unless, the conclusions reached by the trial
court are palpably wrong or based on
erroneous view of the law or if such
conclusions are allowed to stand, they are
likely to result in grave injustice, the
reluctance on the part of the appellate court
in interfering with such conclusions is fully
justified, and
(iv) Merely because the appellate court on re-
appreciation and re-evaluation of the
evidence is inclined to take a different view,
interference with the judgment of acquittal
is not justified if the view taken by the trial
court is a possible view. The evenly
balanced views of the evidence must not
result in the interference by the appellate
court in the judgment of the trial court.”
9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajesh Prasad vs.
State of Bihar & another, (2022) 3 Supreme Court Cases 471,
6 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5610-DB )
observed as under:
“31. The circumstances under which an appeal would
be entertained by this Court from an order of
acquittal passed by a High Court may be
summarized as follows:
31.1. Ordinarily, this Court is cautious in interfering with
an order of acquittal, especially when the order of
acquittal has been confirmed up to the High Court.
It is only in rarest of rare cases, where the High
Court, on an absolutely wrong process of
reasoning and a legally erroneous and perverse
approach to the facts of the case, ignoring some of
the most vital facts, has acquitted the accused,
that the same may be reversed by this Court,
exercising jurisdiction under Article 136 of the
Constitution. [State of U.P. v. Sahai (1982) 1 SCC
352] Such fetters on the right to entertain an
appeal are prompted by the reluctance to expose a
person, who has been acquitted by a competent
court of a criminal charge, to the anxiety and
tension of a further examination of the case, even
though it is held by a superior court. [Arunchalam
v. P.S.R. Sadhanantham (1979) 2 SCC 297] An
appeal cannot be entertained against an order of
acquittal which has, after recording valid and
weighty reasons, has arrived at an unassailable,
logical conclusion which justifies acquittal. [State
of Haryana vs. Lakhbir 1991 Supp (1) SCC 35
31.2. However, this Court has on certain occasions, set
aside the order of acquittal passed by a High
Court. The circumstances under which this Court
may entertain an appeal against an order of
acquittal and pass an order of conviction, may be
summarized as follows:
31.2.1. Where the approach or reasoning of the High
Court is perverse;
(a) Where incontrovertible evidence has been
rejected by the High Court based on suspicion
and surmises, which are rather unrealistic.
[State of Rajasthan v. Sukhpal Singh (1983) 1
SCC 393] For example, where direct,
unanimous accounts of the eyewitnesses, were
discounted without cogent reasoning. [State of
U.P. vs. Shanker 1980 Supp SCC 489]
(b) Where the intrinsic merits of the testimony of
relatives, living in the same house as the
victim, were discounted on the ground that
they were “interested” witnesses. [State of U.P.
v. Hakim Singh (1980)
(c) Where testimony of witnesses had been
disbelieved by the High Court, on an
unrealistic conjecture of personal motive on
the part of witnesses to implicate the accused,
when in fact, the witnesses had no axe to grind
7 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5610-DB )
in the said matter. [State of Rajasthan v.
Sukhpal Singh (1983) 1 SCC 393]
(d) Where dying declaration of the deceased
victim was rejected by the High Court on an
irrelevant ground that they did not explain the
injury found on one of the persons present at
the site of occurrence of the crime.
[Arunachalam vs. P.S.R. Sadhanantham (1979)
2 SCC 297]
(e) Where the High Court applied an unrealistic
standard of “implicit proof” rather than that of
“proof beyond reasonable doubt” and
therefore evaluated the evidence in a flawed
manner. [State of U.P. v. Ranjha Ram (1986) 4
SCC 99]
(f) Where the High Court rejected circumstantial
evidence, based on an exaggerated and
capricious theory, which were beyond the plea
of the accused; [State of Maharashtra v.
Champalal Punjaji Shah (1981) 3 SCC 610]
(g) Where the High Court acquitted the accused on
the ground that he had no adequate motive to
commit the offence, although, in the said case,
there was strong direct evidence establishing
the guilt of the accused, thereby making it
necessary on the part of the prosecution to
establish “motive”. [State of A.P. v. Bogam
Chandraiah (1990) 1 SCC 445]
31.2.2. Where acquittal would result is gross miscarriage
of justice;
(a) Where the findings of the High Court,
disconnecting the accused persons with the
crime, were based on a perfunctory
consideration of evidence, [State of U.P. v.
Pheru Singh 1989 Supp (1) SCC] or based on
extenuating circumstances which were purely
based in imagination and fantasy [State of U.P.
v. Pussu (1983) 3 SCC 502]
(b) Where the accused had been acquitted on
ground of delay in conducting trial, which
delay was attributable not to the tardiness or
indifference of the prosecuting agencies, but to
the conduct of the accused himself; or where
accused had been acquitted on ground of
delay in conducting trial relating to an offence
which is not of a trivial nature. [State of
Maharashtra v. Champalal Punjaji Shah (1981)
3 SCC 610]”
10. In H.D. Sundara & others vs. State of Karnataka,
(2023) 9 Supreme Court Cases 581, the Hon’ble Supreme Court
has observed that the appellate court cannot overturn acquittal
8 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5610-DB )only on the ground that after reappreciating evidence, it is of the
view that the guilt of the accused was established beyond a
reasonable doubt. The relevant portion of the above judgment is
as under:
“8. In this appeal, were are called upon to consider the
legality and validity of the impugned judgment
rendered by the High Court while deciding an
appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short
“CrPC“). The principles which govern the exercise
of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an
appeal against acquittal under Section 378 CrPC
can be summarized as follows:
8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens
the presumption of innocence;
8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal
against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the
oral and documentary evidence;
8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal
against acquittal, after reappreciating the
evidence, is required to consider whether the view
taken by the trial court is possible view which
could have been taken on the basis of the
evidence on record;
8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate
court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the
ground that another view was also possible; and8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of
acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only
conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of
the evidence on record was that the guilt of the
accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt
and no other conclusion was possible.
9. Normally, when an appellate court exercises
appellate jurisdiction, the duty of the appellate
court is to find out whether the verdict which is
under challenge is correct or incorrect in law and
on facts. The appellate court normally ascertains
whether the decision under challenge is legal or
illegal. But while dealing with an appeal against
acquittal, the appellate court cannot examine the
impugned judgment only to find out whether the
view taken was correct or incorrect. After
reappreciating the oral and documentary evidence,
the appellate court must first decide whether the
trial court’s view was a possible view. The
appellate court cannot overturn acquittal only on
the ground that after reappreciating evidence, it is
9 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5610-DB )of the view that the guilt of the accused was
established beyond a reasonable doubt. Only
recording such a conclusion an order of acquittal
cannot be reversed unless the appellate court also
concludes that it was the only possible
conclusion. Thus, the appellate court must see
whether the view taken by the trial court while
acquitting an accused can be reasonably taken on
the basis of the evidence on record. If the view
taken by the trial court is a possible view, the
appellate court cannot interfere with the order of
acquittal on the ground that another view could
have been taken.”
11. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarized to the
effect that in exceptional cases where there are compelling
circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be
perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of
acquittal. Further, if two views were possible on the basis of the
evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the
finding of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court, merely, because the
Appellate Court could have arrived at a different conclusion than
that of the Trial Court.
12. In the instant case, the accused has been tried for the
commission of the offence punishable under Section 20 of the
NDPS Act on the allegations that on 08.05.2010, around 08:45
p.m., at Mohardhar, Kunnu, he was found in exclusive and
conscious possession of 150 grams of charas.
13. To substantiate the charge framed against the
respondent/accused and to bring home the guilt of the accused,
the prosecution has examined as many as eight witnesses.
10 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5610-DB )
However, the case of the prosecution mainly rests upon the
statements of PW-2, Constable Dhani Ram, and PW-7, HC Kewal
Singh, who is the Investigating Officer. Both these witnesses have
deposed that on 08.05.2010 they alongwith Constable Ashwani
Kumar, HHG Brahama Nand went for Nakabandi and traffic
checking towards Mehar-dhar. Around 08:30 p.m., a maruti car,
having registration No. CH-F-4499 came from Joginder Nagar side
and it was signaled to be stopped. They further deposed that a
person was sitting on the rear seat of the vehicle and he tried to
flee. On being inquired, he (accused) divulged his name as
Rakesh. As per these witnesses, the accused was perplexed and
he was hiding something inside his T-shirt. He was asked to show
as to what he was hiding, on which from his vest, a black
substance, which was in the shape of big and small sticks was
found, which was charas. The recovered contraband, on
weighment, was found to be 150 grams. It was put in the same
manner in the vest and kept in a cloth parcel. The cloth parcel was
sealed with seal having seal impression “Z” at four places and the
sample seal was taken separately on a separate piece of cloth,
which is Ex. PW-2/A.
14. The learned Trial Court has acquitted the accused
mainly on the ground that the Investigating Agency has failed to
11 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5610-DB )
comply with the mandatory provisions of Section 50 of the NDPS
Act.
15. Admittedly, as per the case of the prosecution itself, the
contraband was recovered from the packet concealed by the
accused in the vests worn by him under his T-shirt during his
personal search.
16. However, from the entire evidence which finds place
on record on the part of prosecution and even if taken as a whole
on face value, it is clear that the investigation agency has failed to
comply with the mandatory provision of section 50 of NDPS Act,
1985.
17. In the case of Arif Khan @ Agha Khan Vs. State of
Uttarakhand ((2018) 18 SCC (380), Hon’ble Supreme Court has
held that it is mandatory on the part of the authorized officer to
make the suspect aware of the existence of his right to be
searched before a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate, if so required
by him and this requires a strict compliance. Further that the
suspect person may or may not choose to exercise the right
provided to him under Section 50 of the NDPS Act but so far as the
officer is concerned, an obligation is cast upon him under Section
50 of the NDPS Act to apprise the suspect of his right to be
searched before a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate. Para Nos.18
12 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5610-DB )
to 20 of the aforesaid judgment read as follows:
“18. What is the true scope and object of Section 50 of
the NDPS Act, what are the duties, obligation and
the powers conferred on the authorities under
Section 50 and whether the compliance of
requirements of Section 50 are mandatory or
directory, remains no more res integra and are now
settled by the two decisions of the Constitution
Bench of this Court in State of Punjab vs. Baldev
Singh (1999) 6 SCC 172 and Vijaysinh Chandubha
Jadeja (supra).
19. Indeed, the latter Constitution Bench decision
rendered in the case of Vijaysinh Chandubha
Jadeja (supra) has settled the aforementioned
questions after taking into considerations all
previous case law on the subject.
20. Their Lordships have held in Vijaysinh Chandubha
Jadeja (supra) that the requirements of Section 50
of the NDPS Act are mandatory and, therefore, the
provisions of Section 50 must be strictly complied
with. It is held that it is imperative on the part of the
Police Officer to apprise the person intended to be
searched of his right under Section 50 to be
searched only before a Gazetted officer or a
Magistrate. It is held that it is equally mandatory on
the part of the authorized officer to make the
suspect aware of the existence of his right to be
searched before a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate,
if so required by him and this requires a strict
compliance. It is ruled that the suspect person may
or may not choose to exercise the right provided to
him under Section 50 of the NDPS Act but so far as
the officer is concerned, an obligation is cast upon
him under Section 50 of the NDPS Act to apprise
the suspect of his right to be searched before a
Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate. (See also Ashok
Kumar Sharma vs. State of Rajasthan, 2013 (2) SCC
67 and Narcotics Control Bureau vs. Sukh Dev Raj
Sodhi, 2011 (6) SCC 392).”
18. In a recent judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court,
titled as Ranjan Kumar Chadha vs. State of Himachal Pradesh,
AIR 2023 Supreme Court 5164, Hon’ble Supreme Court has
extensively addressed the scope and object of Section 50 of
NDPS Act and laid down the guidelines by holding that search
13 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5610-DB )
and seizure and recovery of contraband not made in the presence
of any Magistrate or Gazetted Officer and non-compliance with the
mandatory procedure under Section 50 of NDPS Act,1985 is fatal
to the prosecution case. It has been held as under:
“33. Ordinarily, it could be said or argued that “to search any
person” would mean, to search the articles on the
person or body of the person to be searched and would
normally not include the articles which are not on the
body of the person to be searched. When we are
deliberating on the scope and true purport of Section
50 of the NDPS Act, we should bear in mind that the
main object of Section 50 of the NDPS Act is to avoid the
allegation of planting something or fabricating evidence
by the prosecution or the authorized officer.
… … … … … … … … …
36. Considering the aforesaid provisions, the inference
which can be drawn is that “to search any person”
would mean only search of the body or wearing apparels
of such person and in that case the procedure which is
required to be followed would be the one prescribed
under Section 50 of the NDPS Act. In contrast, if search
of any building, conveyance or place, including a public
place, is to be carried out, then there is no question of
following the procedure prescribed under Section 50.
However, when a suspected or arrested person is to be
searched, then the procedure prescribed under Section
50 comes into operation and the procedure thereunder
is required to be followed. This can be seen by referring
to Section 100(3) of the CrPC 1973 which provides that
where any person is reasonably suspected of
concealing about his person any article for which search
should be made, such person may be searched and if
such person is a woman, the search shall be made by
another woman with strict regard to decency. The
concealment which is suspected is on the person or
about his person.
64. From the aforesaid discussion, the requirements
envisaged by Section 50 can be summarised as follows:-
(i) Section 50 provides both a right as well as an
obligation. The person about to be searched has the
right to have his search conducted in the presence of a
Gazetted Officer or Magistrate if he so desires, and it
is the obligation of the police officer to inform such
person of this right before proceeding to search the
person of the suspect.
14 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5610-DB )
(ii) Where, the person to be searched declines to exercise
this right, the police officer shall be free to proceed
with the search. However, if the suspect declines to
exercise his right of being searched before a Gazetted
Officer or Magistrate, the empowered officer should
take it in writing from the suspect that he would not
like to exercise his right of being searched before a
Gazetted Officer or Magistrate and he may be searched
by the empowered officer.
(iii) Before conducting a search, it must be communicated
in clear terms though it need not be in writing and is
permissible to convey orally, that the suspect has a
right of being searched by a Gazetted Officer or
Magistrate.
(iv) While informing the right, only two options of either
being searched in presence of a Gazetted Officer or
Magistrate must be given, who also must be
independent and in no way connected to the raiding
party.
(v) In case of multiple persons to be searched, each of
them has to be individually communicated of their
right, and each must exercise or waive the same in
their own capacity. Any joint or common
communication of this right would be in violation
of Section 50.
(vi) Where the right under Section 50 has been exercised, it
is the choice of the police officer to decide whether to
take the suspect before a Gazetted Officer or
Magistrate but an endeavour should be made to take
him before the nearest Magistrate.
(vii) Section 50 is applicable only in case of search of
person of the suspect under the provisions of
the NDPS Act, and would have no application where a
search was conducted under any other statute in
respect of any offence.
(viii) Where during a search under any statute other than
the NDPS Act, a contraband under the NDPS Act also
happens to be recovered, the provisions relating to
the NDPS Act shall forthwith start applying, although in
such a situation Section 50 may not be required to be
complied for the reason that search had already been
conducted.
(ix) The burden is on the prosecution to establish that the
obligation imposed by Section 50 was duly complied
with before the search was conducted.
15 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5610-DB )
(x) Any incriminating contraband, possession of which is
punishable under the NDPS Act and recovered in
violation of Section 50 would be inadmissible and
cannot be relied upon in the trial by the prosecution,
however, it will not vitiate the trial in respect of the
same. Any other article that has been recovered may
be relied upon in any other independent proceedings.”
19. In the instant case, the contraband was allegedly
recovered from the packet concealed by the accused in the vest
worn by him under his T-shirt during his personal search.
However, no option was given to the accused prior to his personal
search either before a Gazetted Officer or before a Magistrate in
flagrant violation of the mandatory provisions of Section 50 of the
NDPS Act. The prosecution has failed to prove on the basis of oral
and documentary evidence that the accused was made aware of
his right to be searched before a Gazetted Officer or before a
Magistrate.
20. By applying the abovesaid principles in the case on
hand, since there is total violation of mandatory provisions of
Section 50 of the NDPS Act as such the recovery stood vitiated.
Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the view taken by
the learned trial Court while acquitting the accused is a reasonable
view based on the evidence and the same cannot be said to be
either perverse or contrary to the material on record.
21. In view of what has been discussed hereinabove, no
16 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5610-DB )
interference in the judgment of acquittal, rendered by the learned
Trial Court, is required, as the same is the result of proper
appreciation of evidence and law. The appeal, which sans merits,
deserves dismissal and is accordingly dismissed. Bail bonds are
discharged.
Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand(s)
disposed of.
( Tarlok Singh Chauhan )
Judge
( Sushil Kukreja )
Judge
11th March, 2025
(virender)