Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 14.08.2025 vs State Of H.P on 26 August, 2025
2025:HHC:28728
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MP(M) No. 1843 of 2025.
Reserved on: 14.08.2025.
Date of Decision: 26.08.2025.
Gaurav ...Petitioner
Versus
State of H.P. ...Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No
For the Petitioner : Mr. K.S. Gill, Advocate.
For the Respondent/State : Mr. Jitender Sharma, Additional
Advocate General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking
regular bail, in FIR No. 72/2024, dated 23.07.2024, registered at
Police Station Parwanoo, District Solan, H.P., for the commission of
offences punishable under Sections 21 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (ND&PS Act).
2. It has been asserted that the petitioner was arrested on
23.07.2024. He was falsely implicated, and there exists no prima
facie case against the petitioner. The petitioner had earlier filed a
bail petition, which was registered as Cr.MP(M) No. 751 of 2025,
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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and was withdrawn on 28.04.2025. The petitioner is the sole
earning member of the family. Charges were framed on 15.07.2025.
The learned Trial Court has summoned only three prosecution
witnesses for 28.08.2025. The petitioner was found in possession
of 24.66 grams of heroin. As per the prosecution, he has undergone
a substantive part of the imprisonment. Four FIRs were registered
against the petitioner. The petitioner would abide by the terms and
conditions which the Court may impose. Hence, the petition.
3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report
asserting that the police party was on patrolling duty on
22.07.2024. They received a secret information that the vehicle
bearing registration No. HR78E-6363 was transporting heroin.
The information was reduced to writing and was sent to Sub
Divisional Police Officer (SDPO) Parwanoo. The vehicle bearing
registration No. HR78E-6363 reached the spot at 11:30 pm. The
police signalled the driver to stop, but the driver tried to reverse
and hit a stationary truck. Driver Harjinder Singh and Conductor
Jitender Kumar of the truck came out, who were associated as
witnesses. The driver of the vehicle bearing registration no.
HR78E-6363 identified himself as Digvijay Singh, and the person
sitting beside him identified him as Gaurav (the present petitioner).
The police checked the vehicle and recovered 24.66 grams of
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heroin. The police seized the heroin and the car and arrested the
petitioner and the co-accused. The heroin was sent to the State
Forensic Science Laboratory (SFSL) for analysis, and was
confirmed to be heroin. The police filed the charge-sheet before
the Trial Court on 19.09.2024 and the supplementary challan on
15.05.2025. The matter is listed on 28.08.2025 for recording the
statements of the prosecution witnesses at Sr. No. 1 to 3. Hence, the
status report.
4. I have heard Mr. K.S. Gill, learned counsel for the
petitioner and Mr. Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate
General for the respondent/State.
5. Mr. K.S. Gill, learned counsel for the petitioner,
submitted that the petitioner is innocent and that he was falsely
implicated. The prosecution evidence has not commenced, and
only three witnesses were summoned, which shows that the trial is
not likely to conclude soon. The petitioner would abide by the
terms and conditions which the Court may impose. No fruitful
purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody.
Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the
petitioner be released on bail.
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2025:HHC:28728
6. Mr. Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate
General for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner was
travelling in the vehicle from which the recovery of heroin was
effected. There is sufficient material to connect the petitioner with
the commission of crime. The petitioner was involved in the
commission of similar offences earlier. He would commit a similar
offence in case of his release on bail. Hence, he prayed that the
present petition be dismissed.
7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ajwar v. Waseem (2024) 10 SCC 768: 2024
SCC OnLine SC 974, wherein it was observed at page 783: –
“Relevant parameters for granting bail
26. While considering as to whether bail ought to be granted
in a matter involving a serious criminal offence, the Court
must consider relevant factors like the nature of the
accusations made against the accused, the manner in which
the crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of
the offence, the role attributed to the accused, the criminal
antecedents of the accused, the probability of tampering of
the witnesses and repeating the offence, if the accused are
released on bail, the likelihood of the accused being
unavailable in the event bail is granted, the possibility of
obstructing the proceedings and evading the courts of justice
and the overall desirability of releasing the accused on bail.
[Refer: Chaman Lal v. State of U.P. [Chaman Lal v. State of
U.P., (2004) 7 SCC 525: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1974]; Kalyan Chandra
5
2025:HHC:28728Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan [Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh
Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri)
1977]; Masroor v. State of U.P. [Masroor v. State of U.P.,
(2009) 14 SCC 286 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1368]; Prasanta Kumar
Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee [Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis
Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765]; Neeru
Yadav v. State of U.P. [Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P., (2014) 16
SCC 508 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 527]; Anil Kumar Yadav v. State
(NCT of Delhi)[Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi),
(2018) 12 SCC 129 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 425]; Mahipal v. Rajesh
Kumar [Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar, (2020) 2 SCC 118 : (2020) 1
SCC (Cri) 558] .]
9. This position was reiterated in Ramratan v. State of M.P.,
2024 SCC OnLine SC 3068, wherein it was observed as under: –
“12. The fundamental purpose of bail is to ensure the
accused’s presence during the investigation and trial. Any
conditions imposed must be reasonable and directly related
to this objective. This Court in Parvez Noordin
Lokhandwalla v. State of Maharastra (2020) 10 SCC 77
observed that though the competent court is empowered to
exercise its discretion to impose “any condition” for the
grant of bail under Sections 437(3) and 439(1)(a) CrPC, the
discretion of the court has to be guided by the need to
facilitate the administration of justice, secure the presence of
the accused and ensure that the liberty of the accused is not
misused to impede the investigation, overawe the witnesses
or obstruct the course of justice. The relevant observations
are extracted herein below:
“14. The language of Section 437(3) CrPC, which uses the
expression “any condition … otherwise in the interest of
justice” has been construed in several decisions of this
Court. Though the competent court is empowered to
exercise its discretion to impose “any condition” for the
grant of bail under Sections 437(3) and 439(1)(a) CrPC,
the discretion of the court has to be guided by the need to
facilitate the administration of justice, secure the
presence of the accused and ensure that the liberty of the
accused is not misused to impede the investigation,
6
2025:HHC:28728overawe the witnesses or obstruct the course of justice.
Several decisions of this Court have dwelt on the nature of
the conditions which can legitimately be imposed both in
the context of bail and anticipatory bail.” (Emphasis
supplied)
13. In Sumit Mehta v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2013) 15 SCC 570,
this Court discussed the scope of the discretion of the Court
to impose “any condition” on the grant of bail and observed
in the following terms: —
“15. The words “any condition” used in the provision
should not be regarded as conferring absolute power on a
court of law to impose any condition that it chooses to
impose. Any condition has to be interpreted as a
reasonable condition acceptable in the facts permissible
in the circumstance, and effective in the pragmatic sense,
and should not defeat the order of grant of bail. We are of
the view that the present facts and circumstances of the
case do not warrant such an extreme condition to be
imposed.” (Emphasis supplied)
14. This Court, in Dilip Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh
(2021) 2 SCC 779, laid down the factors to be taken into
consideration while deciding the bail application and
observed:
“4. It is well settled by a plethora of decisions of this
Court that criminal proceedings are not for the realisation
of disputed dues. It is open to a court to grant or refuse
the prayer for anticipatory bail, depending on the facts
and circumstances of the particular case. The factors to be
taken into consideration while considering an application
for bail are the nature of the accusation and the severity of
the punishment in the case of conviction and the nature
of the materials relied upon by the prosecution;
reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witnesses
or apprehension of threat to the complainant or the
witnesses; the reasonable possibility of securing the
presence of the accused at the time of trial or the
likelihood of his abscondence; character, behaviour and
standing of the accused; and the circumstances which are
peculiar or the accused and larger interest of the public or
7
2025:HHC:28728the State and similar other considerations. A criminal
court, exercising jurisdiction to grant bail/anticipatory
bail, is not expected to act as a recovery agent to realise
the dues of the complainant, and that too, without any
trial.” (Emphasis supplied)
10. A similar view was taken in Shabeen Ahmed versus State
of U.P., 2025 SCC Online SC 479.
11. The present petition has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
12. A perusal of the status report shows that the petitioner
was travelling in the vehicle from which 24.66 grams of heroin
were recovered. In Madan Lal versus State of H.P. (2003) 7 SCC 465:
2003 SCC (Cri) 1664: 2003 SCC OnLineSC 874, the contraband was
recovered from a vehicle, and it was held that all the occupants of
the vehicle would be in conscious possession of the contraband. It
was observed:
“19. Whether there was conscious possession has to be
determined with reference to the factual backdrop. The facts
which can be culled out from the evidence on record are that
all the accused persons were travelling in a vehicle, and as
noted by the trial court, they were known to each other, and
it has not been explained or shown as to how they travelled
together from the same destination in a vehicle which was
not a public vehicle.
20. Section 20(b) makes possession of contraband articles an
offence. Section 20 appears in Chapter IV of the Act, which
relates to offences for possession of such articles. It is
submitted that to make the possession illicit, there must be
conscious possession.
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21. It is highlighted that unless the possession was coupled
with the requisite mental element, i.e., conscious possession
and not mere custody without awareness of the nature of
such possession, Section 20 is not attracted.
22. The expression “possession” is a polymorphous term
which assumes different colours in different contexts. It may
carry different meanings in contextually different
backgrounds. It is impossible, as was observed in the Supdt.
& Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, W.B. v. Anil Kumar
Bhunja [(1979) 4 SCC 274: 1979 SCC (Cri) 1038: AIR 1980 SC
52] to work out a completely logical and precise definition of
“possession” uniformly applicable to all situations in the
context of all statutes.
23. The word “conscious” means awareness of a particular
fact. It is a state of mind which is deliberate or intended.
24. As noted in Gunwantlal v. State of M.P. [(1972) 2 SCC 194:
1972 SCC (Cri) 678: AIR 1972 SC 1756], possession in a given
case need not be physical possession but can be constructive,
having power and control over the article in the case in
question, while the person to whom physical possession is
given holds it subject to that power or control.
25. The word “possession” means the legal right to
possession (see Heath v. Drown [(1972) 2 All ER 561: 1973 AC
498: (1972) 2 WLR 1306 (HL)] ). In an interesting case, it was
observed that where a person keeps his firearm in his
mother’s flat, which is safer than his own home, he must be
considered to be in possession of the same.
(See Sullivan v. Earl of Caithness [(1976) 1 All ER 844: 1976 QB
966: (1976) 2 WLR 361 (QBD)].)
26. Once possession is established, the person who claims
that it was not a conscious possession has to establish it
because how he came to be in possession is within his special
knowledge. Section 35 of the Act gives a statutory
recognition of this position because of the presumption
available in law. Similar is the position in terms of Section
54, where also presumption is also available to be drawn
from possession of illicit articles.
27. In the factual scenario of the present case, not only
possession but conscious possession has been established. It
9
2025:HHC:28728has not been shown by the accused-appellants that the
possession was not conscious in the logical background of
Sections 35 and 54 of the Act.”
13. Therefore, the petitioner was prima facie found in
possession of 24.66 grams of heroin.
14. A perusal of the certified copies of the order-sheets
shows that the challan was assigned to learned Special Judge-II,
Solan, on 19.09.2024. The objections were removed on 29.10.2024.
The charges were framed on 15.07.2025, and witnesses at Sr. No. 1
to 3 were summoned for 28.08.2025. The order-sheets do not show
that the delay is attributable to the petitioner; rather, it appears
that the learned Trial Court had adjourned the matter for five
months for checking of copies and thereafter for two months for
framing the charges. The learned Trial Court had also summoned
only the witnesses at Sr. No. 1 to 3 for 28.08.2025. The
adjournments for a prolonged period granted by the learned Trial
Court and summoning only three witnesses clearly show that the
learned Trial Court is unable to conclude the trial expeditiously. It
was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Javed Gulam Nabi
Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra (2024) 9 SCC 813: 2024 SCC OnLine
SC 1693 that if the State or any prosecuting agency, including the
Court concerned, has no wherewithal to provide the right of speedy
10
2025:HHC:28728
trial to the accused, then the bail should not be opposed on the
ground that the crime is serious. It was observed at page 820:
“17. If the State or any prosecuting agency, including the
court concerned, has no wherewithal to provide or protect
the fundamental right of an accused to have a speedy trial as
enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution then the State
or any other prosecuting agency should not oppose the plea
for bail on the ground that the crime committed is serious.
Article 21 of the Constitution applies irrespective of the
nature of the crime.
18. We may hasten to add that the petitioner is still an
accused, not a convict. The overarching postulate of criminal
jurisprudence that an accused is presumed to be innocent
until proven guilty cannot be brushed aside lightly, however
stringent the penal law may be.
19. We are convinced that the manner in which the
prosecuting agency, as well as the Court, have proceeded, the
right of the accused to have a speedy trial could be said to
have been infringed, thereby violating Article 21 of the
Constitution.”
15. The petitioner was found in possession of 24.66 grams
of heroin. He has been in custody since 23.07.2024 and has spent
more than one year in custody. Applying the principle of
proportionality, the petitioner has undergone a substantial part of
his imprisonment, and his further detention is not justified.
16. It was held in Ajay Kumar Choudhary v. Union of India,
(2015) 7 SCC 291: (2015) 2 SCC (L&S) 455: 2015 SCC OnLine SC 127
that the right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right of the accused.
It was observed at page 298:
11
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“13. Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
1948, assures that:
“12. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference
with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor
to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone
has the right to the protection of the law against such
interference or attacks.”
14. More recently, the European Convention on Human
Rights in Article 6(1) promises that:
“6. (1) In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations or of any criminal charge against him,
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within
a reasonable time….”
and in its second sub-article, that:
“6. (2) Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall
be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to
law.”
15. The Supreme Court of the United States struck down the
use of nolle prosequi, an indefinite but ominous and
omnipresent postponement of civil or criminal prosecution
in Klopfer v. North Carolina [18 L Ed 2d 1: 386 US 213 (1967)].
16. In Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab [(1994) 3 SCC 569: 1994
SCC (Cri) 899] the Constitution Bench of this Court
unequivocally construed the right of speedy trial as a
fundamental right, and we can do no better than extract
these paragraphs from that celebrated decision: (SCC pp.
638-39, paras 86-87)
“86. The concept of speedy trial is read into Article 21
as an essential part of the fundamental right to life and
liberty guaranteed and preserved under our
Constitution. The right to speedy trial begins with the
actual restraint imposed by arrest and consequent
incarceration and continues at all stages, namely, the
stage of the investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal and
revision so that any possible prejudice that may result
from the impermissible and avoidable delay from the
time of the commission of the offence till it
consummates into a finality, can be averted. In this
12
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context, it may be noted that the constitutional
guarantee of a speedy trial is properly reflected in
Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
87. This Court in Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of
Bihar [(1980) 1 SCC 81: 1980 SCC (Cri) 23], while dealing
with Article 21 of the Constitution of India, has
observed thus: (SCC p. 89, para 5)
‘5. … No procedure which does not ensure a
reasonably quick trial can be regarded as
“reasonable, fair or just” and it would fall foul of
Article 21. There can, therefore, be no doubt that
a speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean
reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral and
essential part of the fundamental right to life
and liberty enshrined in Article 21. The question
which would, however, arise is as to what would
be the consequence if a person accused of an
offence is denied a speedy trial and is sought to
be deprived of his liberty by imprisonment as a
result of a long-delayed trial in violation of his
fundamental right under Article 21. Would he be
entitled to be released unconditionally, freed
from the charge levelled against him on the
ground that trying him after an unduly long
period of time and convicting him after such
trial would constitute a violation of his
fundamental right under Article 21.”
17. The legal expectation of expedition and diligence being
present at every stage of a criminal trial and a fortiori in
departmental enquiries has been emphasised by this Court
on numerous occasions. The Constitution Bench in Abdul
Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225: 1992 SCC
(Cri) 93] underscored that this right to speedy trial is implicit
in Article 21 of the Constitution and is also reflected in
Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; that it
encompasses all stages viz. investigation, inquiry, trial,
appeal, revision and retrial; that the burden lies on the
prosecution to justify and explain the delay; that the Court
must engage in a balancing test to determine whether this
right had been denied in the particular case before it.”
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17. It was held in the Shaheen Welfare Association. v. Union
of India, (1996) 2 SCC 616: 1996 SCC (Cri) 366 that a person cannot
be kept behind the bars when there is no prospect of trial being
concluded expeditiously. It was observed at page 621:
“8. It is in this context that it has become necessary to grant
some relief to those persons who have been deprived of their
personal liberty for a considerable length of time without
any prospect of the trial being concluded in the near future.
Undoubtedly, the safety of the community and the nation
needs to be safeguarded looking to the nature of the offences
these undertrials have been charged with. But the ultimate
justification for such deprivation of liberty pending trial can
only be their being found guilty of the offences for which
they have been charged. If such a finding is not likely to be
arrived at within a reasonable time, some relief becomes
necessary.”
18. Similarly, it was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra, (2022) 9 SCC 321: (2022) 3
SCC (Cri) 560: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 453 that no accused can be
subjected to unending detention pending trial. It was observed at
page 335:
“40. Having held so, we cannot be oblivious to what has been
urged on behalf of the respondent-accused that cancellation
of bail by this Court is likely to be construed as an indefinite
foreclosure of his right to seek bail. It is not necessary to
dwell upon the wealth of case law which, regardless of the
stringent provisions in a penal law or the gravity of the
offence, has time and again recognised the legitimacy of
seeking liberty from incarceration. To put it differently, no
accused can be subjected to unending detention pending
trial, especially when the law presumes him to be innocent
until proven guilty. Even where statutory provisions
14
2025:HHC:28728expressly bar the grant of bail, such as in cases under the
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, this Court has
expressly ruled that after a reasonably long period of
incarceration, or for any other valid reason, such stringent
provisions will melt down, and cannot be measured over and
above the right of liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the
Constitution (see Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb [Union of
India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713, paras 15 and 17] ).”
19. It was laid down in Mohd. Muslim v. State (NCT of Delhi),
(2023) 18 SCC 166: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 352, that the right to a
speedy trial is a constitutional right of an accused. The right of bail
is curtailed on the premise that the trial would be concluded
expeditiously. It was observed at page 174: –
13. When provisions of law curtail the right of an accused to
secure bail, and correspondingly fetter judicial discretion
(like Section 37 of the NDPS Act, in the present case), this
Court has upheld them for conflating two competing values
i.e. the right of the accused to enjoy freedom, based on the
presumption of innocence, and societal interest — as
observed in Vaman Narain Ghiya v. State of Rajasthan [Vaman
Narain Ghiya v. State of Rajasthan, (2009) 2 SCC 281 : (2009) 1
SCC (Cri) 745 : (2008) 17 SCR 369] (“the concept of bail
emerges from the conflict between the police power to
restrict liberty of a man who is alleged to have committed a
crime, and presumption of innocence in favour of the alleged
criminal….”). They are, at the same time, upheld on the
condition that the trial is concluded expeditiously. The
Constitution Bench in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab [Kartar
Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569: 1994 SCC (Cri)
899: (1994) 2 SCR 375] made observations to this effect.
In Shaheen Welfare Association. v. Union of India [Shaheen
Welfare Assn. v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 616: 1996 SCC
(Cri) 366: (1996) 2 SCR 1123] again, this Court expressed the
same sentiment, namely, that when stringent provisions are
enacted, curtailing the provisions of bail, and restricting
judicial discretion, it is on the basis that investigation and
15
2025:HHC:28728
trials would be concluded swiftly. The Court said that
parliamentary intervention is based on: (Shaheen Welfare
case [Shaheen Welfare Assn. v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC
616: 1996 SCC (Cri) 366: (1996) 2 SCR 1123], SCC p. 624, para
17)
“17. … a conscious decision has been taken by the
legislature to sacrifice to some extent, the personal liberty
of an undertrial accused for the sake of protecting the
community and the nation against terrorist and
disruptive activities or other activities harmful to society,
it is all the more necessary that investigation of such
crimes is done efficiently and an adequate number of
Designated Courts are set up to bring to book persons
accused of such serious crimes. This is the only way in
which society can be protected against harmful activities.
This would also ensure that persons ultimately found
innocent are not unnecessarily kept in jail for long
periods.”
20. The Court highlighted the effects of pre-trial detention
and the importance of a speedy trial as under at page 178:
“23. Before parting, it would be important to reflect that laws
which impose stringent conditions for the grant of bail may
be necessary in the public interest; yet, if trials are not
concluded in time, the injustice wreaked on the individual is
immeasurable. Jails are overcrowded, and their living
conditions, more often than not, are appalling. According to
the Union Home Ministry’s response to Parliament, the
National Crime Records Bureau had recorded that as on 31-
12-2021, over 5,54,034 prisoners were lodged in jails against
a total capacity of 4,25,069 prisoners in the country [
National Crime Records Bureau, Prison Statistics in India
<https://ncrb.gov.in/sites/default/files/PSI-
2021/Executive_ncrb_Summary-2021.pdf>]. Of these,
1,22,852 were convicts; the rest, 4,27,165, were undertrials.
24. The danger of unjust imprisonment, is that inmates are
at risk of “prisonisation” a term described by the Kerala
High Court in A Convict Prisoner v. State [A Convict
Prisoner v. State, 1993 SCC OnLine Ker 127: 1993 Cri LJ 3242]
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2025:HHC:28728as “a radical transformation” whereby the prisoner: (SCC
OnLine Ker para 13)
“13. … loses his identity. He is known by a number. He
loses personal possessions. He has no personal
relationships. Psychological problems result from loss of
freedom, status, possessions, dignity and autonomy of
personal life. The inmate culture of prison turns out to be
dreadful. The prisoner becomes hostile by ordinary
standards. Self-perception changes.”
25. There is a further danger of the prisoner turning to crime,
“as crime not only turns admirable, but the more
professional the crime, more honour is paid to the criminal”
[ Working Papers – Group on Prisons & Borstals – 1966 U.K.]
(also see Donald Clemmer’s “The Prison Community”
published in 1940 [ Donald Clemmer, The Prison
Community (1968) Holt, Rinehart & Winston, which is
referred to in Tomasz Sobecki, “Donald Clemmer’s Concept
of Prisonisation”, available
at:<https://www.tkp.edu.pl/wpcontent/uploads/2020/12/Sob
ecki_sklad.pdf> (accessed on 23-3-2023).] ). Incarceration
has further deleterious effects, where the accused belongs to
the weakest economic strata: immediate loss of livelihood,
and in several cases, scattering of families as well as loss of
family bonds and alienation from society. The courts,
therefore, have to be sensitive to these aspects (because in
the event of an acquittal, the loss to the accused is
irreparable), and ensure that trials–especially in cases
where special laws enact stringent provisions- are taken up
and concluded speedily.”
21. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Javed
Gulam Nabi Shaikh (supra) that the right to speedy trial of the
offenders facing criminal charges is an important facet of Article 21
of the Constitution of India and inordinate delay in the conclusion
of the trial entitles the accused to grant of bail, it was observed at
page 817: –
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“10. Long back, in Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of
Bihar [Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC
81: 1980 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court had declared that the right
to speedy trial of offenders facing criminal charges is
“implicit in the broad sweep and content of Article 21 as
interpreted by this Court”. Remarking that a valid procedure
under Article 21 is one which contains a procedure that is
“reasonable, fair and just”, it was held that: (SCC p. 89, para
5)
“5. … Now obviously procedure prescribed by law for
depriving a person of liberty cannot be “reasonable, fair
or just” unless that procedure ensures a speedy trial for
determination of the guilt of such person. No procedure
which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be
regarded as “reasonable, fair or just” and it would fall
foul of Article 21. There can, therefore, be no doubt that a
speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean reasonably
expeditious trial, is an integral and essential part of the
fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article
21. The question which would, however, arise is as to what
would be the consequence if a person accused of an
offence is denied a speedy trial and is sought to be
deprived of his liberty by imprisonment as a result of a
long-delayed trial in violation of his fundamental right
under Article 21.”
11. The aforesaid observations have resonated, time and
again, in several judgments, such as Kadra Pahadiya v. State
of Bihar [Kadra Pahadiya v. State of Bihar, (1981) 3 SCC 671:
1981 SCC (Cri) 791] and Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S.
Nayak [Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC 225:
1992 SCC (Cri) 93]. In the latter, the court re-emphasised the
right to a speedy trial and further held that an accused,
facing a prolonged trial, has no option: (Abdul Rehman
Antulay case [Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1
SCC 225: 1992 SCC (Cri) 93], SCC p. 269, para 84)
“84. … The State or complainant prosecutes him. It is,
thus, the obligation of the State or the complainant, as
the case may be, to proceed with the case with reasonable
promptitude. Particularly, in this country, where the large
majority of accused come from poorer and weaker
18
2025:HHC:28728sections of society, not versed in the ways of law, where
they do not often get competent legal advice, the
application of the said rule is wholly inadvisable. Of
course, in a given case, if an accused demands a speedy
trial and yet he is not given one, it may be a relevant
factor in his favour. But we cannot disentitle an accused
from complaining of infringement of his right to a speedy
trial on the ground that he did not ask for or insist upon a
speedy trial.”
22. This position was reiterated in Balwinder Singh v. State
of Punjab, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4354, wherein it was observed:
7. An accused has a right to a fair trial, and while a hurried
trial is frowned upon as it may not give sufficient time to
prepare for the defence, an inordinate delay in the
conclusion of the trial would infringe the right of an accused
guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.
8. It is not for nothing that the Author Oscar Wilde, in “The
Ballad of Reading Gaol”, wrote the following poignant lines
while being incarcerated:
“I know not whether Laws be right,
Or whether Laws be wrong;
All that we know who be in jail
Is that the wall is strong;
And that each day is like a year,
A year whose days are long.”
23. It was submitted that the petitioner has criminal
antecedents and he is not entitled to bail. This submission will not
help the State. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Ayub Khan v. State of Rajasthan, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3763: 2024:
INSC:994 that the criminal antecedents may not be a reason to
19
2025:HHC:28728deny bail to the accused in case of his long incarceration. It was
observed:
“10. The presence of the antecedents of the accused is only
one of the several considerations for deciding the prayer for
bail made by him. In a given case, if the accused makes out a
strong prima facie case, depending upon the fact situation
and period of incarceration, the presence of antecedents may
not be a ground to deny bail. There may be a case where a
Court can grant bail only on the grounds of long
incarceration. The presence of antecedents may not be
relevant in such a case. In a given case, the Court may grant
default bail. Again, the antecedents of the accused are
irrelevant in such a case. Thus, depending upon the peculiar
facts, the Court can grant bail notwithstanding the existence
of the antecedents.”
24. Consequently, the present petition is allowed, and the
petitioner is ordered to be released on bail subject to his furnishing
bail bonds in the sum of ₹1,00,000/- with one surety of the like
amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court. While on bail,
the petitioner will abide by the following terms and conditions: –
(I) The petitioner will not intimidate the witnesses, nor
will he influence any evidence in any manner
whatsoever.
(II) The petitioner shall attend the trial on each and every
hearing and will not seek unnecessary adjournments.
(III) The petitioner will not leave the present address for a
continuous period of seven days without furnishing
the address of the intended visit to the SHO concerned,
the Police Station concerned and the Trial Court.
(IV) The petitioner will surrender his passport, if any, to
the Court; and
(V) The petitioner will furnish his mobile number and
social media contact to the Police and the Court and
will abide by the summons/notices received from the
Police/Court through SMS/WhatsApp/Social Media
Account. In case of any change in the mobile number
20
2025:HHC:28728or social media accounts, the same will be intimated to
the Police/Court within five days from the date of the
change.
25. It is expressly made clear that in case of violation of any
of these conditions, the prosecution will have the right to file a
petition for cancellation of the bail.
26. The petition stands accordingly disposed of. A copy of
this order be sent to the Superintendent of District Sub Jail, Solan,
District Solan, H.P. and the learned Trial Court by FASTER.
27. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the
disposal of this petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on
the case’s merits.
28. A downloaded copy of this order shall be accepted by the
learned Trial Court while accepting the bail bonds from the
petitioner, and in case said Court intends to ascertain the veracity
of the downloaded copy of the order presented to it, the same may
be ascertained from the official website of this Court.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
26 August, 2025
(Pramod) Digitally signed
by CHANDER
CHANDER SHEKHAR
SHEKHAR Date:
2025.08.26
12:34:05 +0530
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