Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On : 16Th December vs Idyll Institute Of Computer on 2 January, 2025
Author: Virender Singh
Bench: Virender Singh
1 ( 2025:HHC:760 )
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA
Cr. MMO No. 1237 of 2024
Reserved on : 16th December, 2024
Decided on : 2nd January, 2025
Sai Infotech Tutu & Another …Petitioners
Versus
Idyll Institute of Computer
Education Pvt Ltd. …Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge
Whether approved for reporting?
________________________________________________
For the petitioners : Ms. Anu Tuli Azta, Advocate.
For the respondent :
Virender Singh, Judge
Petitioners have filed the present petition, under
Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023
(hereinafter referred to as ‘the BNSS’), for quashing the
judgment of conviction dated 24.11.2018 and order of
sentence dated 20.12.2018, passed by the Court of learned
Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No.2, Shimla
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘trial Court’), in Criminal Case
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No.2407/3 of 2014/13, titled as Idyll Institute of Computer
Education Pvt. Ltd versus Sai Infotech Tutu & Another.
2. By way of the judgment of conviction and order of
sentence, as referred to above, the learned trial Court has
convicted the petitioners for the offence punishable under
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881,
(hereinafter referred to as ‘the N.I. Act‘) and sentenced
petitioner No.2, Subhash Singta, to undergo simple
imprisonment for a period of six months and to pay a sum of
Rs.2,10,000/, as compensation. In default of payment of
compensation, petitioner No.2, has further been directed to
undergo simple imprisonment for a period of fifteen days.
3. Thereafter, the petitioners have challenged the
judgment of conviction and order of sentence, as referred to
above, before the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge
(II), Shimla, (hereinafter referred to as the First Appellate
Court’), in Criminal Appeal No.2S/10 of 2019, titled as Sai
Infotech Tutu & Another vs. Idyll Institute of Computer, which
was dismissed on 20.04.2024.
4. The petitioners had preferred Criminal Revision
No.168 of 2021, titled as Sai Infotech Tutu Gyan Bhawan
3 ( 2025:HHC:760 )
and Another versus Idyll Institute of Computer Education
Pvt. Ltd., before this Court, which was also dismissed on
4.11.2024.
5. Now, by way of the present petition, a prayer has
been made to quash the proceedings, mainly on the ground
that the petitioners are now ready and willing to settle the
matter with the complainant and are also ready to deposit the
entire remaining amount. Hence, a prayer has been made to
allow the petition.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioners has made efforts
to justify the present petition, by arguing that the offence,
punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act, is compoundable
and the same can be compounded, at any stage.
7. To buttress her contentions, the learned counsel
appearing for the petitioners has relied upon the decision of a
coordinate Bench of this Court in Cr.MMO No.674 of 2024,
titled as Satvir Singh versus Rajesh Pathania & Another,
decided on 19.7.2024.
8. The main ground upon which, the present petition
has been filed, is that, the petitioners are now ready to
compound the offence.
4 ( 2025:HHC:760 )
9. Admittedly, in this case, the petitioners have not
availed the remedy to assail the order, passed by this Court,
on 4.11.2024, dismissing Cr. Revision No.168 of 2021, which
was filed against the judgment, passed by the learned First
Appellate Court, by virtue of which, the appeal preferred
against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence,
passed by the learned trial Court, was dismissed.
10. In such situation, the first and foremost question,
which arises for determination, before this Court is, as to
whether the bar, as, contained, under Section 362 of the
Cr.PC (now 403 of the BNSS), can be ignored, by exercising
the powers under Section 482 Cr.PC. (Section 528 BNSS).
11. If the present petition is accepted, as prayed for, it
would be nothing, but, interfering with the judgment, passed
by this Court, on 4.11.2024, by virtue which, the Criminal
Revision No.168 of 2021, was dismissed.
12. In other words, the acceptance of the prayer would
amount to review the judgment of the same Court, which has
earlier dismissed the Revision Petition. The said course is not
legally permissible under law, in view of the bar created by
Section 362 Cr.PC.
5 ( 2025:HHC:760 )
13. Admittedly, at present, no proceedings are pending
between the parties before this Court or before the Hon’ble
Supreme Court. Although, compounding can be done, at any
stage, but, for invoking the said provisions i.e., Section 147 of
the N.I. Act, some proceedings must be pending before any
Court.
14. Pendency of the proceedings, before any Court, is
sine qua non, for exercising the powers under Section 482
Cr.PC., as, held by a three Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Apex
Court, in Ramawatar versus State of Madhya Pradesh,
2021 SCC OnLine SC 966. Relevant paragraph 13 of the
judgment, is reproduced as under:
“13. We, however, put a further caveat that the
powers under Article 142 or under Section 482
Cr.P.C., are exercisable in postconviction matters
only where an appeal is pending before one or
the other Judicial forum. This is on the premise
that an order of conviction does not attain finality
till the accused has exhausted his/her legal
remedies and the finality is subjudice before an
appellate court. The pendency of legal
proceedings, be that may before the final Court,
is sinequanon to involve the superior court’s
plenary powers to do complete justice.
Conversely, where a settlement has ensued post
the attainment of all legal remedies, the
annulment of proceedings on the basis of a
compromise would be impermissible. Such an
embargo is necessitated to prevent the accused
from gaining an indefinite leverage, for such a
settlement/compromise will always be loaded
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with lurking suspicion about its bona fide. We
have already clarified that the purpose of these
extraordinary powers is not to incentivise any
hollowhearted agreements between the accused
and the victim but to do complete justice by
effecting genuine settlement(s).”
(Self emphasis supplied)
15. The powers, under Section 482 Cr.PC. (Section 528
BNSS), are not to be used, in contravention to the specific
provisions of the Act. While holding so, the view of this Court
is being guided, by the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court,
in State of Punjab versus Devinder Pal Singh Bhullar and
others, (2011) 14 Supreme Court Cases 770. Relevant
paragraphs 44 to 64 of the said judgment, are reproduced, as
under:
“44. There is no power of review with the
Criminal Court after judgment has been
rendered. The High Court can alter or review its
judgment before it is signed. When an order is
passed, it cannot be reviewed. Section 362
Cr.P.C. is based on an acknowledged principle of
law that once a matter is finally disposed of by a
Court, the said Court in the absence of a specific
statutory provision becomes functus officio and is
disentitled to entertain a fresh prayer for any
relief unless the former order of final disposal is
set aside by a Court of competent jurisdiction in a
manner prescribed by law. The Court becomes
functus officio the moment the order for disposing
of a case is signed. Such an order cannot be
altered except to the extent of correcting a clerical or
arithmetical error. There is also no provision for
modification of the judgment. (See: Hari Singh Mann
7 ( 2025:HHC:760 )v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa & Ors., AIR 2001 SC 43;
and Chhanni v. State of U.P., )
45. Moreover, the prohibition contained in Section
362 Cr.P.C. is absolute; after the judgment is signed,
even the High Court in exercise of its inherent power
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has no authority or
jurisdiction to alter/review the same. (See: Moti Lal v.
State of M.P., AIR 1994 SC 1544; Hari Singh Mann
(supra); and State of Kerala vs. M.M. Manikantan
Nair).
46. If a judgment has been pronounced without
jurisdiction or in violation of principles of natural
justice or where the order has been pronounced
without giving an opportunity of being heard to a
party affected by it or where an order was obtained
by abuse of the process of court which would really
amount to its being without jurisdiction, inherent
powers can be exercised to recall such order for the
reason that in such an eventuality the order becomes
a nullity and the provisions of Section 362 Cr.P.C.
would not operate. In such eventuality, the judgment
is manifestly contrary to the audi alteram partem rule
of natural justice. The power of recall is different from
the power of altering/reviewing the judgment.
However, the party seeking recall/alteration has to
establish that it was not at fault. (Vide: Chitawan &
Ors. v. Mahboob Ilahi, Deepak Thanwardas Balwani
v. State of Maharashtra & Anr. Swarth Mahto & Anr.
v. Dharmdeo Narain Singh, Makkapati Nagaswara
Sastri v. S.S. Satyanarayan, Asit Kumar Kar v. State
of West Bengal & Ors., Vishnu Agarwal v. State of
U.P. & Anr.
47. This Court by virtue of Article 137of the
Constitution has been invested with an express power
to review any judgment in Criminal Law and while no
such power has been conferred on the High Court,
inherent power of the court cannot be exercised for
doing that which is specifically prohibited by the
Code itself. (Vide: State Represented by D.S.P.,
S.B.C.I.D., Chennai v. K.V. Rajendran & Ors.
48. In Smt. Sooraj Devi v. Pyare Lal & Anr., AIR 1981
SC 736, this Court held that the prohibition in Section
362 Cr.P.C. against the Court altering or reviewing its
judgment, is subject to what is “otherwise provided by
this Code or by any other law for the time being in
force”. Those words, however, refer to those
8 ( 2025:HHC:760 )
provisions only where the Court has been expressly
authorised by the Code or other law to alter or review
its judgment. The inherent power of the Court is not
contemplated by the saving provision contained
in Section 362 Cr.P.C and, therefore, the attempt to
invoke that power can be of no avail.
49. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to
the effect that the criminal justice delivery system
does not clothe the court to add or delete any words,
except to correct the clerical or arithmetical error as
specifically been provided under the statute itself
after pronouncement of the judgment as the Judge
becomes functus officio. Any mistake or glaring
omission is left to be corrected only by the appropriate
forum in accordance with law.
IV. INHERENT POWERS UNDER SECTION 482 Cr.P.C. 50. "3......The inherent power under Section
482 Cr.P.C. is intended to prevent the abuse of the
process of the Court and to secure the ends of justice.
Such power cannot be exercised to do something
which is expressly barred under the Cr.P.C. If any
consideration of the facts by way of review is not
permissible under the Cr.P.C. and is expressly barred,
it is not for the Court to exercise its inherent power to
reconsider the matter and record a conflicting
decision. If there had been change in the
circumstances of the case, it would be in order for the
High Court to exercise its inherent powers in the
prevailing circumstances and pass appropriate orders
to secure the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of
the process of the Court. Where there are no such
changed circumstances and the decision has to be
arrived at on the facts that existed as on the date of
the earlier order, the exercise of the power to
reconsider the same materials to arrive at different
conclusion is in effect a review, which is expressly
barred under Section 362 Cr.P.C.
(emphasis supplied)
51. The inherent power of the court under Section
482 Cr.P.C. is saved only where an order has been
passed by the criminal court which is required to be
set aside to secure the ends of justice or where the
proceeding pending before a court, amounts to abuse
of the process of court. Therefore, such powers can be
exercised by the High Court in relation to a matter
9 ( 2025:HHC:760 )
pending before a criminal court or where a power is
exercised by the court under the Cr.P.C. Inherent
powers cannot be exercised assuming that the statute
conferred an unfettered and arbitrary jurisdiction, nor
can the High Court act at its whim or caprice. The
statutory power has to be exercised sparingly with
circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases. (Vide:
Kurukshetra University & Anr. v. State of Haryana &
Anr., AIR 1977 SC 2229; and State of W.B. & Ors. v.
Sujit Kumar Rana, (2004) 4 SCC 129).
52. The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. cannot be
resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Cr.P.C.
for the redressal of the grievance of the aggrieved
party or where alternative remedy is available. Such
powers cannot be exercised as against the express
bar of the law and engrafted in any other provision of
the Cr.P.C. Such powers can be exercised to secure
the ends of justice and to prevent the abuse of the
process of court. However, such expressions do not
confer unlimited/unfettered jurisdiction on the High
Court as the “ends of justice” and “abuse of the
process of the court” have to be dealt with in
accordance with law including the procedural law
and not otherwise. Such powers can be exercised ex
debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice as
the courts have been conferred such inherent
jurisdiction, in absence of any express provision, as
inherent in their constitution, or such powers as are
necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in
course of administration of justice as provided in the
legal maxim “quando lex aliquid alique, concedit,
conceditur et id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest”.
However, the High Court has not been given nor does
it possess any inherent power to make any order,
which in the opinion of the court, could be in the
interest of justice as the statutory provision is not
intended to bypass the procedure prescribed. (Vide:
Lalit Mohan Mondal & Ors. v. Benoyendra Nath
Chatterjee, AIR 1982 SC 785; Rameshchandra
Nandlal Parikh v. State of Gujarat & Anr., AIR 2006
SC 915; Central Bureau of Investigation v. Ravi
Shankar Srivastava, IAS & Anr., AIR 2006 SC
2872; Inder Mohan Goswami & Anr. v. State of
Uttaranchal & Ors., AIR 2008 SC 251; and Pankaj
Kumar v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., AIR 2008 SC
3077).
10 ( 2025:HHC:760 )
53. The High Court can always issue appropriate
direction in exercise of its power under Article 226 of
the Constitution at the behest of an aggrieved person,
if the court is convinced that the power of
investigation has been exercised by an Investigating
Officer malafide or the matter is not investigated at
all. Even in such a case, the High Court cannot direct
the police as to how the investigation is to be
conducted but can insist only for the observance of
process as provided for in the Cr.P.C. Another remedy
available to such an aggrieved person may be to file a
complaint under Section 200 Cr.P.C. and the court
concerned will proceed as provided in Chapter XV of
the Cr.P.C. (See: Gangadhar Janardan Mhatre v.
State of Maharashtra & Ors., (2004) 7 SCC 768;
and Divine Retreat Centre v. State of Kerala & Ors.,
AIR 2008 SC 1614).
54. The provisions of Section 482 Cr.P.C. closely
resemble Section 151 of Code of Civil Procedure,
1908, (hereinafter called the ‘CPC‘), and, therefore,
the restrictions which are there to use the inherent
powers under Section 151 CPC are applicable in
exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and one
such restriction is that there exists no other provision
of law by which the party aggrieved could have
sought relief. (Vide: The Janata Dal v. H.S.
Chowdhary & Ors., AIR 1993 SC 892).
55. In Divisional Forest Officer & Anr. v. G.V.
Sudhakar Rao & Ors., AIR 1986 SC 328, this Court
held that High Court was not competent under Section
482 Cr.P.C. to stay the operation of an order of
confiscation under Section 44(IIA) of the Andhra
Pradesh Forest Act as it is distinct from a trial before
a court for the commission of an offence.
56. In Popular Muthiah v. State represented by
Inspector of Police, (2006) 7 SCC 296, explaining the
scope of Section 482 Cr.P.C., this Court held :
” 48…The High Court cannot issue directions to
investigate the case from a particular angle or by a
particular agency.” (emphasis added)
Thus, in case, the High Court in exercise of its
inherent powers, issues directions contravening the
statutory provisions laying down the procedure of
investigation, it would be unwarranted in law.
11 ( 2025:HHC:760 )
57. In Rajan Kumar Machananda v. State of
Karnataka, 1990 (supp.) SCC 132, this Court
examined a case as to whether the bar under Section
397(3) Cr.P.C. can be circumvented by invoking
inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. by the
High Court. The Court came to the conclusion that if
such a course was permissible it would be possible
that every application facing the bar of Section
397(3) Cr.P.C. would be labelled as one under Section
482 Cr.P.C. Thus, the statutory bar cannot be
circumvented.
58. This Court has consistently emphasised that
judges must enforce laws whatever they may be and
decide the cases strictly in accordance with the law.
“The laws are not always just and the lights are not
always luminous. Nor, again, are judicial methods
always adequate to secure justice”. But the courts
“are bound by the Penal Code and Criminal Procedure
Code” by the very `oath’ of the office. (See: Joseph
Peter v. State of Goa, Daman and Diu, AIR 1977 SC
1812).
59. It is evident from the above that inherent
powers can be exercised only to prevent the abuse of
the process of the court and to secure the ends of
justice. However, powers can be used provided there
is no prohibition for passing such an order under the
provisions of Cr.P.C. and there is no provision under
which the party can seek redressal of its grievance.
Under the garb of exercising inherent powers, the
Criminal Court cannot review its judgment. Such
powers are analogous to the provisions of Section 151
CPC and can be exercised only to do real and
substantial justice. (self emphasis supplied).
60. The rule of inherent powers has its source in
the maxim “Quadolex aliquid alicui concedit,
concedere videtur id sine quo ipsa, ess uon potest”
which means that when the law gives anything to
anyone, it gives also all those things without which
the thing itself could not exist. The order cannot be
passed bypassing the procedure prescribed by law.
The court in exercise of its power under Section
482 Cr.P.C. cannot direct a particular agency to
investigate the matter or to investigate a case from a
particular angle or by a procedure not prescribed
in Cr.P.C. Such powers should be exercised very
sparingly to prevent abuse of process of any court.
12 ( 2025:HHC:760 )
Courts must be careful to see that its decision in
exercise of this power is based on sound principles.
61. To inhere means that it forms a necessary part
and belongs as an attribute in the nature of things.
The High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is crowned
with a statutory power to exercise control over the
administration of justice in criminal proceedings
within its territorial jurisdiction. This is to ensure that
proceedings undertaken under the Cr.P.C. are
executed to secure the ends of justice. For this, the
Legislature has empowered the High Court with an
inherent authority which is repository under the
Statute. The Legislature therefore clearly intended the
existence of such power in the High Court to control
proceedings initiated under the Cr.P.C. Conferment of
such inherent power might be necessary to prevent
the miscarriage of justice and to prevent any form of
injustice. However, it is to be understood that it is
neither divine nor limitless. It is not to generate
unnecessary indulgence. The power is to protect the
system of justice from being polluted during the
administration of justice under the Code.
62. The High Court can intervene where it finds the
abuse of the process of any court which means, that
wherever an attempt to secure something by abusing
the process is located, the same can be rectified by
invoking such power. There has to be a nexus and a
direct corelation to any existing proceeding, not
foreclosed by any other form under the Code, to the
subject matter for which such power is to be
exercised.
63. Application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. lies before
the High Court against an order passed by the court
subordinate to it in a pending case/proceedings.
Generally, such powers are used for quashing
criminal proceedings in appropriate cases. Such an
application does not lie to initiate criminal proceedings
or set the criminal law in motion. Inherent jurisdiction
can be exercised if the order of the Subordinate Court
results in the abuse of the “process” of the court
and/or calls for interference to secure the ends of
justice. The use of word `process’ implies that the
proceedings are pending before the Subordinate
Court. When reference is made to the phrase “to
secure the ends of justice”, it is in fact in relation to
the order passed by the Subordinate Court and it
cannot be understood in a general connotation of the
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phrase. More so, while entertaining such application
the proceedings should be pending in the Subordinate
Court. In case it attained finality, the inherent powers
cannot be exercised. Party aggrieved may approach
the appellate/revisional forum. Inherent jurisdiction
can be exercised if injustice done to a party, e.g., a
clear mandatory provision of law is overlooked or
where different accused in the same case are being
treated differently by the Subordinate Court.
64. An inherent power is not an omnibus for
opening a pandorabox, that too for issues that are
foreign to the main context. The invoking of the power
has to be for a purpose that is connected to a
proceeding and not for sprouting an altogether new
issue. A power cannot exceed its own authority
beyond its own creation. It is not that a person is
remediless. On the contrary, the constitutional remedy
of writs are available. Here, the High Court enjoys
wide powers of prerogative writs as compared to that
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. To secure the corpus of an
individual, remedy by way of habeas corpus is
available. For that the High Court should not resort to
inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. as the
Legislature has conferred separate powers for the
same. Needless to mention that Section 97 Cr.P.C.
empowers Magistrates to order the search of a person
wrongfully confined. It is something different that the
same court exercising authority can, in relation to the
same subject matter, invoke its writ jurisdiction as
well. Nevertheless, the inherent powers are not to
provide universal remedies. The power cannot be and
should not be used to belittle its own existence. One
cannot concede anarchy to an inherent power for that
was never the wisdom of the Legislature. To confer
unbriddled inherent power would itself be trenching
upon the authority of the Legislature.”
(Self emphasis supplied)
16. This matter can be seen from another angle.
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Damodar S. Prabhu versus
Sayed BabaLal, 2015 (5) SCC 663, has elaborately
discussed the provisions of Sections 138 and 147 of the N.I.
14 ( 2025:HHC:760 )
Act and laid down certain guidelines. Relevant para21 of the
judgment, is reproduced, as under:
” With regard to the progression of litigation in
cheque bouncing cases, the learned Attorney
General has urged this Court to frame guidelines
for a graded scheme of imposing costs on parties
who unduly delay compounding of the offence. It
was submitted that the requirement of deposit of
the costs will act as a deterrent for delayed
composition, since at present, free and easy
compounding of offences at any stage, however
belated, gives an incentive to the drawer of the
cheque to delay settling the cases for years. An
application for compounding made after several
years not only results in the system being
burdened but the complainant is also deprived of
effective justice. In view of this submission, we
direct that the following guidelines be followed:
THE GUIDELINES
(i) In the circumstances, it is proposed as follows:
(a) That directions can be given that the Writ of
Summons be suitably modified making it clear to
the accused that he could make an application for
compounding of the offences at the first or second
hearing of the case and that if such an application
is made, compounding may be allowed by the
court without imposing any costs on the accused.
(b) If the accused does not make an application for
compounding as aforesaid, then if an application
for compounding is made before the Magistrate at
a subsequent stage, compounding can be allowed
subject to the condition that the accused will be
required to pay 10% of the cheque amount to be
deposited as a condition for compounding with the
Legal Services Authority, or such authority as the
Court deems fit.
(c) Similarly, if the application for compounding is
made before the Sessions Court or a High Court in
revision or appeal, such compounding may be
15 ( 2025:HHC:760 )
allowed on the condition that the accused pays
15% of the cheque amount by way of costs.
(d) Finally, if the application for compounding is
made before the Supreme Court, the figure would
increase to 20% of the cheque amount.”
(Self emphasis supplied)
16. Admittedly, in the present case, nothing has been
done by the petitioners, when, the lis was pending before the
learned trial Court, Court of Sessions, as well as, before this
Court.
17. If the contentions of the learned counsel appearing
for the petitioners are accepted, then, instead of filing the
present petition, before this Court, the application for
compounding should have been filed, before the learned trial
Court.
18. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, while issuing
directions in Damodar S. Prabhu’s (supra) has categorically
fixed the amount of compounding fee at different levels.
Before the learned trial Court, there is no requirement of
paying the compounding fee, if the compounding is done at
first or second hearing of the case, whereas, 10% of the
cheque amount is held to be payable, as compounding fee,
where, the compounding is done, at the subsequent stage. If
16 ( 2025:HHC:760 )
the proceedings are pending before the Court of Sessions or
before the High Court, the compounding fee is held to be
15%. If the proceedings are pending before the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has increased
the figure, as, 20% of the cheque amount.
19. Merely, on the basis of the said guidelines, the
arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioners qua the
fact that compounding can be done, at any stage, do not hold
water.
20. Even, as per those guidelines, in Damodar S
Prabhu’s case (supra), an inference can be drawn that sine
qua non, for moving the application, for compounding, is
pendency of proceedings. Nonfiling of the appeal before the
Hon’ble Supreme Court against the dismissal of the revision
petition, by this Court, resulted into finality of the judgment
of conviction.
21. If the present petition is allowed, it would amount
to reopening the matter, which is not permissible under the
provisions of Section 482 Cr.PC.
22. Even otherwise, if the prayer is accepted, it would
amount to give premium to the accused, for their act of
17 ( 2025:HHC:760 )
omission, in not preferring the appeal before the Hon’ble
Supreme Court against the dismissal of the revision Petition,
by this Court, on 4.11.2024, whereas, the present petition
has been filed on 3.12.2024.
23. Considering the fact that no appeal has been
preferred against the dismissal of the revision petition, by this
Court, this Court is of the view that the petitioners could not
bring their case within the purview of the exceptions, as,
carved out, by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 46 of the
judgment in Devinder Pal Singh Bhullar‘s case (supra).
24. In view of the directions, issued, by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, in Damodar S. Prabhu’s case (supra),
compounding is permissible, at any stage of the proceedings,
but, sine qua non a pendency of the proceedings, whereas, in
this case, no proceedings, in any Court, are pending, as such,
a line has to be drawn, where, the compounding of the
offence, could be permitted.
25. If the prayer, at this stage, is accepted, then, there
would be no end to the litigation, as, after challenging the
judgment of conviction and order of sentence unsuccessfully,
which has attained finality, by way of all the legal remedies,
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available, thereafter, the person, like the petitioners, would
approach this Court, under Section 482 Cr.PC. (Section 528
BNSS), to get rid of the judgment of conviction and order of
sentence, under the garb of compromise.
26. Considering all these facts, the present petition is
not maintainable and the same is accordingly dismissed. The
pending application(s), if any, are also disposed of.
(Virender Singh)
Judge
January 02, 2025 (ps)