Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 18.06.2025 vs State Of Himachal Pradesh on 25 June, 2025
2025:HHC:19710
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MP (M) No. 1203 of 2025
Reserved on: 18.06.2025
Date of Decision: 25.06.2025
Jeevan Singh @ Jivnu …Petitioner
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh …Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No
For the Petitioner : Mr. Jagmohan Singh Chandel,
Advocate.
For the Respondent/State : Mr. Ajit Sharma, Deputy
Advocate General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition for
seeking regular bail in F.I.R. 73 of 2024, dated 10.11.2024,
registered at Police Station Swarghat, District Bilaspur, H.P., for
the commission of an offence punishable under Section 20 of the
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (in short
‘NDPS Act‘)
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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2. It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution’s
case, the police party intercepted a vehicle bearing registration
No. PB-01A-2770 at 3:10 a.m. and recovered 5 kg and 787 grams
of charas from the blue trolley bag, which was kept in the dickey
of the vehicle. The petitioner was travelling in the vehicle. The
police arrested the petitioner and seized the charas. The
petitioner is innocent, and he was falsely implicated. There are
reasonable grounds to believe that the petitioner is not guilty of
the commission of the offence. The investigation is complete,
and no recovery is to be effected from the petitioner. The
driver/owner of the vehicle was not arrayed as an accused. The
petitioner would abide by all the terms and conditions which the
Court may impose. No purpose would be served by keeping the
accused in custody. Therefore, it was prayed that the present
petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.
3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report
asserting that the police party was on patrolling duty on
10.11.2024. They intercepted a vehicle bearing registration No.
PB01A-2770. The driver identified himself as Prince Kumar, and
the other person identified himself as Jeevan Singh (the present
petitioner). The driver said that he was engaged by the petitioner
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to drop him at Chandigarh Airport; however, the petitioner could
not give any satisfactory answer for going towards the Airport.
The Police checked the vehicle and found a trolley bag and
recovered eight packets wrapped with Khakhi tape. These were
checked and found to contain 5kg and 787 grams of charas. The
police seized the charas and arrested the petitioner. The Charas
was sent to SFSL Junga, and as per result of the analysis, it was
found to be an extract of cannabis and a sample of Charas. The
Charge sheet was filed before the Court on 22.01.2025, and the
matter is listed before the learned Special Judge on 30.06.2025 for
recording of statements of PWs 1, 5, 8, and 9. The petitioner
would indulge in the commission of a similar offence in case of
release on bail. Hence, the status report.
4. I have heard Mr. Jagmohan Singh Chandel, learned
counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy
Advocate General, for the respondent-State.
5. Mr Jagmohan Singh Chadel, learned counsel for the
petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was
falsely implicated. The police arrested the petitioner and made
the driver a witness. The driver was driving the vehicle, and he
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had the keys; therefore, he was in possession of the trolley bag.
There is nothing to connect the petitioner with the commission of
a crime. There are various discrepancies in the prosecution’s case.
Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the
petitioner be released on bail. He relied upon judgments of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dataram Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh,
AIR 2018SC (Criminal) 425 and Anr. and Union of India vs. Shri Shiv
Shankar Kesari in Appeal (Crl) 1223 of 2007 decided on 14.09.2007
in support of his submission.
6. Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General,
submitted that the police had recovered 5 kg and 787 grams of
charas, which is a commercial quantity. Rigours of Section 37 of
the NDPS Act apply to the present case. The petitioner has not
satisfied the twin conditions laid down in Section 37 of the NDPS
Act. The petitioner would commit a similar offence in case of his
release on bail. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be
dismissed.
7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
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8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ajwar v. Waseem (2024) 10 SCC 768:
2024 SCC OnLine SC 974, wherein it was observed at page 783: –
“Relevant parameters for granting bail
26. While considering as to whether bail ought to be
granted in a matter involving a serious criminal offence,
the Court must consider relevant factors like the nature of
the accusations made against the accused, the manner in
which the crime is alleged to have been committed, the
gravity of the offence, the role attributed to the accused,
the criminal antecedents of the accused, the probability of
tampering of the witnesses and repeating the offence, if
the accused are released on bail, the likelihood of the
accused being unavailable in the event bail is granted, the
possibility of obstructing the proceedings and evading the
courts of justice and the overall desirability of releasing the
accused on bail. [Refer: Chaman Lal v. State of U.P. [Chaman
Lal v. State of U.P., (2004) 7 SCC 525: 2004 SCC (Cri)
1974]; Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan [Kalyan
Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC
(Cri) 1977]; Masroor v. State of U.P. [Masroor v. State of U.P.,
(2009) 14 SCC 286 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1368]; Prasanta Kumar
Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee [Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis
Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765]; Neeru
Yadav v. State of U.P. [Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P., (2014) 16
SCC 508 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 527]; Anil Kumar Yadav v. State
(NCT of Delhi)[Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi),
(2018) 12 SCC 129 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 425]; Mahipal v. Rajesh
Kumar [Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar, (2020) 2 SCC 118 : (2020) 1
SCC (Cri) 558] .]
9. This position was reiterated in Ramratan v. State of
M.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3068, wherein it was observed as under:-
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“12. The fundamental purpose of bail is to ensure the
accused’s presence during the investigation and trial. Any
conditions imposed must be reasonable and directly
related to this objective. This Court in Parvez Noordin
Lokhandwalla v. State of Maharastra (2020) 10 SCC 77
observed that though the competent court is empowered to
exercise its discretion to impose “any condition” for the
grant of bail under Sections 437(3) and 439(1)(a) CrPC, the
discretion of the court has to be guided by the need to
facilitate the administration of justice, secure the presence
of the accused and ensure that the liberty of the accused is
not misused to impede the investigation, overawe the
witnesses or obstruct the course of justice. The relevant
observations are extracted herein below:
“14. The language of Section 437(3) CrPC, which uses
the expression “any condition … otherwise in the
interest of justice” has been construed in several
decisions of this Court. Though the competent court is
empowered to exercise its discretion to impose “any
condition” for the grant of bail under
Sections 437(3) and 439(1)(a) CrPC, the discretion of the
court has to be guided by the need to facilitate the
administration of justice, secure the presence of the accused
and ensure that the liberty of the accused is not misused to
impede the investigation, overawe the witnesses or obstruct
the course of justice. Several decisions of this Court have
dwelt on the nature of the conditions which can
legitimately be imposed both in the context of bail and
anticipatory bail.” (Emphasis supplied)
13. In Sumit Mehta v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2013) 15 SCC 570,
this Court discussed the scope of the discretion of the Court
to impose “any condition” on the grant of bail and
observed in the following terms:–
“15. The words “any condition” used in the provision
should not be regarded as conferring absolute power on
a court of law to impose any condition that it chooses to
impose. Any condition has to be interpreted as a
reasonable condition acceptable in the facts permissible in
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2025:HHC:19710the circumstance, and effective in the pragmatic sense, and
should not defeat the order of grant of bail. We are of the
view that the present facts and circumstances of the
case do not warrant such an extreme condition to be
imposed.” (Emphasis supplied)
14. This Court, in Dilip Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh
(2021) 2 SCC 779, laid down the factors to be taken into
consideration while deciding the bail application and
observed:
“4. It is well settled by a plethora of decisions of this
Court that criminal proceedings are not for the
realisation of disputed dues. It is open to a court to
grant or refuse the prayer for anticipatory bail,
depending on the facts and circumstances of the
particular case. The factors to be taken into consideration
while considering an application for bail are the nature of
the accusation and the severity of the punishment in the
case of conviction and the nature of the materials relied
upon by the prosecution; reasonable apprehension of
tampering with the witnesses or apprehension of threat to
the complainant or the witnesses; the reasonable possibility
of securing the presence of the accused at the time of trial or
the likelihood of his abscondence; character, behaviour and
standing of the accused; and the circumstances which are
peculiar or the accused and larger interest of the public or
the State and similar other considerations. A criminal
court, exercising jurisdiction to grant bail/anticipatory
bail, is not expected to act as a recovery agent to realise
the dues of the complainant, and that too, without any
trial.” (Emphasis supplied)
10. This position was reiterated in Shabeen Ahmed versus
State of U.P., 2025 SCC Online SC 479.
11. The present petition has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
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12. The petitioner was travelling in the vehicle from which
the recovery was effected. The vehicle was a taxi, and the driver
categorically stated that the petitioner had hired it to go to
Chandigarh Airport from Kullu. Prima facie, there is nothing to
doubt the testimony of the driver. In Madan Lal versus State of H.P.
(2003) 7 SCC 465: 2003 SCC (Cri) 1664: 2003 SCC OnLineSC 874, the
contraband was recovered from a vehicle, and it was held that all
the occupants of the vehicle would be in conscious possession of
the contraband. It was observed:
“19. Whether there was conscious possession has to be
determined with reference to the factual backdrop. The
facts which can be culled out from the evidence on record
are that all the accused persons were travelling in a vehicle,
and as noted by the trial court, they were known to each
other, and it has not been explained or shown as to how
they travelled together from the same destination in a
vehicle which was not a public vehicle.
20. Section 20(b) makes possession of contraband articles
an offence. Section 20 appears in Chapter IV of the Act,
which relates to offences for possession of such articles. It
is submitted that in order to make the possession illicit,
there must be conscious possession.
21. It is highlighted that unless the possession was coupled
with the requisite mental element, i.e. conscious
possession and not mere custody without awareness of the
nature of such possession, Section 20 is not attracted.
22. The expression “possession” is a polymorphous term
which assumes different colours in different contexts. It
may carry different meanings in contextually different
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2025:HHC:19710backgrounds. It is impossible, as was observed in the Supdt.
& Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, W.B. v. Anil Kumar
Bhunja [(1979) 4 SCC 274: 1979 SCC (Cri) 1038: AIR 1980 SC
52] to work out a completely logical and precise definition
of “possession” uniformly applicable to all situations in
the context of all statutes.
23. The word “conscious” means awareness of a particular
fact. It is a state of mind which is deliberate or intended.
24. As noted in Gunwantlal v. State of M.P. [(1972) 2 SCC 194:
1972 SCC (Cri) 678: AIR 1972 SC 1756], possession in a given
case need not be physical possession but can be
constructive, having power and control over the article in
the case in question, while the person to whom physical
possession is given holds it subject to that power or
control.
25. The word “possession” means the legal right to
possession (see Heath v. Drown [(1972) 2 All ER 561: 1973 AC
498: (1972) 2 WLR 1306 (HL)] ). In an interesting case, it
was observed that where a person keeps his firearm in his
mother’s flat, which is safer than his own home, he must
be considered to be in possession of the same.
(See Sullivan v. Earl of Caithness [(1976) 1 All ER 844: 1976 QB
966 : (1976) 2 WLR 361 (QBD)] .)
26. Once possession is established, the person who claims
that it was not a conscious possession has to establish it
because how he came to be in possession is within his
special knowledge. Section 35 of the Act gives a statutory
recognition of this position because of the presumption
available in law. Similar is the position in terms of Section
54, where also presumption is also available to be drawn
from possession of illicit articles.
27. In the factual scenario of the present case, not only
possession but conscious possession has been established.
It has not been shown by the accused-appellants that the
possession was not conscious in the logical background of
Sections 35 and 54 of the Act.”
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13. Therefore, the petitioner has to be considered, prima
facie, in possession of Charas.
14. It was submitted that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that the petitioner is not involved in the commission of a
crime. There are various contradictions in the prosecution’s case,
and the number of persons present in the vehicle is doubtful. All
these facts show a reasonable ground for believing the petitioner
is not guilty of the offence. The term of reasonable ground to
believe was explained in Union of India v. Shiv Shanker Kesari,
(2007) 7 SCC 798: (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 505: 2007 SCC OnLine SC 1125
as under at page 801:
“7. The expression used in Section 37(1)(b)(ii) is
“reasonable grounds”. The expression means something
more than prima facie grounds. It connotes substantial
probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty
of the offence charged, and this reasonable belief
contemplated in turn points to the existence of such facts
and circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify
recording of satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of
the offence charged.
8. The word “reasonable” has in law the prima facie
meaning of reasonable in regard to those circumstances of
which the actor, called on to act reasonably, knows or
ought to know. It is difficult to give an exact definition of
the word “reasonable”.
“7. … In Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, 4th Edn., p. 2258
states that it would be unreasonable to expect an exact
definition of the word ‘reasonable’. Reason varies in its
11
2025:HHC:19710conclusions according to the idiosyncrasy of the
individual, and the times and circumstances in which he
thinks. The reasoning which built up the old scholastic
logic sounds now like the jingling of a child’s toy.”
(See Municipal Corpn. of Delhi v. Jagan Nath Ashok
Kumar [(1987) 4 SCC 497] (SCC p. 504, para 7) and Gujarat
Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. Unique Erectors
(Gujarat) (P) Ltd. [(1989) 1 SCC 532]
9. “9. … It is often said that ‘an attempt to give a specific
meaning to the word “reasonable” is trying to count
what is not number and measure what is not space’. The
author of Words and Phrases (Permanent Edn.) has
quoted from Nice & Schreiber, In re [123 F 987 at p. 988]
to give a plausible meaning for the said word. He says
‘the expression “reasonable” is a relative term, and
the facts of the particular controversy must be
considered before the question as to what constitutes
reasonable can be determined. ‘
It is not meant to be expedient or convenient, but
certainly something more than that.” [Ed. As observed
in Rena Drego v. Lalchand Soni, (1998) 3 SCC 341, p. 346,
para 9.]
10. The word “reasonable” signifies “in accordance with
reason”. In the ultimate analysis, it is a question of fact
whether a particular act is reasonable or not, depends on
the circumstances in a given situation. (See Municipal
Corpn. of Greater Mumbai v. Kamla Mills Ltd. [(2003) 6 SCC
315] )
11. The court, while considering the application for bail
with reference to Section 37 of the Act, is not called upon to
record a finding of not guilty. It is for the limited purpose,
essentially confined to the question of releasing the
accused on bail, that the court is called upon to see if there
are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not
guilty and records its satisfaction about the existence of
such grounds. But the court has not to consider the matter
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as if it is pronouncing a judgment of acquittal and
recording a finding of not guilty.”
15. In the present case, the police officials and the driver
of the vehicle have categorically stated that the recovery was
effected from the Blue trolley bag. The driver claimed that the
trolley bag belonged to the petitioner, and there is nothing on
record to doubt his testimony.
16. F.I.R. and the statement of the driver show that the
only two persons were present in the vehicle, and there is nothing
on record to show the presence of any other person. Once the
possession of the petitioner is proved, the presumption would
arise under Sections 35 and 54 of the NDPS Act that it was
conscious and with the requisite intent; therefore, the plea that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that the petitioner is not
guilty of the commission of the offence is not acceptable.
17. It was submitted that the bag was not sealed on the
spot, and this makes the prosecution’s case suspect. This
submission is only stated to be rejected. The police seized the
charas on the spot, and there was no requirement to seize the bag,
and the prosecution’s case cannot be doubted because the bag was
not seized on the spot.
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18. As per the status report, police have recovered 5
kilograms and 787 grams of charas, which is a commercial
quantity. Therefore, the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act
apply to the present case.
19. Section 37 of the NDPS Act provides that in an offence
involving commercial quantity, the Court should be satisfied that
the accused is not guilty of the commission of an offence and is
not likely to commit any offence while on bail. Section 37 of the
NDPS Act reads as under:
“37. Offences are to be cognizable and non-bailable. – (1)
Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)–
(a) every offence punishable under this Act shall be
cognizable;
(b) no person accused of an offence punishable for
offences under section 19, section 24, or section
27A, and also for offences involving commercial
quantity, shall be released on bail or his own bond
unless-
(i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an
opportunity to oppose the application for such
release, and
(ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the
application, the court is satisfied that there
are reasonable grounds for believing that he is
not guilty of such an offence and that he is not
likely to commit any offence while on bail.
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(2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in
clause (b) of sub-section (1) are in addition to the
limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law for the time being in
force, on granting of bail.”
20. This Section was interpreted by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Union of India Versus Niyazuddin & Another (2018) 13 SCC
738 and it was held that in the absence of the satisfaction that the
accused is not guilty of an offence and he is not likely to commit
an offence while on bail, he cannot be released on bail. It was
observed:
“7. Section 37 of the NDPS Act contains special provisions
with regard to the grant of bail in respect of certain
offences enumerated under the said Section. They are :
(1) In the case of a person accused of an offence
punishable under Section 19,
(2) Under Section 24,
(3) Under Section 27A and
(4) Of offences involving commercial quantity.
8. The accusation in the present case is with regard to the
fourth factor, namely, commercial quantity. Be that as it
may, once the Public Prosecutor opposes the application
for bail to a person accused of the enumerated offences
under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, in case, the court
proposes to grant bail to such a person, two conditions are
to be mandatorily satisfied in addition to the normal
requirements under the provisions of the Cr.P.C. or any
other enactment.
(1) The court must be satisfied that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that the person is
not guilty of such an offence;
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(2) that person is not likely to commit any offence
while on bail.”
21. This position was reiterated in State of Kerala Versus
Rajesh, AIR 2020 SC 721, wherein it was held:
“19. This Court has laid down broad parameters to be
followed while considering the application for bail moved
by the accused involved in offences under the NDPS Act. In
Union of India vs. Ram Samujh and Ors., (1999) 9 SCC 429, it
has been elaborated as under:-
“7. It is to be borne in mind that the aforesaid
legislative mandate is required to be adhered to and
followed. It should be borne in mind that in a murder
case, the accused commits the murder of one or two
persons, while those persons who are dealing in
narcotic drugs are instrumental in causing death or
in inflicting death-blow to a number of innocent
young victims, who are vulnerable; it causes
deleterious effects and a deadly impact on the
society; they are a hazard to the society; even if they
are released temporarily, in all probability, they
would continue their nefarious activities of
trafficking and/or dealing in intoxicants
clandestinely. The reason may be the large stake and
illegal profit involved. This Court, dealing with the
contention with regard to punishment under the
NDPS Act, has succinctly observed about the adverse
effect of such activities in Durand Didier vs. Chief
Secy., Union Territory of Goa, (1990) 1 SCC 95) as
under:
24. With deep concern, we may point out that
the organised activities of the underworld and
the clandestine smuggling of narcotic drugs
and psychotropic substances into this country
and illegal trafficking in such drugs and
substances have led to drug addiction among a
sizeable section of the public, particularly the
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2025:HHC:19710adolescents and students of both sexes and the
menace has assumed serious and alarming
proportions in the recent years. Therefore, in
order to effectively control and eradicate this
proliferating and booming devastating
menace, causing deleterious effects and deadly
impact on society as a whole, Parliament, in its
wisdom, has made effective provisions by
introducing Act 81 of 1985 specifying
mandatory minimum imprisonment and fine.
8. To check the menace of dangerous drugs flooding
the market, Parliament has provided that the person
accused of offences under the NDPS Act should not be
released on bail during trial unless the mandatory
conditions provided in Section 37, namely,
(i) there are reasonable grounds for believing
that the accused is not guilty of such offence;
and
(ii) that he is not likely to commit any offence
while on bail are satisfied. The High Court has
not given any justifiable reason for not
abiding by the aforesaid mandate while
ordering the release of the respondent
accused on bail. Instead of attempting to take
a holistic view of the harmful socio-economic
consequences and health hazards which
would accompany trafficking illegally in
dangerous drugs, the court should implement
the law in the spirit with which Parliament,
after due deliberation, has amended.”
20. The scheme of Section 37 reveals that the exercise of
power to grant bail is not only subject to the limitations
contained under Section 439 of the CrPC but is also subject
to the limitation placed by Section 37, which commences
with the non-obstante clause. The operative part of the
said section is in the negative form prescribing the
enlargement of bail to any person accused of the
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commission of an offence under the Act unless twin
conditions are satisfied. The first condition is that the
prosecution must be given an opportunity to oppose the
application, and the second is that the Court must be
satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing
that he is not guilty of such an offence. If either of these
two conditions is not satisfied, the ban for granting bail
operates.
21. The expression “reasonable grounds” means something
more than prima facie grounds. It contemplates substantial
probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty
of the alleged offence. The reasonable belief contemplated
in the provision requires the existence of such facts and
circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify
satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the alleged
offence. In the case on hand, the High Court seems to have
completely overlooked the underlying object of Section 37
that in addition to the limitations provided under the CrPC,
or any other law for the time being in force, regulating the
grant of bail, its liberal approach in the matter of bail under
the NDPS Act is indeed uncalled for.”
22. A similar view was taken in Union of India v. Mohd.
Nawaz Khan, (2021) 10 SCC 100: (2021) 3 SCC (Cri) 721: 2021 SCC
OnLine SC 1237 wherein it was observed at page 110:
“21. Under Section 37(1)(b)(ii), the limitations on the grant
of bail for offences punishable under Sections 19, 24 or 27-
A and also for offences involving a commercial quantity
are:
(i) The Prosecutor must be given an opportunity to
oppose the application for bail; and
(ii) There must exist “reasonable grounds to
believe” that : (a) the person is not guilty of such an
offence; and (b) he is not likely to commit any
offence while on bail.
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22. The standard prescribed for the grant of bail is
“reasonable ground to believe” that the person is not guilty
of the offence. Interpreting the standard of “reasonable
grounds to believe”, a two-judge Bench of this Court
in Shiv Shanker Kesari [Union of India v. Shiv Shanker Kesari,
(2007) 7 SCC 798 : (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 505], held that : (SCC
pp. 801-02, paras 7-8 & 10-11)
“7. The expression used in Section 37(1)(b)(ii) is
“reasonable grounds”. The expression means something
more than prima facie grounds. It connotes substantial
probable causes for believing that the accused is not
guilty of the offence charged, and this reasonable belief
contemplated in turn points to the existence of such facts
and circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to
justify the recording of satisfaction that the accused is
not guilty of the offence charged.
8. The word “reasonable” has in law the prima facie
meaning of reasonable in regard to those
circumstances of which the actor, called on to act
reasonably, knows or ought to know. It is difficult to
give an exact definition of the word “reasonable”.
‘7. … Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, 4th Edn., p. 2258
states that it would be unreasonable to expect an
exact definition of the word “reasonable”. Reason
varies in its conclusions according to the
idiosyncrasy of the individual, and the times and
circumstances in which he thinks. The reasoning
which built up the old scholastic logic sounds now
like the jingling of a child’s toy.’
[See MCD v. Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar [MCD v. Jagan
Nath Ashok Kumar, (1987) 4 SCC 497], SCC p. 504, para
7 and Gujarat Water Supply & Sewerage
Board v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd. [Gujarat
Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. Unique Erectors
(Gujarat) (P) Ltd., (1989) 1 SCC 532] ]
***
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10. The word “reasonable” signifies “in accordance
with reason”. In the ultimate analysis, it is a
question of fact whether a particular act is
reasonable or not, depends on the circumstances in a
given situation. (See Municipal Corpn. of Greater
Mumbai v. Kamla Mills Ltd. [Municipal Corpn. of
Greater Mumbai v. Kamla Mills Ltd. (2003) 6 SCC 315]
11. The court, while considering the application for
bail with reference to Section 37 of the Act, is not
called upon to record a finding of not guilty. It is for
the limited purpose, essentially confined to the
question of releasing the accused on bail, that the
court is called upon to see if there are reasonable
grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty
and records its satisfaction about the existence of
such grounds. But the court has not to consider the
matter as if it is pronouncing a judgment of acquittal
and recording a finding of not guilty.”(emphasis
supplied)
23. Based on the above precedent, the test which the High
Court and this Court are required to apply while granting
bail is whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that
the accused has not committed an offence and whether he
is likely to commit any offence while on bail. Given the
seriousness of offences punishable under the NDPS Act and
in order to curb the menace of drug trafficking in the
country, stringent parameters for the grant of bail under
the NDPS Act have been prescribed.
23. In the present case, there is nothing to show that the
petitioner is not reasonably guilty of committing the offence.
Further, there is nothing to show that the petitioner would
indulge in the commission of a similar offence in case of his
release on bail. Therefore, the petitioner has failed to satisfy the
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2025:HHC:19710
twin conditions laid down under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, and
he is not entitled to bail.
24. No other point was urged.
25. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and
the same is dismissed.
26. The observation made herein before shall remain
confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no
bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
25th June, 2025
(ravinder)