Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 18.08.2025 vs State Of H.P. & Others on 27 August, 2025
2025:HHC:28897
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MMO No. 785 of 2025
Reserved on: 18.08.2025
.
Date of Decision: 27.08.2025
Neeta ...Petitioner
Versus
State of H.P. & others ...Respondents
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting? No.
For the petitioner : Mr. Janesh Gupta, Advocate.
For the respondents : Mr. Jitender K. Sharma,
Additional Advocate General
for respondent No.1/State.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition for
quashing of F.I.R. No. 85 of 2025 dated 07.05.2025, registered
for the commission of offences punishable under Sections
303(2) and 329(3) of Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) 2023, at
Police Station Joginder Nagar, District Mandi, H.P.
______________________
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
petition are that the informant made a complaint to the police
.
stating that the wheat crop was stolen from his field on the
intervening night of 04.05.2025 and 05.05.2025. The informant
noticed this fact when he had visited the field in the morning.
He suspected Kamal Kant, Nirmla Devi and Neeta Devi (present
petitioner). They had earlier thrown stones into the informant’s
land and had damaged the wheat crops growing on his land.
The police registered the F.I.R. and conducted the investigation.
3. Being aggrieved from the registration of the F.I.R.,
the petitioner has filed the present petition asserting that the
petitioner was not in town on the date of the incident. She went
to the holy shrine of Kedarnath, which is evident from the travel
tickets from Delhi to Rishikesh and the photographs taken at
the holy shrine. There is a dispute between the parties regarding
the agreement to sell dated 31.05.2024. The petitioner was
falsely implicated due to the dispute. The continuation of the
proceedings amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court.
Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed
and the F.I.R. and consequential proceedings arising out of the
said F.I.R. be quashed.
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4. I have heard Mr. Janesh Gupta, learned counsel for
the petitioner, and Mr. Jatinder K. Sharma, learned Additional
.
Advocate General, for the respondent No.1/State.
5. Mr. Janesh Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioner,
referred to various documents annexed to the petition to submit
that the petitioner had travelled to Kedarnath. Her photographs
were taken at Kedarnath. An agreement to sell was executed by
the informant with co-accused Manju Sharma, and possession
was delivered to her. The informant is not executing the sale
deed, and complaints were made against the informant
regarding this fact. Hence, it was prayed that the present
petition be allowed and F.I.R., as well as consequential
proceedings arising out of the said F.I.R., be quashed.
6. Mr. Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate
General for the respondent No.1/State, submitted that the
investigation is at the initial stage. The police would discharge
the petitioner in case she was not present on the spot. It is
premature to adjudicate the plea taken by the petitioner that she
was not present on the spot. Hence, he prayed that the present
petition be dismissed.
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7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
.
8. The law relating to quashing of criminal cases was
explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of
U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: –
“7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned,
it is now more or less well settled as regards theprinciples to be applied by the court. In this regard, one
may refer to the decision of this Court in State of
Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein
this Court has summarised some of the principles underwhich FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed
in the following words:
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the
various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter
XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by thisCourt in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of
the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the
inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code whichwe have extracted and reproduced above, we give the
following categories of cases by way of illustrationwherein such power could be exercised either to
prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise
to secure the ends of justice, though it may not bepossible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and
sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or
rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad
kinds of cases wherein such power should be
exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they
are taken at their face value and accepted in their::: Downloaded on – 27/08/2025 21:27:23 :::CIS
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2025:HHC:28897entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence
or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first
information report and other materials, if any,.
accompanying the FIR do not disclose a
cognizable offence, justifying an investigation
by police officers under Section 156(1) of the
Code except under an order of a Magistrate
within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made
in the FIR or complaint and the evidence
collected in support of the same do not disclose
the commission of any offence and make out a
case against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only
a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is
permitted by a police officer without an order of a
Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2)
of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently
improbable on the basis of which no prudent
person can ever reach a just conclusion that
there is sufficient ground for proceeding against
the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in
any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned
Act (under which a criminal proceeding is
instituted) to the institution and continuance of the
proceedings and/or where there is a specific
provision in the Code or the concerned Act,
providing efficacious redress for the grievance of
the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
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ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the
accused and with a view to spite him due to a
private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added)
8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6)
.
would be of relevance to us in this case.
In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the
allegations made in the first information report or the
complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute
any offence or make out a case against the accused, then
the FIR or the complaint can be quashed.
As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a
non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by
a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate
as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in
such a situation, the FIR can be quashed.
Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an
express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of
the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal
proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be
quashed.”
9. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of
Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed:
“8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising
its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC,may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes
or to secure the ends of justice.
These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited
by any other statutory provision. However, given the
broad and profound nature of this authority, the High
Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for
invoking such powers are embedded
within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High
Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or::: Downloaded on – 27/08/2025 21:27:23 :::CIS
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2025:HHC:28897where intervention is essential to uphold the
ends of justice.
9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the
course of several decades, has laid down the principles.
and guidelines that High Courts must follow before
quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby
pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case
before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, interalia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the
criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the
FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii)
no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civilin nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus
allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and
compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v.
Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335).
10. It was held in State of Karnataka v. L.
Muniswamy (1977) 2 SCC 699: 1977 SCC (Cri) 404 that the High
Court can quash the criminal proceedings if they amount to an
abuse of the process of the Court. It was observed at page 703:
“7. … In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High
Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to theconclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue
would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the
ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to bequashed. The saving of the High Court’s inherent powers,
both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve
a salutary public purpose, which is that a court
proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a
weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case,
the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very
nature of the material on which the structure of the
prosecution rests, and the like would justify the High
Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of::: Downloaded on – 27/08/2025 21:27:23 :::CIS
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2025:HHC:28897justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of
mere law, though justice has got to be administered
according to laws made by the legislature. The
compelling necessity for making these observations is.
that without a proper realisation of the object and
purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent
powers of the High Court to do justice, between the State
and its subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate thewidth and contours of that salient jurisdiction.”
11. The term abuse of the process was explained in
Chandran Ratnaswami v. K.C. Palanisamy, (2013) 6 SCC 740:
(2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 447: 2013 SCC OnLine SC 450 at page 761:
33. The doctrine of abuse of process of court and the
remedy of refusal to allow the trial to proceed is a well-
established and recognised doctrine both by the English
courts and courts in India. There are some established
principles of law which bar the trial when there appears
to be an abuse of the process of the court.
34. Lord Morris in Connelly v. Director of Public
Prosecutions [1964 AC 1254 : (1964) 2 WLR 1145 : (1964) 2
All ER 401 (HL)], observed: (AC pp. 1301-02)
“There can be no doubt that a court which is endowed
with a particular jurisdiction has powers which are
necessary to enable it to act effectively within such
jurisdiction. … A court must enjoy such powers in
order to enforce its rules of practice and to suppress
any abuses of its process and to defeat any attempted
thwarting of its process.
***
The power (which is inherent in a court’s jurisdiction)
to prevent abuses of its process and to control its
procedure must in a criminal court include a power to
safeguard an accused person from oppression or
prejudice.”
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In his separate pronouncement, Lord Delvin in the same
case observed that where particular criminal proceedings
constitute an abuse of process, the court is empowered to
refuse to allow the indictment to proceed to trial.
.
35. In Hui Chi-ming v. R. [(1992) 1 AC 34 : (1991) 3 WLR 495
: (1991) 3 All ER 897 (PC)], the Privy Council defined the
word “abuse of process” as something so unfair and
wrong with the prosecution that the court should not
allow a prosecutor to proceed with what is, in all other
respects, a perfectly supportable case.
36. In the leading case of R. v. Horseferry Road Magistrates’
Court, ex p Bennett [(1994) 1 AC 42: (1993) 3 WLR 90: (1993)
3 All ER 138 (HL)], on the application of the abuse of
process, the court confirms that an abuse of process
justifying the stay of prosecution could arise in the
following circumstances:
(i) where it would be impossible to give the accused a
fair trial; or
(ii) where it would amount to misuse/manipulation of
the process because it offends the court’s sense ofjustice and propriety to be asked to try the accused in
the circumstances of the particular case.
37. In R. v. Derby Crown Court, ex p Brooks [(1984) 80 Cr
App R 164 (DC)], Lord Chief Justice Ormrod stated:
“It may be an abuse of process if either (a) the
prosecution has manipulated or misused the process
of the court to deprive the defendant of a protection
provided by law or to take unfair advantage of atechnicality, or (b) on the balance of probability the
defendant has been, or will be, prejudiced in the
preparation of conduct of his defence by delay on the
part of the prosecution which is unjustifiable.”
38. Neill, L.J. in R. v. Beckford (Anthony) [(1996) 1 Cr App R
94: 1995 RTR 251 (CA)], observed that:
“The jurisdiction to stay can be exercised in many
different circumstances. Nevertheless, two main::: Downloaded on – 27/08/2025 21:27:23 :::CIS
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2025:HHC:28897strands can be detected in the authorities: (a) cases
where the court concludes that the defendant cannot
receive a fair trial; (b) cases where the court concludes
that it would be unfair for the defendant to be tried.”
.
What is unfair and wrong will be for the court to
determine on the individual facts of each case.
12. It was held in Mahmood Ali v. State of U.P., (2023) 15
SCC 488: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 950 that where the proceedings are
frivolous or vexatious, the Court owes a duty to quash them.
However, the Court cannot appreciate the material while
exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC. It was
observed at page 498:
13. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes
a duty to look into many other attending circumstances
emerging from the record of the case over and above the
averments and, if need be, with due care and
circumspection, try to read in between the lines. The
Court, while exercising its jurisdiction under Section
482CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution, need not
restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered
to take into account the overall circumstances leading to
the initiation/registration of the case as well as the
materials collected in the course of investigation. Take,
for instance, the case at hand. Multiple FIRs have been
registered over a period of time. It is in the background of
such circumstances that the registration of multiple FIRs
assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of
wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge, as
alleged.
14. State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy [State of
A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522: 2004 SCC
(Cri) 1805], a two-judge Bench of this Court elaborated on
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the types of materials the High Court can assess to quash
an FIR. The Court drew a fine distinction between the
consideration of materials that were tendered as evidence
and the appreciation of such evidence. Only such material
.
that manifestly fails to prove the accusation in the FIR
can be considered for quashing an FIR. The Court held :
(Golconda Linga Swamy case [State of A.P. v. Golconda
Linga Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1805], SCCp. 527, paras 5-7)
“5. … Authority of the court exists for the
advancement of justice, and if any attempt is made to
abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, thecourt has power to prevent such abuse. It would be an
abuse of the process of the court to allow any action
which would result in injustice and prevent the
promotion of justice. In the exercise of its powerscourt would be justified in quashing any proceeding if
it finds that initiation or continuance of it amounts to
abuse of the process of the court or quashing of these
proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice.
When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the
court may examine the question of fact. When a
complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look
into the materials to assess what the complainant has
alleged and whether any offence is made out, even if the
allegations are accepted in toto.
6. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab [R.P. Kapur v. State of
Punjab, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 21: AIR 1960 SC 866], this
Court summarised some categories of cases where
inherent power can and should be exercised to quash
the proceedings : (SCC OnLine SC para 6)
(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal
bar against the institution or continuance, e.g. want
of sanction;
(ii) where the allegations in the first information
report or complaint taken at their face value and
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accepted in their entirety do not constitute the
offence alleged;
(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but
there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence
.
adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge.
7. In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear
in mind the distinction between a case where there is no
legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly
inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where
there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or
may not support the accusations. When exercising
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court
would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether
the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether, on a
reasonable appreciation of it, the accusation would not be
sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. The
judicial process, no doubt, should not be an
instrument of oppression or needless harassment. The
court should be circumspect and judicious in
exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts
and circumstances into consideration before issuing
the process, lest it would be an instrument in the
hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to
harass any person needlessly. At the same time, the
section is not an instrument handed over to an
accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about
its sudden death.” (emphasis supplied)
13. It was held in Minu Kumari v. State of Bihar, (2006) 4
SCC 359: (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 310: 2006 SCC OnLine SC 417 that the
High Court should refrain from giving a prima facie opinion
when the facts are hazy and the evidence has not been collected.
It was observed at page 366:
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“20. As noted above, the powers possessed by the High
Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide, and
the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in
its exercise. The court must be careful to see that its.
decision in the exercise of this power is based on sound
principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to
stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the
highest court of a State should normally refrain from
giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire
facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the
evidence has not been collected and produced before the
Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal,
are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true
perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no
hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in
which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary
jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage.
[See Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary [(1992) 4 SCC 305: 1993
SCC (Cri) 36] and Raghubir Saran (Dr.) v. State of
Bihar [(1964) 2 SCR 336: AIR 1964 SC 1 : (1964) 1 Cri LJ 1] .]
14. The present petition is to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
15. It was specifically mentioned in the F.I.R. that the
informant’s wheat crop was stolen, and this fact was noticed on
the next morning. The name of the petitioner was mentioned as
a suspect. These allegations, prima facie, show the commission
of cognizable offences of theft and criminal trespass.
16. It was submitted that the informant had only
expressed a suspicion against the petitioner, which is not
sufficient to proceed further in the matter. This submission is
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only stated to be rejected. The police are to conduct the
investigation and find out the name of the thief. It is premature
.
to say that the petitioner would be arrayed as an accused simply
because her name was mentioned as a suspect. The police will
collect the material, and if anything is found against the
petitioner, only then will the charge sheet be filed against her.
17. It was submitted that the allegations in the F.I.R. are
false. The petitioner had gone to Rishikesh, which is evident
from the photographs and documents placed on record. This
submission will not help the petitioner. The Court exercising
inherent jurisdiction has to take the allegations in the FIR as
correct. This position was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine
SC 983, wherein it was observed: –
“29. It is settled law that the power of quashing a
complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly with
circumspection, and while exercising this power, theCourt must believe the averments and allegations in the
complaint to be true and correct. It has been repeatedly
held that, save in exceptional cases where non-
interference would result in a miscarriage of justice, the
Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the
stage of investigation of offences. Extraordinary and
inherent powers of the Court should not be used
routinely according to its whims or caprice.”
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18. It was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P.,
2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, that the Court exercising inherent
.
jurisdiction to quash the FIR cannot go into the truthfulness or
otherwise of the allegations. It was observed: –
“13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court
would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to
the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the
allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stageof quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr.
P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint,
if taken at their face value, must disclose the commission
of an offence and make out a case against the accused. Atthe cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations
made in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at their face
value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or
make out a case against the accused. We are of the
considered view that the present case would fall underCategory-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in
the case of Bhajan Lal (supra).
14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this
Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of
Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC1060:
“14. First, we would like to deal with the
submission of the learned Senior Counsel forRespondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed,
the petition for quashing of the FIR is untenable.
We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping
in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj
A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of
Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23].
In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of
Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this
Court while deciding the question of whether the::: Downloaded on – 27/08/2025 21:27:23 :::CIS
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2025:HHC:28897High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition
for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was
filed by the police during the pendency of the
Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16).
“16. Thus, the general conspectus of the
various sections under which the appellant is
being charged and is to be prosecuted would
show that the same is not made out evenprima facie from the complainant’s FIR. Even
if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned
Single Judge [Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of
Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365] could havestill examined whether the offences alleged to
have been committed by the appellant were
prima facie made out from the complainant’s
FIR, charge-sheet, documents, etc. or not.
19. The petitioner has relied upon the photocopies of
various documents to submit that she had gone to Kedarnath.
All these documents are photocopies, and their authenticity has
not been established. It was rightly submitted on behalf of the
State that it is impermissible to rely upon the documents not
forming part of the charge-sheet, especially when the
authenticity of these documents is yet to be seen. It was laid
down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in MCD v. Ram Kishan
Rohtagi, (1983) 1 SCC 1: 1983 SCC (Cri) 115 that the proceedings
can be quashed on the face of the complaint and the papers
accompanying the same, no offence is constituted. It is not
permissible to add or subtract anything. It was observed:
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“10. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that proceedings
against an accused in the initial stages can be quashed
only if, on the face of the complaint or the papers
accompanying the same, no offence is constituted. In.
other words, the test is that taking the allegations and
the complaint as they are, without adding or subtracting
anything, if no offence is made out, then the High Court
will be justified in quashing the proceedings in exercise
of its powers under Section 482 of the present Code.”
20. Madras High Court also held in Ganga Bai v. Shriram,
1990 SCC OnLine MP 213: ILR 1992 MP 964: 1991 Cri LJ 2018, that
the fresh evidence is not permissible or desirable in the
proceedings under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. It was observed:
“Proceedings under Section 482, Cr.P.C. cannot be
allowed to be converted into a full-dressed trial. Shri
Maheshwari filed a photostat copy of an order dated
28.7.1983, passed in Criminal Case No. 1005 of 1977, towhich the present petitioner was not a party. Fresh
evidence at this stage is neither permissible nor desirable.
The respondent, by filing this document, is virtually
introducing additional evidence, which is not the object ofSection 482, Cr. P.C.”
21. Andhra Pradesh High Court also took a similar view
in Bharat Metal Box Company Limited, Hyderabad and Others vs.
G. K. Strips Private Limited and another, 2004 STPL 43 AP, and
held:
“9. This Court can only look into the complaint and the
documents filed along with it, and the sworn statements
of the witnesses, if any, recorded. While judging the
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Section 482 Cr.PC debars the Court from looking into
fresh documents, in view of the principles laid down by
the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. M..
Devendrappa and another, 2002 (1) Supreme 192. The
relevant portion of the said judgment reads as follows:
“The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it
appears that on consideration of the allegations, inthe light of the statement made on oath of the
complainant that the ingredients of the offence or
offences are disclosed and there is no material to
show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous orvexatious, in that event there would be no
justification for interference by the High Court.
When information is lodged at the Police Station
and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of
rthe informant would be of secondary importance. Itis the material collected during the investigation
and the evidence presented in Court which decides
the fate of the accused person. The allegations of
mala fides against the informant are of noconsequence and cannot by itself be the basis for
quashing the proceedings”.
22. A similar view was taken in Mahendra K.C. v. State of
Karnataka, (2022) 2 SCC 129: (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 401, wherein it
was observed at page 142:
“16. … the test to be applied is whether the allegations in
the complaint, as they stand, without adding or
detracting from the complaint, prima facie establish the
ingredients of the offence alleged. At this stage, the High
Court cannot test the veracity of the allegations, nor, for
that matter, can it proceed in the manner that a judge
conducting a trial would, based on the evidence collected
during the course of the trial.”
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23. This position was reiterated in Supriya Jain v. State of
Haryana, (2023) 7 SCC 711: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 765, wherein it
.
was held:
13. All these documents, which the petitioner seeks to
rely on, if genuine, could be helpful for her defence at thetrial, but the same are not material at the stage of
deciding whether quashing as prayed for by her before
the High Court was warranted or not. We, therefore, see
no reason to place any reliance on these threedocuments.
24. A similar view was taken in Iveco Magirus
Brandschutztechnik GMBH v. Nirmal Kishore Bhartiya, (2024) 2
SCC 86: (2024) 1 SCC (Cri) 512: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1258, wherein
it was observed:
“63. Adverting to the aspect of the exercise of
jurisdiction by the High Courts under Section 482CrPC, in
a case where the offence of defamation is claimed by the
accused to have not been committed based on any of theExceptions and a prayer for quashing is made, the law
seems to be well settled that the High Courts can go nofurther and enlarge the scope of inquiry if the accused seeks
to rely on materials which were not there before theMagistrate. This is based on the simple proposition that what
the Magistrate could not do, the High Courts may not do. We
may not be understood to undermine the High Courts’
powers saved by Section 482CrPC; such powers are
always available to be exercised ex debito justitiae, i.e. to
do real and substantial justice for the administration of
which alone the High Courts exist. However, the tests laid
down for quashing an FIR or criminal proceedings
arising from a police report by the High Courts in the
exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482CrPC not being::: Downloaded on – 27/08/2025 21:27:23 :::CIS
20
2025:HHC:28897substantially different from the tests laid down for
quashing a process issued under Section 204 read with
Section 200, the High Courts on recording due
satisfaction are empowered to interfere if on a reading of.
the complaint, the substance of statements on oath of the
complainant and the witness, if any, and documentary
evidence as produced, no offence is made out and that
proceedings, if allowed to continue, would amount to anabuse of the legal process. This, too, would be
impermissible if the justice of a given case does not
overwhelmingly so demand.” (Emphasis supplied).
25. A perusal of these documents shows that the tickets
bearing the name Neeta, inter alia, have been filed. First, there is
insufficient material to connect the petitioner to Neeta
mentioned in the ticket. Secondly, there is no evidence that
Neeta had also travelled based on the ticket purchased in her
name. Reliance was also placed upon the photographs, but in
the absence of forensic analysis and identification of the
persons in the photographs, it is difficult to say that the
petitioner is the person mentioned in the photographs. These
are the matters of investigation, and it is impermissible for this
Court to record a finding regarding these matters at this stage.
Therefore, the F.I.R. cannot be quashed based on the material
annexed to the present petition.
26. It was submitted that there is a dispute between the
parties regarding the agreement to sell, and the F.I.R. was
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lodged because the co-accused had issued a notice asking the
informant to execute the sale deed. This submission will not
.
help the petitioner. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Ramveer Upadhyay v. State of U.P., 2022 SCC OnLine SC
484, that a complaint cannot be quashed because it was initiated
due to enmity. It was observed:
“30. The fact that the complaint may have been initiated
because of a political vendetta is not in itself grounds for
quashing the criminal proceedings, as observed by
Bhagwati, CJ, in Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar
(1987) 1 SCC 2884. It is a well-established proposition oflaw that a criminal prosecution, if otherwise justified and
based upon adequate evidence, does not become vitiated
on account of mala fides or political vendetta of the first
informant or complainant. Though the view of Bhagwati,
CJ, in Sheonandan Paswan (supra) was the minority view,there was no difference of opinion with regard to this
finding. To quote Krishna Iyer, J., in State of Punjab v.
Gurdial Singh (1980) 2 SCC 471, “If the use of power is for
the fulfilment of a legitimate object, the actuation or
catalysation by malice is not legicidal.”
Xxxx
39. In our considered opinion, criminal proceedings
cannot be nipped in the bud by the exercise of
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. only because
the complaint has been lodged by a political rival. It is
possible that a false complaint may have been lodged at
the behest of a political opponent. However, such a
possibility would not justify interference under Section
482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal proceedings. As
observed above, the possibility of retaliation on the part
of the petitioners by the acts alleged, after the closure of
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the earlier criminal case, cannot be ruled out. The
allegations in the complaint constitute an offence under
the Atrocities Act. Whether the allegations are true or
untrue would have to be decided in the trial. In the
.
exercise of power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., the
Court does not examine the correctness of the allegations
in a complaint except in exceptionally rare cases where it
is patently clear that the allegations are frivolous or do
not disclose any offence. The Complaint Case No. 19/2018
is not such a case which should be quashed at the
inception itself without further Trial. The High Court
rightly dismissed the application under Section 482 of
the Cr.P.C.”
27. Therefore, it is impermissible to quash the FIR on the
ground that it is mala fide.
28. The investigation is continuing, and there is no
reason to scuttle the same; therefore, the present petition fails
the same is dismissed, and so also, the miscellaneous
applications, if any.
29. The observations made herein before shall remain
confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing,
whatsoever, on the merits of the case.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
27 August 2025
th
Judge
(ravinder)
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