Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 21.08.2025 vs Mam Raj on 29 August, 2025
Bench: Vivek Singh Thakur, Sushil Kukreja
1 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:29284-DB )
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA
Cr. Appeal No. 266 of 2015
Reserved on: 21.08.2025
Decided on: 29.08.2025
____________________________________________________
State of Himachal Pradesh …..Appellant.
.
Versus
Mam Raj ......Respondent.
_____________________________________________________
Coram
The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Vivek Singh Thakur, Judge.
The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sushil Kukreja, Judge.
1
Whether approved for reporting? Yes.
_____________________________________________________
For the appellant: Mr. I.N. Mehta, Senior Additional
Advocate General.
For the respondents: Ms. Upasana Thakur, Advocate, vice
Mr. Karan Singh Kanwar, Advocate.
Sushil Kukreja, Judge.
The instant appeal has been preferred by the
appellant/State under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure against the impugned judgment dated 26.09.2014,
passed by learned Special Judge, Sirmaur District at Nahan, H.P.,
in Sessions Trial No. 03-ST/7 of 2014, whereby the accused
(respondent herein) was acquitted for the offences punishable
under Sections 504, 506, 376 of the Indian Penal Code (for short
“IPC“) read with Section 3(i)(xii) of the Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short
‘SCST Act’).
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
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2 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:29284-DB )
2. The facts giving rise to the present appeal, as per the
prosecution story, can be summarized as under:
2(a). The prosecutrix (name withheld) got recorded her
statement under Section 154 Cr.P.C., wherein she stated that the
.
accused (Mam Raj, who is respondent herein) committed forcible
sexual intercourse with her on three different occasions in the year
2011. She further stated that the accused also threatened her to
do away with her life and he wrote letters with an intention to black
mail her. The prosecutrix also stated that the accused used caste
based remarks for her and her family members and threatened to
eliminate them. As per the prosecutrix, she had purchased a
ladies suit from the shop of one Anita Sahni and the accused paid
for that suit without her consent. The matter was reported to the
Pradhan of the concerned panchayat, where the accused
apologized. A complaint was made to Sub Divisional Magistrate,
Rajgarh. During the investigation, the prosecutrix was medically
examined. Upon the statement of the prosecutrix, police effected
relevant recoveries and her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C.
was recorded. It has come in the prosecution story that on
12.08.2013, around 06:00 p.m., the accused caught hold of the
prosecutrix by her arm and she was rescued by her husband. It
has also come in the prosecution story that the accused used to
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3 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:29284-DB )
disturb peace and he used caste based remarks against the
prosecutrix and her family members frequently. After completion of
the investigation, police presented the chargesheet in the learned
Trial Court.
.
3. The prosecution, in order to prove its case, examined
eleven witnesses. Statement of the accused, under Section 313
Cr.P.C., was recorded, wherein he pleaded not guilty and claimed
trial.
4. The learned Trial Court, vide impugned judgment dated
26.09.2014 acquitted the accused for the offences punishable
under Sections 504, 506, 376 IPC read with Section 3(i)(xii) of
SCST Act, hence the instant appeal preferred by the
appellant/State.
5. The learned Senior Additional Advocate General for the
appellant/State contended that the impugned judgment is against
the law and facts, based upon surmises and conjectures, thus
liable to set-aside. He further contended that the learned Trial
Court has failed to appreciate the evidence in its right and true
perspective, as such the impugned judgment of acquittal passed
by the learned Trial Court deserves to be quashed and set-aside
by allowing the instant appeal.
6. Conversely, the learned vice counsel for the
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4 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:29284-DB )
respondent/accused contended that the judgment passed by the
learned Trial Court is the result of proper appreciation of the
material on record and the same was passed after appreciating the
evidence and law in its right and true perspective. She further
.
contended that the learned Trial Court has passed a well reasoned
judgment, which does not require any interference, thus the instant
appeal, which is devoid of any merit, be dismissed.
7. We have heard the learned Senior Additional Advocate
General for the appellant/State, learned vice counsel for the
respondent/accused and carefully examined the entire records.
8. It is well settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court in a catena
of decisions that an Appellate Court has full power to review, re-
appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of
acquittal is founded. However, Appellate Court must bear in mind
that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of
the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to
him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that
every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is
proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused
having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is
further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court.
Further, if two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the
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5 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:29284-DB )
evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the
finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court.
9. The scope of power of Appellate Court in case of
appeal against acquittal has been dealt with by the Hon’ble Apex
.
Court in Muralidhar alias Gidda & another Vs. State of
Karnatka reported in (2014) 5 SCC 730, which reads as under:
“10. Lord Russell in Sheo Swarup[1], highlighted the
approach of the High Court as an appellate court
hearing the appeal against acquittal. Lord Russell
said,
“… the High Court should and will always give
proper weight and consideration to such
matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge
as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the
r presumption of innocence in favour of the
accused, a presumption certainly not
weakened by the fact that he has been
acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the
accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (4)
the slowness of an appellate court in
disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a
Judge who had the advantage of seeing the
witnesses.”
The opinion of the Lord Russell has been followed
over the years.
11. As early as in 1952, this Court in Surajpal Singh[2]
while dealing with the powers of the High Court in
an appeal against acquittal under Section 417 of
the Criminal Procedure Code observed:
“7………..the High Court has full power to review
the evidence upon which the order of
acquittal was founded, but it is equally well
settled that the presumption of innocence of
the accused is further reinforced by his
acquittal by the trial court, and the findings of
the trial court which had the advantage of
seeing the witnesses and hearing their
evidence can be reversed only for very
substantial and compelling reasons.”
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6 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:29284-DB )
12. The approach of the appellate court in the appeal
against acquittal has been dealt with by this Court
in Tulsiram Kanu [3], Madan Mohan Singh [4], Atley
[5] , Aher Raja Khima [6], Balbir Singh [7], M.G.
Agarwal [8], Noor Khan [9], Khedu Mohton [10],
Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade [11], Lekha Yadav [12],
Khem Karan [13], Bishan Singh [14], Umedbhai
Jadavbhai [15], K. Gopal Reddy [16], Tota Singh
.
[17], Ram Kumar [18], Madan Lal [19], Sambasivan
[20], Bhagwan Singh [21], Harijana Thirupala [22],
C. Antony [23], K. Gopalakrishna [24], Sanjay
Thakran [25] and Chandrappa [26]. It is not
necessary to deal with these cases individually.
Suffice it to say that this Court has consistently held
that in dealing with appeals against acquittal, the
appellate court must bear in mind the following:
(i) There is presumption of innocence in favour
of an accused person and such presumption
is strengthened by the order of acquittal
passed in his favour by the trial court;
(ii) The accused person is entitled to the benefit
r of reasonable doubt when it deals with the
merit of the appeal against acquittal;
(iii) Though, the power of the appellate court in
considering the appeals against acquittal are
as extensive as its powers in appeals against
convictions but the appellate court isgenerally loath in disturbing the finding of fact
recorded by the trial court. It is so because
the trial court had an advantage of seeing the
demeanor of the witnesses. If the trial courttakes a reasonable view of the facts of the
case, interference by the appellate court withthe judgment of acquittal is not justified.
Unless, the conclusions reached by the trial
court are palpably wrong or based on
erroneous view of the law or if such
conclusions are allowed to stand, they are
likely to result in grave injustice, the
reluctance on the part of the appellate court
in interfering with such conclusions is fully
justified; and
(iv) Merely because the appellate court on re-
appreciation and re-evaluation of the
evidence is inclined to take a different view,
interference with the judgment of acquittal is
not justified if the view taken by the trial court
is a possible view. The evenly balanced
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7 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:29284-DB )
views of the evidence must not result in the
interference by the appellate court in the
judgment of the trial court.”
10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajesh Prasad vs.
State of Bihar & another, (2022) 3 SCC 471, observed as under:
.
“31. The circumstances under which an appeal
would be entertained by this Court from an
order of acquittal passed by a High Court may
be summarized as follows:
31.1. Ordinarily, this Court is cautious in interfering
with an order of acquittal, especially when the
order of acquittal has been confirmed up to the
High Court. It is only in rarest of rare cases,where the High Court, on an absolutely wrong
process of reasoning and a legally erroneous
and perverse approach to the facts of the case,
ignoring some of the most vital facts, has
acquitted the accused, that the same may be
r reversed by this Court, exercising jurisdiction
under Article 136 of the Constitution. [State ofU.P. v. Sahai (1982) 1 SCC 352] Such fetters on
the right to entertain an appeal are prompted by
the reluctance to expose a person, who has
been acquitted by a competent court of a
criminal charge, to the anxiety and tension of afurther examination of the case, even though it
is held by a superior court. [Arunchalam v.
P.S.R. Sadhanantham (1979) 2 SCC 297] An
appeal cannot be entertained against an orderof acquittal which has, after recording valid and
weighty reasons, has arrived at anunassailable, logical conclusion which justifies
acquittal. [State of Haryana vs. Lakhbir]31.2. However, this Court has on certain occasions,
set aside the order of acquittal passed by a
High Court. The circumstances under which
this Court may entertain an appeal against an
order of acquittal and pass an order of
conviction, may be summarized as follows:
31.2.1. Where the approach or reasoning of the
High Court is perverse;
(a) Where incontrovertible evidence has been
rejected by the High Court based on
suspicion and surmises, which are rather::: Downloaded on – 29/08/2025 21:33:43 :::CIS
8 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:29284-DB )unrealistic. [State of Rajasthan v. Sukhpal
Singh (1983) 1 SCC 393] For example,
where direct, unanimous accounts of the
eyewitnesses, were discounted without
cogent reasoning. [State of U.P. vs.
Shanker 1980 Supp SCC 489]
(b) Where the intrinsic merits of the testimony
.
of relatives, living in the same house as
the prosecutrix, were discounted on the
ground that they were “interested”
witnesses. [State of U.P. v. Hakim Singh
(1980)
(c) Where testimony of witnesses had been
disbelieved by the High Court, on an
unrealistic conjecture of personal motive
on the part of witnesses to implicate the
accused, when in fact, the witnesses had
no axe to grind in the said matter. [State of
Rajasthan v. Sukhpal Singh (1983) 1 SCC
393]
(d)
r Where dying declaration of the deceased
prosecutrix was rejected by the High Court
on an irrelevant ground that they did not
explain the injury found on one of the
persons present at the site of occurrence
of the crime. [Arunachalam vs. P.S.R.
Sadhanantham (1979) 2 SCC 297]
(e) Where the High Court applied an unrealistic
standard of “implicit proof” rather than that
of “proof beyond reasonable doubt” and
therefore evaluated the evidence in a
flawed manner. [State of U.P. v. Ranjha
Ram (1986) 4 SCC 99]
(f) Where the High Court rejected
circumstantial evidence, based on an
exaggerated and capricious theory, which
were beyond the plea of the accused;
[State of Maharashtra v. Champalal Punjaji
Shah (1981) 3 SCC 610]
(g) Where the High Court acquitted the
accused on the ground that he had no
adequate motive to commit the offence,
although, in the said case, there was
strong direct evidence establishing the
guilt of the accused, thereby making it
necessary on the part of the prosecution
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9 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:29284-DB )
to establish “motive”. [State of A.P. v.
Bogam Chandraiah (1990) 1 SCC 445]
31.2.2.Where acquittal would result is gross
miscarriage of justice;
(a) Where the findings of the High Court,
disconnecting the accused persons with
.
the crime, were based on a perfunctory
consideration of evidence, [State of U.P. v.
Pheru Singh 1989 Supp (1) SCC] or
based on extenuating circumstances
which were purely based in imagination
and fantasy [State of U.P. v. Pussu (1983)
3 SCC 502]
(b)Where the accused had been acquitted
on ground of delay in conducting trial,
which delay was attributable not to the
tardiness or indifference of the prosecuting
agencies, but to the conduct of the
accused himself; or where accused had
been acquitted on ground of delay in
r conducting trial relating to an offence
which is not of a trivial nature. [State of
Maharashtra v. Champalal Punjaji Shah
(1981) 3 SCC 610].”
11. In H.D. Sundara & others vs. State of Karnataka,
(2023) 9 SCC 581, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that
the appellate court cannot overturn acquittal only on the ground
that after re-appreciating evidence, it is of the view that the guilt of
the accused was established beyond a reasonable doubt. The
relevant portion of the above judgment is as under:
“8. In this appeal, were are called upon to consider
the legality and validity of the impugned
judgment rendered by the High Court while
deciding an appeal against acquittal under
Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (for short “CrPC“). The principles which
govern the exercise of appellate jurisdiction
while dealing with an appeal against acquittal
under Section 378 CrPC can be summarized as
follows:
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8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens
the presumption of innocence;
8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal
against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the
oral and documentary evidence;
.
8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal
against acquittal, after reappreciating the
evidence, is required to consider whether the
view taken by the trial court is possible view
which could have been taken on the basis ofthe evidence on record;
8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the
appellate court cannot overturn the order of
acquittal on the ground that another view wasalso possible; and
8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order
of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the
only conclusion which can be recorded on the
r basis of the evidence on record was that the
guilt of the accused was proved beyond areasonable doubt and no other conclusion was
possible.
9. Normally, when an appellate court exercises
appellate jurisdiction, the duty of the appellatecourt is to find out whether the verdict which is
under challenge is correct or incorrect in law
and on facts. The appellate court normally
ascertains whether the decision underchallenge is legal or illegal. But while dealing
with an appeal against acquittal, the appellatecourt cannot examine the impugned judgment
only to find out whether the view taken was
correct or incorrect. After re-appreciating the
oral and documentary evidence, the appellatecourt must first decide whether the trial court’s
view was a possible view. The appellate court
cannot overturn acquittal only on the ground
that after re-appreciating evidence, it is of the
view that the guilt of the accused was
established beyond a reasonable doubt. Only
recording such a conclusion an order of
acquittal cannot be reversed unless the
appellate court also concludes that it was the
only possible conclusion. Thus, the appellate
court must see whether the view taken by the
trial court while acquitting an accused can be::: Downloaded on – 29/08/2025 21:33:43 :::CIS
11 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:29284-DB )reasonably taken on the basis of the evidence
on record. If the view taken by the trial court is
a possible view, the appellate court cannot
interfere with the order of acquittal on the
ground that another view could have been
taken.”
.
12. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarized to the
effect that in exceptional cases where there are compelling
circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be
perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of
acquittal. Further, if two views were possible on the basis of the
evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the
finding of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court, merely, because the
Appellate Court could have arrived at a different conclusion than
that of the Trial Court.
13. The burden of proof in a criminal trial never shifts and it
is always the burden of the prosecution to prove its case beyond
reasonable doubt on the basis of acceptable evidence. In fact, it is
a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that the more serious
the offence, the stricter the degree of proof required, since a higher
degree of assurance is required to convict the accused.
14. Rape or an attempt to rape is a crime not against an
individual but a crime which destroys the basic equilibrium of the
social atmosphere. In Jugendra Singh vs. State of UP, (2012) 6
SCC 297, Hon’ble Apex Court has held:-
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12 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:29284-DB )
“49. Rape or an attempt to rape is a crime not
against an individual but a crime which destroys
the basic equilibrium of the social atmosphere.
The consequential death is more horrendous. It
is to be kept in mind that an offence against the
body of a woman lowers her dignity and mars
her reputation. It is said that one’s physical
frame is his or her temple. No one has any right
.
of encroachment. An attempt for the momentary
pleasure of the accused has caused the death
of a child and had a devastating effect on her
family and, in the ultimate eventuate, on the
collective at large. When a family suffers in
such a manner, the society as a whole is
compelled to suffer as it creates an incurable
dent in the fabric of the social milieu. The cry of
the collective has to be answered and
respected and that is what exactly the High
Court has done by converting the decision of
acquittal to that of conviction and imposed the
sentence as per law.”
15. It is a settled principle of law that conviction can be
based on the sole testimony of the victim of sexual assault without
corroboration from any other evidence. The prosecutrix
complaining of having been a victim of the offence of rape is not
accomplice of the crime and there is, no rule of law that her
testimony cannot be acted without corroboration on material
particulars. Her testimony has to be appreciated on the principles
of probabilities just as the testimony of any other witness and if the
Court finds it difficult to accept the version of the prosecutrix on its
face value, it may search for evidence direct or circumstantial
which would lend assurance to her testimony.
16. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed in a catena
of decisions that the Court should examine the broader
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probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions
or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix,
which are not of a fatal nature to throw out an otherwise reliable
prosecution case. If the statement of the prosecutrix is of sterling
.
quality and inspires confidence, then corroboration from other
evidence need not be sought, but where the statement of the
prosecutrix is shaky and does not inspire confidence then
corroboration should be sought from other evidence collected
during investigation.
17. In State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Gian Chand,
(2001) 6 SCC 71, it was held that conviction for an offence of rape
can be based on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix corroborated
by medical evidence and other circumstances such as the report of
chemical examination etc. if the same is found to be natural,
trustworthy and worth being relied on.
18. In the case of Vijay @ Chinee vs. State of Madhya
Pradesh, (2010) 8 SCC 191, it was held that the statement of the
prosecutrix, if found to be worthy of credence and reliable, requires
no corroboration. The Court may convict the accused on the sole
testimony of the prosecutrix. Paras 9 to 14 of the judgment are
reproduced as under:-
“9. In State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash
Kewalchand Jain AIR 1990 SC 658, this Court held
that a woman, who is the victim of sexual assault, is::: Downloaded on – 29/08/2025 21:33:43 :::CIS
14 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:29284-DB )not an accomplice to the crime but is a victim of
another person’s lust and, therefore, her evidence
need not be tested with the same amount of
suspicion as that of an accomplice. The Court
observed as under:-
“16. A prosecutrix of a sex-offence cannot be put
on par with an accomplice. She is in fact a.
victim of the crime. The Evidence Act
nowhere says that her evidence cannot be
accepted unless it is corroborated in material
particulars. She is undoubtedly a competent
witness under Section 118 and her evidencemust receive the same weight as is attached
to an injured in cases of physical violence.
The same degree of care and caution must
attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in
the case of an injured complainant or witnessand no more. What is necessary is that the
Court must be alive to and conscious of the
fact that it is dealing with the evidence of a
person who is interested in the outcome of
the charge levelled by her. If the court keeps
r this in mind and feels satisfied that it can act
on the evidence of the prosecutrix, there isno rule of law or practice incorporated in the
Evidence Act similar to illustration (b) to
Section 114 which requires it to look for
corroboration. If for some reason the court is
hesitant to place implicit reliance on thetestimony of the prosecutrix it may look for
evidence which may lend assurance to her
testimony short of corroboration required in
the case of an accomplice. The nature ofevidence required to lend assurance to the
testimony of the prosecutrix must necessarilydepend on the facts and circumstances of
each case. But if a prosecutrix is an adult
and of full understanding the court is entitled
to base a conviction on her evidence unlessthe same is shown to be infirm and not
trustworthy. If the totality of the
circumstances appearing on the record of the
case disclose that the prosecutrix does not
have a strong motive to falsely involve the
person charged, the court should ordinarily
have no hesitation in accepting her evidence.
10. In State of U.P. v. Pappu @ Yunus and Anr. AIR 2005
SC 1248, this Court held that even in a case where it
is shown that the girl is a girl of easy virtue or a girl
habituated to sexual intercourse, it may not be a::: Downloaded on – 29/08/2025 21:33:43 :::CIS
15 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:29284-DB )ground to absolve the accused from the charge of
rape. It has to be established that there was consent
by her for that particular occasion. Absence of injury
on the prosecutrix may not be a factor that leads the
court to absolve the accused. This Court further held
that there can be conviction on the sole testimony of
the prosecutrix and in case, the court is not satisfied
with the version of the prosecutrix, it can seek other.
evidence, direct or circumstantial, by which it may get
assurance of her testimony. The Court held as
under:-
12. It is well settled that a prosecutrix complaining of
having been a victim of the offence of rape is
not an accomplice after the crime. There is no
rule of law that her testimony cannot be acted
without corroboration in material particulars.
She stands at a higher pedestal than an injuredwitness. In the latter case, there is injury on the
physical form, while in the former it is both
physical as well as psychological and
emotional. However, if the court of facts finds it
difficult to accept the version of the prosecutrixon its face value, it may search for evidence,
direct or circumstantial, which would lendassurance to her testimony. Assurance, short of
corroboration as understood in the context of an
accomplice, would do.
11. In State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh and Ors.: AIR
1996 SC 1393, this Court held that in cases involving
sexual harassment, molestation etc. the court is duty
bound to deal with such cases with utmost sensitivity.
Minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies inthe statement of a prosecutrix should not be a
ground for throwing out an otherwise reliableprosecution case. Evidence of the victim of sexual
assault is enough for conviction and it does not
require any corroboration unless there are
compelling reasons for seeking corroboration. Thecourt may look for some assurances of her statement
to satisfy judicial conscience. The statement of the
prosecutrix is more reliable than that of an injured
witness as she is not an accomplice. The Court
further held that the delay in filing FIR for sexual
offence may not be even properly explained, but if
found natural, the accused cannot be given any
benefit thereof. The Court observed as under:
“8. … The court overlooked the situation in which a
poor helpless minor girl had found herself in the
company of three desperate young men who::: Downloaded on – 29/08/2025 21:33:43 :::CIS
16 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:29284-DB )were threatening her and preventing her from
raising any alarm. Again, if the investigating
officer did not conduct the investigation properly
or was negligent in not being able to trace out
the driver or the car, how can that become a
ground to discredit the testimony of the
prosecutrix? The prosecutrix had no control
over the investigating agency and the.
negligence of an investigating officer could not
affect the credibility of the statement of the
prosecutrix…. The courts must, while evaluating
evidence remain alive to the fact that in a case
of rape, no self- respecting woman would comeforward in a court just to make a humiliating
statement against her honour such as is
involved in the commission of rape on her. In
cases involving sexual molestation, supposed
considerations which have no material effect onthe veracity of the prosecution case or even
discrepancies in the statement of the
prosecutrix should not, unless the
discrepancies are such which are of fatal
nature, be allowed to throw out an otherwise
rreliable prosecution case…. Seeking
corroboration of her statement before replyingupon the same as a rule, in such cases,
amounts to adding insult to injury….
Corroboration as a condition for judicial reliance
on the testimony of the prosecutrix is not a
requirement of law but a guidance of prudenceunder given circumstances…
** ** ** **
21….The courts should examine the broader
probabilities of a case and not get swayed by
minor contradictions or insignificantdiscrepancies in the statement of the
prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal nature, to
throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution
case. If evidence of the prosecutrix inspiresconfidence, it must be relied upon without
seeking corroboration of her statement in
material particulars. If for some reason the court
finds it difficult to place implicit reliance on her
testimony, it may look for evidence which may
lend assurance to her testimony, short of
corroboration required in the case of an
accomplice. The testimony of the prosecutrix
must be appreciated in the background of the
entire case and the trial court must be alive to
its responsibility and be sensitive while dealing
with cases involving sexual molestations.
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12. In State of Orissa v. Thakara Besra and Anr. AIR
2002 SC 1963, this Court held that rape is not mere
a physical assault, rather it often distracts the whole
personality of the victim. The rapist degrades the
very soul of the helpless female and, therefore, the
testimony of the prosecutrix must be appreciated in
the background of the entire case and in such cases,.
non-examination even of other witnesses may not be
a serious infirmity in the prosecution case,
particularly where the witnesses had not seen the
commission of the offence.
13. In State of Himachal Pradesh v. Raghubir Singh
(1993) 2 SCC 622, this Court held that there is no
legal compulsion to look for any other evidence to
corroborate the evidence of the prosecutrix before
recording an order of conviction. Evidence has to beweighed and not counted. Conviction can be
recorded on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, if
her evidence inspires confidence and there is
absence of circumstances which militate against her
veracity. A similar view has been reiterated by thisCourt in Wahid Khan v. State of M.P. placing reliance
on an earlier judgment in Rameshswar v. State ofRajasthan.
14. Thus, the law that emerges on the issue is to the effect
that the statement of the prosecutrix, if found to be
worthy of credence and reliable, requires nocorroboration. The court may convict the accused on
the sole testimony of the prosecutrix”
19. There cannot be any dispute with the proposition of law
laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in catena of pronouncements
that in case of rape, evidence of prosecutrix must be given
predominant consideration, and finding of guilt in case of rape can
be based upon the uncorroborated evidence of the prosecutrix, but
apart from above, Hon’ble Apex court has also held that if the story
put forth by the prosecutrix is improbable and belies logic, placing
sole reliance upon her statement would be violence to the very
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18 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:29284-DB )
principles which govern the appreciation of evidence in a criminal
matter. In this regard, reliance is placed on judgment rendered by
the Hon’ble Apex Court in Tameezduddin alias Tammu v. State
of NCT of Delhi, (2009) 15 SCC 566, wherein it has been held as
.
under:-
“9. It is true that in a case of rape the evidence of the
prosecutrix must be given predominant
consideration, but to hold that this evidence has to
be accepted even if the story is improbable and
belies logic, would be doing violence to the very
principles which govern the appreciation of evidencein a criminal matter. We are of the opinion that story
is indeed improbable.”
20. Now reverting back to the facts of the case on hand.
Precisely, as per the allegations of the prosecutrix, the accused
had threatened her to do away with her life, he used caste based
remarks with intention to humiliate her and also committed rape
upon her. The moot point involved for consideration in this appeal
is whether the statement of the prosecutrix is credible and worthy
of credence.
21. We have gone through the statement of the prosecutrix
and after going through the same minutely, it cannot be said that
her testimony is confidence inspiring, truthful and corroborated
with other evidence. Though, the prosecutrix has leveled the
allegation of rape against the accused, however, there is no
evidence to establish such allegation. After close scrutiny of her
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19 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:29284-DB )
testimony, it can be said that on major aspects, she was
deliberately ambiguous and kept on changing her stand. As per the
prosecutrix, the accused raped her thrice, but she could not
narrate the dates when the accused committed rape on her. She
.
could not even state the month or the year when she was raped by
the accused. She did not give any explanation as to why she did
not make any complaint qua threatening and commission of rape
by the accused. The perusal of love letters, Ex. P4 to P40,
nowhere reflects that the same were written by the prosecutrix
under any kind of pressure. In fact, these letters are pure reflection
of feelings of the prosecutrix towards the accused. The defence of
the accused is that the prosecutrix was obsessed towards him,
which was opposed by her family and by him when the letters
written by her to him became public, then false case was got
registered against him. The perusal of the love letters fully
probablized the defence of the accused and the same nowhere
demonstrates that the same were written under any kind of
pressure. As per the prosecutrix, the accused committed rape with
her three years prior to her deposition in the Court (21.07.2014)
and she wrote letters Ex. P4 to P40 between 25.11.2011 to
15.11.2012. She further deposed that the accused used to
blackmail and abuse her and threatened to eliminate her family.
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20 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:29284-DB )
However, the prosecutrix herself had shattered her above stand by
admitting in her cross-examination that her brother got married one
or one and half years prior to her deposition in the Court and
during his marriage, meal was prepared by the accused and his
.
brother. Thus, the statement of the prosecutrix cannot be believed
that even after commission of the alleged sexual assault by the
accused upon the prosecutrix, her family would invite the accused
and his brother to prepare the meal.
22. In the background of the legal position discussed
above, when we consider the case in hand, we are of the opinion
that the statement of the prosecutrix does not inspire confidence.
She had made several improvements in her deposition and
consistently changed her stand. In the wake of the serious nature
of the allegations leveled by the prosecutrix against the accused
and considering the testimony of the prosecutrix, by no stretch of
imagination it can be held that the accused had committed forcible
intercourse with her and threatened to eliminate her family or had
intimidated the prosecutrix in any manner.
23. The accused, in addition to the offences under Section
504, 506 and 376 IPC, was also charged under Section 3(i)(xii) of
the SCST Act for intentionally insulting or intimidating with an intent
to humiliate the prosecutrix in any place within public view who
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21 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:29284-DB )
was a member of scheduled caste community. The prosecutrix
merely stated that the accused used to make caste based remarks
since last about 3-4 years, but she did not specifically state that
what were the caste based remarks used by the accused against
.
the prosecutrix and her family. Admittedly, she did not make any
complaint qua the caste based remarks allegedly made by the
accused to Pradhan or SDM. The prosecution examined PW-2
Smt. Suman Thakur and her husband as PW-4 to prove the
allegations of caste based remarks. However, both these
witnesses are interested witnesses, as they themselves admitted
that they were putting up in the house of Swami Radhika Dass
alongwith 6 bighas of land, which belonged to grand-mother of the
accused. These witnesses admitted the dispute qua the above
property. Therefore, the above witnesses are interested witnesses
and their depositions cannot be relied upon without any
independent corroboration. These witnesses had not stated as to
what were the caste based remarks used by the accused against
the prosecutrix and her family. Similarly, the deposition of PW-9
Bhim Singh cannot be believed, as he had improved his version in
the Court and he was confronted with his statement Ex. DB, which
was recorded by the police, wherein he did not state that he made
complaint to the Panchayat that the accused used caste based
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22 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:29284-DB )
remarks against the prosecutrix and her family. Kushal Kumar
(PW-10), the then President, Gram Panchayat, only deposed that
accused was abusing the villagers in an inebriated state and only
simple allegations were leveled in the complaint made to him
.
against the accused. This witness did not state that any caste
based remarks were used by the accused against the prosecution.
PW-12 Prithvi Singh also deposed on the above analogy, thus his
deposition is also not helpful to the prosecution case. Even if it is
presumed that the allegation of atrocity leveled by the prosecutrix
against the accused is correct, but the letters, Ex. P4 to P40,
written by the prosecutrix to the accused completely rules out any
possibility of atrocity on the prosecutrix by the accused.
24. Hence, in view of the entire evidence on record,
particularly, the statement of the prosecutrix, it has become clear
that there is nothing on record, which could, even remotely,
establish the guilt of the accused beyond the scope of reasonable
doubt. The evidence on record neither establishes the sexual
assault nor any atrocity upon the prosecutrix by the accused.
25. In view of what has been discussed hereinabove, no
interference in the judgment of acquittal, dated 26.09.2014, passed
by the learned Special Judge, Sirmaur District at Nahan, H.P., in
Sessions Trial No. 03-ST/7 of 2014, is required. The view taken by
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23 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:29284-DB )
the learned Trial Court was the only possible view, as such the
appeal, which sans merits, deserves dismissal and is accordingly
dismissed. Bail bonds are discharged.
Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand(s)
.
disposed of.
( Vivek Singh Thakur )
Judge
( Sushil Kukreja )
Judge
29.08.2025
(virender) r
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