Meghalaya High Court
Date Of Decision: 21.08.2025 vs The State Of Meghalaya on 21 August, 2025
Author: W. Diengdoh
Bench: W. Diengdoh
2025:MLHC:749
Serial No. 01
Supplementary List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
BA No. 40 of 2025
Date of Decision: 21.08.2025
Shri. Ronald Kyndiah,
Aged about 28 years,
S/o (L) H. Umdor, R/o- Lower Mawprem,
Sngithiang Shillong, East Khasi Hills District,
Meghalaya.
.....Petitioner
-Versus-
1. The State of Meghalaya
Represented by Secretary Home (Police)
Government of Meghalaya.
2. The Superintendent of Police,
Ri-Bhoi District, Meghalaya.
.....Respondents
Coram:
Hon'ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge
i) Whether approved for reporting in Yes/No
Law journals etc.:
ii) Whether approved for publication
in press: Yes/No
Appearance:
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s) : Mr. S.S. Yadav, Adv.
Mr. S. Purkayastha, Adv.
For the Respondent(s) : Mr. K. Khan, P.P with
Mr. A.H. Kharwanlang, Addl. P.P
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ORDER (ORAL)
1. Heard Mr. S.S. Yadav, learned counsel who has submitted that the
petitioner has approached this Court by way of this application under Section
483 of the BNSS with a prayer for grant of bail since he was arrested on
01.07.2023 in connection with Umsning P.S. Case No. 21(07) 2023 under
Section 21(c) and 29 of the NDPS Act.
2. The learned counsel has submitted that the case has since been
charge sheeted and the learned Special Judge (NDPS), Ri-Bhoi District,
Nongpoh had taken cognizance of the same in Crl. (NDPS) Case No. 23 of
2023. The stage of the case is for recording of evidence of the prosecution’s
witnesses.
3. The learned counsel has also fairly admitted that this is the second
bail application filed before this Court, the first one was dismissed by this
Court vide order dated 26.06.2025. Since then, certain material witnesses
have been examined in the case, their deposition of which has prompted the
petitioner to approach this Court with a prayer for grant of bail, centered on
the merits of the case.
4. It is the further submission of the learned counsel that on perusal
of the evidence rendered by PW-2, what can be seen is that this witness has
categorically stated in his examination-in-chief that on 30.06.2023 at around
8:00 p.m. while he was at home, the police came to his house and asked him
to accompany them to the house of Bah Kyndiah (petitioner herein) located
at Lumkeni. On reaching the said house, the police started a search of the
house to recover any suspected contraband. However, no such contraband
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was found and three policemen stayed at the said house overnight.
5. Similarly, PW-3 in his examination-in-chief has also stated that on
30.06.2023 at about 9:00 p.m. or so while he was at home, he received a
phone call from the village headman requesting him to come to his house.
From there along with the headman he went to the house of Bah Kyndiah
whereupon he saw the police conducting a search of the said compound and
house of the petitioner. This witness was at the said house for about two and
half hours and since nothing was recovered by the police, he went back
home.
6. PW-2 has further stated that on the following day, that is,
01.07.2023 at about 8:00 a.m. or so he was instructed by the police to go
back to the house of the petitioner and he along with members of the village
were present at about 9:00 a.m. when the police again started searching the
place in and around the compound. The police then found one big tin box
from outside the compound of the house of the petitioner hidden in the
bushes. This witness has reiterated that even on 01.07.2023 nothing was
recovered from the house of the petitioner.
7. PW-3 has also stated something in the same line when he said that
on 01.07.2023 he was again called to go to the house of the petitioner and at
about 8:30 a.m. to 8:45 a.m. when he arrived at the house, he saw some police
personnel were still conducting search inside and outside the house. This
witness also saw the police recovered one big tin box from outside the
compound of the house of the petitioner.
8. The learned counsel has also submitted that PW-1 who is the
complainant and a police official in his deposition before the court has stated
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that on 01.07.2023 at 8:00 a.m. the search was conducted. At around 1:00
p.m. the sniffer dog gave a signal toward the jungle area at the entrance of
the farm house and when the search party proceeded toward the jungle area,
one iron box was recovered.
9. The learned counsel at this point of time has referred to the
authorization certificate under Section 41(2) of the NDPS Act issued by Shri
Ishan Gupta, IPS Assistant Superintendent of Police, Ri-Bhoi District,
wherein SI Kenneth Nongsiej of Umsning P.S. was authorised to conduct
house/body search and seizure over the farmhouse and premises of Shri.
Ramul Kyndiah S/o (L) R. Pde at Lumkeni, Umran, Niangbyrnai, Ri-Bhoi
District. The said authorization was dated 01.07.2023 at about 2:30 p.m.
This, according to the learned counsel is a clear violation of the provision of
Section 41(2) of the NDPS Act when the search was already conducted on
30.06.2023 and in the morning hours of 01.07.2023, while the authorization
came well after the search and seizure was already made.
10. The learned counsel went on to submit that the chain of events
proceeded to the point where the police brought the box to the compound of
the house of the petitioner and broke the lock of the said box. Inside the box
were found small boxes of the size of soap boxes and the police placed the
said boxes in one place on top of the cloth. PW-2 who was at the scene
managed to see only two small boxes. He was asked by the police to sign on
some papers but he did not see the contents of the boxes. PW-3 has also
stated that he has been made one of the seizure witnesses, but actually he
does not know how many boxes were taken out of the big tin box since only
two small boxes were shown to him and he saw that the contents inside the
boxes is a green-coloured powder.
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11. In all this, the learned counsel has submitted that what is relevant
for consideration is the fact that evidence on record has proved that no
seizure of the alleged contraband substance was ever made from the
possession of the petitioner and as such, prima facie he is deemed not to be
guilty of the offence alleged, therefore, the rigors of section 37 of the NDPS
Act cannot be employed in his case. In this regard, the case of Mohd Muslim
@ Hussain v. State (NCT of Delhi) reported in AIR 2023 SC 1648 has been
cited, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed at para 18 and 19 as
follows:
“18. The conditions which courts have to be cognizant of are that
there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is “not
guilty of such offence” and that he is not likely to commit any
offence while on bail. What is meant by “not guilty” when all the
evidence is not before the court? It can only be a prima facie
determination. That places the court’s discretion within a very
narrow margin. Given the mandate of the general law on bails
(Sections 436, 437 and 439, CrPC) which classify offences based
on their gravity, and instruct that certain serious crimes have to be
dealt with differently while considering bail applications, the
additional condition that the court should be satisfied that the
accused (who is in law presumed to be innocent) is not guilty, has
to be interpreted reasonably…”
19. …Therefore, the only manner in which such special conditions
as enacted under Section 37 can be considered within
constitutional parameters is where the court is reasonably satisfied
on a prima facie look at the material on record (whenever the bail
application is made) that the accused is not guilty. Any other
interpretation, would result in complete denial of the bail to a
person accused of offences such as those enacted under Section 37
of the NDPS Act.”
12. The fact that the petitioner is in custody for more than two years,
that is, from the date he was arrested on 01.07.2023 and out of ten witnesses,
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only three have been examined so far, has led to the learned counsel to refer
to the case of Shri. Sanju Singh v. State of Meghalaya, wherein vide order
dated 11.03.2025 passed in BA No. 13 of 2025, this Court has granted bail
to the petitioner therein, who was charged with the offence punishable under
Section 22(c) of the NDPS Act and who in course of investigation was found
not to be in conscious possession of any contraband substance having been
in custody for about 1 year 4 months. The petitioner in this case facing
similar circumstances and being in custody for more than 2 years, he may
therefore be enlarged on bail, submits the learned counsel.
13. Per contra, Mr. K. Khan, learned P.P has countered the submission
and contention made by the learned counsel for the petitioner by submitting
that the ground for grant of bail in this case is mainly on delay of proceedings
before the Trial Court. However, the learned P.P has referred to the order
dated 26.06.2025 passed by this Court in BA No. 30 of 2025 also involving
the petitioner herein in the same case, wherein on an application for grant of
bail on account of delay, this Court at para 10 of the same has listed the many
number of dates when the case was taken up by the trial court and has noted
that there was no lapse on the part of the prosecution to delay such
proceedings. As such, it is submitted that the petitioner cannot come with the
plea of delay in this instant application.
14. It is further submitted that the issue in the Sanju Singh‘s case
(supra) is delay and conscious possession, whereas in this case it is not so,
as the issue of delay has been dealt with hereinabove and what has been
canvassed by the petitioner is with regard to the contents of the deposition of
the seizure witnesses, as such there is no similarity in the two cases.
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15. The learned P.P has also submitted that the law is well settled as
to what is required to be argued as regard grant of bail, pre-chargesheet and
post-chargesheet period. The case of Vilas Pandurang Pawar & Anr v. State
of Maharashtra & Ors. (2012) 8 SCC 795 para 10 was cited, though the order
was passed in a case under the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, the learned PP has further submitted
that it is pertinent to note that the observation of the Apex Court in this para
is relevant to the case in hand, inasmuch as it was observed that
“…Moreover, while considering the application for bail, scope for
appreciation of evidence and other material on record is limited. The court
is not expected to indulge in critical analysis of the evidence on record…”.
16. Therefore, what the seizure witnesses has stated is the factual
aspect of the matter when they have consistently stated that the police have
seized the tin box from outside the compound of the house of the petitioner
and the same was brought inside the compound whereupon on being opened,
the smaller boxes were found containing power. This piece of evidence was
found consistent with the record of the Panchnama (annexed as Annexure XI
A in this petition) wherein it was stated that “At around 5:30pm, the sniffer
dogs detected 1(one) Aluminium Box concealed in the bushes, suspected to
contained illicit contrabands. The box was opened in the premises of the GD
and witnesses and found 70(seventy) nos of soap boxes were found to contain
suspected contrabands inside.”
17. The learned P.P has laid stressed on the issue of the relevancy of
the evidence of the seizure witnesses which cannot be made the basis for a
prima facie finding in favour of the accused/petitioner and has submitted that
in the final analysis of the case there would be other witnesses who would
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support the case of the prosecution and therefore the fact that the petitioner
has highlighted the alleged discrepancies in the evidence of the seizure
witness to secure bail at this point of time cannot be the ground for
consideration of the same.
18. This Court has considered the submission made for and against the
grant of bail on behalf of the petitioner herein. Facts as stated above is that
the petitioner was arrested in connection with an offence punishable under
Section 22(c) of the NDPS Act which involves possession of commercial
quantity of psychotropic substances, the punishment of which shall not be
less than 10 years. In such a situation, when a prayer is made for grant of bail
the provision of Section 37 of the NDPS Act is attracted.
19. Needless to say, for consideration of bail involving Section 37 of
the Act the approach of the court is not to grant bail except on the ground
that the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that
the accused is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit
any offence while on bail.
20. The rigors of Section 37 invariably have prevented the courts to
grant bail to an accused person, if in course of investigation or trial nothing
is presented in favour of such accused person to dispel the doubt or
presumption that he is indeed guilty of such offence.
21. However, there are exception to this rule even if the provision of
Section 37 is applicable in a given case, one of such exceptions is the
consideration for grant of bail if prolonged or unnecessary delay in the
proceedings not attributable to the accused has been occasioned. The other
is the aspect of reasonable grounds to believe that the accused is not guilty
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of such offence.
22. Now, what are reasonable grounds have been explained by the
Apex Court in a number of judgments, the most succinct one is that which is
found in the case of Union of India v. Shri Shiv Shanker Kesari reported in
(2007) 7 SCC 798, wherein the following was held:
“7. The expression used in Section 37(1)(b)(ii) is “reasonable
grounds”. The expression means something more than prima facie
grounds. It connotes substantial probable causes for believing that
the accused is not guilty of the offence charged and this reasonable
belief contemplated in turn points to existence of such facts and
circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify recording
of satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the offence charged.
8. The word “reasonable” has in law the prima facie meaning of
reasonable in regard to those circumstances of which the actor,
called on to act reasonably, knows or ought to know. It is difficult
to give an exact definition of the word “reasonable”.
“7… In Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, 4th Edn., p. 2258 states that
it would be unreasonable to expect an exact definition of the
word ‘reasonable’. Reason varies in its conclusions according to
the idiosyncrasy of the individual, and the times and
circumstances in which he thinks. The reasoning which built up
the old scholastic logic sounds now like the jingling of a child’s
toy.”
(See: Municipal Corpn. of Delhi v. Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar
[(1987) 4 SCC 497] (SCC p. 504, para 7) and Gujarat Water
Supply and Sewerage Board v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd.
[(1989) 1 SCC 532].
9. “9…It is often said that ‘an attempt to give a specific meaning
to the word “reasonable” is trying to count what is not number and
measure what is not space’. The author of Words and Phrases
(Permanent Edn.) has quoted from Nice & Schreiber, in re [123 F.
987 at p. 988] to give a plausible meaning for the said word. He
says
‘the expression “reasonable” is a relative term, and the facts of
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the particular controversy must be considered before the
question as to what constitutes reasonable can be determined’.
It is not meant to be expedient or convenient but certainly
something more than that.”
10. The word “reasonable” signifies “in accordance with reason”.
In the ultimate analysis it is a question of fact, whether a particular
act is reasonable or not depends on the circumstances in a given
situation. (See Municipal Corpn. of Greater Mumbai v. Kamla
Mills Ltd. [(2003) 6 SCC 315].
11. The Court while considering the application for bail with
reference to Section 37 of the Act is not called upon to record a
finding of not guilty. It is for the limited purpose essentially
confined to the question of releasing the accused on bail that the
Court is called upon to see if there are reasonable grounds for
believing that the accused is not guilty and records its satisfaction
about the existence of such grounds. But the Court has not to
consider the matter as if it is pronouncing a judgment of acquittal
and recording a finding of not guilty.”
23. Coming back to the case in hand, what is observed is that the
petitioner having been arrested in the said case and undergoing trial, the stage
of the trial is for recording of the evidence of the prosecution witnesses of
which 3 out of 10 have been examined. The petitioner taking note of the
deposition of the three witnesses and finding that the statements made by
these witnesses have, for the moment, failed to implicate the petitioner as far
as possession of the alleged contraband is concerned, therefore he has
approached this Court with this petition seeking for grant of bail.
24. This Court, even if the authority cited by the learned P.P that is,
the case of Vilas Pandurang Pawar(supra) as also the proposition found in
the case of Shiv Shankar Kesari(supra) is taken into consideration, there is
no reason to indulge in critical analysis of the evidence on record, as on a
bare reading of the same, the evidence of PW-2 and PW-3 have amply
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cleared the air that the petitioner cannot be linked to the discovery of the
alleged contraband substance found in the tin box, firstly, not from within
the compound of the house of the petitioner, if at all, and secondly, certainly
not from his physical possession or even conscious possession.
25. To restate what has been cited at para 19 of the Mohd Muslim
case(supra), this Court is reasonably satisfied on a prima facie look at the
material on record that the accused/petitioner is not guilty, that is, at the time
when this bail application was preferred. It remains to be seen as to what
would be the final analysis at the conclusion of the trial, for which the Trial
Court is to take a call upon appreciation of the body of evidence then. For
the present, suffice it to say that the petitioner has made out a case for grant
of bail, the contention of the learned P.P not found to be wholly convincing
to decide otherwise.
26. In view of the above, this application is hereby allowed. The
accused/petitioner is directed to be released on bail, if not wanted in any
other case, on the following conditions:
i. That he shall not abscond or tamper with the witnesses;
ii. That he shall attend court as and when called for;
iii. That he shall not leave the jurisdiction of Meghalaya, except
with due permission of the court concerned; andiv. That he shall bind himself on a bond of ₹ 50,000/- (Rupees
fifty thousand) only along with one surety of like amount to
the satisfaction of the trial court.
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27. Petition disposed of. No costs.
Judge
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by 12
TIPRILYNTI KHARKONGOR
Date: 2025.08.22 15:50:48 IST