Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 22.7.2025 vs State Of Himachal Pradesh on 28 July, 2025
2025:HHC:24435
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MP(M) No. 1411 of 2025
Reserved on: 22.7.2025
Date of Decision: 28.07.2025.
Shivanshu Lohia ...Petitioner
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh ...Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No.
For the Petitioner : Mr. Servedaman Rathour, Advocate.
For the Respondent : Mr. Prashant Sen, Deputy Advocate
General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition for
seeking regular bail in FIR No. 12 of 2025, dated 16.1.2025,
registered for the commission of an offence punishable under
Section 21 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act
(in short ‘the ND&PS Act‘), at Police Station, Nahan, District
Sirmour, H.P.
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2
2025:HHC:24435
2. It has been asserted that the FIR was lodged on false
facts. The petitioner has no concern with the commission of the
offence. The petitioner was wrongly implicated and arrested by
the police. The charge sheet has been filed, and the petitioner is
not required for any purpose. The petitioner would abide by the
terms and conditions, which the Court may impose. Hence, the
petition.
3. The petition is opposed by filing a status report
asserting that the police party was on patrolling duty on
16.1.2025. They received a secret information at about 5.30 PM
that petitioner Shivanshu Lohia was dealing in heroin, and in case
of search, a huge quantity of heroin could be recovered. The
information was reduced into writing and was sent to Additional
Superintendent of Police, Headquarters, Nahan, H.P. The police
associated the independent witnesses and went to the
petitioner’s house, where he was present. The search of the house
was conducted, during which 12 syringes, one foil paper and one
transparent polythene pouch were recovered. The police checked
the pouch and found 6.9 grams of heroin. The police seized the
articles and arrested the petitioner. The heroin was sent to SFSL,
Junga and as per report, it was confirmed to be Diacetylmorphine
3
2025:HHC:24435
(Heroin). FIR Nos.81 of 2021 and 135 of 2021 are registered against
the petitioner. The petitioner is a drug peddler, and he would
indulge in the commission of similar offences in case of his
release on bail. Hence, the status report.
4. I have heard Mr. Servedaman Rathour, learned counsel
for the petitioner and Mr. Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate
General, for the respondent-State.
5. Mr. Servedaman Rathour, learned counsel for the
petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and was
falsely implicated. As per the prosecution, 6.9 grams of heroin
was found in possession of the petitioner, which is slightly more
than a small quantity. The petitioner has been in custody for more
than six months. The trial has not commenced, and the matter is
listed for fixation of evidence. Pre-trial detention of the
petitioner is not justified, keeping in view the quantity of the
heroin allegedly found in possession of the petitioner. Therefore,
he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner
be released on bail.
6. Mr. Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General,
for the respondent-State, submitted that the petitioner is
4
2025:HHC:24435
involved in the sale of heroin, which adversely affects the
younger generation. The petitioner is likely to commit a similar
crime in case of his release on bail. Therefore, he prayed that the
present petition be dismissed.
7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
8. The parameters for granting bail were considered by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ajwar v. Waseem (2024) 10 SCC 768:
2024 SCC OnLine SC 974, wherein it was observed at page 783: –
“Relevant parameters for granting bail
26. While considering as to whether bail ought to be
granted in a matter involving a serious criminal offence,
the Court must consider relevant factors like the nature of
the accusations made against the accused, the manner in
which the crime is alleged to have been committed, the
gravity of the offence, the role attributed to the accused,
the criminal antecedents of the accused, the probability of
tampering of the witnesses and repeating the offence, if
the accused are released on bail, the likelihood of the
accused being unavailable in the event bail is granted, the
possibility of obstructing the proceedings and evading the
courts of justice and the overall desirability of releasing the
accused on bail. [Refer: Chaman Lal v. State of U.P. [Chaman
Lal v. State of U.P., (2004) 7 SCC 525: 2004 SCC (Cri)
1974]; Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan [Kalyan
Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC
(Cri) 1977]; Masroor v. State of U.P. [Masroor v. State of U.P.,
(2009) 14 SCC 286 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1368]; Prasanta Kumar
Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee [Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis
5
2025:HHC:24435Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765]; Neeru
Yadav v. State of U.P. [Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P., (2014) 16
SCC 508 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 527]; Anil Kumar Yadav v. State
(NCT of Delhi)[Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi),
(2018) 12 SCC 129 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 425]; Mahipal v. Rajesh
Kumar [Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar, (2020) 2 SCC 118 : (2020) 1
SCC (Cri) 558] .]
9. This position was reiterated in Ramratan v. State of
M.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3068, wherein it was observed: –
“12. The fundamental purpose of bail is to ensure the
accused’s presence during the investigation and trial. Any
conditions imposed must be reasonable and directly
related to this objective. This Court in Parvez Noordin
Lokhandwalla v. State of Maharastra (2020) 10 SCC 77
observed that though the competent court is empowered to
exercise its discretion to impose “any condition” for the
grant of bail under Sections 437(3) and 439(1)(a) CrPC, the
discretion of the court has to be guided by the need to
facilitate the administration of justice, secure the presence
of the accused and ensure that the liberty of the accused is
not misused to impede the investigation, overawe the
witnesses or obstruct the course of justice. The relevant
observations are extracted herein below:
“14. The language of Section 437(3) CrPC, which uses
the expression “any condition … otherwise in the
interest of justice” has been construed in several
decisions of this Court. Though the competent court is
empowered to exercise its discretion to impose “any
condition” for the grant of bail under
Sections 437(3) and 439(1)(a) CrPC, the discretion of the
court has to be guided by the need to facilitate the
administration of justice, secure the presence of the accused
and ensure that the liberty of the accused is not misused to
impede the investigation, overawe the witnesses or obstruct
the course of justice. Several decisions of this Court have
dwelt on the nature of the conditions which can
6
2025:HHC:24435legitimately be imposed both in the context of bail and
anticipatory bail.” (Emphasis supplied)
13. In Sumit Mehta v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2013) 15 SCC 570,
this Court discussed the scope of the discretion of the Court
to impose “any condition” on the grant of bail and
observed in the following terms:–
“15. The words “any condition” used in the provision
should not be regarded as conferring absolute power on
a court of law to impose any condition that it chooses to
impose. Any condition has to be interpreted as a
reasonable condition acceptable in the facts permissible in
the circumstance, and effective in the pragmatic sense, and
should not defeat the order of grant of bail. We are of the
view that the present facts and circumstances of the
case do not warrant such an extreme condition to be
imposed.” (Emphasis supplied)
14. This Court, in Dilip Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh
(2021) 2 SCC 779, laid down the factors to be taken into
consideration while deciding the bail application and
observed:
“4. It is well settled by a plethora of decisions of this
Court that criminal proceedings are not for the
realisation of disputed dues. It is open to a court to
grant or refuse the prayer for anticipatory bail,
depending on the facts and circumstances of the
particular case. The factors to be taken into consideration
while considering an application for bail are the nature of
the accusation and the severity of the punishment in the
case of conviction and the nature of the materials relied
upon by the prosecution; reasonable apprehension of
tampering with the witnesses or apprehension of threat to
the complainant or the witnesses; the reasonable possibility
of securing the presence of the accused at the time of trial or
the likelihood of his abscondence; character, behaviour and
standing of the accused; and the circumstances which are
peculiar or the accused and larger interest of the public or
the State and similar other considerations. A criminal
7
2025:HHC:24435court, exercising jurisdiction to grant bail/anticipatory
bail, is not expected to act as a recovery agent to realise
the dues of the complainant, and that too, without any
trial.” (Emphasis supplied)
10. This position was reiterated in Shabeen Ahmed versus
State of U.P., 2025 SCC Online SC 479.
11. The present petition is to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
12. As per the status report, the petitioner was arrested on
20.1.2025. The charge sheet was filed before the Court on
27.2.2025, and the matter was listed on 22.7.2025 for fixation of
evidence. The fact that the learned Trial Court is unable to
commence the trial within the period of five months shows its
inability to conclude the trial within a reasonable time. Hence, the
plea taken by the petitioner that his right to a speedy trial is being
violated has some force.
13. It was held in Ajay Kumar Choudhary v. Union of India,
(2015) 7 SCC 291: (2015) 2 SCC (L&S) 455: 2015 SCC OnLine SC 127
that the right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right of the
accused. It was observed at page 298:
“13. Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, 1948, assures that:
8
2025:HHC:24435
“12. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary
interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and
reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection
of the law against such interference or attacks.”
14. More recently, the European Convention on Human
Rights in Article 6(1) promises that:
“6. (1) In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations or of any criminal charge against him,
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing
within a reasonable time….”
and in its second sub-article, that:
“6. (2) Everyone charged with a criminal offence
shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty
according to law.”
15. The Supreme Court of the United States struck down the
use of nolle prosequi, an indefinite but ominous and
omnipresent postponement of civil or criminal prosecution
in Klopfer v. North Carolina [18 L Ed 2d 1: 386 US 213 (1967)].
16. In Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab [(1994) 3 SCC 569: 1994
SCC (Cri) 899] the Constitution Bench of this Court
unequivocally construed the right of speedy trial as a
fundamental right, and we can do no better than extract
these paragraphs from that celebrated decision: (SCC pp.
638-39, paras 86-87)
“86. The concept of speedy trial is read into Article 21 as an
essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty
guaranteed and preserved under our Constitution. The
right to speedy trial begins with the actual restraint
imposed by arrest and consequent incarceration and
continues at all stages, namely, the stage of the
investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal and revision so that any
possible prejudice that may result from the impermissible
and avoidable delay from the time of the commission of the
offence till it consummates into a finality, can be averted.
In this context, it may be noted that the constitutional
9
2025:HHC:24435
guarantee of a speedy trial is properly reflected in Section
309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
87. This Court in Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of
Bihar [(1980) 1 SCC 81: 1980 SCC (Cri) 23] while
dealing with Article 21 of the Constitution of India
has observed thus: (SCC p. 89, para 5)
‘5. … No procedure which does not ensure a
reasonably quick trial can be regarded as
“reasonable, fair or just” and it would fall foul
of Article 21. There can, therefore, be no doubt
that a speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean
reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral and
essential part of the fundamental right to life
and liberty enshrined in Article 21. The
question which would, however, arise is as to
what would be the consequence if a person
accused of an offence is denied a speedy trial
and is sought to be deprived of his liberty by
imprisonment as a result of a long-delayed
trial in violation of his fundamental right
under Article 21. Would he be entitled to be
released unconditionally, freed from the
charge levelled against him on the ground that
trying him after an unduly long period of time
and convicting him after such trial would
constitute a violation of his fundamental right
under Article 21.”
17. The legal expectation of expedition and diligence being
present at every stage of a criminal trial and a fortiori in
departmental enquiries has been emphasised by this Court
on numerous occasions. The Constitution Bench in Abdul
Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225: 1992 SCC
(Cri) 93] underscored that this right to speedy trial is
implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution and is also
reflected in Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973; that it encompasses all stages viz. investigation,
inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial; that the burden
lies on the prosecution to justify and explain the delay; that
10
2025:HHC:24435
the Court must engage in a balancing test to determine
whether this right had been denied in the particular case
before it.”
14. It was held in the Shaheen Welfare Association. v. Union
of India, (1996) 2 SCC 616: 1996 SCC (Cri) 366 that a person cannot
be kept behind the bars when there is no prospect of trial being
concluded expeditiously. It was observed at page 621:
“8. It is in this context that it has become necessary to
grant some relief to those persons who have been deprived
of their personal liberty for a considerable length of time
without any prospect of the trial being concluded in the
near future. Undoubtedly, the safety of the community and
the nation needs to be safeguarded looking to the nature of
the offences these undertrials have been charged with. But
the ultimate justification for such deprivation of liberty
pending trial can only be their being found guilty of the
offences for which they have been charged. If such a
finding is not likely to be arrived at within a reasonable
time, some relief becomes necessary.”
15. Similarly, it was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra, (2022) 9 SCC 321: (2022) 3
SCC (Cri) 560: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 453 that no accused can be
subjected to unending detention pending trial. It was observed at
page 335:
“40. Having held so, we cannot be oblivious to what has
been urged on behalf of the respondent-accused that
cancellation of bail by this Court is likely to be construed as
an indefinite foreclosure of his right to seek bail. It is not
necessary to dwell upon the wealth of case law which,
11
2025:HHC:24435regardless of the stringent provisions in a penal law or the
gravity of the offence, has time and again recognised the
legitimacy of seeking liberty from incarceration. To put it
differently, no accused can be subjected to unending
detention pending trial, especially when the law presumes
him to be innocent until proven guilty. Even where
statutory provisions expressly bar the grant of bail, such as
in cases under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act,
1967, this Court has expressly ruled that after a reasonably
long period of incarceration, or for any other valid reason,
such stringent provisions will melt down, and cannot be
measured over and above the right of liberty guaranteed
under Article 21 of the Constitution (see Union of
India v. K.A. Najeeb [Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3
SCC 713, paras 15 and 17] ).”
16. It was laid down in Mohd. Muslim v. State (NCT of
Delhi), (2023) 18 SCC 166: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 352, that the right to
a speedy trial is a constitutional right of an accused. The right of
bail is curtailed on the premise that the trial would be concluded
expeditiously. It was observed at page 174: –
13. When provisions of law curtail the right of an accused to
secure bail, and correspondingly fetter judicial discretion
(like Section 37 of the NDPS Act, in the present case), this
Court has upheld them for conflating two competing
values i.e. the right of the accused to enjoy freedom, based
on the presumption of innocence, and societal interest —
as observed in Vaman Narain Ghiya v. State of Ra-
jasthan [Vaman Narain Ghiya v. State of Rajasthan, (2009) 2
SCC 281 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 745 : (2008) 17 SCR 369] (“the
concept of bail emerges from the conflict between the police
power to restrict liberty of a man who is alleged to have
committed a crime, and presumption of innocence in favour of
the alleged criminal….”). They are, at the same time, upheld
on the condition that the trial is concluded expeditiously.
12
2025:HHC:24435
The Constitution Bench in Kartar Singh v. State of Pun-
jab [Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569: 1994
SCC (Cri) 899 : (1994) 2 SCR 375] made observations to this
effect. In Shaheen Welfare Association. v. Union of In-
dia [Shaheen Welfare Assn. v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC
616: 1996 SCC (Cri) 366 : (1996) 2 SCR 1123] again, this Court
expressed the same sentiment, namely, that when
stringent provisions are enacted, curtailing the provisions
of bail, and restricting judicial discretion, it is on the basis
that investigation and trials would be concluded swiftly.
The Court said that parliamentary intervention is based on:
(Shaheen Welfare case [Shaheen Welfare Assn. v. Union of In-
dia, (1996) 2 SCC 616: 1996 SCC (Cri) 366: (1996) 2 SCR 1123],
SCC p. 624, para 17)
“17. … a conscious decision has been taken by the
legislature to sacrifice to some extent, the personal
liberty of an undertrial accused for the sake of
protecting the community and the nation against
terrorist and disruptive activities or other activities
harmful to society, it is all the more necessary that
investigation of such crimes is done efficiently and an
adequate number of Designated Courts are set up to
bring to book persons accused of such serious crimes.
This is the only way in which society can be protected
against harmful activities. This would also ensure that
persons ultimately found innocent are not
unnecessarily kept in jail for long periods.”
17. The Court highlighted the effects of pre-trial
detention and the importance of a speedy trial as under at page
178:
“23. Before parting, it would be important to reflect that
laws which impose stringent conditions for the grant of
bail may be necessary in the public interest; yet, if trials are
not concluded in time, the injustice wreaked on the
individual is immeasurable. Jails are overcrowded, and
13
2025:HHC:24435their living conditions, more often than not, are appalling.
According to the Union Home Ministry’s response to
Parliament, the National Crime Records Bureau had
recorded that as on 31-12-2021, over 5,54,034 prisoners
were lodged in jails against a total capacity of 4,25,069
prisoners in the country [ National Crime Records Bureau,
Prison Statistics in India
<https://ncrb.gov.in/sites/default/files/PSI-2021/Executiv
e_ncrb_Summary-2021.pdf>]. Of these, 1,22,852 were
convicts; the rest, 4,27,165, were undertrials.
24. The danger of unjust imprisonment, is that inmates are
at risk of “prisonisation” a term described by the Kerala
High Court in A Convict Prisoner v. State [A Convict Pris-
oner v. State, 1993 SCC OnLine Ker 127: 1993 Cri LJ 3242] as “a
radical transformation” whereby the prisoner : (SCC OnLine
Ker para 13)
“13. … loses his identity. He is known by a number. He
loses personal possessions. He has no personal
relationships. Psychological problems result from loss
of freedom, status, possessions, dignity and autonomy
of personal life. The inmate culture of prison turns out
to be dreadful. The prisoner becomes hostile by ordinary
standards. Self-perception changes.”
25. There is a further danger of the prisoner turning to
crime, “as crime not only turns admirable, but the more
professional the crime, more honour is paid to the criminal”
[ Working Papers – Group on Prisons & Borstals – 1966
U.K.] (also see Donald Clemmer’s “The Prison Community”
published in 1940 [ Donald Clemmer, The Prison
Community (1968) Holt, Rinehart & Winston, which is
referred to in Tomasz Sobecki, “Donald Clemmer’s
Concept of Prisonisation”, available
at:<https://www.tkp.edu.pl/wpcontent/uploads/2020/12/S
obecki_sklad.pdf> (accessed on 23-3-2023).] ).
Incarceration has further deleterious effects, where the
accused belongs to the weakest economic strata:
immediate loss of livelihood, and in several cases,
scattering of families as well as loss of family bonds and
14
2025:HHC:24435alienation from society. The courts, therefore, have to be
sensitive to these aspects (because in the event of an
acquittal, the loss to the accused is irreparable), and ensure
that trials–especially in cases where special laws enact
stringent provisions- are taken up and concluded
speedily.”
18. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
recently in Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra (2024)
9 SCC 813: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1693 that the right to speedy trial of
the offenders facing criminal charges is an important facet of
Article 21 of the Constitution of India and inordinate delay in the
conclusion of the trial entitles the accused to grant of bail, it was
observed at page 817: –
“10. Long back, in Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of
Bihar [Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC
81: 1980 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court had declared that the right
to speedy trial of offenders facing criminal charges is
“implicit in the broad sweep and content of Article 21 as
interpreted by this Court”. Remarking that a valid
procedure under Article 21 is one which contains a
procedure that is “reasonable, fair and just”, it was held
that: (SCC p. 89, para 5)
“5. … Now obviously procedure prescribed by law for
depriving a person of liberty cannot be “reasonable, fair
or just” unless that procedure ensures a speedy trial for
determination of the guilt of such person. No procedure
which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be
regarded as “reasonable, fair or just” and it would fall
foul of Article 21. There can, therefore, be no doubt that
a speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean reasonably
expeditious trial, is an integral and essential part of the
fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article
15
2025:HHC:24435
21. The question which would, however, arise is as to
what would be the consequence if a person accused of
an offence is denied a speedy trial and is sought to be
deprived of his liberty by imprisonment as a result of a
long-delayed trial in violation of his fundamental right
under Article 21.”
11. The aforesaid observations have resonated, time and
again, in several judgments, such as Kadra Pahadiya v. State
of Bihar [Kadra Pahadiya v. State of Bihar, (1981) 3 SCC 671:
1981 SCC (Cri) 791] and Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S.
Nayak [Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1992) 1 SCC
225: 1992 SCC (Cri) 93]. In the latter, the court re-
emphasised the right to a speedy trial and further held that
an accused, facing a prolonged trial, has no option: (Abdul
Rehman Antulay case [Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak,
(1992) 1 SCC 225: 1992 SCC (Cri) 93], SCC p. 269, para 84)
“84. … The State or complainant prosecutes him. It
is, thus, the obligation of the State or the complainant,
as the case may be, to proceed with the case with
reasonable promptitude. Particularly, in this country,
where the large majority of accused come from poorer
and weaker sections of society, not versed in the ways of
law, where they do not often get competent legal advice,
the application of the said rule is wholly inadvisable. Of
course, in a given case, if an accused demands a speedy
trial and yet he is not given one, it may be a relevant
factor in his favour. But we cannot disentitle an accused
from complaining of infringement of his right to a
speedy trial on the ground that he did not ask for or
insist upon a speedy trial.”
19. It was further held that if the State or any prosecuting
agency, including the Court concerned, has no wherewithal to
provide the right of speedy trial to the accused, then the bail
16
2025:HHC:24435
should not be opposed on the ground that the crime is serious. It
was observed at page 820:
17. If the State or any prosecuting agency, including the
court concerned, has no wherewithal to provide or protect
the fundamental right of an accused to have a speedy trial
as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution then the
State or any other prosecuting agency should not oppose
the plea for bail on the ground that the crime committed is
serious. Article 21 of the Constitution applies irrespective
of the nature of the crime.
18. We may hasten to add that the petitioner is still an
accused, not a convict. The over-arching postulate of
criminal jurisprudence that an accused is presumed to be
innocent until proven guilty cannot be brushed aside
lightly, howsoever stringent the penal law may be.
19. We are convinced that the manner in which the
prosecuting agency as well as the Court have proceeded,
the right of the accused to have a speedy trial could be said
to have been infringed, thereby violating Article 21 of the
Constitution.
20. This position was reiterated in Balwinder Singh v. State
of Punjab, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4354, wherein it was observed:
7. An accused has a right to a fair trial, and while a hurried
trial is frowned upon as it may not give sufficient time to
prepare for the defence, an inordinate delay in the
conclusion of the trial would infringe the right of an
accused guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.
8. It is not for nothing that the Author Oscar Wilde in “The
Ballad of Reading Gaol” wrote the following poignant lines
while being incarcerated:
“I know not whether Laws be right,
Or whether Laws be wrong;
17
2025:HHC:24435
All that we know who be in jail
Is that the wall is strong;
And that each day is like a year,
A year whose days are long.”
21. It was submitted that the petitioner has criminal
antecedents and he is not entitled to bail on this consideration.
This submission will not help the State. It was laid down by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ayub Khan v. State of Rajasthan, 2024
SCC OnLine SC 3763: 2024: INSC:994 that the criminal antecedents
may not be a reason to deny bail to the accused in case of his long
incarceration. It was observed:
“10. The presence of the antecedents of the accused is only
one of the several considerations for deciding the prayer
for bail made by him. In a given case, if the accused makes
out a strong prima facie case, depending upon the fact
situation and period of incarceration, the presence of
antecedents may not be a ground to deny bail. There may
be a case where a Court can grant bail only on the grounds
of long incarceration. The presence of antecedents may not
be relevant in such a case. In a given case, the Court may
grant default bail. Again, the antecedents of the accused
are irrelevant in such a case. Thus, depending upon the
peculiar facts, the Court can grant bail notwithstanding the
existence of the antecedents.”
22. Consequently, the present petition is allowed, and the
petitioner is ordered to be released on bail subject to his
furnishing bail bonds in the sum of ₹1,00,000/- with one surety
of the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court.
18
2025:HHC:24435
While on bail, the petitioner will abide by the following terms and
conditions: –
(I) The petitioner will not intimidate the witnesses, nor
will he influence any evidence in any manner
whatsoever.
(II) The petitioner shall attend the trial on each and
every hearing and will not seek unnecessary
adjournments.
(III) The petitioner will not leave the present address for a
continuous period of seven days without furnishing
the address of the intended visit to the SHO
concerned, the Police Station concerned and the Trial
Court.
(IV) The petitioner will surrender his passport, if any, to
the Court; and
(V) The petitioner will furnish his mobile number and
social media contact to the Police and the Court and
will abide by the summons/notices received from the
Police/Court through SMS/WhatsApp/Social Media
Account. In case of any change in the mobile number
or social media accounts, the same will be intimated
to the Police/Court within five days from the date of
the change.
23. It is expressly made clear that in case of violation of
any of these conditions, the prosecution will have the right to file
a petition for cancellation of the bail.
24. The petition stands accordingly disposed of. A copy of
this order be sent to the Superintendent of Model Central Jail,
19
2025:HHC:24435
Nahan, District Sirmour, H.P. and the learned Trial Court by
FASTER.
25. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the
disposal of this petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on
the case’s merits.
26. A downloaded copy of this order shall be accepted by
the learned Trial Court while accepting the bail bonds from the
petitioner, and in case said Court intends to ascertain the veracity
of the downloaded copy of the order presented to it, the same may
be ascertained from the official website of this Court.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
28th July, 2025
(Chander)
Digitally signed by KARAN SINGH GULERIA
Date: 2025.07.28 11:44:59 IST
[ad_1]
Source link