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Uttarakhand High Court
22 July vs State Of Uttarakhand on 22 July, 2025
Author: Manoj Kumar Tiwari
Bench: Manoj Kumar Tiwari
2025:UHC:6408-DB
HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL
JUSTICE SHRI MANOJ KUMAR TIWARI
AND
JUSTICE SHRI SUBHASH UPADHYAY
Writ Petition (S/B) No. 385 of 2020
22 July, 2025
Bhanu Pratap Singh --Petitioner
Versus
State of Uttarakhand --Respondents
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Presence:-
Mr. Arvind Vashishta, Senior Advocate assisted by Ms. Devanshi Joshi,
Advocate for the petitioner.
Mr. Puran Singh Bisht, Addl. C.S.C. for the State
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The Court made the following:
JUDGMENT:
(per Hon’ble Justice Sri Manoj Kumar Tiwari)
1. By means of this writ petition, petitioner has
challenged rejection of his candidature for appointment as
Assistant Prosecuting Officer by Government of
Uttarakhand. The reliefs sought are as follows:-
“(a) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of
certiorari quashing the order la[;k 672@chl&6@2020&01 ¼08½ 2007 Vh-
lh-&3 (Annexure No.13) dated 05.11.2020 passed by the
respondent.
(b) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of
mandamus directing the respondent to consider
petitioner’s candidature for the post of Assistant
Prosecuting Officer.”
2. Petitioner is a Law Graduate, who was appointed
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on probation as Civil Judge (J.D.) in State of U.P. on the
recommendation of Uttar Pradesh Public Service
Commission. While he was undergoing training in Judicial
Training Research Institute (JTRI), Lucknow, an order was
passed by Principal Secretary, Home Department, State of
U.P. in September, 2014, whereby petitioner was
discharged from service. In the said order, it was
mentioned that it is a discharge simpliciter from service as
petitioner failed to give satisfaction, as stipulated in Rule
24(4) of The Uttar Pradesh Judicial Service Rules, 2001.
3. In reply to petitioner’s writ petition (WPSB
No.1654 of 2014), challenging the aforesaid discharge
order, counter affidavit was filed on behalf of Allahabad
High Court. In paragraph nos.17 (i) and (ii) thereof, it was
mentioned that sub-rule (5) of Rule 24 of The Uttar
Pradesh Judicial Service Rules, 2001 was referred to the
Rule Committee and on the recommendation of the Rule
Committee, the last sentence of sub-rule (5), which
created a bar for reappointment in service, was removed.
Sub-rule (5) of Rule 24 of the aforesaid Rules, before
amendment made by Notification dated 04.09.2015, reads
as under:-
(5) A person, whose services are dispensed with under
sub-rule (4) shall not be entitled to compensation and
2
2025:UHC:6408-DBshall also not be eligible for reappointment to the service.”
4. After referring to sub-rule (5) of Rule 24, both
before and after amendment, following statement was
made in para 17 (ii) of the counter affidavit:-
“Hence, there is no bar against reappointment in the
Uttar Pradesh Judicial Service after discharge simplicitor
and the petitioners are not debarred from seeking
reappointment under the Uttar Pradesh Judicial Service
and apart from the Uttar Pradesh Judicial Service, it was
always open for the petitioners to apply to other
government or private services and the discharge
simpliciter in question is not at all a bar from employment
in government/private services. A true copy of the Uttar
Pradesh Judicial Service (Third Amendment) Rules, 2015
is annexed herewith as Annexure CA-2 to this affidavit.
Therefore, it cannot be said that an order made under
Rule 24(5) of the Rules, 2001 visits the petitioners with
civil consequences, and therefore, there is no violation of
Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India.”
5. After his discharge from service, petitioner
responded to an advertisement dated 10.06.2016 issued
by Uttarakhand Public Service Commission, inviting
applications against 26 vacancies on the post of Assistant
Prosecuting Officer. He participated in that selection and by
virtue of his merit, he was recommended for appointment.
Since appointment letters were issued to other
recommended candidates and petitioner alone was left out,
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therefore, he made a representation to Secretary, Home
Department, Government of Uttarakhand, in which he
stated that he is neither dismissed nor removed from
service nor he has been convicted of an offence involving
moral turpitude, therefore, denial of appointment to him, is
without any reason or justification. He also drew attention
to sub-rule (5) of Rule 24 of U.P. Judicial Service Rules,
2001, which after amendment, permits reappointment of a
person, who is discharged from service under Rule 24(4) of
the said Rules in U.P. Judicial Service. He further stated
that he has not suppressed any information and he had
also enclosed the discharge certificate with his application
and also pointed out that as many as 15 Trainee Judicial
Officers, including the petitioner, were discharged from
service, out of which 02 were reappointed in Uttar Pradesh
Judicial Service and 02 others were appointed as Assistant
Prosecuting Officer in State of U.P. while some others were
selected and appointed in Delhi Higher Judicial Service,
which proves that petitioner’s discharge from service does
not disqualify him from re-appointment under the State.
6. The Secretary, Home Department, passed an
order on 05.12.2020, rejecting candidature of the
petitioner for appointment as Assistant Prosecuting Officer,
by relying upon Rule 11 of Uttarakhand Prosecuting
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Officers Service Rules, 2015. Thus, feeling aggrieved
petitioner has approached this Court.
7. In view of the facts as mentioned above, the
following questions fall for consideration of this Court: (i)
Whether discharge of a probationer for unsatisfactory work
would have the effect of disqualifying him for future
employment, and (ii) Whether the Secretary, Home
Department, Government of Uttarakhand was justified in
denying appointment to the petitioner by invoking Rule 11
of The Uttarakhand Prosecuting Officers Service Rules,
2015.
8. It is not in dispute that petitioner was discharged
from service without holding any disciplinary inquiry. He
was discharged by invoking provisions of The U.P.
Temporary Government Servants (Termination of Service)
Rules, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as ‘The Termination
Rules, 1975’). In the discharge order passed by the State
Government, there is a reference to the Resolution passed
by the Full Court of Allahabad High Court, which is
extracted below:-
“The aforesaid probationer Judicial Officers were
recommended to be discharged simpliciter from services
for having failed to give satisfaction, as stipulated in Rule
24(4) of the Uttar Pradesh Judicial Service Rules, 2001”
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9. The order passed by Government of Uttar
Pradesh reveals that the Judicial Officers, who were
discharged from service, were given one month’s pay in
lieu of notice, in terms of first Proviso to Rule 3(2) as
required under Rule 3 of The Termination Rules, 1975. Rule
1(3) and Rule 3 of the said Rules is extracted below”-
“1(3) They shall apply to all persons holding a civil post in
connection with the affairs of Uttar Pradesh and who are under
the rule-making control of Governor, but who do not hold a lien
on permanent post under the Government of Uttar Pradesh.
3. Termination of service. – (1) Notwithstanding anything to
the contrary in any existing rules or orders on the subject, the
services of a Government servant in temporary service shall be
liable to termination at any time by a notice in writing given
either by the Government servant to the appointing authority,
or by the appointing authority to the Government servant.
(2) The period of notice shall be one month:
Provided that the services of any such Government
servant may be terminated forthwith, and on such termination
the Government servant shall be entitled to claim a sum
equivalent to the amount of his pay plus allowances, if any, for
the period of the notice or as the case may be, for the period
by which such notice falls short of one month at the same rates
at which he was drawing them immediately before the
termination of his services.
Provided further that it shall be open to the appointing
authority to relieve a Government servant without any notice
or accept notice for a shorter period, without requiring the
Government servant to pay any penalty in lieu of notice:
Provided also that such notice given by the Government
servant against whom a disciplinary proceeding is pending or
contemplated shall be effective only if it is accepted by the6
2025:UHC:6408-DBappointing authority, provided in the case of a contemplated
disciplinary proceeding, the Government servant is informed of
the non-acceptance of his notice before the expiry of that
notice.”
10. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of
Allahabad High Court in petitioner’s writ petition, the stand
taken was that his discharge from service will not disqualify
him for seeking appointment in U.P. Judicial Service or in
any other government or private service. This stand is in
consonance with the law of the land which provides that
discharge of a probationer for unsatisfactory work does not
cast any stigma and do not come in the way of his
reappointment.
11. In the celebrated judgment of Parshotam Lal
Dhingra vs. Union of India reported in AIR 1958
Supreme Court 36, a Constitution Bench of Hon’ble
Supreme Court held that “One test for determining whether
the termination of the service of a Government servant is
by way of punishment is to ascertain whether the servant,
but for such termination, had the right to hold the post. If
he had a right to the post as in the three cases
hereinbefore mentioned, the termination of his service will
by itself be a punishment and he will be entitled to the
protection of Art. 311. In other words and broadly
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speaking, Art. 311 (2), will apply to those cases where the
Government servant, had he been employed by a private
employer, will be entitled to maintain an action for
wrongful dismissal, removal or reduction in rank. To put it
in another way, if the Government has, by contract,
express or implied, or, under the rules, the right to
terminate the employment at any time, then such
termination in the manner provided by the contract or the
rules is, prima facie and per se, not a punishment and does
not attract the provisions of Art. 311.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
12. In the case of Samsher Singh vs. State of
Punjab & Another and connected matter, reported in
(1974) 2 SCC 831, Hon’ble Supreme Court held as
under:-
“62. The position of a probationer was considered by this
Court in Purshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India [1958] S C.R.
828 Das, C.J., speaking for the Court said that where a person
is appointed to a permanent post in Government service on
probation the termination of his service during or at the end of
the period of probation will not ordinarily and by itself be a
punishment because the Government servant so appointed has
no right to continue to hold such a post any more than a
servant employed on probation by a private employer is
entitled to do so. Such a termination does not operate as a
forfeiture of any right of a servant to hold the post, for he has
no such right. Obviously such a termination cannot be a
dismissal, removal or reduction in rank by way of punishment.
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There are, however, two important observations of Das, C.J., in
Dhingra‘s case (supra). One is that if a right exists under a
contract or service Rules to terminate the service the motive
operating on the mind of the Government is wholly irrelevant.
The other is that if the termination of service is sought to be
founded on misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other
disqualification, then it is a punishment and violates Article
311 of the constitution. The reasoning why motive is said to be
irrelevant is that it inheres in the state of mind which is not
discernible. On the other land, if termination is founded on
misconduct it is objective and is manifest.
63. No abstract proposition can be laid down that where
the services of a probationer are terminated without saying
anything more in the order of termination than that the
services are terminated it can never amount to a punishment in
the facts and circumstances of the case. If a probationer is
discharged on the ground of misconduct, or inefficiency or for
similar reason without a proper enquiry and without his getting
a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against his
discharge it may in a given case amount to removal from
service within the meaning of Article 311(2) of the Constitution.
64. Before a probationer is confirmed the authority
concerned is under an obligation to consider whether the work
of the probationer is satisfactory or whether he is suitable for
the post. In the absence of any Rules governing a probationer
in this respect the authority may come to the conclusion that
on account of inadequacy for the job or for any temperamental
or other object not involving moral turpitude the probationer is
unsuitable for the job and hence must be discharged. No
punishment is involved, in this. The authority may in some
cases be of the view that the conduct of the probationer may
result in dismissal or removal on an inquiry. But in those cases
the authority may not hold an inquiry and may simply
discharge the probationer with a view to giving him a chance to
make good in other walks of life without a stigma at the time of
termination of probation. If, on the other hand, the probationer9
2025:UHC:6408-DBis faced with an enquiry on charges of misconduct or
inefficiency or corruption, and if his services are terminated
without following the provisions of Article 311(2) he can claim
protection. In Gopi Kishore Prasad v. Union of India A.I.R. 1960
S.C. 689 it was said that if the Government proceeded against
the probationer in the direct way without casting any aspersion
on his honesty or competence, his discharge would not have
the effect of removal by way of punishment. Instead of taking
the easy course the Government chose the more difficult one of
starting proceedings against him and branding him as a
dishonest and incompetent officer.”
13. In the case of Pavanendra Narayan Verma vs.
Sanjay Gandhi PGI of Medical Sciences and another,
reported in (2002) 1 SCC 520, Hon’ble Supreme Court
considered and discussed the entire law regarding
discharge of a probationer. Paragraphs 13, 14, 15, 16, 17
and 18 of this judgment are relevant, which are extracted
below:-
“13. Another Constitution Bench of this Court in
Benjamin (A.G.) and Union of India explained the decision of
Parshotam Lal Dhingra. It followed the two tests mentioned in
Dhingras case viz.
(1) Whether the temporary Government servant had a
right to the post or the rank, or
(2) Whether he has been visited with evil consequences.
14. If “punishment” were restricted to “evil
consequences”, the Court’s task in deciding the nature of an
order of termination would have been easier. Courts would only
have to scan the termination order to see whether it ex facie
contains the stigma or refers to a document which stigmatises
the officer, in which case the termination order would have to
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be set aside on the ground that it is punitive. In these cases
the “evil consequences” must be assessed in relation to the
blemish on the employee’s reputation so as to render him unfit
for service elsewhere and not in relation to the post temporarily
occupied by him. This perhaps is the underlying rationale of
several of the decisions on the issue.
15. In V.P. Ahuja v. State of Punjab (2000) 3 SCC
239 cited by the appellant, the Court construed the language of
the order and found that it was ex-facie stigmatic.
16. In Krishnadevaraya Education Trust & Anr. v. L.A.
Balakrishna (2001) 1 Scale 196 , the first letter of termination
mentioned that the Committee appointed to go into the
question of general performance of each staff had found that
the employee, who had been appointed on probation, “was not
upto the mark”. This was followed by a second order of
termination which did not refer to the employee’s performance
at all. The Court held that it was preferable that the order of
termination did not mention that the employee’s performance
was not satisfactory as then “the employer runs the risk of the
allegation being made that the order itself casts a stigma.”
(SCC p.320, para 5). Nevertheless, the Court held that the
reasons stated in the first order did not mean that the
termination may be by way of punishment because “the
probationer is on test and if the services are found not to be
satisfactory, the employer has, in terms of the letter of
appointment, the right to terminate the services.”(SCC p.321,
para 6)
17. Finally, this Court in H.F. Sangati V. Registrar
General, High Court of Karnataka and Others dealt with the
question whether an order terminating the appointment of a
probationer Munsif could be considered to be punitive. In that
case during the period of probation, several adverse remarks
had been made in the confidential records of the probationer.
The Administrative Committee of the High Court considered
these confidential records and came to the conclusion that the
appellant was not fit to be confirmed in the post of a judicial
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officer. They recommended to the High Court accordingly. The
High Court accepted the recommendation at a Full Court
meeting and referred the matter to the State Government. The
State Government accepted the recommendation and
discharged the probationer from service. The order of
termination mentioned that the employee was “unsuitable to
hold the post of Munsif”. The Court held that the order did not
cast any stigma on the employee and was not punitive.
18. But the law does not rest there. In Samsher Singh
v. State of Punjab, the Courts were asked to look behind the
form of the order to find out whether the termination was in
substance punitive. So when a full-scale inquiry is held against
a probationer or a temporary appointee and he is found guilty,
an order terminating his services for this reason has been seen
as punitive and bad. It is this search for the “substance” behind
the “form” of the order of punishment which has lead to some
apparently conflicting decisions.”
14. In the aforesaid judgment (Pavanendra Narayan
Verma vs. Sanjay Gandhi PGI), after considering the
judgments on the point, Hon’ble Supreme Court enunciated
the law in para-29 of the judgment, which is also extracted
below:-
“29. Before considering the facts of the case before us one
further, seemingly intractable, area relating to the first test
needs to be cleared viz. what language in a termination order
would amount to a stigma? Generally speaking when a
probationer’s appointment is terminated it means that the
probationer is unfit for the job, whether by reason of
misconduct or ineptitude, whatever the language used in the
termination order may be. Although strictly speaking, the
stigma is implicit in the termination, a simple termination is not
stigmatic. A termination order which explicitly states what is
implicit in every order of termination of a probationer’s12
2025:UHC:6408-DBappointment, is also not stigmatic. The decisions cited by the
parties and noted by us earlier, also do not hold so. In order to
amount to a stigma, the order must be in a language which
imputes something over and above mere unsuitability for the
job.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
15. In the case of Rajesh Kumar Srivastava vs.
State of Jharkhand and others, reported in (2011) 4
SCC 447, Hon’ble Apex Court reiterated that a probationer
can be released from service for unsatisfactory work and
such release would not amount to dismissal or removal
from service. Para 9 and 10 of this judgment are extracted
below:-
“9. The records placed before us disclose that at the
time when the impugned order was passed, the appellant
was working as a Probationer Munsif. A person is placed
on probation so as to enable the employer to adjudge his
suitability for continuation in the service and also for
confirmation in service. There are various criteria for
adjudging suitability of a person to hold the post on
permanent basis and by way of confirmation. At that stage
and during the period of probation the action and activities
of the probationer (appellant) are generally under scrutiny
and on the basis of his overall performance a decision is
generally taken as to whether his services should be
continued and that he should be confirmed, or he should
be released from service. In the present case, in the
course of adjudging such suitability it was found by the
respondents that the performance of the appellant was not
satisfactory and therefore he was not suitable for the job.
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10. The aforesaid decision to release him from
service was taken by the respondents considering his
overall performance, conduct and suitability for the job.
While taking a decision in this regard neither any notice is
required to be given to the appellant nor is he required to
be given any opportunity of hearing. Strictly speaking, it is
not a case of removal as sought to be made out by the
appellant, but was a case of simple discharge from
service. It is, therefore, only a termination simpliciter and
not removal from service on the grounds of indiscipline or
misconduct. While adjudging his performance, conduct
and overall suitability, his performance record as also the
report from the higher authorities were called for and they
were looked into before any decision was taken as to
whether the officer concerned should be continued in
service or not.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
16. Similar view was expressed by Hon’ble Supreme
Court in State Bank of India and others vs. Palak Modi
and another, reported in (2013) 3 SCC 607. Para 25
and 36 of the said judgment are extracted below:-
“25. The ratio of the above noted judgments is that a
probationer has no right to hold the post and his service can
be terminated at any time during or at the end of the period
of probation on account of general unsuitability for the post
held by him. If the competent authority holds an inquiry for
judging the suitability of the probationer or for his further
continuance in service or for confirmation and such inquiry is
the basis for taking decision to terminate his service, then
the action of the competent authority cannot be castigated
as punitive. However, if the allegation of misconduct
constitutes the foundation of the action taken, the ultimate14
2025:UHC:6408-DBdecision taken by the competent authority can be nullified on
the ground of violation of the rules of natural justice.
36. There is a marked distinction between the
concepts of satisfactory completion of probation and
successful passing of the training/test held during or at the
end of the period of probation, which are sine qua non for
confirmation of a probationer and the Bank’s right to punish
a probationer for any defined misconduct, misbehaviour or
misdemeanor. In a given case, the competent authority
may, while deciding the issue of suitability of probationer to
be confirmed, ignore the act(s) of misconduct and terminate
his service without casting any aspersion or stigma which
may adversely affect his future prospects but, if the
misconduct/misdemeanor constitutes the basis of the final
decision taken by the competent authority to dispense with
the service of the probationer albeit by a non stigmatic
order, the Court can lift the veil and declare that in the garb
of termination simpliciter, the employer has punished the
employee for an act of misconduct.”
17. In every service under the State or
instrumentalities of State, appointment is made on
probation in order to assess his suitability for the job.
During the period of probation, an appointee is kept under
watch. If the employer finds the performance of the
probationer not up to the mark, then he can either extend
the period of probation or discharge the probationer from
service, which is also referred to as Termination Simpliciter.
In the Rules governing conditions of service, the period of
probation is mentioned and the extent to which it can be
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extended is also provided. Merely because an appointee
has completed the period of probation do not result in his
acquiring permanent status. As per the law of the land,
there cannot be automatic confirmation of a probationer in
service and there has to be an express order confirming
the probationer on the post he was appointed.
18. State of Uttar Pradesh has framed Rules in
exercise of its rule making power under proviso to Article
309 of the Constitution of India known as The U.P.
Temporary Government Servants (Termination of Service)
Rules, 1975. The said Rules provide that a temporary
government servant shall be liable to be terminated at any
time by giving one month’s notice in writing or one month’s
salary in lieu of such notice. A probationer does not hold
lien on a post and, as such, his status remains that of a
‘temporary’ government servant. Although Rule 24(4) of
U.P. Judicial Service Rules, 2001 provides for discharge of a
probationer from service, however, the said provision falls
short of providing a mechanism for terminating the
services of a probationer or discharging him from service.
The Termination Rules, 1975 applies to persons appointed
to a civil post in connection with the affairs of Uttar
Pradesh and who are under the rule-making control of
Governor but do not hold a lien on any post. The said Rules
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lay down the procedure of termination of a temporary
government servant including a probationer. Thus, the
Termination Rules, 1975 becomes part of conditions of
service of a person appointed to service which is under
rule-making control of the Governor, including the one who
is appointed to U.P. Judicial Service. Thus, it can be safely
inferred that the State Government reserved the right to
terminate the employment of a probationer at any time
under the Termination Rules, 1975 and in exercise of that
right, petitioner was discharged from service. Therefore,
his discharge will not amount to punishment and cannot be
termed as punitive.
19. Allahabad High Court in its counter affidavit, filed
before the Lucknow Bench, categorically stated that
discharge of the petitioner shall not debar him from
seeking reappointment in U.P. Judicial Service or any other
State service. It is nobody’s case that disciplinary inquiry
was initiated against the petitioner before discharging him
from service and that his discharge was founded on a
charge. Thus, by no stretch of imagination, petitioner’s
discharge from U.P. Judicial Service will operate as
disqualification for his future employment.
20. Rule 24(5) of U.P. Judicial Service Rules, 2001, as
it existed before amendment in 2015 also do not disqualify
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a discharged probationer for appointment in other services
in State of Uttar Pradesh, it only operates as bar against
appointment in U.P. Judicial Service. That bar has also been
removed w.e.f. 04.09.2015 by an amendment.
21. Rule 11 of The Uttarakhand Prosecuting Officers
Service Rules, 2015 is extracted below:
“11. The character of a candidate for direct recruitment to
post in the Service must be such as to render him suitable in
all respects for employment in Government service. The
appointing authority shall satisfy itself on this point.
Note – Persons dismissed by Union Government or State
Government or a Local Authority or by a Corporation or a
Body owned or controlled by the Union Government or State
Government shall be ineligible for appointment to any post
in the service. Persons convicted of an offence involving
moral turpitude shall also be ineligible.”
22. Careful perusal of Rule 11 with note appended
thereto would reveal that the appointing authority can deny
appointment, by direct recruitment, to a post in service if
the character of a candidate is not found to be suitable for
employment under the State. The note appended to Rule
11 clarifies that a person who is dismissed from service by
Union Government, State Government, Local Authority,
Corporation or a body under or controlled by Union/State
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Government shall be ineligible for appointment. It further
provides that person convicted of an offence involving
moral turpitude shall also be ineligible.
23. Now coming back to the facts of the case in
hand. Petitioner’s discharge from service does not reflect
upon his character. In fact, the discharge order makes no
comment on his conduct or character and the reason for
discharge indicated in the order is that petitioner failed to
give satisfaction as stipulated in Rule 24(4) of the U.P.
Judicial Service Rules, 2001. No disciplinary inquiry was
held against the petitioner before discharging him from
service and he was discharged before completing training.
Rule 24(4) of the aforesaid Rules provides that a member
of Service, who is on probation, may be discharged from
service, if he has not made sufficient use of his
opportunities or has failed to give satisfaction.
24. Thus, there is no material available with the
Secretary, Home, based on which such opinion can be
formed that petitioner does not bear good character.
25. Government of U.P. has framed The U.P. Temporary
Government Servants (Termination of Service) Rules, 1975,
which enables the Appointing Authority to terminate
services of temporary government servant at any time by
issuing one month’s notice or by paying salary in lieu of
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such notice. Thus, the said Rules form part of conditions of
service of every person appointed to a State service
including judicial service. The Competent Authority
exercised the power available under Rule 24(4) of the U.P.
Judicial Service Rules, 2001 and discharged the petitioner
from service by invoking the provision of The Temporary
Government Servants (Termination of Service) Rules, 1975.
Thus, it can be safely inferred that the discharge of
petitioner from service was as per the service conditions
applicable to him. His employer, in the counter affidavit,
filed before the Lucknow Bench of Allahabad High Court has
mentioned that petitioner’s discharge was not by way of
punishment and he was discharged as he failed to give
satisfaction. Thus, it cannot be said that character of the
petitioner is such which renders him unsuitable for
employment in government service. In fact, petitioner
stated in his representation made to the Competent
Authority that other persons, who were discharged from
service with him, were reappointed in U.P. Judicial Service,
Delhi Higher Judicial Service and as Assistant Prosecuting
Officer in State of U.P. Petitioner’s discharge from service
under Rule 24(4) of the aforesaid Rules cannot be termed
as dismissal or removal from service. Petitioner’s discharge
was not by way of punishment but as per the conditions of
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his service. Even otherwise also, it is not the case that
petitioner was convicted of an offence involving moral
turpitude. Therefore, merely because petitioner was
discharged from service will not render him unsuitable for
appointment as Assistant Prosecuting Officer in State of
Uttarakhand.
26. Thus, this Court has no hesitation in holding that
denial of appointment to petitioner by the Secretary, Home,
Uttarakhand is unsustainable in the eyes of law. Invocation
of Rule 11 of Uttarakhand Prosecuting Officers Service
Rules, 2015 for denying appointment to the petitioner is
ex-facie illegal.
27. For the aforesaid reasons, impugned order dated
05.11.2020 passed by respondent is liable to be set aside
and is hereby set aside. Writ petition is allowed.
Respondent is directed to act upon the recommendation
made by Uttarakhand Public Service Commission by issuing
necessary order, within four weeks from the date of
production of certified copy of this order.
(Subhash Upadhyay, J.) (Manoj Kumar Tiwari, J.)
22.07.2025 22.07.2025
Rajni
Digitally signed by RAJINI GUSAIN
RAJINI
DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF
UTTARAKHAND, ou=HIGH COURT OF
UTTARAKHAND,
2.5.4.20=97cfa6e4cbd49c07b876db484
48ac3701a9ae475a2547e4b7f1d9b1f17
GUSAIN
d01342, postalCode=263001,
st=UTTARAKHAND,
serialNumber=8D039BC77BD1A2222B
4DF4FC80D4557562F95BEBA013F5306
16A158A0A878BD8, cn=RAJINI GUSAIN
Date: 2025.08.07 17:41:31 +05’30’
21
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