25.02.2025 vs State Of H.P on 28 February, 2025

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Himachal Pradesh High Court

Reserved On: 25.02.2025 vs State Of H.P on 28 February, 2025

Author: Virender Singh

Bench: Virender Singh

                                   2025:HHC:4071

     IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH
                     SHIMLA
                       Cr.MP(M) No. of 108 of 2025
                       Reserved on: 25.02.2025
                       Date of Decision: 28.02.2025
Saurav Phul alias Sonu                                            ...Applicant

                                        Versus

State of H.P.                                                  .....Respondent
Coram:
The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1
For the Applicant              :        Mr. Deepak Gupta, Advocate.
For the Respondent             :        Mr. H.S. Rawat and Mr.
                                        Mohinder Zharaick,, Additional
                                        Advocates General with Mr.
                                        Rohit Sharma, Deputy
                                        Advocate General.

Virender Singh, Judge (Oral)

Applicant-Saurav Phul @Sonu has filed the

present application, under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik

Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter referred to as ‘BNSS’), for

releasing him on bail, during the pendency of the trial, in case

FIR No.15 of 2024, dated 30.01.2024, registered under Section

20 of the Narcotic Drugs & Psychotropic Substances Act

(hereinafter referred to as the ‘NDPS Act‘), with Police Station,

Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P.

1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment?

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2. The relief of bail has been sought on the ground

that the police of Police Station Ghumarwin has falsely arrested

the applicant for allegedly possessing charas weighing 1.237

Kg.

3. According to the applicant, the investigation is

complete and the police has filed the charge sheet, upon which,

the competent Court of law has taken the cognizance and case

is now stated to be fixed for PWs.

4. As per the applicant, he has falsely been implicated

and arrested in this case, as no evidence is there to connect

him with the alleged crime, for which, he has been arrested.

5. The applicant has also sought the relief of bail on

the ground that he is in judicial custody for the last more than

one year and is the only bread earner of his family.

6. Apart from this, learned counsel appearing on

behalf of the applicant, in order to show that there is no

evidence connecting the applicant with the crime, for which, he

has been arrested, has also highlighted the fact that the sole

independent witness, which has allegedly been associated by

the IO, when appeared in the witness box, has turned hostile.

7. Besides this, it has also been argued that there is

undue delay in the trial and due to the fact that the applicant is
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in judicial custody, now his entire family is at the verge of

starvation, as, there is no one to look after them.

8. To buttress his contentions, learned counsel

appearing for the applicant has relied upon the decisions of this

Court in Cr.MP(M) No.1146 of 2023, titled as Rakesh Kumar

versus State of H.P., decided on 29.05.2023, Cr.MP(M)

No.2772 of 2022, titled as Sarbdyal versus State of H.P.

decided on 03.01.2023 and Cr.MP(M) No.62 of 2023, titled as

Puran Chand versus State of H.P. decided on 04.03.2023.

9. On the basis of the above facts, a prayer has been

made to release the applicant on bail by allowing the present

application.

10. The applicant had also tried his luck by moving

similar application before the Court of learned Special Judge,

Ghumarwin, District Bilaspur, H.P., however, the same was

dismissed vide order dated 08.05.2024.

11. When put to notice, the police has filed the status

report disclosing therein that on 30.01.2024, Inspector

Incharge, Police Station Ghumarwin, along with the other police

officials, was on patrolling duty. While on patrolling and traffic

checking duty, when they were present at a place near Rohin

Four Lane and were checking the traffic, then at about 03.15
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PM., a Maruti Car, bearing registration No.HP-03C-5686, being

driven by its driver came there from Baloh side. The driver was

driving the said vehicle towards Baged(Bilaspur). Another Car

bearing No.PB-09K1330 being driven by its driver was also

following the said Car. Both the vehicles were stopped for

traffic checking.

12. It has been mentioned in the status report that the

driver of vehicle No.HP-03C-5686, on inquiry, disclosed his

name as Saurav Phul (applicant). His driving license was also

checked. When the documents of the said vehicle were

demanded then, he made efforts to cover a yellow envelope

with the help of cloth, which was there in the vehicle near the

gear liver. Meanwhile, driver of vehicle bearing No.PB-

09K1330 also came there to get the documents of his vehicle

checked. In his presence, Investigating Officer inquired about

the yellow coloured carry bag from the applicant, upon which,

he became perplexed and could not give a satisfactory answer.

13. Thereafter, the drivers of 8-10 vehicles, which were

stopped for checking, were requested to become the witnesses,

but all of them had put forward their personal difficulties. The

efforts were also made to associate the local Pradhan/Ward

Member, but, Investigating Officer could not contact them.

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Then, in the presence of Shri Ashish Sharma, driver of vehicle

No.PB-09K1330, the yellow coloured carry bag, which was

recovered from vehicle No.HP-03C-5686, was searched and on

opening, it was found to be containing Charas, which on

weighment, was found to be 1.218 kg. Thereafter, the Ruka

was prepared and submitted to the Police Station, upon which,

the FIR in question has been registered. Thereafter, all other

codal formalities were completed and accused was arrested.

The contraband, so recovered, was also taken into possession.

14. After receiving the positive report from the SFSL

Junga, the police has filed the charge sheet against the

applicant, upon which, the competent Court of law has taken

the cognizance.

15. The police, in the status report, has opposed the

prayer on the ground that the contraband, so recovered, falls

within the definition of ‘commercial quantity’ and in case, the

applicant is released on bail, he may coerce the witnesses and

may again indulge in the similar activities. As such, a prayer

has been made to dismiss the bail application.

16. Admittedly, the contraband, so allegedly recovered,

in this case, from the possession of the applicant, falls within
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the definition of ‘commercial quantity’.

17. Once, the contraband, allegedly recovered from the

applicant, falls within the definition of ‘commercial quantity’, as

such, the rigors of Section 37 of NDPS Act are applicable, in

this case.

18. The provisions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, have

been discussed and explained by a three Judge Bench of the

Hon’ble Supreme Court, way back in the year 2004, in cases,

titled as Collector of Customs, New Delhi versus

Ahmadalieva Nodira, reported in (2004) 3 Supreme Court

Cases 549, and Narcotics Control Bureau versus Dilip

Pralhad Namade, reported in (2004) 3 Supreme Court Cases

619. The relevant paras 9 to 11 of the judgment in Dilip

Pralhad Namade‘s case (supra), are reproduced, as under:

“9. As observed by this Court in Union of India v.
Thamisharasi & Ors. (JT
1995(4) SC 253) clause

(b) of sub-section (1) of Section 37 imposes
limitations on granting of bail in addition to those
provided under the Code. The two limitations are
(1) an opportunity to the public prosecutor to
oppose the bail application and (2) satisfaction of
the Court that there are reasonable grounds for
believing that the accused is not guilty of such
offence and that he is not likely to commit any
offence while on bail.

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10. The limitations on granting of bail come in
only when the question of granting bail arises on
merits. Apart from the grant of opportunity to the
public prosecutor, the other twin conditions which
really have relevance so far the present accused-
respondent is concerned, are (1) the satisfaction
of the Court that there are reasonable grounds for
believing that the accused is not guilty of the
alleged offence and that he is not likely to commit
any offence while on bail. The conditions are
cumulative and not alternative. The satisfaction
contemplated regarding the accused being not
guilty has to be based for reasonable grounds.
The expression “reasonable grounds” means
something more than prima-facie grounds. It
contemplates substantial probable causes for
believing that the accused is not guilty of the
alleged offence. The reasonable belief
contemplated in the provision requires existence
of such facts and circumstances as are sufficient
in themselves to justify satisfaction that the
accused is not guilty of the alleged offence and he
is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.
This nature of embargo seems to have been
envisaged keeping in view the deleterious nature
of the offence, necessitates of public interest and
the normal tendencies of the persons involved in
such network to pursue their activities with greater
vigour and make hay when, at large. In the case
at hand the High Court seems to have completely
overlooked the underlying object of Section 37
and transgressed the limitations statutorily
imposed in allowing bail. It did not take note of the
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confessional statement recorded under Section
67
of the Act.

11. A bare reading of the impugned judgment
shows that the scope and ambit of Section 37 of
the NDPS Act was not kept in view by the High
Court. Mere non-compliance of the order passed
for supply of copies, if any, cannot as in the
instant case entitle an accused to get bail
notwithstanding prohibitions contained in Section

37.”

19. The term ‘reasonable’ has elaborately been

discussed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in case, titled as

Union of India versus Shiv Shanker Kesari, reported in

(2007) 7 Supreme Court Cases 798. The relevant paras-8 to

11 of the judgment are reproduced, as under:

“8. The word “reasonable” has in law the prima
facie meaning of reasonable in regard to those
circumstances of which the actor, called on to act
reasonably, knows or ought to know. It is difficult
to give an exact definition of the word
“reasonable”.

“7. … In Strouds Judicial Dictionary, Fourth
Edition, page 2258 states that it would be
unreasonable to expect an exact definition of
the word ‘reasonable’. Reason varies in its
conclusions according to the idiosyncrasy of
the individual, and the times and
circumstances in which he thinks. The
reasoning which built up the old scholastic
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logic sounds now like the jingling of a child’s
toy.

(See: Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. M/s
Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar and another (1987) 4
SCC 497. and Gujarat Water Supplies and
Sewerage Board v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat)
Pvt. Ltd. and another
[(1989) 1 SCC 532].

9. “9. …It is often said that “an attempt to give a
specific meaning to the word “reasonable” is
trying to count what is not number and measure
what is not space”. The author of Words and
Phrases (Permanent Edition) has quoted from
Nice & Schreiber 123 F. 987, 988 to give a
plausible meaning for the said word. He says,

‘the expression “reasonable” is a relative
term, and the facts of the particular
controversy must be considered before the
question as to what constitutes reasonable
can be determined’.

It is not meant to be expedient or convenient but
certainly something more than that.”

10. The word “reasonable” signifies “in
accordance with reason”. In the ultimate analysis
it is a question of fact, whether a particular act is
reasonable or not depends on the circumstances
in a given situation. (See: Municipal Corporation
of Greater Mumbai and another v. Kamla Mills
Ltd.
(2003) 6 SCC 315).

11. The Court while considering the application
for bail with reference to Section 37 of the Act is
not called upon to record a finding of not guilty. It
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is for the limited purpose essentially confined to
the question of releasing the accused on bail that
the Court is called upon to see if there are
reasonable grounds for believing that the
accused is not guilty and records its satisfaction
about the existence of such grounds. But the
Court has not to consider the matter as if it is
pronouncing a judgment of acquittal and
recording a finding of not guilty.”

20. This view has again been reiterated by the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in a latest decision, in case, titled as State of

Kerala and others versus Rajesh and others, reported in

(2020) 12 Supreme Court Cases 122. The relevant paras 18

to 21 of the judgment are reproduced, as under:

“18. This Court has laid down broad parameters
to be followed while considering the application
for bail moved by the accused involved in
offences under NDPS Act. In Union of India Vs.
Ram Samujh and Ors.
1999(9) SCC 429, it has
been elaborated as under:

“7. It is to be borne in mind that the aforesaid
legislative mandate is required to be adhered to
and followed. It should be borne in mind that in a
murder case, the accused commits murder of
one or two persons, while those persons who are
dealing in narcotic drugs are instrumental in
causing death or in inflicting deathblow to a
number of innocent young victims, who are
vulnerable; it causes deleterious effects and a
deadly impact on the society; they are a hazard
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to the society; even if they are released
temporarily, in all probability, they would continue
their nefarious activities of trafficking and/or
dealing in intoxicants clandestinely. Reason may
be large stake and illegal profit involved. This
Court, dealing with the contention with regard to
punishment under the NDPS Act, has succinctly
observed about the adverse effect of such
activities in Durand Didier v. Chief Secy., Union
Territory of Goa
[(1990) 1 SCC 95)] as under:

’24. With deep concern, we may point out that the
organised activities of the underworld and the
clandestine smuggling of narcotic drugs and
psychotropic substances into this country and
illegal trafficking in such drugs and substances
have led to drug addiction among a sizeable
section of the public, particularly the adolescents
and students of both sexes and the menace has
assumed serious and alarming proportions in the
recent years. Therefore, in order to effectively
control and eradicate this proliferating and
booming devastating menace, causing
deleterious effects and deadly impact on the
society as a whole, Parliament in its wisdom, has
made effective provisions by introducing this Act
81 of 1985 specifying mandatory minimum
imprisonment and fine.

8. To check the menace of dangerous drugs
flooding the market, Parliament has provided that
the person accused of offences under the NDPS
Act
should not be released on bail during trial
unless the mandatory conditions provided in
Section 37, namely,
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(i) there are reasonable grounds for believing that
the accused is not guilty of such offence; and

(ii) that he is not likely to commit any offence
while on bail

are satisfied. The High Court has not given any
justifiable reason for not abiding by the aforesaid
mandate while ordering the release of the
respondent-accused on bail. Instead of
attempting to take a holistic view of the harmful
socio-economic consequences and health
hazards which would accompany trafficking
illegally in dangerous drugs, the court should
implement the law in the spirit with which
Parliament, after due deliberation, has amended.”

19. The scheme of Section 37 reveals that the
exercise of power to grant bail is not only subject
to the limitations contained under Section 439 of
the CrPC, but is also subject to the limitation
placed by Section 37 which commences with
non-obstante clause. The operative part of the
said section is in the negative form prescribing
the enlargement of bail to any person accused of
commission of an offence under the Act, unless
twin conditions are satisfied. The first condition is
that the prosecution must be given an opportunity
to oppose the application; and the second, is that
the Court must be satisfied that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that he is not
guilty of such offence. If either of these two
conditions is not satisfied, the ban for granting
bail operates.

2025:HHC:4071

20. The expression “reasonable grounds” means
something more than prima facie grounds. It
contemplates substantial probable causes for
believing that the accused is not guilty of the
alleged offence. The reasonable belief
contemplated in the provision requires existence
of such facts and circumstances as are sufficient
in themselves to justify satisfaction that the
accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. In the
case on hand, the High Court seems to have
completely overlooked the underlying object of
Section 37 that in addition to the limitations
provided under the CrPC, or any other law for the
time being in force, regulating the grant of bail, its
liberal approach in the matter of bail under the
NDPS Act is indeed uncalled for.

21. We may further like to observe that the
learned Single Judge has failed to record a
finding mandated under Section 37 of the NDPS
Act which is a sine qua non for granting bail to
the accused under the NDPS Act.”

21. In a recent decision, in case, titled as Narcotics

Control Bureau versus Mohit Aggarwal, reported in AIR

2022 SC 3444, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has reiterated the

earlier view regarding compliance of the conditions, as

enumerated in Section 37 of the NDPS Act. The relevant paras

10 to 15 of the judgment are reproduced, as under:

“10. The provisions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act
read as follows:

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“[37. Offences to be cognizable and
nonbailable.-(1) Notwithstanding anything
contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (2 of 1974)-

(a) every offence punishable under this Act shall
be cognizable;

(b) no person accused of an offence punishable
for [offences under section 19 or section 24 or
section 27A and also for offences involving
commercial quantity] shall be released on bail or
on his own bond unless-

(i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an
opportunity to oppose the application for such
release, and

(ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the
application, the court is satisfied that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that he is not
guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to
commit any offence while on bail.

(2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in
clause (b) of sub section (1) are in addition to the
limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law for the time
being in force, on granting of bail.

11. It is evident from a plain reading of the
nonobstante clause inserted in sub-section (1)
and the conditions imposed in subsection (2) of
Section 37 that there are certain restrictions
placed on the power of the Court when granting
bail to a person accused of having committed an
offence under the NDPS Act. Not only are the
limitations imposed under Section 439 of the
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Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to be kept in
mind, the restrictions placed under clause (b) of
sub-section (1) of Section 37 are also to be
factored in. The conditions imposed in sub-
section (1) of Section 37 is that (i) the Public
Prosecutor ought to be given an opportunity to
oppose the application moved by an accused
person for release and (ii) if such an application is
opposed, then the Court must be satisfied that
there are reasonable grounds for believing that
the person accused is not guilty of such an
offence. Additionally, the Court must be satisfied
that the accused person is unlikely to commit any
offence while on bail.

12. The expression “reasonable grounds” has
come up for discussion in several rulings of this
Court. In “Collector of Customs, New Delhi v.
Ahmadalieva Nodira
“, (2004) 3 SCC 549, a
decision rendered by a Three Judges Bench of
this Court, it has been held thus:

“7. The limitations on granting of bail come in only
when the question of granting bail arises on
merits. Apart from the grant of opportunity to the
Public Prosecutor, the other twin conditions which
really have relevance so far as the present
accused respondent is concerned, are: the
satisfaction of the court that there are reasonable
grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty
of the alleged offence and that he is not likely to
commit any offence while on bail. The conditions
are cumulative and not alternative. The
satisfaction contemplated regarding the accused
being not guilty has to be based on reasonable
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grounds. The expression “reasonable
grounds” means something more than prima
facie grounds. It contemplates substantial
probable causes for believing that the
accused is not guilty of the alleged offence.
The reasonable belief contemplated in the
provision requires existence of such facts and
circumstances as are sufficient in themselves
to justify satisfaction that the accused is not
guilty of the alleged offence.” [emphasis added]

13. The expression “reasonable ground” came up
for discussion in “State of Kerala and others Vs.
Rajesh and others
” (2020) 12 SCC 122 and this
Court has observed as below:

“20. The expression “reasonable grounds” means
something more than prima facie grounds. It
contemplates substantial probable causes for
believing that the accused is not guilty of the
alleged offence. The reasonable belief
contemplated in the provision requires
existence of such facts and circumstances as
are sufficient in themselves to justify
satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of
the alleged offence. In the case on hand, the
High Court seems to have completely overlooked
the underlying object of Section 37 that in
addition to the limitations provided under the
CrPC, or any other law for the time being in force,
regulating the grant of bail, its liberal approach in
the matter of bail under the NDPS Act is indeed
uncalled for.” [emphasis added]
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14. To sum up, the expression “reasonable
grounds” used in clause (b) of Sub-Section (1) of
Section 37 would mean credible, plausible and
grounds for the Court to believe that the accused
person is not guilty of the alleged offence. For
arriving at any such conclusion, such facts and
circumstances must exist in a case that can
persuade the Court to believe that the accused
person would not have committed such an
offence. Dove-tailed with the aforesaid
satisfaction is an additional consideration that the
accused person is unlikely to commit any offence
while on bail.

15. We may clarify that at the stage of examining
an application for bail in the context of the
Section 37 of the Act, the Court is not required to
record a finding that the accused person is not
guilty. The Court is also not expected to weigh
the evidence for arriving at a finding as to
whether the accused has committed an offence
under the NDPS Act or not. The entire exercise
that the Court is expected to undertake at this
stage is for the limited purpose of releasing him
on bail. Thus, the focus is on the availability of
reasonable grounds for believing that the
accused is not guilty of the offences that he has
been charged with and he is unlikely to commit
an offence under the Act while on bail.”

22. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in a case, Criminal

Appeal No.5544 of 2024, titled as ‘Narcotics Control Bureau

versus Kashif’, Neutral Citation No.2024 INSC 1045 has
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again reiterated the law, as enumerated by it, in Narcotics

Control Bureau versus Mohit Aggarwal, reported in AIR

2022 SC 3444. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in this case, has

held that the provisions of Section 37 of NDPS Act are

mandatory in nature. Relevant paragraphs 8 and 39 of the said

judgment are reproduced, as under:-

“8. There has been consistent and persistent view of
this Court that in the NDPS cases, where the offence
is punishable with minimum sentence of ten years,
the accused shall generally be not released on bail.
Negation of bail is the rule and its grant is an
exception. While considering the application for bail,
the court has to bear in mind the provisions of Section
37
of the NDPS Act, which are mandatory in nature.
The recording of finding as mandated in Section 37 is
a sine qua non for granting bail to the accused
involved in the offences under the said Act. Apart
from the granting opportunity of hearing to the Public
Prosecutor, the other two conditions i.e., (i) the
satisfaction of the court that there are reasonable
grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of
the alleged offence and that (ii) he is not likely to
commit any offence while on bail, are the cumulative
and not alternative conditions.

xxx xxx xxx xxx

39. The upshot of the above discussion may be
summarized as under:

(i) The provisions of NDPS Act are required to be
interpreted keeping in mind the scheme, object and
purpose of the Act; as also the impact on the society
as a whole. It has to be interpreted literally and not
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liberally, which may ultimately frustrate the object,
purpose and Preamble of the Act.

(ii) While considering the application for bail, the Court
must bear in mind the provisions of Section 37 of the
NDPS Act which are mandatory in nature. Recording
of findings as mandated in Section 37 is sine qua non
is known for granting bail to the accused involved in
the offences under the NDPS Act.

(iii) The purpose of insertion of Section 52A laying
down the procedure for disposal of seized Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, was to ensure
the early disposal of the seized contraband drugs and
substances. It was inserted in 1989 as one of the
measures to implement and to give effect to the
International Conventions on the Narcotic drugs and
psychotropic substances.

(iv) Sub-section (2) of Section 52A lays down the
procedure as contemplated in sub-section (1) thereof,
and any lapse or delayed compliance thereof would
be merely a procedural irregularity which would
neither entitle the accused to be released on bail nor
would vitiate the trial on that ground alone.

(v) Any procedural irregularity or illegality found to
have been committed in conducting the search and
seizure during the course of investigation or
thereafter, would by itself not make the entire
evidence collected during the course of investigation,
inadmissible. The Court would have to consider all the
circumstances and find out whether any serious
prejudice has been caused to the accused.

(vi) Any lapse or delay in compliance of Section 52A
by itself would neither vitiate the trial nor would entitle
the accused to be released on bail. The Court will
have to consider other circumstances and the other
primary evidence collected during the course of
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investigation, as also the statutory presumption
permissible under Section 54 of the NDPS Act.”

(self-emphasis supplied)

23. In view of the above, there is nothing on the record

to give an occasion for this Court to hold that the twin

conditions, as enumerated in Section 37 of the NDPS Act, are

in favour of the applicant, in the present case.

24. Being guided by the decisions of the Hon’ble

Supreme Court, as referred to above, this Court is of the view

that the case laws, which have been relied upon by the learned

counsel appearing for the applicant, no where help the case of

the applicant. As such, no benefit could be derived by the

applicant from the said decisions.

25. So far as the fact that the sole independent

witness, which according to the applicant, has turned hostile is

concerned, the applicant is before this Court by way of bail

application, not in an appeal. Even otherwise, the evidence of

the hostile witness does not efface from the record.

26. To consider the evidence, so led by the

prosecution, before the learned trial Court, is the sole

prerogative of the learned trial Court. By commenting upon the

evidence of a hostile witness or evidence of any other witness,

this Court cannot usurp the powers of the learned trial Court.

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Even otherwise, there is no legal impediment for the learned

trial Court to consider the evidence of the official witnesses, if

the same are at par, with the evidence of independent witness.

27. So far as the plea that there is inordinate delay in

the trial is concerned, keeping in view the pace of the trial, this

Court is of the view that the FIR in question was registered on

30.01.2024 and as per the documents, annexed with the bail

application, till 18.10.2024, the learned trial Court has recorded

the statements of as many as five witnesses. As such, it cannot

be said that there is any inordinate delay in the trial.

28. Considering all these facts, this Court is of the view

that the applicant is not able to make out a case, on the basis of

which, it can be said that the applicant has not committed the

offence and in case, he is ordered to be released, on bail, he is

not likely to commit any offence. As such, in the absence of the

satisfaction of the twin conditions, the applicant is not held

entitled for any relief.

29. Consequently, the present bail application is

dismissed.

30. Any of the observations, made hereinabove, shall

not be taken, as an expression of opinion, on the merits of the
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case, as, these observations are confined only to the disposal

of the present bail application.

(Virender Singh)
Judge
February 28, 2025
(subhash)

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