Uttarakhand High Court
26 June vs Presiding Officer Labour Court … on 26 June, 2025
Author: Manoj Kumar Tiwari
Bench: Manoj Kumar Tiwari
2025:UHC:5465
HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL
Writ Petition Misc. Single No. 1400 of 2022
26 June, 2025
Managing Director G M V N Ltd.
& another ... Petitioners
Versus
Presiding Officer Labour Court Dehradun
& another ... Respondent
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Presence:-
Ms. Abhilasha Tomar, Advocate holding brief of Mr. Sandeep Kothari,
learned counsel for the petitioners.
Mr. Nagesh Agarwal, learned counsel for respondent no. 2.
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JUDGMENT
1. This is employer’s petition under Article 227 of
the Constitution challenging the award dated 17.02.2022
rendered by learned Labour Court, Dehradun in
Adjudication Case No. 24 of 2012. By the said award,
termination of service of respondent no. 2 was declared to
be unjust and illegal and it was provided that the workman
shall be entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service
and back wages at the rate of 5 percent of his monthly
salary from the date of raising the dispute till the date of his
reinstatement.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that
respondent no. 2 was appointed as Production Supervisor in
Garhwal Mandal Vikas Nigam, therefore, learned Labour
Court had no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the
dispute raised by respondent no. 2, who was not a
workman. It is further contended that the work and conduct
of respondent no. 2 was far from satisfactory and due to
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the misconduct committed by him, domestic enquiry was
initiated against him by issuing a charge sheet; since he did
not participate in the enquiry, therefore, after issuing show
cause notice on 08.04.1999, his services were terminated
vide order dated 01.07.1999. Thus, she submits that
interference made by learned Labour Court in the matter is
unwarranted in the facts and circumstances of the case.
3. Per contra, Mr. Nagesh Agarwal, learned counsel
appearing for respondent no. 2 submits that although the
designation given to petitioner was Supervisor, however, he
had no supervisory powers and he was simply discharging
clerical functions, such as, making challan, maintaining
record of the production in the factory, preparing challan for
transporting the goods out of the factory, etc. He further
submits that charge sheet was not served upon respondent
no. 2 nor his reply was ever sought regarding the charges,
and the show cause notice was also not served upon him.
He further submits that one Sri Rajesh Naithani appears to
have been appointed as enquiry officer, but no intimation
regarding the enquiry was sent to respondent no. 2,
therefore, he was not aware about pendency of any enquiry
and the enquiry, if any, was held in absolute violation of
principles of natural justice and his services were
terminated, without issuing show cause notice, on
01.07.1999.
4. Based on the pleadings made by the parties, the
following three points for determination were formulated by
learned Labour Court:-
(i) Whether the domestic inquiry proceedings were
conducted by the OP in accordance with the
Principles of Natural Justice? If no, then effect?
(ii) Whether the termination of service of workman
Chintamani Sharma by the Ops w.e.f. 01.07.1999 is
proper and/or legal? If no, then effect?
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(iii) The workman is entitled to what benefit/relief?
5. Respondent no. 2 appeared as witness and filed
his affidavit. One Sri K.N. Nautiyal, Assistant General
Manager, Tourism, GMVN was examined as employer
witness.
6. On the first issue, learned Labour Court held that
domestic enquiry was held in violation of principles of
natural justice and respondent no. 2 was not given
reasonable opportunity to defend himself. Issue nos. 2 & 3
were also decided in favour of respondent no. 2 by holding
that as the domestic enquiry was held without granting
opportunity to defend himself to respondent no. 2,
therefore, the termination order passed, on the strength of
such domestic enquiry, is not sustainable in the eyes of law.
7. Mr. Nagesh Agarwal, learned counsel for
respondent no. 2 has drawn attention of this Court to the
averment made in para 1 of the written statement filed by
his client before learned Labour Court, where it is stated
that even though designation given to respondent no. 2 was
Supervisor, but he discharged duties of a Clerk e.g.,
maintaining record of the production made in the factory,
preparing challan for transporting the goods out of the
factory etc. He further submits that employer, in para 1 of
his written statement, admitted this statement made by
respondent no. 2 in para 1 of his written statement. Thus,
he submits that petitioner cannot be permitted to raise the
contention regarding status of respondent no. 2, at this
belated stage.
8. Section 2(z) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 defines “Workman” as follows:-
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“‘Workman’ means any person (including apprentice)
employed in any industry to do any skilled or unskilled
manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work for hire or
reward, whether the terms of employment be express or
implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this
Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such
person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in
connection with, or as a consequence of, that dispute, or
whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that
dispute, but does not include any such person –
(i) who is subject to any Army Act, 1950 or the Air Force
Act, 1950, or the Navy (Discipline) Act, 1934; or
(ii) who is employed in the police service or as an officer
or other employee of a prison; or
(iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or
administrative capacity; or(iv)who being employed in
a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding five
hundred rupees per mensem or exercises, either by
the nature of the duties attached to the office or by
reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly
of a managerial nature.”
9. From the aforesaid definition of ‘Workman’, it is
revealed that a person employed in any industry to do
skilled or unskilled manual, supervisory, technical or clerical
work is a Workman. However, such person are not included
in the definition of workman; (i) who are subject to Army
Act, Air Force Act or Navy (Discipline) Act; (ii) who is
employed in the police service or as an officer/employee of
a prison; (iii) who is employed mainly in managerial or
administrative capacity; and (iv) who being employed in
supervisory capacity draws wages exceeding five hundred
rupees per month or exercise functions mainly of a
managerial nature.
10 In determining the question whether an
employee is a workman under Section 2(z) of the U.P.
Industrial Disputes Act or not, the Court has to see the
principal duty/responsibility of an employee and neither his
designation is decisive nor any incidental work that he may
be required to do shall get him outside the purview of
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workman. Anyone whose principal job and nature of
employment is manual, technical or clerical would be a
workman. Although the designation given to respondent
no. 2 is that of a Supervisor, however, a Supervisor is one
who has authority over others; someone who
superintendents and directs others. Thus, an employee,
who in the interest of employer, is responsible to control the
work done by other workers and if the work is not done
correctly to guide them to do it correctly, as per norms,
shall certainly be a Supervisor.
11. Petitioner has not made any averment in his
written statement filed before learned Labour Court to show
that duty of respondent no. 2 was to supervise the work of
other workers. Respondent No. 2 had no disciplinary control
over other employees and as per his unrebutted statement,
he was discharging duties of a Clerk.
12. In the present case, respondent no. 2 made a
categorical statement in his written statement that he was
employed to do clerical work in the factory and this
statement was admitted by the employer in his written
statement. Admission is the best evidence, therefore,
learned Labour Court was not expected to delve into this
aspect any further. Employer did not lead any evidence
regarding duties and function of respondent no. 2 to prove
that he was not a workman. Moreover, employer did not
raise any contention before learned Labour Court on the
question of its jurisdiction to entertain the dispute,
therefore, the employer cannot be permitted to raise the
issue of status of respondent no. 2, in these proceedings.
13. Learned counsel for the petitioner then
submitted that respondent no. 2 was getting wages
exceeding ₹500/- per month, therefore, he cannot be
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treated as workman in view of provision contained in Clause
(iv) of Section 2(2) of Industrial Disputes Act.
14. The said submission looks attractive in the first
blush, but on a deeper scrutiny, the said contention cannot
be countenanced. The wage limit of Rs. 500/- was fixed in
Section 2(s)(iv) several decades ago, when money had
more purchasing power. With the passage of time, the said
wage limit has become otiose and a person serving in the
lowest rung of employment in any establishment today is
getting many times more wages than what is specified in
Section 2(s)(iv) of U.P. Industrial Disputes Act. Industrial
Disputes Act is a beneficial legislation, therefore, it requires
a liberal interpretation.
15. Learned Labour Court considered and discussed
all relevant aspects and held that the domestic enquiry,
which culminated in passing of termination order against
respondent no. 2, was held in violation of principles of
natural justice and further that respondent no. 2 was
denied reasonable opportunity to defend himself. The
finding returned by learned Labour Court is a finding of fact,
which cannot be interfered with in a petition under Article
227 of the Constitution.
16. Law is well settled that while exercising
supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the
Constitution, this Court does not sit as a court of appeal.
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Syed Yakoob vs. K.S.
Radhakrishnan & others reported in 1964 AIR 477 has held
as under:-
“7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of
High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Article 226 has
been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal
position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari
can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by
inferior courts or tribunals: these are cases where orders are6
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passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is
in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction.
A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction
conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or properly,
as for instance, it decides a question without giving an
opportunity, be heard to the party affected by the order, or
where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is
opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no
doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a
supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not
entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation
necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior
Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence
cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An
error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be
corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it
may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by
the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown
that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously
refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had
erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has
influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact
is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of
law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing
with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in
mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be
challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground
that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the
Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the
impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led
on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said
finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and
the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is
within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High
Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be
legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed
Ahmad Ishaque [(1955) 1 SCR 1104] Nagandra Nath
Bora v. Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals
Assam [(1958) SCR 1240] and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar
Singh [AIR 1960 SC 1168]”
17. Similar view was taken by Hon’ble Supreme
Court in the case of Sadhana Lodh v. National Insurance
Co. Ltd., reported in (2003) 3 SCC 524. Para 7 of the said
judgment is extracted below:-
“7. The supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High
Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution is confined only
to see whether an inferior court or tribunal has proceeded
within its parameters and not to correct an error apparent on
the face of the record, much less of an error of law. In
exercising the supervisory power under Article 227 of the
Constitution, the High Court does not act as an appellate7
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court or the tribunal. It is also not permissible to a High
Court on a petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution
to review or reweigh the evidence upon which the inferior
court or tribunal purports to have passed the order or to
correct errors of law in the decision.”
18. Since learned Tribunal has returned findings of
fact, which cannot be interfered with while exercising power
of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution.
Thus, any interference with the impugned award would not
be warranted. The writ petition fails and is dismissed.
________________________
MANOJ KUMAR TIWARI, J.
26.06.2025
Aswal
NITI RAJ
Digitally signed by NITI RAJ SINGH ASWAL
DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND, ou=HIGH COURT
OF UTTARAKHAND,
2.5.4.20=eacc6757ee7881e933ff8934f07477005aa85f9802a3a08
SINGH ASWAL
b08d1369512ea30f3, postalCode=263001, st=UTTARAKHAND,
serialNumber=44EB54CBF00B7698CB6F10C2CE3D26F5C22DAC
F4F4610C1FE58A58531726FBB0, cn=NITI RAJ SINGH ASWAL
Date: 2025.07.03 06:30:32 -07’00’
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