Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 28.02.2025 vs State Of Himachal Pradesh And Anr on 5 March, 2025
2025:HHC:4609
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MMO No. 952 of 2024
Reserved on: 28.02.2025
Date of Decision: 05.03.2025.
Yaman Sheikh ...Petitioner
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh and Anr. ..Respondents
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No.
For the Petitioner : Mr. Nimish Gupta, Advocate.
For Respondent/State : Mr. Gautam Sood, Deputy
Advocate General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition to quash
FIR no.8 of 2022, dated 12.01.2022, registered at Police Station
Palampur for the commission of offences punishable under
Sections 307, 365, 341, 323, and 506 of the Indian Penal Code
(IPC) and consequent proceedings pending before the learned
Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Palampur, based on the
compromise effected between the parties.
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2
2025:HHC:4609
2. I have heard Mr. Nimish Gupta, learned counsel for
the petitioner and Mr. Gautam Sood, learned Deputy Advocate
General for respondent-State.
3. Mr. Nimish Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioner,
submitted that the parties are related to each other. The victim
is the sister of the accused. They want to maintain a cordial
relationship. An FIR can be quashed by the Court in the exercise
of its inherent jurisdiction. He relied upon the judgments of
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Narender Singh versus the State of
Punjab, 2014 (6) SCC 466, State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan, (2019) 5
SCC 688: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 706: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 320 and
Naushey Ali and others Vs. State of U.P. and another 2025 INSC 182
in support of his submission.
4. Mr Gautam Sood, learned Deputy Advocate General
for respondent-State, submitted that the allegations in the FIR
prima facie make out a case for the commission of an offence
punishable under Section 307 of IPC. Such an FIR cannot be
quashed in the exercise of the inherent powers as the offence
punishable under Section 307 of IPC affects the society at large.
Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
3
2025:HHC:4609
5. I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
6. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303: 2012 SCC OnLine
SC 769 that the power to quash the proceedings under Section
482 of Cr.P.C. based on the compromise is different from the
power of compounding under Section 320 of CrPC. It was
observed:
“57. Quashing of offence or criminal proceedings on the
ground of settlement between an offender and victim is
not the same thing as compounding of offence. They are
different and not interchangeable. Strictly speaking, the
power of compounding offences given to a court under
Section 320 is materially different from the quashing of
criminal proceedings by the High Court in the exercise of
its inherent jurisdiction. In compounding of offences, the
power of a criminal court is circumscribed by the
provisions contained in Section 320, and the court is
guided solely and squarely thereby while, on the other
hand, the formation of opinion by the High Court for
quashing a criminal offence or criminal proceeding or
criminal complaint is guided by the material on record as
to whether the ends of justice would justify such exercise
of power although the ultimate consequence may be
acquittal or dismissal of indictment.
58. Where the High Court quashes a criminal proceeding
having regard to the fact that the dispute between the
offender and the victim has been settled although the
offences are not compoundable, it does so as, in its
opinion, a continuation of criminal proceedings will be an
exercise in futility and justice in the case demands that
4
2025:HHC:4609the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace
is restored; securing the ends of justice being the ultimate
guiding factor. No doubt, crimes are acts that have
harmful effects on the public and consist of wrongdoing
that seriously endangers and threatens the well-being of
society, and it is not safe to leave the crime-doer only
because he and the victim have settled the dispute
amicably or the victim has been paid compensation, yet
certain crimes have been made compoundable in law,
with or without the permission of the court. In respect of
serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., or other
offences of mental depravity under IPC or offences of moral
turpitude under special statutes, like the Prevention of
Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants
while working in that capacity, the settlement between the
offender and the victim can have no legal sanction at all.
However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and
predominantly bear civil flavour, having arisen out of a
civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or
such like transactions or the offences arising out of
matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the
family dispute, where the wrong is basically to the victim
and the offender and the victim have settled all disputes
between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such
offences have not been made compoundable, the High
Court may within the framework of its inherent power,
quash the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or
FIR if it is satisfied that on the face of such settlement,
there is hardly any likelihood of the offender being
convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings,
justice shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be
defeated. The above list is illustrative and not exhaustive.
Each case will depend on its own facts, and no hard-and-
fast category can be prescribed.” (Emphasis supplied)
59. B.S. Joshi [(2003) 4 SCC 675: 2003 SCC (Cri) 848], Nikhil
Merchant [(2008) 9 SCC 677 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri)
858], Manoj Sharma [(2008) 16 SCC 1 : (2010) 4 SCC (Cri)
145] and Shiji [(2011) 10 SCC 705 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 101]
5
2025:HHC:4609do illustrate the principle that the High Court may quash
criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint in exercise of its
inherent power under Section 482 of the Code and Section
320 does not limit or affect the powers of the High Court
under Section 482. Can it be said that by quashing
criminal proceedings in B.S. Joshi [(2003) 4 SCC 675: 2003
SCC (Cri) 848], Nikhil Merchant [(2008) 9 SCC 677 : (2008) 3
SCC (Cri) 858], Manoj Sharma [(2008) 16 SCC 1 : (2010) 4
SCC (Cri) 145] and Shiji [(2011) 10 SCC 705 : (2012) 1 SCC
(Cri) 101] this Court has compounded the non-
compoundable offences indirectly? We do not think so.
There does exist the distinction between compounding an
offence under Section 320 and quashing a criminal case
by the High Court in the exercise of inherent power under
Section 482. The two powers are distinct and different,
although the ultimate consequence may be the same, viz.
acquittal of the accused or dismissal of indictment.
60. We find no incongruity in the above principle of law
and the decisions of this Court in Simrikhia [(1990) 2 SCC
437: 1990 SCC (Cri) 327], Dharampal [(1993) 1 SCC 435: 1993
SCC (Cri) 333: 1993 Cri LJ 1049], Arun Shankar
Shukla [(1999) 6 SCC 146: 1999 SCC (Cri) 1076: AIR 1999 SC
2554], Ishwar Singh [(2008) 15 SCC 667 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri)
1153], Rumi Dhar [(2009) 6 SCC 364 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri)
1074] and Ashok Sadarangani [(2012) 11 SCC 321]. The
principle propounded in Simrikhia [(1990) 2 SCC 437: 1990
SCC (Cri) 327] that the inherent jurisdiction of the High
Court cannot be invoked to override express bar provided
in law is by now well settled. In Dharampal [(1993) 1 SCC
435: 1993 SCC (Cri) 333: 1993 Cri LJ 1049], the Court
observed the same thing that the inherent powers under
Section 482 of the Code cannot be utilised for exercising
powers which are expressly barred by the Code. A similar
statement of law is made in Arun Shankar Shukla [(1999) 6
SCC 146: 1999 SCC (Cri) 1076: AIR 1999 SC 2554]. In Ishwar
Singh [(2008) 15 SCC 667: (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1153], the
accused was alleged to have committed an offence
punishable under Section 307 IPC and with reference to
6
2025:HHC:4609
Section 320 of the Code, it was held that the offence
punishable under Section 307 IPC was not compoundable
offence and there was express bar in Section 320 that no
offence shall be compounded if it is not compoundable
under the Code. In Rumi Dhar [(2009) 6 SCC 364 : (2009) 2
SCC (Cri) 1074], although the accused had paid the entire
due amount as per the settlement with the bank in the
matter of recovery before the Debts Recovery Tribunal,
the accused was being proceeded with for the commission
of the offences under Sections 120-B/420/467/468/471
IPC along with the bank officers who were being
prosecuted under Section 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act. The Court refused to quash
the charge against the accused by holding that the Court
would not quash a case involving a crime against the
society when a prima facie case has been made out
against the accused for framing the charge. Ashok
Sadarangani [(2012) 11 SCC 321] was again a case where
the accused persons were charged of having committed
the offences under Sections 120-B, 465, 467, 468 and 471
IPC and the allegations were that the accused secured the
credit facilities by submitting forged property documents
as collaterals and utilised such facilities in a dishonest
and fraudulent manner by opening letters of credit in
respect of foreign supplies of goods, without actually
bringing any goods but inducing the bank to negotiate the
letters of credit in favour of foreign suppliers and also by
misusing the cash-credit facility. The Court was alive to
the reference made in one of the present matters and also
the decisions in B.S. Joshi [(2003) 4 SCC 675: 2003 SCC (Cri)
848], Nikhil Merchant [(2008) 9 SCC 677 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri)
858] and Manoj Sharma [(2008) 16 SCC 1 : (2010) 4 SCC
(Cri) 145] and it was held that B.S. Joshi [(2003) 4 SCC 675:
2003 SCC (Cri) 848] and Nikhil Merchant [(2008) 9 SCC
677 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 858] dealt with different factual
situation as the dispute involved had overtures of a civil
dispute but the case under consideration in Ashok
Sadarangani [(2012) 11 SCC 321] was more on the criminal
intent than on a civil aspect. The decision in Ashok
7
2025:HHC:4609Sadarangani [(2012) 11 SCC 321] supports the view that
criminal matters involving overtures of a civil dispute
stand on a different footing.
61. The position that emerges from the above discussion
can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in
quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in the
exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and
different from the power given to a criminal court for
compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code.
Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory
limitation, but it has to be exercised in accord with the
guideline engrafted in such power, viz. : (i) to secure the
ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of
any court. In what cases power to quash the criminal
proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where
the offender and the victim have settled their dispute
would depend on the facts and circumstances of each
case, and no category can be prescribed. However, before
exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard
to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious
offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape,
dacoity, etc., cannot be fittingly quashed even though the
victim or victim’s family and the offender have settled the
dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a
serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise
between the victim and the offender in relation to the
offences under special statutes like the Prevention of
Corruption Act or the offences committed by public
servants while working in that capacity, etc., cannot
provide any basis for quashing criminal proceedings
involving such offences. But the criminal cases having
overwhelmingly and predominately civil flavour stand on
a different footing for the purposes of quashing,
particularly the offences arising from a commercial,
financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like
transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony
relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the
wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the
8
2025:HHC:4609
parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category
of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal
proceedings if, in its view, because of the compromise
between the offender and the victim, the possibility of
conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the
criminal case would put the accused to great oppression
and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to
him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and
complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In
other words, the High Court must consider whether it
would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to
continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of
the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of
process of law despite settlement and compromise
between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to
secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the
criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the
above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court
shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal
proceeding.” (Emphasis supplied)
7 The Hon’ble Supreme Court examined the power of
the Court to quash the FIR based on the compromise in Narender
Singh versus the State of Punjab, 2014 (6) SCC 466 and laid down
the following principles: –
“29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and
lay down the following principles by which the High Court
would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the
settlement between the parties and exercising its power
under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the
settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to
accept the settlement with direction to continue with the
criminal proceedings:
29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code
is to be distinguished from the power which lies in
9
2025:HHC:4609the Court to compound the offences under Section
320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the
Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash
the criminal proceedings even in those cases which
are not compoundable, where the parties have
settled the matter between themselves. However,
this power is to be exercised sparingly and with
caution.
29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement
and, on that basis, a petition for quashing the
criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in
such cases would be to secure:
(i) ends of justice, or
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.
While exercising the power, the High Court is to form
an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.
29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those
prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences
of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape,
dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and
have a serious impact on society. Similarly, the
offences alleged to have been committed under
special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act
or the offences committed by public servants while
working in that capacity are not to be quashed
merely on the basis of compromise between the
victim and the offender.
29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having
overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character,
particularly those arising out of commercial
transactions or arising out of matrimonial
relationships or family disputes, should be quashed
when the parties have resolved their entire disputes
among themselves.
29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is
to examine as to whether the possibility of
10
2025:HHC:4609
conviction is remote and bleak and whether
continuation of criminal cases would put the accused
to great oppression and prejudice and extreme
injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the
criminal cases.
29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the
category of heinous and serious offences and, therefore,
are to be generally treated as crimes against society and
not against the individual alone. However, the High
Court would not rest its decision merely because there is
a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is
framed under this provision. It would be open to the
High Court to examine whether incorporation of Section
307 IPC is there for the sake of it or if the prosecution has
collected sufficient evidence, which, if proved, would
lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For
this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go
by the nature of the injury sustained, whether such
injury is inflicted on the vital/delicate parts of the
body, the nature of weapons used, etc. Medical
reports in respect of injuries suffered by the victim
can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of
this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine
whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or
the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In
the former case, it can refuse to accept the
settlement and quash the criminal proceedings,
whereas in the latter case, it would be permissible for
the High Court to accept the plea compounding the
offence based on a complete settlement between the
parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by
the fact that the settlement between the parties is
going to result in harmony between them, which
may improve their future relationship.
29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power
under Section 482 of the Code or not, the timings of
settlement play a crucial role. In those cases where
the settlement is arrived at immediately after the
11
2025:HHC:4609
alleged commission of the offence and the matter is
still under investigation, the High Court may be
liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the
criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of
this reason that, at this stage, the investigation is
still ongoing and even the chargesheet has not been
filed. Likewise, in those cases where the charge is
framed but the evidence is yet to start, or the
evidence is still at the infancy stage, the High Court
can show benevolence in exercising its powers
favourably, but after a prima facie assessment of the
circumstances/material mentioned above. On the
other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost
complete or after the conclusion of the evidence, the
matter is at the stage of argument, normally the
High Court should refrain from exercising its power
under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the
trial court would be in a position to decide the case
finally on merits and to come to a conclusion as to
whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is
committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the
conviction is already recorded by the trial court and
the matter is at the appellate stage before the High
Court, mere compromise between the parties would
not be a ground to accept the same, resulting in the
acquittal of the offender who has already been
convicted by the trial court. Here, the charge is
proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is
already recorded of a heinous crime, therefore, there
is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of
such a crime.” (Emphasis supplied)
8. This question was again considered in Parbatbhai
Aahir v. State of Gujarat, (2017) 9 SCC 641: (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 1: 2017
SCC OnLine SC 1189 and the following principles were
summarised:
12
2025:HHC:4609
16. The broad principles which emerge from the
precedents on the subject may be summarised in the
following propositions:
16.1. Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of
the High Court to prevent abuse of the process of any
court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision
does not confer new powers. It only recognises and
preserves powers which inhere in the High Court.
16.2. The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High
Court to quash a first information report or a
criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement
has been arrived at between the offender and the
victim is not the same as the invocation of
jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an
offence. While compounding an offence, the power of
the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power
to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the
offence is non-compoundable.
16.3. In forming an opinion whether a criminal
proceeding or complaint should be quashed in the
exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the
High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice
would justify the exercise of the inherent power.
16.4. While the inherent power of the High Court
has a wide ambit and plenitude, it has to be exercised
(i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent
abuse of the process of any court.
16.5. The decision as to whether a complaint or first
information report should be quashed on the ground
that the offender and victim have settled the dispute
revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of
each case, and no exhaustive elaboration of
principles can be formulated.
16.6. In the exercise of the power under Section 482
and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has
been settled, the High Court must have due regard to
13
2025:HHC:4609
the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and
serious offences involving mental depravity or offences
such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately
be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim
have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly
speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact
on society. The decision to continue with the trial in such
cases is founded on the overriding element of public
interest in punishing persons for serious offences.
16.7. As distinguished from serious offences, there
may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming
or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand
on a distinct footing insofar as the exercise of the
inherent power to quash is concerned.
16.8. Criminal cases involving offences which arise
from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership
or similar transactions with an essentially civil
flavour may, in appropriate situations, fall for
quashing where parties have settled the dispute.
16.9. In such a case, the High Court may quash the
criminal proceeding if, in view of the compromise
between the disputants, the possibility of a
conviction is remote and the continuation of a
criminal proceeding would cause oppression and
prejudice and
16.10. There is yet an exception to the principle set
out in proposition 16.8. and 16.9. above. Economic
offences involving the financial and economic well-
being of the State have implications which lie beyond
the domain of a mere dispute between private
disputants. The High Court would be justified in
declining to quash where the offender is involved in
an activity akin to financial or economic fraud or
misdemeanour. The consequences of the act
complained of upon the financial or economic
system will weigh in the balance.” (Emphasis
supplied)
14
2025:HHC:4609
9. Similar principles were laid down in State of M.P. v.
Laxmi Narayan, (2019) 5 SCC 688: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 706: 2019 SCC
OnLine SC 320 and it was observed:
“15. Considering the law on the point and the other
decisions of this Court on the point referred to
hereinabove, it is observed and held as under:
15.1. That the power conferred under Section 482 of
the Code to quash the criminal proceedings for the
non-compoundable offences under Section 320 of
the Code can be exercised having overwhelmingly
and predominantly the civil character, particularly
those arising out of commercial transactions or
arising out of matrimonial relationship or family
disputes and when the parties have resolved the
entire dispute amongst themselves;
15.2. Such power is not to be exercised in those
prosecutions which involve heinous and serious
offences of mental depravity or offences like murder,
rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in
nature and have a serious impact on society;
15.3. Similarly, such power is not to be exercised for
the offences under special statutes like the
Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences
committed by public servants while working in that
capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis
of compromise between the victim and the
offender;
15.4. Offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act,
etc., would fall in the category of heinous and serious
offences and, therefore, are to be treated as crimes
against the society and not against the individual
alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the
offence under Section 307 IPC and/or the Arms Act, etc.
which have a serious impact on the society cannot be
15
2025:HHC:4609quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the
Code, on the ground that the parties have resolved their
entire dispute amongst themselves. However, the
High Court would not rest its decision merely
because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the
FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It
would be open to the High Court to examine
whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there
for the sake of it or if the prosecution has collected
sufficient evidence, which, if proved, would lead to
framing the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this
purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by
the nature of the injury sustained, whether such
injury is inflicted on the vital/delicate parts of the
body, the nature of weapons used, etc. However,
such an exercise by the High Court would be
permissible only after the evidence is collected after
investigation, the chargesheet is filed/the charge is
framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not
permissible when the matter is still under
investigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in
paras 29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of this Court
in Narinder Singh [Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab,
(2014) 6 SCC 466: (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 54] should be
read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in
the circumstances stated hereinabove;
15.5. While exercising the power under Section 482
of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings in
respect of non-compoundable offences, which are
private and do not have a serious impact on society,
on the ground that there is a
settlement/compromise between the victim and the
offender, the High Court is required to consider the
antecedents of the accused; the conduct of the
accused, namely, whether the accused was
absconding and why he was absconding, how he
had managed with the complainant to enter into a
compromise, etc.” (Emphasis supplied)
16
2025:HHC:4609
10. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Naushey Ali v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 292 that the Court
can examine whether Section 307 was added for the sake of it or
there is some evidence to back it. It was observed:
“12. Coming back to Laxmi Narayan (supra), this Court
has held that the mere mention of Section 307 IPC in the
FIR or the charge sheet should not be the basis for
adopting a hands-off approach. It has further held that it
would be open for the court to examine as to whether
incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it
or whether there is evidence to back it. It has been held
that the courts may go by the nature of injuries sustained
as to whether the injuries are inflicted on the
vital/delicate parts of the body and the nature of the
weapon used. It has also been clarified that such an
exercise would be permissible after investigation and
filing of chargesheet/framing of charges or during the
trial. [See 15.4 of Laxmi Narayan (supra)].
11. The allegations in the FIR show that the accused
called the petitioner on the pretext of giving her various articles.
He asked the victim to sit in the vehicle and sped away the
vehicle. When the victim asked the accused to stop the vehicle,
the accused caught her hair and gave her a beating. The accused
pushed her from the moving vehicle. When the victim fell, the
accused reversed the vehicle and attempted to crush the victim
under the tyres of the vehicle. The victim’s husband arrived on
the spot in the meantime and hit the vehicle of the accused to
17
2025:HHC:4609
save the victim. These allegations clearly show that the accused
had not only beaten the victim and pushed her from the moving
vehicle, but he had attempted to crush her under the tyres of the
vehicle. The prior conduct, coupled with an attempt to crush the
victim under the tyres of the vehicle, prima facie, shows the
commission of an offence punishable under Section 307 of IPC
because if the death had been caused in these circumstances, the
accused would have been guilty of the commission of a murder.
Therefore, it cannot be said that no case is made out for the
commission of an offence punishable under Section 307 of IPC,
and the Section was added merely for the sake of it.
12. Since the FIR registered for the commission of an
offence punishable under Section 307 of IPC cannot be quashed
as per the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, hence, the
present petition fails, and the same is dismissed.
13. The observations made hereinabove are regarding
the disposal of this petition and will have no bearing whatsoever
on the case’s merits.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
5th March, 2025
(Nikita)
[ad_1]
Source link