Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 28.03.2025 vs State Of Himachal Pradesh & Ors on 23 April, 2025
2025:HHC:10663
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MMO No. 245 of 2025
Reserved on: 28.03.2025
Date of Decision: 23rd April 2025.
Satish Kumar and Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. ...Respondents
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No
For the Petitioner : M/s Pawan K. Sharma and Tim
Saran, Advocates.
For Respondent No.1/State. : Mr. Ajit Sharma, Deputy
Advocate General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioners have filed the present petition for
quashing of criminal proceedings pending before learned Judicial
Magistrate, First Class, Baijnath, District Kangra (learned Trial
Court) in a case titled State of H.P. versus Satish Kumar and others
arising out of FIR No. 5/2024 dated 3rd January 2024 registered for
the commission of offences punishable under Sections 341, 147,
149, 504, and 506 of Indian Penal code (IPC) at Police Station,
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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Baijnath District Kangra, HP. (The parties shall hereinafter be
referred to in the same manner in which they are arrayed before the
learned Trial Court for convenience).
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
petition are that Sunny Kumar (informant) and Chaman Kumar
were going to Delhi on 24th December 2023 in a bus bearing
registration No. DD-01R-9971. When the bus reached Palampur, a
passenger sitting behind them started misbehaving with them.
They also had arguments with the driver and conductor. They got
off the bus at Kalu Di Hatti. The bus left for Delhi. When they were
returning to their home, they received a call from the mobile
number xxx6008 and the caller started abusing them. The caller
asked them to stop at Palampur, where they would be given
suitable treatment. They disconnected the call, however, the caller
started calling them from a different mobile numbers. When they
reached Tashi Jong on 24th December 2023 at 10:15 PM, a vehicle
bearing registration number HP-53A-5009 stopped them.
Another vehicle was also parked on the spot but the informant
could not read its registration number. Satish @ Sattu came out of
the vehicle bearing registration number HP-53A-5009 with 5-6
people. They had the baseball bats with them. They gave beatings
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to the informant and Chaman. The assailants were intoxicated.
Both parties suffered injuries in the incident. The police registered
the FIR and conducted the investigation. Police seized the baseball
bat, recorded the statements of the witnesses and filed a charge
sheet against the accused for the commission of offences
punishable under Sections 341, 147, 149, 504, and 506 of IPC.
3. Being aggrieved by the registration of the FIR and the
consequential proceedings, the petitioners have filed the present
petition for quashing the FIR and the criminal proceedings arising
out of it. It was asserted that the informant had lodged a false FIR
against the petitioners. The informant and Chaman Lal boarded
the bus from Tashi Jong to Delhi. They were drunk. They started
misbehaving with fellow passengers. The driver and conductor
tried to intervene but the informant and Chaman Lal assaulted the
driver and conductor. Ashwani also assaulted one passenger
named Kaushal Ahuja. When all the passengers protested, the
informant party got off the bus. Petitioner no. 1 is the owner of the
bus. The driver and conductor informed him about the incident.
The informant party called petitioner No. 1 and asked him to
refund their money. They asked him to meet at Tashi Jong. When
the petitioners reached Tashi Jong with petitioners Nos. 2 to 5, the
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informant party assaulted them. Petitioners No. 1 to 4 were taken
to the hospital, where they were examined for the injuries
sustained by them. Their injuries were found to be grievous. The
informant lodged a false FIR with a mala fide intention and as a
counterblast to the FIR No. 239 of 2023, which was registered
against the informant party. Therefore, it was prayed that the
present petition be allowed and FIR and criminal proceedings
arising out of it be quashed.
4. I have heard M/s Pawan K Sharma and Tim Saran,
learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned
Deputy Advocate General for Respondent No. 1/State.
5. Mr. Pawan K Sharma, learned counsel for the
petitioners submitted that the FIR is false and a counterblast to
the FIR lodged against the informant party. The petitioners had
sustained grievous injuries. The continuation of the criminal
proceedings against the petitioners amounts to abuse of the
process of the Court. The FIR is a result of mala fides. Hence, he
prayed that the present petition be allowed and that FIR and
criminal proceedings be quashed. He relied upon the judgement of
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the State of Haryana versus
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Chaudhary Bhajan Lal AIR 1992 SC 604 in support of his
submission.
6. Mr Ajit Sharma learned Deputy Advocate General for
respondent No.1/State submitted that the FIR discloses the
commission of a cognizable offence. A charge sheet has been filed
before the Court. This court cannot go into the truthfulness or
otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR while exercising
jurisdiction under Section 528 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha
Sanhita (BNSS); hence, he prayed that the present petition be
dismissed.
7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
8. The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC
OnLine SC 7 as under: –
“7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it
is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to
be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the
decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan
Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has
summarized some of the principles under which
FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the
following words:
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“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various
relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of
the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series
of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary
power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under
Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and
reproduced above, we give the following categories of
cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be
exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any
court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it
may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly
defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible
guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive
list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should
be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they are
taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or
make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information
report and other materials, if any, accompanying
the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence,
justifying an investigation by police officers under
Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of
a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2)
of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in
the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in
support of the same do not disclose the
commission of any offence and make out a case
against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute
a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-
cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a
police officer without an order of a Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
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(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently
improbable on the basis of which no prudent
person can ever reach a just conclusion that there
is sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in
any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act
(under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to
the institution and continuance of the proceedings
and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code
or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for
the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the
accused and with a view to spite him due to a
private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added)
8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would
be of relevance to us in this case.
In clause (1) it has been mentioned that where the
allegations made in the first information report or the
complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any
offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR
or the complaint can be quashed.
As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-
cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police
officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such
a situation, the FIR can be quashed.
Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an
express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of
the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal
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proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be
quashed.”
9. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of
Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed:
“8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its
extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may
issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to
secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are
neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory
provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of
this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly.
The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded
within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High
Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where
intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice.
9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the
course of several decades, has laid down the principles and
guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing
criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting
the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial
Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the
following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been
filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the
legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv)
the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains
vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are
willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State
of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335)
10. The present petition is to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
11. It was specifically mentioned in the FIR that the
petitioners stopped the informant and Chaman at Tashi Jong.
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Satish @ Satu and 5 to 6 persons gave beatings to the informant
and Chaman with baseball bats. These allegations constitute the
commission of cognizable offences.
12. It was submitted that the allegations in the FIR are
false and a counterblast to the FIR lodged by petitioner-Satish
Kumar. This Court cannot go into the truthfulness or otherwise of
the allegations made in the complaint. This position was laid
down in Maneesha Yadav vs. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643,
wherein it was held: –
“13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court
would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to
the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations
made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of
the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the
allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at their face
value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make
out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in
the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint,
even if taken at their face value, do not disclose the
commission of an offence or make out a case against the
accused. We are of the considered view that the present case
would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated
by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra).
14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court
in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi),
Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC 1060:
“14. First, we would like to deal with the submission
of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that
once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for
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2025:HHC:10663quashing of the FIR is untenable. We do not see any
merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position
of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of
Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7
SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23]. In Joseph Salvaraj
A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC
59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the
question of whether the High Court could entertain
the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the
charge-sheet was filed by the police during the
pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC
p. 63, para 16)
“16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various
sections under which the appellant is being
charged and is to be prosecuted would show that
the same is not made out even prima facie from
the complainant’s FIR. Even if the charge sheet
had been filed, the learned Single Judge [Joesph
Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj
365] could have still examined whether the
offences alleged to have been committed by the
appellant were prima facie made out from the
complainant’s FIR, charge-sheet, documents,
etc. or not.”
13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2025) 1 SCC 392:
2024 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court cannot conduct a mini-
trial while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. It
was observed at page 397:
“17. This Court, in a series of judgments, has held that
while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of
the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court is not
supposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable reference can be
11
2025:HHC:10663made to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan Singh [CBI v. Aryan
Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379]. The
relevant paragraph from the judgment is extracted
hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7)
6. … As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of
discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings,
while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the
Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. …
7. … At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the
powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court has very
limited jurisdiction and is required to consider ‘whether
any sufficient material is available to proceed further
against the accused for which the accused is required to
be tried or not’.”
14. A similar view was taken in Dineshbhai Chandubhai
Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2018) 3 SCC 104 : (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 683:
2018 SCC OnLine SC 6 wherein it was observed at page 111:
“29 [Ed.: Paras 29 and 30 corrected vide Official
Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./2/2018 dated 31-1-2018.]. The
High Court, in our view, failed to see the extent of its
jurisdiction, which it possesses to exercise while examining
the legality of any FIR complaining commission of several
cognizable offences by the accused persons. In order to
examine as to whether the factual contents of the FIR
disclose any prima facie cognizable offences or not, the
High Court cannot act like an investigating agency and nor
can exercise the powers like an appellate court. The
question, in our opinion, was required to be examined
keeping in view the contents of the FIR and prima facie
material, if any, requiring no proof.
30 [Ed.: Paras 29 and 30 corrected vide Official
Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./2/2018 dated 31-1-2018.] . At
this stage, the High Court could not appreciate the evidence
nor could draw its own inferences from the contents of the
FIR and the material relied on. It was more so when the
12
2025:HHC:10663material relied on was disputed by the complainants and
vice versa. In such a situation, it becomes the job of the
investigating authority at such stage to probe and then of
the court to examine the questions once the charge sheet is
filed along with such material as to how far and to what
extent reliance can be placed on such material.
31. In our considered opinion, once the court finds that the
FIR does disclose prima facie commission of any cognizable
offence, it should stay its hand and allow the investigating
machinery to step in to initiate the probe to unearth the
crime in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the
Code.
32. The very fact that the High Court in this case went into
the minutest details in relation to every aspect of the case
and devoted 89 pages judgment to quash the FIR in part led
us to draw a conclusion that the High Court had exceeded
its powers while exercising its inherent jurisdiction under
Section 482 of the Code. We cannot concur with such
approach of the High Court.
33. The inherent powers of the High Court, which are
obviously not defined being inherent in its very nature,
cannot be stretched to any extent and nor can such powers
be equated with the appellate powers of the High Court
defined in the Code. The parameters laid down by this Court
while exercising inherent powers must always be kept in
mind else it would lead to committing a jurisdictional error
in deciding the case. Such is the case here.
34. On perusal of the three complaints and the FIR
mentioned above, we are of the considered view that the
complaint and FIR, do disclose a prima facie commission of
various cognizable offences alleged by the complainants
against the accused persons and, therefore, the High Court
instead of dismissing the application filed by the accused
persons in part should have dismissed the application as a
whole to uphold the entire FIR in question.”
15. Hence, it is not permissible for the Court to go into the
truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR.
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16. Secondly, it is not permissible to look into the
documents annexed to the petition for quashing the FIR. It was
laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in MCD v. Ram Kishan
Rohtagi, (1983) 1 SCC 1: 1983 SCC (Cri) 115 that the proceedings can
be quashed on the face of the complaint and the papers
accompanying the same, no offence is constituted. It is not
permissible to add or subtract anything. It was observed:
“10. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that proceedings
against an accused in the initial stages can be quashed only
if on the face of the complaint or the papers accompanying
the same, no offence is constituted. In other words, the test
is that taking the allegations and the complaint as they are,
without adding or subtracting anything, if no offence is
made out then the High Court will be justified in quashing
the proceedings in exercise of its powers under Section 482
of the present Code.”
17. Madras High Court also held in Ganga Bai v. Shriram,
1990 SCC OnLine MP 213: ILR 1992 MP 964: 1991 Cri LJ 2018, that the
fresh evidence is not permissible or desirable in the proceedings
under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. It was observed:
“Proceedings under Section 482, Cr.P.C. cannot be allowed
to be converted into a full-dressed trial. Shri Maheshwari
filed a photostat copy of an order dated 28.7.1983, passed in
Criminal Case No. 1005 of 1977, to which the present
petitioner was not a party. Fresh evidence at this stage is
neither permissible nor desirable. The respondent by filing this
document is virtually introducing additional evidence, which is
not the object of Section 482, Cr.P.C.”
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18. Andhra Pradesh High Court also took a similar view in
Bharat Metal Box Company Limited, Hyderabad and Others vs. G. K.
Strips Private Limited and another, 2004 STPL 43 AP, and held:
“9. This Court can only look into the complaint and the
documents filed along with it and the sworn statements of
the witnesses if any recorded. While judging the
correctness of the proceedings, it cannot look into the
documents, which are not filed before the lower Court.
Section 482 Cr.PC debars the Court to look into fresh
documents, in view of the principles laid down by the
Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa and
another, 2002 (1) Supreme 192. The relevant portion of the
said judgment reads as follows:
“The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears
that on consideration of the allegations, in the light of
the statement made on oath of the complainant that
the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed
and there is no material to show that the complaint is
mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there
would be no justification for interference by the High
Court. When information is lodged at the Police
Station and an offence is registered, then the mala
fides of the informant would be of secondary
importance. It is the material collected during the
investigation and evidence led in Court, which decides
the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala
fides against the informant are of no consequence and
cannot by itself be the basis for quashing the
proceedings”.
19. A similar view was taken in Mahendra K.C. v. State of
Karnataka, (2022) 2 SCC 129: (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 401 wherein it was
observed at page 142:
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“16. … the test to be applied is whether the allegations in
the complaint as they stand, without adding or detracting
from the complaint, prima facie establish the ingredients
of the offence alleged. At this stage, the High Court cannot
test the veracity of the allegations nor for that matter can it
proceed in the manner that a judge conducting a trial
would, based on the evidence collected during the course of
the trial.”
20. This position was reiterated in Supriya Jain v. State of
Haryana, (2023) 7 SCC 711: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 765 wherein it was
held:
13. All these documents which the petitioner seeks to rely
on, if genuine, could be helpful for her defence at the trial
but the same are not material at the stage of deciding
whether quashing as prayed for by her before the High
Court was warranted or not. We, therefore, see no reason to
place any reliance on these three documents.
21. A similar view was taken in Iveco Magirus
Brandschutztechnik GMBH v. Nirmal Kishore Bhartiya, (2024) 2 SCC
86: (2024) 1 SCC (Cri) 512: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1258, wherein it was
observed:
“63. Adverting to the aspect of the exercise of jurisdiction
by the High Courts under Section 482CrPC, in a case where
the offence of defamation is claimed by the accused to have
not been committed based on any of the Exceptions and a
prayer for quashing is made, the law seems to be well settled
that the High Courts can go no further and enlarge the scope of
inquiry if the accused seeks to rely on materials which were not
there before the Magistrate. This is based on the simple
proposition that what the Magistrate could not do, the High
Courts may not do. We may not be understood to undermine
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2025:HHC:10663the High Courts’ powers saved by Section 482CrPC; such
powers are always available to be exercised ex debito
justitiae i.e. to do real and substantial justice for the
administration of which alone the High Courts exist.
However, the tests laid down for quashing an FIR or
criminal proceedings arising from a police report by the
High Courts in the exercise of jurisdiction under Section
482CrPC not being substantially different from the tests
laid down for quashing a process issued under Section 204
read with Section 200, the High Courts on recording due
satisfaction are empowered to interfere if on a reading of
the complaint, the substance of statements on oath of the
complainant and the witness, if any, and documentary
evidence as produced, no offence is made out and that
proceedings, if allowed to continue, would amount to an
abuse of the legal process. This too, would be impermissible
if the justice of a given case does not overwhelmingly so
demand.” (Emphasis supplied)
22. Therefore, it is not permissible to look into the material
filed by the petitioners with the petition and the Court has to rely
upon the material brought before the learned Trial Court. The
authenticity of the documents filed with the petition has not been
established and it is impermissible to rely upon them to quash the
FIR.
23. It was submitted that the FIR was lodged by the
informant with a mala fide intention as a counterblast to the FIR
lodged against him. This submission will not help the petitioners.
It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of
Chhattisgarh vs Amar Kumar Singh 2023(6) 559 that when an
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investigation was conducted and a charge sheet was filed, the
question of mala fide would become meaningless. It was observed:
“78. Thirdly, it must be remembered that when information
is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered in
respect of a disproportionate assets case, it is the material
collected during the investigation and evidence led in court
that is decisive for determining the fate of the accused. To
our mind, whether the first information report is the
outcome of mala fides would be of secondary importance.
In such a case, should the allegations of mala fides be of
some prima facie worth, they would pale into insignificance
if sufficient materials are gathered for sending the accused
up for a trial; hence, the plea of mala fide may not per se
form the basis for quashing the first information
report/complaint.
79. Finally, following the above, what is of substantial
importance is that if criminal prosecution is based upon
adequate evidence and the same is otherwise justifiable, it
does not become vitiated on account of significant political
overtones and mala fide motives. We can say without fear of
contradiction that it is not in all cases in our country that an
individual, who is accused of acts of omission/commission
punishable under the PC Act but has the blessings of the
ruling dispensation, is booked by the police and made to
face prosecution. If, indeed, in such a case (where a
prosecution should have been but has not been launched)
the succeeding political dispensation initiates steps for
launching prosecution against such an accused but he/she
is allowed to go scot-free, despite there being materials
against him/her, merely on the ground that the action
initiated by the current regime is mala fide in the sense that
it is either to settle scores with the earlier regime or to
wreak vengeance against the individual, in such an
eventuality we are constrained to observe that it is criminal
justice that would be the casualty. This is because it is
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2025:HHC:10663difficult to form an opinion conclusively at the stage of
reading a first information report that the public servant is
either in or not in possession of property disproportionate
to the known sources of his/her income. It would all depend
on what is ultimately unearthed after the investigation is
complete. Needless to observe, the first information report
in a disproportionate assets case must, as of necessity,
prima facie, contain ingredients for the perception that
there is fair enough reason to suspect the commission of a
cognizable offence relating to “criminal misconduct”
punishable under the PC Act and to embark upon an
investigation.”
24. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Ramveer Upadhyay v. State of U.P., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 484, that a
complaint cannot be quashed because it was initiated due to
enmity. It was observed:
“30. The fact that the complaint may have been initiated by
reason of political vendetta is not in itself grounds for
quashing the criminal proceedings, as observed by
Bhagwati, CJ in Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar (1987) 1
SCC 2884. It is a well-established proposition of law that a
criminal prosecution if otherwise justified and based upon
adequate evidence, does not become vitiated on account of
mala fides or political vendetta of the first informant or
complainant. Though the view of Bhagwati, CJ in
Sheonandan Paswan (supra) was the minority view, there
was no difference of opinion with regard to this finding. To
quote Krishna Iyer, J., in State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh
(1980) 2 SCC 471, “If the use of power is for the fulfilment of
a legitimate object, the actuation or catalysation by malice
is not legicidal.”
Xxxx
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39. In our considered opinion, criminal proceedings cannot
be nipped in the bud by the exercise of jurisdiction under
Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. only because the complaint has
been lodged by a political rival. It is possible that a false
complaint may have been lodged at the behest of a political
opponent. However, such a possibility would not justify
interference under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash the
criminal proceedings. As observed above, the possibility of
retaliation on the part of the petitioners by the acts
alleged, after the closure of the earlier criminal case,
cannot be ruled out. The allegations in the complaint
constitute an offence under the Atrocities Act. Whether the
allegations are true or untrue would have to be decided in
the trial. In the exercise of power under Section 482 of the
Cr.P.C., the Court does not examine the correctness of the
allegations in a complaint except in exceptionally rare
cases where it is patently clear that the allegations are
frivolous or do not disclose any offence. The Complaint
Case No. 19/2018 is not such a case which should be
quashed at the inception itself without further Trial. The
High Court rightly dismissed the application under Section
482 of the Cr.P.C.”
25. Thus, it is impermissible to quash the FIR on the
ground of enmity.
26. A charge sheet has been filed before the Court. The
learned Trial Court is seized of the matter. It was laid down by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P., (2023) 8 SCC 734:
2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge sheet has been filed,
the learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate the same. It
was observed:
20
2025:HHC:10663
“At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the
investigation has been completed and the charge sheet is
ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR
do not inspire any confidence, particularly in the absence of
any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, we are of
the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge
application before the trial court under Section 227 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even
according to the State, the investigation is over and the
charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court.
In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to
look into the materials which the investigating officer
might have collected forming part of the charge sheet. If
any such discharge application is filed, the trial court shall
look into the materials and take a call whether any
discharge case is made out or not.”
27. The FIR discloses the commission of cognizable
offences, and it cannot be quashed at this stage.
28. No other point was urged.
29. In view of the above, the present petition fails and the
same is dismissed.
30. The observation made herein before shall remain
confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no
bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
23rd April, 2025
(saurav pathania)
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