Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 29.05.2025 vs State Of H.P on 25 June, 2025
2025:HHC:19717
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Appeal No. 411 of 2023
Reserved on: 29.05.2025
Date of Decision: 25.06.2025
Vatan Singh …Petitioner
Versus
State of H.P. …Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No.
For the Petitioner : Mr. Divya Raj Singh, Advocate.
For the Respondent : Mr. Jitender K. Sharma, Additional
Advocate General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The present appeal is directed against the judgment of
conviction and order of sentence dated 02.09.2023 vide which the
appellant (accused before the learned Trial Court) was convicted of
the commission of an offence punishable under Section 15 of
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (in short ‘NDPS
Act‘) and was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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years, pay a fine of ₹ 25,000/- and in default of payment of fine to
undergo further simple imprisonment for two months for the
commission of aforesaid offence. (Parties shall hereinafter be
referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned
Trial Court for convenience.)
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal
are that the police presented a challan against the accused for the
commission of an offence punishable under Section 15 of the NDPS
Act. It was asserted that PSI-Mukul Sharma (PW8), HC Dalip Singh
(PW2), HC-Virender Singh, HC Shamim Akhtar (PW1), and
Constable Navraj (PW12) had gone towards Badripur Bhuppur on
13.06.2014 in a vehicle bearing registration No. HP-17C-1222 being
driven by HHC Manoj Kumar under the supervision of ASP/SHO
Rohit Malpani. PSI Mukul received a secret information at Bhuppur
near Baweja petrol pump that Vatan Singh was selling poppy husk
from his tea stall, and in case of a search of the tea stall, a huge
quantity of poppy husk could be recovered. The information was
credible. Ramjani (PW3) and Surinder Kumar were associated with
the raiding party. Report under Section 42(2) of the NDPS Act
(Ext. PW1/A) was prepared and was handed over to HC-Shamim
Akhtar with a direction to deliver it to SDPO/Dy.S.P. PSI Mukul
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went to the tea stall of the accused. The accused tried to run away
after seeing the police. The police apprehended him, and he
identified himself as Vatan Singh. The police apprised him of the
information received by them. He was told that he had a right that
his tea stall should be searched before the Magistrate or the
Gazetted Officer. The accused consented to be searched by the
police. Memo (Ext. PW8/A) was prepared. Police Officials and
witness Ramjani gave their search to the accused; however,
nothing incriminating was found in their possession. Consent
Memo (Ext. PW2/A) was prepared. The search of the tea stall was
conducted during which one transparent polythene tied with a
knot (Ext. ‘PB’) was found in the wooden cabinet of the shop. PSI
Mukul untied the polythene and found the poppy husk (Ext. PC) in
it. He prepared the identification memo (Ext. PW8/B). He weighed
the poppy husk with the help of a weighing scale and found its
weight to be 5 kg 700 grams. The polythene bag containing poppy
husk was tied with a knot, and it was put in a cloth parcel (Ext. PA).
The parcel was sealed with four impressions of the seal ‘T’. Sample
seal ‘T’ (Ext. PW8/C) was taken on a separate piece of cloth. The
NCB-I form (Ext. PW6/C) was filled in triplicate, and the seal
impression was put on the NCB-I form. The seal was handed over
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to Constable Navraj after its use. Memo (Ext. PW8/D) was prepared.
The cloth parcel, NCB-I form and sample seal were seized vide
memo (Ext. PW8/E). PSI-Mukul prepared the rukka (Ext. PW8/F)
and handed it over to Constable Navraj with a direction to carry it
to the police station. FIR (Ext. PW8/G) was registered at the police
station. ASI-Mukul conducted the investigation. He prepared the
site plan (Ext. PW8/J) and recorded the statement of witnesses as
per their version. HC Dalip took the photographs (Ext. PW2/A1 to
Ext. PW2/A5) which were transferred to CD (Ext. PW2/A6). The
accused was arrested vide memo (Ext. PW8/L). The case property
was produced before SHO Bhisham Thakur (PW11), who checked
the parcel and re-sealed it with four impressions of seal ‘H’. He
obtained a sample seal on a piece of cloth (Ext. PW11/A), filled
columns Nos 9 to 11 of NCB-I form (Ext. PW6/C) and put the seal
‘H’ on the form. He issued a re-sealing certificate (Ext. PW11/B)
and handed over the case property to HHC Narayan Singh (PW6).
HHC Narayan Singh (PW6) made an entry in Register No.19 at Sr.
No.214 (Ext. PW6/A) and deposited the case property in the
malkhana. PSI Mukul Sharma prepared the special report (Ext.
PW5/A) and sent it to SDPO, Paonta Sahib, through Constable Tara
Singh. SDPO Yogesh Rolta made an endorsement on the report
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under Section 42(2) of the NDPS Act and the special report and
handed them over to his Reader, HHC Subhash Chand (PW5). HHC-
Subhash Chand made an entry at Sr. No.2221 and retained the
documents on record. HHC-Narayan Singh handed over the case
property, sample seal, NCB-I form and documents to HHC-
Jitender Sharma (PW7) on 16.06.2014 with a direction to carry
them to FSL Junga. HHC Jitender Singh deposited all the articles at
FSL Junga and handed over the receipt to HHC Narayan Singh on
his return. The result of the analysis (Ext. PW8/N) was issued, in
which it was mentioned that the exhibit, stated as poppy husk, was
a sample of poppy straw. The statements of remaining witnesses
were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the
investigation, the challan was prepared and was presented before
the learned Trial Court.
3. The learned Trial Court charged the accused with the
commission of an offence punishable under Section 15 of the NDPS
Act, to which the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be
tried.
4. The prosecution examined 12 witnesses to prove its
case. HC Shamim Akhtar (PW1) accompanied the police party and
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carried the information under Section 42(2) to the SDPO from the
spot. HC-Dalip Singh Tomar (PW2) and HC Navraj (PW12) are the
official witnesses to the recovery. Ramjani (PW3) is an independent
witness who did not support the prosecution’s case. HC Rajesh
Kumar (PW4) proved the entry in the daily diary. HHC Subhash
Chand (PW5) was posted as Assistant Reader to SDPO. HHC
Narayan Singh (PW6) was posted as MHC with whom the case
property was deposited. HHC Jitender Singh (PW7) carried the case
property to FSL Junga. SI Mukul (PW8) conducted the investigation
and effected the recovery. Sanjay Singhal (PW9) issued the
certificate. Constable Tara Justa (PW10) carried the special report
to the SDPO. Bhisham Thakur (PW11) was posted as SHO, who
resealed the case property.
5. The accused in his statement recorded under Section 313
of Cr.P.C. denied the prosecution’s case in its entirety. He stated
that he did not have a tea stall. He was called to the police station.
He was taken to a place where his photographs were taken. He was
made to sign some blank papers in the police station, and
thereafter, he was put in the lockup. Statement of Siphai Mahta
(DW1) was recorded in defence.
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6. Learned Trial Court held that the statements of official
witnesses corroborated each other. There were no major
contradictions in the statements. The mere fact that Ramjani did
not support the prosecution’s case is not sufficient to discard the
prosecution’s case. Statement of Siphai Mahta (DW1) was not
satisfactory and could not be relied upon. The testimonies of police
officials could not be discarded simply because they happened to be
police officials. The non-production of the seal was not material
and could not be used to reject the prosecution’s case. The report of
the analysis proved that the substance recovered from the tea stall
of the accused was poppy straw; therefore, the accused was
convicted and sentenced as aforesaid.
7. Being aggrieved from the judgment and order passed by
the learned Trial Court, the accused has filed the present appeal,
asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in convicting and
sentencing the accused. The evidence was not properly
appreciated. The independent witness did not support the
prosecution’s case, which made it doubtful. Seal was not produced
in the Court, and the non-prosecution of the same is fatal to the
prosecution’s case. The testimony of the defence witness
demolished the case of the prosecution. The discrepancies in the
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statements were sufficient to discard the prosecution’s case. The
contraband was not produced before the learned Magistrate, and
this is fatal to the prosecution’s case. The report of the FSL was not
proved as per the law. The integrity of the case property was not
established; therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be
allowed and the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial
Court be set aside.
8. I have heard Mr. Divya Raj Singh, learned counsel for
the appellant/accused and Mr. Jitender Sharma, learned Additional
Advocate General, for the respondent/State.
9. Mr. Divya Raj Singh, learned counsel for the
appellant/accused, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in
convicting and sentencing the accused. The independent witnesses
did not support the prosecution’s case, and there were material
contradictions in the statements of the official witnesses. PSI
Mukul Sharma stated that he had received the information near the
petrol pump through the informer, whereas HC Navraj (PW12)
specifically stated that no person met the police party at the Petrol
Pump except witnesses. This made the prosecution’s case doubtful
that the police had received secret information regarding the sale
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of the poppy husk by the accused, and that is why the police went
to the tea stall of the accused. Sanjay Singhal (PW9) stated in his
cross-examination that he had not issued any certificate and could
not say from where the certificate was brought by the police. This
certificate was relied upon by the prosecution to prove the
ownership of the tea stall. Once, the certificate was not properly
proved, the prosecution’s version that the accused is the owner of
the tea stall and had kept the poppy husk inside it is not believable.
The integrity of the case property was not established. The case
property was not produced before the learned Judicial Magistrate,
and there is a violation of Section 52A of the NDPS Act; therefore,
he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment and
order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.
10. He submitted in the alternative that, as per the
prosecution, the police recovered 5 kg 700 grams of poppy husk.
The learned Trial Court awarded a sentence of five years, which is
disproportionate. The Court has to consider the principle of
proportionality while imposing the sentence, and the learned Trial
Court failed to adhere to this principle; hence, he prayed that the
sentence be reduced in the alternative.
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11. Mr. Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate
General, for the respondent State, submitted that the police
officials supported the prosecution case. The mere fact that
independent witnesses had not supported the prosecution’s case is
not sufficient to discard it. Learned Trial Court had properly
appreciated the evidence and there is no infirmity in the judgment
and order passed by the learned Trial Court; hence, he prayed that
the present appeal be dismissed.
12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
13. Ramjani (PW3) did not support the prosecution’s case.
He stated that he was called by the police to the police station in
Paonta Sahib. The police obtained his signatures on some written
papers and some blank papers. He was neither associated with the
police, nor search of the stall of the accused was conducted in his
presence. No contraband was recovered in his presence. He was
permitted to be cross-examined by the learned Public Prosecutor.
He denied the previous statement recorded by the police; however,
he admitted his signatures on the report (Ext. PW1/A), consent
memo (Ext. PW2/A), entrustment memo (Ext. PW8/D) and the
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seizure memo (Ext. PW2/A). He stated in his cross-examination
that police called him to the police station along with one Surinder
Kumar. The police asked him to witness the personal search of the
accused. Nothing was recovered from the accused except for some
currency notes. The police took him and Surinder to the Baweja
Petrol Pump and took some photographs. No contraband was
recovered in his presence. The police obtained his signatures on
the papers and the cloth at the police station. He denied the
previous statement recorded by the police.
14. PSI-Mukul (PW8) specifically stated in his
examination-in-chief that he had recorded the statements of
witnesses, including the statement of Ramjani (Ext. PW8/K), as per
his version. This was not suggested to be incorrect in the cross-
examination which means that this part of his testimony is
accepted to be correct; hence, Ramjani is shown to have been made
two inconsistent statements; one before the police and one before
the Court and his credit has been shaken under Section 155(2) of
Indian Evidence Act. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Sat Paul v. Delhi Admn., (1976) 1 SCC 727 that where a
witness has been thoroughly discredited by confronting him with
the previous statement, his statement cannot be relied upon.
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However, when he is confronted with some portions of the
previous statement, his credibility is shaken to that extent, and the
rest of the statement can be relied upon. It was observed:
“52. From the above conspectus, it emerges clearly that even
in a criminal prosecution, when a witness is cross-examined
and contradicted with the leave of the court by the party
calling him, his evidence cannot, as a matter of law, be
treated as washed off the record altogether. It is for the
Judge of fact to consider in each case whether, as a result of
such cross-examination and contradiction, the witness
stands thoroughly discredited or can still be believed
regarding a part of his testimony. If the Judge finds that in
the process, the credit of the witness has not been
completely shaken, he may, after reading and considering
the evidence of the witness, as a whole, with due caution and
care, accept, in the light of the other evidence on the record,
that part of his testimony which he finds to be creditworthy
and act upon it. If in a given case, the whole of the testimony
of the witness is impugned, and in the process, the witness
stands squarely and totally discredited, the Judge should, as
a matter of prudence, discard his evidence in toto.”
15. This Court has also laid down in Ian Stilman versus. State
2002(2) Shim. L.C. 16 that where a witness has been cross-
examined by the prosecution with the leave of the Court, his
statement cannot be relied upon. It was observed:
“12. It is now well settled that when a witness who has been
called by the prosecution is permitted to be cross-examined
on behalf of the prosecution, such a witness loses credibility
and cannot be relied upon by the defence. We find support
for the view we have taken from the various authorities of
the Apex Court. In Jagir Singh v. The State (Delhi
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2025:HHC:19717Administration), AIR 1975 Supreme Court 1400, the Apex Court
observed:
“It is now well settled that when a witness, who has
been called by the prosecution, is permitted to be
cross-examined on behalf of the prosecution, the
result of that course being adopted is to discredit this
witness altogether and not merely to get rid of a part
of his testimony”.
16. It was laid down by this Court in Budh Ram Versus State
of H.P. 2020 Cri. L.J. 4254, that the prosecution’s version cannot be
discarded because the independent witnesses did not support it. It
was observed:
“Though the independent witnesses, PW-1 Rajiv Kumar and
PW-2 Hira Lal, were declared hostile and were cross-
examined, however, the law in respect of appreciating the
testimonies of such witnesses is well settled. Hon’ble Apex
Court in Sudru versus State of Chhattisgarh, (2019) 8 SCC 333,
relying upon Bhajju versus State of M.P., 2010 4 SCC 327, has
again reiterated the well-settled principle that evidence of a
hostile witness can be relied upon by the prosecution
version. Merely because a witness has turned hostile, the
same does not render his evidence or testimony
inadmissible in a trial, and such a conviction can be based
upon such testimony, if it is corroborated by other reliable
evidence.
In a case titled Raja and Others versus State of Karnataka,
(2016) 10 SCC 506 the Apex Court observed that the evidence
of a hostile witness cannot be altogether discarded and as
such it is open for the Court to rely on the dependable part of
such evidence which stands duly corroborated by other
reliable evidence on record.
In a case titled Selvaraj @ Chinnapaiyan versus State
represented by Inspector of Police, (2015) 2 SCC 662 the Apex
Court has observed that in a situation/case, wherein, the
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witness deposes false in his/her cross-examination, that
itself is not sufficient to outrightly discard his/her testimony
in examination-in-chief. The Court held that a conviction
can be recorded believing the testimony of such a witness
given in examination-in-chief; however, such evidence is
required to be examined with great caution.
In Ashok alias Dangra Jaiswal versus State of Madhya Pradesh,
(2011) 5 SCC 123, it has been held as under: –
“The seizure witness turning hostile may not be very
significant by itself, as it is not an uncommon
phenomenon in criminal trials, particularly in cases
relating to the NDPS Act.”
17. Therefore, the accused cannot be acquitted simply
because the independent witnesses have turned hostile.
18. Surinder Kumar, another witness, was given up by the
prosecution. It was submitted that an adverse inference should be
drawn against the prosecution for his non-examination. This
submission cannot be accepted. It was held in Hukam Singh v. State
of Rajasthan, (2000) 7 SCC 490: 2000 SCC (Cri) 1416: 2000 SCC
OnLine SC 1311 that the Public Prosecutor is not obliged to examine
a witness who will not support the prosecution. It was observed at
page 495:
“13. When the case reaches the stage envisaged in Section
231 of the Code the Sessions Judge is obliged “to take all such
evidence as may be produced in support of the prosecution”.
It is clear from the said section that the Public Prosecutor is
expected to produce evidence “in support of the
prosecution” and not in derogation of the prosecution case.
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At the said stage, the Public Prosecutor would be in a
position to take a decision as to which among the persons
cited are to be examined. If there are too many witnesses on
the same point, the Public Prosecutor is at liberty to choose
two or some among them alone so that the time of the Court
can be saved from repetitious depositions on the same
factual aspects. That principle applies when there are too
many witnesses cited if they all had sustained injuries at the
occurrence. The Public Prosecutor in such cases is not
obliged to examine all the injured witnesses. If he is satisfied
by examining any two or three of them, it is open to him to
inform the Court that he does not propose to examine the
remaining persons in that category. This will help not only
the prosecution in relieving itself of the strain of adducing
repetitive evidence on the same point but also help the Court
considerably in lessening the workload. The time has come
to make every effort possible to lessen the workload,
particularly those courts crammed with cases, but without
impairing the cause of justice.
14. The situation in a case where the prosecution cited two
categories of witnesses to the occurrence, one consisting of
persons closely related to the victim and the other consisting
of witnesses who have no such relation, the Public
Prosecutor’s duty to the Court may require him to produce
witnesses from the latter category, also subject to his
discretion to limit to one or two among them. But if the
Public Prosecutor got reliable information that anyone
among that category would not support the prosecution
version, he is free to state in court about that fact and skip
that witness from being examined as a prosecution witness.
It is open to the defence to cite him and examine him as a
defence witness. The decision in this regard has to be taken
by the Public Prosecutor fairly. He can interview the witness
beforehand to enable him to know well in advance the stand
which that particular person would be adopting when
examined as a witness in court.
15. A four-judge Bench of this Court had stated the above
legal position thirty-five years ago in Masalti v. State of
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U.P. [AIR 1965 SC 202: (1965) 1 Cri LJ 226]. It is contextually
apposite to extract the following observation of the Bench:
“It is not unknown that where serious offences like the
present are committed and a large number of accused
persons are tried, attempts are made either to terrorise or
win over prosecution witnesses and if the prosecutor
honestly and bona fide believes that some of his
witnesses have been won over, it would be unreasonable
to insist that he must tender such witnesses before the
court.”
16. The said decision was followed in Bava Hajee
Hamsa v. State of Kerala [(1974) 4 SCC 479: 1974 SCC (Cri) 515:
AIR 1974 SC 902]. In Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of
Maharashtra [(1973) 2 SCC 793: 1973 SCC (Cri) 1033] Krishna
Iyer J., speaking for a three-judge Bench had struck a note of
caution that while a Public Prosecutor has the freedom “to
pick and choose” witnesses he should be fair to the court
and the truth. This Court reiterated the same position
in Dalbir Kaur v. State of Punjab [(1976) 4 SCC 158: 1976 SCC
(Cri) 527].
19. It was laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pohlu v.
State of Haryana, (2005) 10 SCC 196, that the intrinsic worth of the
testimony of witnesses has to be assessed by the Court and if the
testimony of the witnesses appears to be truthful, the non-
examination of other witnesses will not make the testimony
doubtful. It was observed: –
“[10] It was then submitted that some of the material
witnesses were not examined and, in this connection, it was
argued that two of the eye-witnesses named in the FIR,
namely, Chander and Sita Ram, were not examined by the
prosecution. Dharamvir, son of Sukhdei, was also not
examined by the prosecution, though he was a material
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2025:HHC:19717witness, being an injured eyewitness, having witnessed the
assault that took place in the house of Sukhdei, PW 2. It is
true that it is not necessary for the prosecution to multiply
witnesses if it prefers to rely upon the evidence of
eyewitnesses examined by it, which it considers sufficient to
prove the case of the prosecution. However, the intrinsic
worth of the testimony of the witnesses examined by the
prosecution has to be assessed by the Court. If their evidence
appears to be truthful, reliable and acceptable, the mere fact
that some other witnesses have not been examined will not
adversely affect the case of the prosecution. We have,
therefore, to examine the evidence of the two eye witnesses,
namely, PW 1 and PW 2, and to find whether their evidence is
true, on the basis of which the conviction of the appellants
can be sustained. ”
20. This position was reiterated in Rohtash vs. State of
Haryana 2013 (14) SCC 434, and it was held that the prosecution is
not bound to examine all the cited witnesses, and it can drop
witnesses to avoid multiplicity or plurality of witnesses. It was
observed:
14. A common issue that may arise in such cases where some
of the witnesses have not been examined, though the same
may be material witnesses, is whether the prosecution is
bound to examine all the listed/cited witnesses. This Court,
in Abdul Gani & Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC
31, has examined the aforesaid issue and held, that as a
general rule, all witnesses must be called upon to testify in
the course of the hearing of the prosecution, but that there is
no obligation compelling the public prosecutor to call upon
all the witnesses available who can depose regarding the
facts that the prosecution desires to prove. Ultimately, it is a
matter left to the discretion of the public prosecutor, and
though a court ought to and no doubt would take into
consideration the absence of witnesses whose testimony
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2025:HHC:19717would reasonably be expected, it must adjudge the evidence
as a whole and arrive at its conclusion accordingly, taking
into consideration the persuasiveness of the testimony given
in the light of such criticism, as may be levelled at the
absence of possible material witnesses.
15. In Sardul Singh v. State of Bombay, AIR 1957 SC 747, a
similar view has been reiterated, observing that a court
cannot normally compel the prosecution to examine a
witness which the prosecution does not choose to examine
and that the duty of a fair prosecutor extends only to the
extent of examination of such witnesses, who are necessary
for the purpose of disclosing the story of the prosecution
with all its essentials.
16. In Masalti v. the State of U.P., AIR 1965 SC 202, this Court
held that it would be unsound to lay down as a general rule,
that every witness must be examined, even though, the
evidence provided by such witness may not be very material,
or even if it is a known fact that the said witness has either
been won over or terrorised. In such cases, it is always open
to the defence to examine such witnesses as their own
witnesses, and the court itself may also call upon such a
witness in the interests of justice under Section 540 Cr. P.C.
(See also: Bir Singh & Ors. vs. State of U.P., (1977 (4) SCC 420)
17. In Darya Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab, AIR 1965 SC 328,
this Court reiterated a similar view and held that if the eye-
witness(s) is deliberately kept back, the Court may draw an
inference against the prosecution and may, in a proper case,
regard the failure of the prosecutor to examine the said
witnesses as constituting a serious infirmity in the proof of
the prosecution case.
18. In Raghubir Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1971 SC 2156, this
Court held as under:
“10. … Material witnesses considered necessary by the
prosecution for unfolding the prosecution’s story
alone need to be produced without unnecessary and
redundant multiplication of witnesses. The appellant’s
counsel has not shown how the prosecution’s story is
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2025:HHC:19717rendered less trustworthy as a result of the non-
production of the witnesses mentioned by him. No
material and important witness was deliberately kept
back by the prosecution. Incidentally, we may point
out that the accused too have not considered it proper
to produce those persons as witnesses for
controverting the prosecution version…..”
19. In Harpal Singh v. Devinder Singh & Ann, AIR 1997 SC 2914,
this Court reiterated a similar view and further observed:
“24. … Illustration (g) in Section 114 of the Evidence
Act is only a permissible inference and not a necessary
inference. Unless there are other circumstances also to
facilitate the drawing of an adverse inference, it should
not be a mechanical process to draw the adverse
inference merely on the strength of non-examination
of a witness even if it is a material witness…..”
20. In Mohanlal Shamji Soni v. Union of India &Anr., AIR 1991
SC 1346, this Court held:
“10. It is a cardinal rule in the law of evidence that the
best available evidence should be brought before the
Court to prove a fact or the points in issue. But it is left
either for the prosecution or for the defence to
establish its respective case by adducing the best
available evidence, and the Court is not empowered
under the provisions of the Code to compel either the
prosecution or the defence to examine any particular
witness or witnesses on their side. Nonetheless, if
either of the parties withholds any evidence which
could be produced and which, if produced, would be
unfavourable to the party withholding such evidence,
the Court can draw a presumption under illustration
(g) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act.
.. In order to enable the Court to find out the truth and
render a just decision, the salutary provisions of
Section 540 of the Code (Section 311 of the new Code)
are enacted whereunder any Court by exercising its
discretionary authority at any stage of enquiry, trial or
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another proceeding can summon any person as a
witness or examine any person in attendance though
not summoned as a witness or recall or re-examine
any person in attendance though not summoned as a
witness or recall and re-examine any person already
examined who are expected to be able to throw light
upon the matter in dispute; because if judgments
happen to be rendered on inchoate, inconclusive and
speculative presentation of facts, the ends of justice
would be defeated.”
21. In Banti @ Guddu v. State of M.P. AIR 2004 SC 261, this
Court held:
“12. In trials before a Court of Session, the prosecution
“shall be conducted by a Public Prosecutor”. Section
226 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 enjoins
him to open up his case by describing the charge
brought against the accused. He has to state what
evidence he proposes to adduce for proving the guilt of
the accused…….If that version is not in support of the
prosecution’s case, it would be unreasonable to insist
on the Public Prosecutor to examine those persons as
witnesses for the prosecution.
13. When the case reaches the stage envisaged in
Section 231 of the Code, the Sessions Judge is obliged
“to take all such evidence as may be produced in
support of the prosecution”. It is clear from the said
section that the Public Prosecutor is expected to
produce evidence “in support of the prosecution” and
not in derogation of the prosecution’s case. At the said
stage, the Public Prosecutor would be in a position to
take a decision as to which among the presences cited
are to be examined. If there are too many witnesses on
the same point, the Public Prosecutor is at liberty to
choose two or some among them alone so that the
time of the Court can be saved from repetitious
depositions on the same factual aspects…….This will
help not only the prosecution in relieving itself of the
strain of adducing repetitive evidence on the same
P a g e | 21
2025:HHC:19717point but also help the Court considerably in lessening
the workload. The time has come to make every effort
possible to lessen the workload, particularly those
courts crammed with cases, but without impairing the
cause of justice.
14. It is open to the defence to cite him and examine
him as a defence witness.”
22. The said issue was also considered by this Court in R.
Shaji (supra), and the Court, after placing reliance upon its
judgments in Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras; AIR 1957 SC
614; and Kishan Chand v. State of Haryana JT 2013 (1) SC 222,
held as under:
“22. In the matter of the appreciation of evidence of
witnesses, it is not the number of witnesses, but the
quality of their evidence, that is important, as there is
no requirement in the law of evidence stating that a
particular number of witnesses must be examined to
prove/disprove a fact. It is a time-honoured principle
that evidence must be weighed and not counted. The
test is whether the evidence has a ring of truth, is
cogent, credible, trustworthy, or otherwise. The legal
system has laid emphasis on the value provided by
each witness, as opposed to the multiplicity or
plurality of witnesses. It is thus the quality and not
quantity which determines the adequacy of evidence,
as has been provided by Section 134 of the Evidence
Act. Where the law requires the examination of at least
one attesting witness, it has been held that the number
of witnesses produced over and above this does not
carry any weight.”
23. Thus, the prosecution is not bound to examine all the
cited witnesses, and it can drop witnesses to avoid
multiplicity or plurality of witnesses. The accused can also
examine the cited, but not examined, witnesses, if he so
desires, in his defence. It is the discretion of the prosecutor
to tender the witnesses to prove the case of the prosecution,
and “the court will not interfere with the exercise of that
P a g e | 22
2025:HHC:19717
discretion unless, perhaps, it can be shown that the
prosecution has been influenced by some oblique motive.”
In an extraordinary situation, if the court comes to the
conclusion that a material witness has been withheld, it can
draw an adverse inference against the prosecution, as has
been provided under Section 114 of the Evidence Act.
Undoubtedly, the public prosecutor must not take the liberty
to “pick and choose” his witnesses, as he must be fair to the
court, and therefore, to the truth. In a given case, the Court
can always examine a witness as a court witness, if it is so
warranted in the interests of justice. The evidence of the
witnesses must be tested on the touchstone of reliability,
credibility and trustworthiness. If the court finds the same
to be untruthful, there is no legal bar for it to discard the
same.
21. This position was reiterated in Rajesh Yadav v. State of
U.P., (2022) 12 SCC 200: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 150, wherein it was
observed at page 224: –
Non-examination of the witness
34. A mere non-examination of the witness per se will not
vitiate the case of the prosecution. It depends upon the
quality and not the quantity of the witnesses and their
importance. If the court is satisfied with the explanation
given by the prosecution, along with the adequacy of the
materials, sufficient enough to proceed with the trial and
convict the accused, there cannot be any prejudice.
Similarly, if the court is of the view that the evidence is not
screened and could well be produced by the other side in
support of its case, no adverse inference can be drawn. The
onus is on the part of the party who alleges that a witness
has not been produced deliberately to prove it.
35. The aforesaid settled principle of law has been laid down
in Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab [Sarwan Singh v. State of
Punjab, (1976) 4 SCC 369: 1976 SCC (Cri) 646]: (SCC pp. 377-
78, para 13)
P a g e | 23
2025:HHC:19717
“13. Another circumstance which appears to have
weighed heavily with the Additional Sessions Judge was
that no independent witness of Salabatpura had been
examined by the prosecution to prove the prosecution
case of assault on the deceased, although the evidence
shows that there were some persons living in that locality
like the “pakodewalla”, hotelwalla, shopkeeper and some
of the passengers who had alighted at Salabatpura with
the deceased. The Additional Sessions Judge has drawn an
adverse inference against the prosecution for its failure to
examine any of those witnesses. Mr Hardy has adopted
this argument. In our opinion, the comments of the
Additional Sessions Judge are based on a serious
misconception of the correct legal position. The onus of
proving the prosecution’s case rests entirely on the
prosecution, and it follows as a logical corollary that the
prosecution has complete liberty to choose its witnesses if it is
to prove its case. The court cannot compel the prosecution to
examine one witness or the other as its witness. At the most,
if a material witness is withheld, the court may draw an
adverse inference against the prosecution. But it is not the
law that the omission to examine any and every witness,
even on minor points, would undoubtedly lead to rejection of
the prosecution’s case or drawing of an adverse inference
against the prosecution. The law is well-settled that the
prosecution is bound to produce only such witnesses as are
essential for the unfolding of the prosecution narrative. In
other words, before an adverse inference against the
prosecution can be drawn, it must be proved to the
satisfaction of the court that the witnesses who had been
withheld were eyewitnesses who had actually seen the
occurrence and were therefore material to prove the case. It is
not necessary for the prosecution to multiply witnesses after
witnesses on the same point; it is the quality rather than the
quantity of the evidence that matters. In the instant case,
the evidence of the eyewitnesses does not suffer from any
infirmity or any manifest defect on its intrinsic merit.
Secondly, there is nothing to show that at the time when
the deceased was assaulted, a large crowd had gathered
P a g e | 24
2025:HHC:19717
and some of the members of the crowd had actually seen
the occurrence and were cited as witnesses for the
prosecution and then withheld. We must not forget that
in our country, there is a general tendency amongst the
witnesses in mofussil to shun giving evidence in courts
because of the cumbersome and dilatory procedure of our
courts, the harassment to which they are subjected by the
police and the searching cross-examination which they
have to face before the courts. Therefore, nobody wants
to be a witness in a murder or any serious offence if he
can avoid it. Although the evidence does show that four or
five persons had alighted from the bus at the time when
the deceased and his companions got down from the bus,
there is no suggestion that any of those persons stayed on
to witness the occurrence. They may have proceeded to
their village homes.” (emphasis supplied)
36. This Court has reiterated the aforesaid principle in Gulam
Sarbar v. State of Bihar [Gulam Sarbar v. State of Bihar, (2014)
3 SCC 401: (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 195]: (SCC pp. 410-11, para 19)
“19. In the matter of the appreciation of evidence of
witnesses, it is not the number of witnesses but the
quality of their evidence which is important, as there is
no requirement under the Law of Evidence that any
particular number of witnesses is to be examined to
prove/disprove a fact. It is a time-honoured principle that
evidence must be weighed and not counted. The test is
whether the evidence has a ring of truth, is cogent,
credible, trustworthy or otherwise. The legal system has
laid emphasis on the value provided by each witness,
rather than the multiplicity or plurality of witnesses. It is
quality and not quantity which determines the adequacy
of evidence as has been provided by Section 134 of the
Evidence Act. Even in probate cases, where the law
requires the examination of at least one attesting
witness, it has been held that the production of more
witnesses does not carry any weight. Thus, conviction can
even be based on the testimony of a sole eyewitness, if
the same inspires confidence. (Vide Vadivelu
P a g e | 25
2025:HHC:19717
Thevar v. State of Madras [Vadivelu Thevar v. State of
Madras, 1957 SCR 981: AIR 1957 SC 614], Kunju v. State of
T.N. [Kunju v. State of T.N., (2008) 2 SCC 151 : (2008) 1 SCC
(Cri) 331], Bipin Kumar Mondal v. State of W.B. [Bipin
Kumar Mondal v. State of W.B., (2010) 12 SCC 91 : (2011) 2
SCC (Cri) 150], Mahesh v. State of M.P. [Mahesh v. State of
M.P., (2011) 9 SCC 626 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 783], Prithipal
Singh v. State of Punjab [Prithipal Singh v. State of Punjab,
(2012) 1 SCC 10 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 1] and Kishan
Chand v. State of Haryana [Kishan Chand v. State of
Haryana, (2013) 2 SCC 502 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 807] .)”
22. Thus, no adverse inference can be drawn from the non-
examination of Surinder Kumar.
23. HC Dalip Singh Tomar (PW2), PSI Mukul Sharma (PW8)
and Constable Navraj (PW12) supported the prosecution case in
their examination-in-chief. They categorically stated about the
receipt of the information, the visit of the police party with the
witnesses to the tea stall of the accused, the recovery of the
contraband from the tea stall, its seizure, and the arrest of the
accused.
24. Inspector Mukul Sharma (PW8) stated in his cross-
examination that somebody personally gave him secret
information at Baweja Petrol Pump, where the police had stopped
their vehicle. HC Navraj (PW12), on the other hand, stated that no
person met the police party near Baweja Petrol Pump except the
P a g e | 26
2025:HHC:19717witnesses-Ramjani and Surinder. It was submitted that these
statements made the receipt of secret information near Baweja
Petrol Pump doubtful. This submission cannot be accepted. The
incident occurred on 13.06.2014. Inspector Mukul made the
statement on 02.09.2022, and HC Navraj made a statement on
02.09.2022 after eight years after the incident. The contradictions
were bound to come with time due to the failure of memory and
cannot be used to discard the prosecution’s case. It was laid down
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Goverdhan Vs. State of Chhattisgarh
(2025) SCC Online SC 69 that the discrepancies are not sufficient to
discard the prosecution case unless they are material. It was
observed: –
“51. As we proceed to examine this crucial aspect, it may be
apposite to keep in mind certain observations made by this
Court relating to discrepancies in the account of
eyewitnesses.
In Leela Ram (Dead) through Duli Chand v. State of
Haryana, (1999) 9 SCC 525, it was observed as follows:
“9. Be it noted that the High Court is within its
jurisdiction, being the first appellate court to
reappraise the evidence, but the discrepancies found
in the ocular account of two witnesses, unless they are
so vital, cannot affect the credibility of the evidence of
the witnesses. There are bound to be some
discrepancies between the narrations of different
witnesses when they speak on details, and unless the
contradictions are of a material dimension, the same
P a g e | 27
2025:HHC:19717should not be used to jettison the evidence in its
entirety. Incidentally, corroboration of evidence with
mathematical niceties cannot be expected in criminal
cases. Minor embellishment, there may be, but
variations by reason therefore should not render the
evidence of eyewitnesses unbelievable. Trivial
discrepancies ought not to obliterate otherwise
acceptable evidence. In this context, reference may be
made to the decision of this Court in State of
U.P. v. M.K. Anthony [(1985) 1 SCC 505: 1985 SCC (Cri)
105]. In para 10 of the Report, this Court observed:
(SCC pp. 514-15)
’10. While appreciating the evidence of a
witness, the approach must be whether the
evidence of the witness, read as a whole, appears
to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is
formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the court
to scrutinise the evidence more particularly
keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and
infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a
whole and evaluate them to find out whether it
is against the general tenor of the evidence
given by the witness and whether the earlier
evaluation of the evidence is shaken as to render
it unworthy of belief. Minor discrepancies on
trivial matters not touching the core of the case,
hypertechnical approach by taking sentences
torn out of context here or there from the
evidence, attaching importance to some
technical error committed by the investigating
officer not going to the root of the matter would
not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence
as a whole. If the court before whom the witness
gives evidence had the opportunity to form the
opinion about the general tenor of evidence
given by the witness, the appellate court which
had not this benefit will have to attach due
weight to the appreciation of evidence by the
P a g e | 28
2025:HHC:19717trial court and unless there are reasons weighty
and formidable it would not be proper to reject
the evidence on the ground of minor variations
or infirmities in the matter of trivial details.
Even honest and truthful witnesses may differ in
some details unrelated to the main incident
because the power of observation, retention and
reproduction differ with individuals.’
10. In a very recent decision in Rammi v. State of
M.P. [(1999) 8 SCC 649: 2000 SCC (Cri) 26], this Court
observed: (SCC p. 656, para 24)
’24. When an eyewitness is examined at length,
it is quite possible for him to make some
discrepancies. No true witness can escape from
making some discrepant details. Perhaps an
untrue witness who is well tutored can
successfully make his testimony totally non-
discrepant. But courts should bear in mind that
it is only when discrepancies in the evidence of a
witness are so incompatible with the credibility
of his version that the court is justified in
jettisoning his evidence. But too serious a view
to be adopted on mere variations falling in the
narration of an incident (either as between the
evidence of two witnesses or as between two
statements of the same witness) is an unrealistic
approach for judicial scrutiny.’
This Court further observed: (SCC pp. 656-57, paras
25-27)
’25. It is a common practice in trial courts to
make out contradictions from the previous
statement of a witness for confronting him
during cross-examination. Merely because there
is an inconsistency in evidence, it is not
sufficient to impair the credit of the witness. No
doubt, Section 155 of the Evidence Act provides
scope for impeaching the credit of a witness by
P a g e | 29
2025:HHC:19717proof of an inconsistent former statement. But a
reading of the section would indicate that all
inconsistent statements are not sufficient to
impeach the credit of the witness. The material
portion of the section is extracted below:
“155. Impeaching the credit of a witness.–
The credit of a witness may be impeached in
the following ways by the adverse party, or,
with the consent of the court, by the party
who calls him–
(1)-(2) ***
(3) by proof of former statements
inconsistent with any part of his evidence
which is liable to be contradicted;”
26. A former statement, though seemingly
inconsistent with the evidence, need not
necessarily be sufficient to amount to a
contradiction. Only such an inconsistent
statement, which is liable to be “contradicted”,
would affect the credit of the witness. Section
145 of the Evidence Act also enables the cross-
examiner to use any former statement of the
witness, but it cautions that if it is intended to
“contradict” the witness, the cross-examiner is
enjoined to comply with the formality
prescribed therein. Section 162 of the Code also
permits the cross-examiner to use the previous
statement of the witness (recorded under
Section 161 of the Code) for the only a limited
purpose, i.e. to “contradict” the witness.
27. To contradict a witness, therefore, must be
to discredit the particular version of the witness.
Unless the former statement has the potency to
discredit the present statement, even if the
latter is at variance with the former to some
extent, it would not be helpful to contradict that
P a g e | 30
2025:HHC:19717
witness (vide Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P. [AIR
1959 SC 1012: 1959 Cri LJ 1231]).”
52. Further, this Court also cautioned about attaching too
much importance to minor discrepancies of the evidence of
the witnesses in Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of
Gujarat (1983) 3 SCC 217 as follows:
“5. … We do not consider it appropriate or permissible to
enter upon a reappraisal or reappreciation of the evidence
in the context of the minor discrepancies painstakingly
highlighted by the learned counsel for the appellant.
Overmuch importance cannot be attached to minor
discrepancies. The reasons are obvious:
(1) By and large, a witness cannot be expected to
possess a photographic memory and to recall the
details of an incident. It is not as if a videotape is
replayed on the mental screen.
(2) Ordinarily, it so happens that a witness is
overtaken by events. The witness could not have
anticipated the occurrence, which so often has an
element of surprise. The mental faculties,
therefore, cannot be expected to be attuned to
absorb the details.
(3) The powers of observation differ from person to
person. What one may notice, another may not. An
object or movement might emboss its image on one
person’s mind, whereas it might go unnoticed on
the part of another.
(4) By and large, people cannot accurately recall a
conversation and reproduce the very words used by
them or heard by them. They can only recall the
main purport of the conversation. It is unrealistic
to expect a witness to be a human tape recorder.
(5) In regard to the exact time of an incident or the
time duration of an occurrence, usually, people
make their estimates by guesswork on the spur of
the moment at the time of interrogation. And one
P a g e | 31
2025:HHC:19717cannot expect people to make very precise or
reliable estimates in such matters. Again, it
depends on the time sense of individuals, which
varies from person to person.
(6) Ordinarily, a witness cannot be expected to recall
accurately the sequence of events which take place
in rapid succession or in a short time span. A
witness is liable to get confused or mixed up when
interrogated later on.
(7) A witness, though wholly truthful, is liable to be
overawed by the court atmosphere and the piercing
cross-examination made by the counsel and, out of
nervousness, mix up facts, get confused regarding
the sequence of events, or fill up details from
imagination on the spur of the moment. The
subconscious mind of the witness sometimes so
operates on account of the fear of looking foolish or
being disbelieved, though the witness is giving a
truthful and honest account of the occurrence
witnessed by him–perhaps it is a sort of
psychological defence mechanism activated on the
spur of the moment.”
53. To the same effect, it was also observed
in Appabhai v. State of Gujarat 1988 Supp SCC 241 as follows:
“13. … The court, while appreciating the evidence,
must not attach undue importance to minor
discrepancies. The discrepancies which do not shake
the basic version of the prosecution’s case may be
discarded. The discrepancies which are due to normal
errors of perception or observation should not be
given importance. The errors due to lapse of memory
may be given due allowance. The court, by calling into
aid its vast experience of men and matters in different
cases, must evaluate the entire material on record by
excluding the exaggerated version given by any
witness. When a doubt arises in respect of certain facts
alleged by such a witness, the proper course is to
P a g e | 32
2025:HHC:19717ignore that fact only unless it goes to the root of the
matter to demolish the entire prosecution story. The
witnesses nowadays go on adding embellishments to
their version, perhaps for fear that their testimony
being rejected by the court. The courts, however,
should not disbelieve the evidence of such witnesses
altogether if they are otherwise trustworthy.
Jaganmohan Reddy, J. speaking for this Court
in Sohrab v. State of M.P. [(1972) 3 SCC 751: 1972 SCC
(Cri) 819] observed : [SCC p. 756, para 8: SCC (Cri) p.
824, para 8]
‘8. … This Court has held that falsus in uno,
falsus in omnibus is not a sound rule for the
reason that hardly one comes across a witness
whose evidence does not contain a grain of
untruth or at any rate exaggeration,
embroideries or embellishments. In most cases,
the witnesses when asked about details venture
to give some answer, not necessarily true or
relevant for fear that their evidence may not be
accepted in respect of the main incident which
they have witnessed but that is not to say that
their evidence as to the salient features of the
case after cautious scrutiny cannot be
considered….'”
25. Therefore, this contradiction by itself is not sufficient to
discard the prosecution’s case.
26. The prosecution relied upon the certificate (Ext. PW9/A)
in which it was mentioned that Vattan General Store is a
respectable registered member of Vyopar Mandal, Paonta Sahib.
The Vyopar Mandal should be taken into confidence before
carrying out the inspection or taking the samples so as to protect
P a g e | 33
2025:HHC:19717the rights of the parties. Sanjay Singhal (PW9) stated that the
certificate was issued in the name and style of M/s Vatan General
Store by the office. The certificate had his signature at point ‘A’.
The shop is located at Paonta Sahib. He stated in his cross-
examination that the police had not collected this document from
him, and he did not know from where the police obtained this
certificate.
27. This witness categorically stated in his examination-
in-chief that the certificate bears his signatures and the shop was
located at Paonta Sahib; therefore, the mere fact that this
certificate was not collected from him does not mean that the
certificate is false. He categorically affirmed the correctness of the
certificate by saying that it bears his signature. Thus, not much
advantage can be derived by the defence from the part of his
testimony wherein he stated that he did not know from where the
certificate was taken by the police.
28. Siphai Mahta (DW1) stated that he had been running a
shop at Ranbaxy Chowk since 2004. There are two shops adjacent
to his shop, which are occupied by Sonu Motors. There was no tea
shop adjacent to his shop. The police never visited the premises. He
P a g e | 34
2025:HHC:19717stated in his cross-examination that the father of the accused used
to run a Kariyana Shop at Taruwala, and he used to purchase goods
on a credit basis. He produced the registration certificate
(Ext. D1/DW1) of his shop, which shows the location of his shop as
Kedarpur near Sabu. He denied that the accused was running a tea
stall at Ranbaxy Chowk. He admitted that he had appeared in the
Court because the father of the accused, Mahinder Singh, used to
give goods on a credit basis to him.
29. This witness admitted that he had appeared in the Court
because the father of the accused used to supply the goods to him
on credit. Learned Trial Court had rightly held that the credibility
of this witness was suspect because of this admission, and no
reliance could be placed upon his testimony. Further, the
registration certificate of his shop shows the place of business as
near Sabu, which is not shown to be the place of incident;
therefore, his testimony could not have been used to reject the
prosecution’s case.
30. In any case, the ownership of the shop is not material.
The police officials categorically stated that they went to the tea
stall where the accused was present, who tried to run away after
P a g e | 35
2025:HHC:19717seeing the police; therefore, the presence of the accused in the tea
stall was duly established by their testimonies. The recovery was
effected from the cupboard kept inside the tea stall. Since the
accused was present in the tea stall; hence, he was in possession of
the cupboard and the articles lying inside it. Thus, even if the
ownership of the shop was not established, the accused cannot
claim acquittal in the present case.
31. HC Dalip Singh Tomar (PW2) admitted in his cross-
examination that the contraband was recovered from an open
wooden cabinet. It was submitted that the recovery from the open
shelf/cabinet does not show the exclusive possession of the
accused. This submission cannot be accepted. The cupboard was
accessible to the accused, and it was in his possession. Learned
Trial Court had rightly pointed out that the presumption of
possession can be drawn from the recovery as per Sections 35 and
54 of the NDPS Act. The accused simply denied the possession and
did not claim that it was put by some other person without his
knowledge; therefore, the plea taken by him that the substance was
not in possession cannot be accepted.
P a g e | 36
2025:HHC:19717
32. It was suggested to the police officials that they had
falsely implicated the accused. The accused also claimed that he
was taken to the police station, where he was made to put his
signature on some blank papers, and thereafter, he was taken to
the spot where the photographs were taken. He has not explained
why the police should falsely implicate him. He did not attribute
any enmity to the police officials and learned Trial Court had
rightly discarded this defence of the accused.
33. Learned Trial Court held that the testimonies of the
police officials cannot be discarded because they happened to be
police officials. The presumption that an official act is done
regularly applies to the acts done by police officials as well. It was
laid down by this Court in Budh Ram Versus State of H.P. 2020
Cri.L.J.4254 that the testimonies of the police officials cannot be
discarded on the ground that they belong to the police force. It was
observed:
“11. It is a settled proposition of law that the sole testimony
of the police official, which if otherwise is reliable,
trustworthy, cogent and duly corroborated by other
admissible evidence, cannot be discarded only on the ground
that he is a police official and may be interested in the
success of the case. There is also no rule of law, which lays
down that no conviction can be recorded on the testimony of
a police officer even if such evidence is otherwise
P a g e | 37
2025:HHC:19717trustworthy. Rule of prudence may require more careful
scrutiny of their evidence. Wherever, the evidence of a police
officer, after careful scrutiny, inspires confidence and is
found to be trustworthy and reliable, can form the basis of
conviction and the absence of some independent witness of
the locality does not in any way affect the creditworthiness
of the prosecution case. No infirmity attaches to the
testimony of the police officers merely because they belong
to the police force.”
34. Similar is the judgment in Karamjit Singh versus State
AIR 2003 S.C 3011 wherein it was held:
“The testimony of police personnel should be treated in the
same manner as a testimony of any other witness and there
is no principle of law that without corroboration by
independent witnesses, their testimony cannot be relied
upon. The presumption that a person acts honestly applies,
as much in favour of police personnel as of other persons
and it is not a proper judicial approach to distrust and
suspect them without good grounds. It will all depend upon
the facts and circumstances of each case and no principle of
general application can be laid down.” (Emphasis supplied)
35. This position was reiterated in Sathyan v. State of Kerala,
2023 SCC OnLine SC 986 wherein it was observed:
22. Conviction being based solely on the evidence of police
officials is no longer an issue on which the jury is out. In
other words, the law is well settled that if the evidence of
such a police officer is found to be reliable, trustworthy then
basing the conviction thereupon, cannot be questioned, and
the same shall stand on firm ground. This Court in Pramod
Kumar v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) 2013 (6) SCC 588
13. This Court, after referring to State of U.P. v. Anil
Singh [1988 Supp SCC 686: 1989 SCC (Cri) 48], State (Govt.
of NCT of Delhi) v. Sunil [(2001) 1 SCC 652: 2001 SCC (Cri)
248] and Ramjee Rai v. State of Bihar [(2006) 13 SCC
P a g e | 38
2025:HHC:19717
229 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 626] has laid down recently
in Kashmiri Lal v. State of Haryana [(2013) 6 SCC 595: AIR
2013 SCW 3102] that there is no absolute command of law
that the police officers cannot be cited as witnesses and
their testimony should always be treated with suspicion.
Ordinarily, the public at large shows their disinclination
to come forward to become witnesses. If the testimony of
the police officer is found to be reliable and trustworthy,
the court can definitely act upon the same. If, in the
course of scrutinising the evidence, the court finds the
evidence of the police officer as unreliable and
untrustworthy, the court may disbelieve him but it should
not do so solely on the presumption that a witness from
the Department of Police should be viewed with distrust.
This is also based on the principle that the quality of the
evidence weighs over the quantity of evidence.
23. Referring to State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) v. Sunil 2001 (1)
SCC 652, in Kulwinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2015) 6 SCC
674 this court held that: —
“23. … That apart, the case of the prosecution cannot be
rejected solely on the ground that independent witnesses
have not been examined when, on the perusal of the
evidence on record the Court finds that the case put forth
by the prosecution is trustworthy. When the evidence of
the official witnesses is trustworthy and credible, there is
no reason not to rest the conviction on the basis of their
evidence.”
24. We must note, that in the former it was observed: —
“21… At any rate, the court cannot start with the
presumption that the police records are untrustworthy.
As a proposition of law, the presumption should be the
other way around. That official acts of the police have
been regularly performed is a wise principle of
presumption and recognised even by the legislature… If
the court has any good reason to suspect the truthfulness
of such records of the police the court could certainly take
into account the fact that no other independent person
P a g e | 39
2025:HHC:19717was present at the time of recovery. But it is not a legally
approvable procedure to presume the police action as
unreliable to start with, nor to jettison such action merely
for the reason that police did not collect signatures of
independent persons in the documents made
contemporaneous with such actions.”
25. Recently, this Court in Mohd. Naushad v. State (NCT of
Delhi) 2023 SCC OnLine 784 had observed that the
testimonies of police witnesses, as well as pointing out
memos do not stand vitiated due to the absence of
independent witnesses.
26. It is clear from the above propositions of law, as
reproduced and referred to, that the testimonies of official
witnesses can nay be discarded simply because independent
witnesses were not examined. The correctness or
authenticity is only to be doubted on “any good reason”
which, quite apparently is missing from the present case. No
reason is forthcoming on behalf of the Appellant to
challenge the veracity of the testimonies of PW – 1 and PW –
2, which the courts below have found absolutely to be
inspiring in confidence. Therefore, basing the conviction on
the basis of testimony of the police witnesses as undertaken
by the trial court and is confirmed by the High Court vide the
impugned judgment, cannot be faulted with.”
36. The learned Trial Court found the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses credible. It was laid down by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Goverdhan (supra) that the Appellate Court
should not interfere with the findings regarding the credibility of
the witnesses recorded by the learned Trial Court unless there is
some illegality in it. It was observed: –
“83. The trial court, after recording the testimony of the
PW-10, and on consideration of the same, found her
P a g e | 40
2025:HHC:19717evidence trustworthy and credible. We see no reason to
question the assessment about the credibility of the witness
by the Trial Court, which had the advantage of seeing and
hearing the witness and all other witnesses. Nothing has
been brought to our notice of any serious illegality or breach
of fundamental law to warrant taking a different view of the
evidence of PW-10.
In this regard, we may keep in mind the valuable
observations made by this Court in Jagdish Singh v. Madhuri
Devi, (2008) 10 SCC 497, in the following words:
“28. At the same time, however, the appellate court is
expected, nay bound, to bear in mind a finding
recorded by the trial court on oral evidence. It should
not forget that the trial court had an advantage and
opportunity of seeing the demeanour of witnesses
and, hence, the trial court’s conclusions should not
normally be disturbed. No doubt, the appellate court
possesses the same powers as the original court, but
they have to be exercised with proper care, caution
and circumspection. When a finding of fact has been
recorded by the trial court mainly on appreciation of
oral evidence, it should not be lightly disturbed unless
the approach of the trial court in the appraisal of
evidence is erroneous, contrary to well-established
principles of law or unreasonable.
29. …………………………………..
30. In Sara Veeraswami v. Talluri Narayya [(1947-48) 75
IA 252: AIR 1949 PC 32] the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council, after referring to relevant decisions on
the point, stated [Quoting from Watt v. Thomas, [1947] 1
All ER 582, pp. 583 H-584 A.] : (IA p. 255)
“… but if the evidence as a whole can reasonably
be regarded as justifying the conclusion arrived
at at the trial, and especially if that conclusion
has been arrived at on conflicting testimony by a
tribunal which saw and heard the witnesses, the
P a g e | 41
2025:HHC:19717appellate court will bear in mind that it has not
enjoyed this opportunity and that the view of
the trial Judge as to where credibility lies is
entitled to great weight. This is not to say that
the Judge of the first instance can be treated as
infallible in determining which side is telling the
truth or is refraining from exaggeration. Like
other tribunals, he may go wrong on a question
of fact, but it is a cogent circumstance that a
Judge of first instance, when estimating the
value of verbal testimony, has the advantage
(which is denied to courts of appeal) of having
the witnesses before him and observing how
their evidence is given.”
37. Nothing was shown in the cross-examination of the
prosecution’s witnesses to shake their credibility, and the finding
of the learned Trial Court regarding the credibility of the witnesses
is to be accepted as correct.
38. It was submitted that the case property was not
produced before the learned Magistrate, which is violative of the
mandatory provisions of Section 52A of the NDPS Act. This
submission is not acceptable. It was laid down in Sandeep Kumar Vs
State of H.P., 2022 Law Suits (HP) 149, that the provisions of Section
52-A of the NDPS Act is not mandatory and its non-compliance is
not fatal to the prosecution case. It was observed:-
“24. It has also been strenuously argued on behalf of the
appellants that the investigating agency had failed to comply
with the provisions of Section 52-A of the NDPS Act and thus
P a g e | 42
2025:HHC:19717cast a shadow of doubt on its story. The contention raised on
behalf of the appellants is that the rules framed for
investigations under the NDPS Act are mandatory and have
to be strictly followed. Neither the required sample was
taken on the spot, nor were the samples preserved by
complying with Section 52-A of the Act. It has been argued
that compliance with Section 52-A of the Act is
mandatory…..
xxxxxx
27. The precedent relied upon on behalf of the appellants,
however, did not lay down the law that non-compliance
with Section 52-A of the Act is fatal to the prosecution’s case
under the NDPS Act. On the other hand, in State of Punjab vs.
Makhan Chand, 2004 (3) SCC 453, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, while dealing with the question of the effect of non-
compliance of Section 52-A, has held as under: –
10. This contention, too, has no substance for two
reasons. Firstly, Section 52A, as the marginal note
indicates, deals with the “disposal of seized narcotic
drugs and psychotropic substances”. Under Sub-
section (1), the Central Government, by notification in
the Official Gazette, is empowered to specify certain
narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances having
regard to the hazardous nature, vulnerability to theft,
substitution, constraints of proper storage space and
such other relevant considerations, so that even if
they are material objects seized in a criminal case,
they could be disposed of after following the
procedure prescribed in Sub-sections (2) & (3). If the
procedure prescribed in Sub-sections (2) & (3) of
Section 52A is complied with and upon an application,
the Magistrate issues the certificate contemplated by
Subsection (2), then Sub-section (4) provides that,
notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in
the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 or the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973, such inventory, photographs of
narcotic drugs or substances and any list of samples
drawn under Sub-section (2) of Section 52A as
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2025:HHC:19717
certified by the Magistrate, would be treated as
primary evidence in respect of the offence. Therefore,
Section 52A(1) does not empower the Central
Government to lay down the procedure for the search
of an accused but only deals with the disposal of seized
narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.
11. Secondly, when the very same standing orders came up
for consideration in Khet Singh v. Union of India, 2002 (4) SCC
380, this Court took the view that they are merely intended
to guide the officers to see that a fair procedure is adopted by
the Officer-in-Charge of the investigation. It was also held
that they were not inexorable rules, as there could be
circumstances in which it may not be possible for the seizing
officer to prepare the mahazar at the spot if it is a chance
recovery, where the officer may not have the facility to
prepare the seizure mahazar at the spot itself. Hence, we do
not find any substance in this contention.”
39. Therefore, the prosecution’s case cannot be discarded
due to the non-compliance with the provisions of Section 52A of
the NDPS Act.
40. It was submitted that the seal was not produced before
the Court, and the same is fatal to the prosecution’s case. This
submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by this Court in
Fredrick George v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2002 SCC OnLine HP 73:
2002 Cri LJ 4600 that there is no requirement to produce the seal
before the Court. It was observed at page 4614:
“62. It is a fact that the seals used for sealing and re-sealing
the bulk case property and the samples have not been
produced at the trial. In Manjit Singh‘s case (2001 (2) Cri LJ
P a g e | 44
2025:HHC:19717(CCR) 74) (supra), while dealing with the effect of non-
production of the seal, this Court held as under:
“In the absence of any mandatory provision in the
law/Rules of procedure relating to sealing of the case
property, that the seal used in sealing the case property
must be produced at the trial, it cannot be said that
failure to produce such seal at the trial will be fatal to the
case of the prosecution. It will depend on the facts and
circumstances of each case whether, by non-production
of the seal at the trial, any doubt is raised about the safe
custody of the case property or not.”
63. In view of the above position in law and the conclusion
we have already arrived at hereinabove that there is
unchallenged and trustworthy evidence that the case
property was not tampered with at any stage, the non-
production of the seals used for sealing and re-sealing of the
bulk case property of the samples is also of no help to the
accused.”
41. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Varinder Kumar Versus State of H.P. 2019 (3) SCALE 50 that failure to
produce the seal in the Court is not fatal. It was observed:-
“6. We have considered the respective submissions. PW10 is
stated to have received secret information at 2.45 P.M. on
31.03.1995. He immediately reduced it into writing and sent
the same to PW8, Shri Jaipal Singh, Dy. S.P., C.I.D., Shimla. At
3.05 P.M., PW7, Head Constable Surender Kumar, stopped
PW5, Naresh Kumar and another independent witness,
Jeevan Kumar, travelling together, whereafter the appellant
was apprehended at 3.30 P.M. with two Gunny Bags on his
Scooter, which contained varying quantities of ‘charas’.
PW8, Shri Jaipal Singh, Dy.S.P., C.I.D., Shimla, who had
arrived by then, gave notice to the appellant and obtained his
consent for carrying out the search. Two samples of 25 gms.
Each were taken from the two Gunny Bags and sealed with
the seal ‘S’ and given to PW5. PW2, Jaswinder Singh, the
P a g e | 45
2025:HHC:19717Malkhana Head Constable, resealed it with the seal ‘P’. The
conclusion of the Trial Court that the seal had not been
produced in the Court is, therefore, perverse in view of the
two specimen seal impressions having been marked as
Exhibits PH and PK. It is not the case of the appellant that the
seals were found tampered with in any manner.”
42. It was specifically held in Varinder Kumar (supra) that
when the sample seals were produced before the Court, the
conclusion of the Trial Court that the seals were produced before
the Court was perverse.
43. In the present case, the seal impression was obtained on
the NCB-I form. The sample seals were also produced before the
Court. The Court had the sample seals and the NCB-I form to
compare the seal impression with the seal impression put on the
parcels. Learned Trial Court noticed during the examination of PSI
Mukul Sharma (PW8) that the parcel was sealed with seal
impressions ‘T’ and ‘H’ at four places and seal impression ‘FSL’ at
four places, and the seals were intact. Thus, the learned Trial Court
satisfied itself regarding the correctness of the seal impression,
and the failure to produce the seal cannot be held to be material.
44. It was submitted that the integrity of the case property
has not been established. This submission is also not acceptable.
Report of analysis (Ext. PW8/N) shows that one sealed parcel
P a g e | 46
2025:HHC:19717
bearing four seals of ‘T’ and four seals of seal ‘H’ was received in
the laboratory. The seals were intact and were tallied with the
specimen seals signed by the forwarding authority and the seal
impression on the form NCB-I. This report establishes the integrity
of the case property. It was held in Baljit Sharma vs. State of H.P
2007 HLJ 707, that where the report of analysis shows that the seals
were intact, the case of the prosecution that the case property
remained intact is to be accepted as correct. It was observed:
“A perusal of the report of the expert Ex.PW8/A shows that
the samples were received by the expert in a safe manner,
and the sample seal was separately sent, tallied with the
specimen impression of a seal taken separately. Thus, there
was no tampering with the seal, and the seal impressions
were separately taken and sent to the expert also.”
45. Similar is the judgment in Hardeep Singh vs State of
Punjab 2008(8) SCC 557, wherein it was held:
“It has also come to evidence that to date, the parcels of the
sample were received by the Chemical Examiner, and the
seal put on the said parcels was intact. That itself proves
and establishes that there was no tampering with the
previously mentioned seal in the sample at any stage, and
the sample received by the analyst for chemical
examination contained the same opium, which was
recovered from the possession of the appellant. In that view
of the matter, a delay of about 40 days in sending the
samples did not and could not have caused any prejudice to
the appellant.”
P a g e | 47
2025:HHC:19717
46. In State of Punjab vs Lakhwinder Singh 2010 (4) SCC 402,
the High Court had concluded that there could have been
tampering with the case property since there was a delay of seven
days in sending the report to FSL. It was laid down by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court that the case property was produced in the Court,
and there was no evidence of tampering. Seals were found to be
intact, which would rule out the possibility of tampering. It was
observed:
“The prosecution has been able to establish and prove that
the aforesaid bags, which were 35 in number, contained
poppy husk, and accordingly, the same were seized after
taking samples therefrom, which were properly sealed. The
defence has not been able to prove that the aforesaid seizure
and seal put in the samples were in any manner tampered
with before it was examined by the Chemical Examiner.
There was merely a delay of about seven days in sending the
samples to the Forensic Examiner, and it is not proved as to
how the aforesaid delay of seven days has affected the said
examination, when it could not be proved that the seal of the
sample was in any manner tampered with. The seal having
been found intact at the time of the examination by the
Chemical Examiner and the said fact having been recorded in
his report, a mere observation by the High Court that the
case property might have been tampered with, in our
opinion, is based on surmises and conjectures and cannot
take the place of proof.
17. We may at this stage refer to a decision of this Court in
Hardip Singh v. State of Punjab reported in (2008) 8 SCC 557 in
which there was a delay of about 40 days in sending the
sample to the laboratory after the same was seized. In the
said decision, it was held that in view of cogent and reliable
P a g e | 48
2025:HHC:19717evidence that the opium was seized and sealed and that the
samples were intact till they were handed over to the
Chemical Examiner, the delay itself was held to be not fatal
to the prosecution case. In our considered opinion, the ratio
of the aforesaid decision squarely applies to the facts of the
present case in this regard.
18. The case property was produced in the Court, and there is
no evidence to show that the same was ever tampered with.”
47. Similar is the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Surinder Kumar vs State of Punjab (2020) 2 SCC 563, wherein it was
held: –
“10. According to learned senior counsel for the appellant,
Joginder Singh, ASI, to whom Yogi Raj, SHO (PW-3), handed
over the case property for producing the same before the
Illaqa Magistrate and who returned the same to him after
such production was not examined, as such, link evidence,
was incomplete. In this regard, it is to be noticed that Yogi
Raj, SHO, handed over the case property to Joginder Singh,
ASI, for production before the Court. After producing the
case property before the Court, he returned the case property
to Yogi Raj, SHO (PW-3), with the seals intact. It is also to be
noticed that Joginder Singh, ASI, was not in possession of the
seals of either the investigating officer or Yogi Raj, SHO. He
produced the case property before the Court on 13.09.1996
vide application Ex.P-13. The concerned Judicial Magistrate
of First Class, after verifying the seals on the case property,
passed the order Ex.P-14 to the effect that since there was no
judicial malkhana at Abohar, the case property was ordered
to be kept in safe custody, in Police Station Khuian Sarwar,
till further orders. Since Joginder Singh, ASI, was not in
possession of the seals of either the SHO or the Investigating
Officer, the question of tampering with the case property by
him did not arise at all.
11. Further, he has returned the case property, after
P a g e | 49
2025:HHC:19717production of the same, before the Illaqa Magistrate, with
the seals intact, to Yogi Raj, SHO. In that view of the matter,
the Trial Court and the High Court have rightly held that the
non-examination of Joginder Singh did not, in any way,
affect the case of the prosecution. Further, it is evident from
the report of the Chemical Examiner, Ex.P-10, that the sample
was received with seals intact and that the seals on the sample
tallied with the sample seals. In that view of the matter, the
chain of evidence was complete.” (Emphasis supplied)
48. Therefore, the submission that the integrity of the case
property has not been established cannot be accepted.
49. Thus, the learned Trial Court had rightly held that the
prosecution’s case was proved beyond a reasonable doubt for the
commission of an offence punishable under Section 15 of the NDPS
Act, and the conviction recorded by the learned Trial Court cannot
be faulted.
50. Learned Trial Court sentenced the accused to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for five years and to pay a fine of
₹25,000/-. The accused was found in possession of 5 kg 700 grams
of poppy straw. As per the notification issued by the Central
Government, the small quantity of poppy straw has been defined as
1000 kg, whereas the commercial quantity has been defined as 50
kg, which means that a person possessing 50 kg can be sentenced
to 10 years imprisonment. It was laid down by the Hon’ble
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2025:HHC:19717
Supreme Court in Uggarsain v. State of Haryana, (2023) 8 SCC 109:
2023 SCC OnLine SC 755 that the Courts have to apply the principle
of proportionality while imposing sentence. It was observed at page
113:
10. This Court has, time and again, stated that the principle
of proportionality should guide the sentencing process.
In Ahmed Hussein Vali Mohammed Saiyed v. State of
Gujarat [Ahmed Hussein Vali Mohammed Saiyed v. State of
Gujarat, (2009) 7 SCC 254 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 368 : (2009) 8
SCR 719] it was held that the sentence should “deter the
criminal from achieving the avowed object to (sic break the)
law,” and the endeavour should be to impose an “appropriate
sentence.” The Court also held that imposing “meagre
sentences” merely on account of lapse of time would be
counterproductive. Likewise, in Jameel v. State of
U.P. [Jameel v. State of U.P., (2010) 12 SCC 532 : (2011) 1 SCC
(Cri) 582 : (2009) 15 SCR 712] while advocating that
sentencing should be fact dependent exercises, the Court
also emphasised that : (Jameel case [Jameel v. State of U.P.,
(2010) 12 SCC 532 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 582 : (2009) 15 SCR 712],
SCC p. 535, para 15)
“15. … the law should adopt the corrective machinery or
deterrence based on a factual matrix. By deft modulation, the
sentencing process be stern where it should be, and tempered
with mercy where it warrants to be. The facts and given
circumstances in each case, the nature of the crime, the
manner in which it was planned and committed, the motive
for commission of the crime, the conduct of the accused, the
nature of weapons used and all other attending
circumstances are relevant facts which would enter into the
area of consideration.”
(emphasis supplied)
11. Again, in Guru Basavaraj v. State of Karnataka [Guru
Basavaraj v. State of Karnataka, (2012) 8 SCC 734: (2012) 4 SCC
P a g e | 51
2025:HHC:19717
(Civ) 594 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 972 : (2012) 8 SCR 189] the Court
stressed that: (SCC p. 744, para 33)
“33. … It is the duty of the court to see that an appropriate
sentence is imposed, regard being had to the commission of
the crime and its impact on the social order”
(emphasis supplied)
and that sentencing includes “adequate punishment”. In B.G.
Goswami v. Delhi Admn. [B.G. Goswami v. Delhi Admn., (1974)
3 SCC 85: 1973 SCC (Cri) 796 : (1974) 1 SCR 222], the Court
considered the issue of punishment and observed that
punishment is designed to protect society by deterring
potential offenders as well as prevent the guilty party from
repeating the offence; it is also designed to reform the
offender and reclaim him as a law-abiding citizen for the
good of the society as a whole. Reformatory, deterrent and
punitive aspects of punishment thus play their due part in
judicial thinking while determining the question of
awarding appropriate sentences.
12. In Sham Sunder v. Puran [Sham Sunder v. Puran, (1990) 4
SCC 731: 1991 SCC (Cri) 38: 1990 Supp (1) SCR 662], the
appellant-accused was convicted under Section 304 Part I
IPC. The appellate court reduced the sentence to the term of
imprisonment already undergone, i.e. six months. However,
it enhanced the fine. This Court ruled that the sentence
awarded was inadequate. Proceeding further, it opined that :
(SCC p. 737, para 8)
“8. … The court, in fixing the punishment for any particular
crime, should take into consideration the nature of the
offence, the circumstances in which it was committed, and
the degree of deliberation shown by the offender. The
measure of punishment should be proportionate to the
gravity of the offence. The sentence imposed by the High
Court appears to be so grossly and entirely inadequate as to
involve a failure of justice. We are of the opinion that to meet
the ends of justice, the sentence has to be enhanced.”
(emphasis supplied)
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2025:HHC:19717
This Court enhanced the sentence to one of rigorous
imprisonment for a period of five years. This Court has
emphasised, in that sentencing depends on the facts, and
the adequacy is determined by factors such as “the nature of
crime, the manner in which it is committed, the propensity
shown and the brutality reflected” [Ravada Sasikala v. State of
A.P. [Ravada Sasikala v. State of A.P., (2017) 4 SCC 546: (2017) 2
SCC (Cri) 436: (2017) 2 SCR 379]]. Other decisions, like: State
of M.P. v. Bablu [State of M.P. v. Bablu, (2014) 9 SCC 281 :
(2014) 6 SCC (Cri) 1 : (2014) 9 SCR 467]; Hazara Singh v. Raj
Kumar [Hazara Singh v. Raj Kumar, (2013) 9 SCC 516 : (2014) 1
SCC (Cri) 159 : (2013) 5 SCR 979] and State of Punjab v. Saurabh
Bakshi [State of Punjab v. Saurabh Bakshi, (2015) 5 SCC 182 :
(2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 751 : (2015) 3 SCR 590] too, have stressed on
the significance and importance of imposing appropriate,
“adequate” or “proportionate” punishments.
51. If this principle is applied to the present case, the
sentence of five years is excessive. Learned Trial Court noticed that
the appropriate sentence should be proportionate to the
contraband recovered but failed to specify how the possession of 5
kg will be proportionate to five years when possession of 50 kg can
lead to the imprisonment of 10 years, therefore, the sentence
imposed by learned Trial Court is to be interfered with.
52. The accused has been in custody since 02.09.2023.
Hence, in these circumstances, the accused is sentenced to undergo
imprisonment already undergone by him and pay a fine of
₹10,000/-, and in default of payment of fine, to further undergo
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2025:HHC:19717
simple imprisonment for three months for the commission of an
offence punishable under Section 15 of the NDPS Act.
53. In view of the above, the present appeal is partly allowed
and the appellant/accused is sentenced to undergo imprisonment
for the period already undergone by him and to pay a fine of
₹ 10,000/- and in default of payment of fine to further undergo
simple imprisonment for three months for the commission of an
offence punishable under Section 15 of NDPS Act. Subject to this
modification, the rest of the judgment passed by the learned Trial
Court is upheld.
54. The modified warrant be prepared accordingly.
55. Records of the learned Trial Court be sent back
forthwith, along with a copy of this judgment.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
25th June, 2025
(Saurav pathania)