Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 29.7.2025 vs Sukh Ram on 5 August, 2025
2025:HHC:26120
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Appeal No. 282 of 2012
.
Reserved on: 29.7.2025
Date of Decision: 05.08.2025.
State of H.P. ...Appellant
Versus
Sukh Ram
Coram
r to ...Respondent
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes.
For the Appellant : Mr. Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate
General.
For the Respondent : Ms. Akansha Chauhan, Advocate,
vice Mr. Anubhav Chopra,
Advocate.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The present appeal is directed against the judgment
dated 22.3.2012, passed by learned Special Judge (Forests),
Shimla, H.P. (learned Trial Court), vide which the respondent
(accused before the learned Trial Court) was acquitted of the
commission of an offence punishable under Section 13(2) read
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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with Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
(PC Act). (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same
.
manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for
convenience.)
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
appeal are that the police presented a challan against the
accused before the learned Trial Court for the commission of an
offence punishable under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)
(e) of the PC Act. It was alleged that a preliminary inquiry was
conducted against Sukh Ram Chauhan, Deputy Director of
Health Services, and it was found that an amount of ₹16,50,000
was deposited in the name of his son Chetan Chauhan, at B.R.
Ambedkar Medical College, Bangalore, for admission into MBBS.
Sukh Ram Chauhan admitted the deposit of ₹1,42,000/- and
claimed that the remaining amount was deposited by some
person to falsely implicate him. The information was sought
from the College and it was found that an amount of $ 50,000/-
U.S. Dollars or equivalent was required to be deposited for
admission against the management seat. Sukh Ram Chauhan
claimed an income of ₹2.00 lacs per annum from his ancestral
land, whereas Tehsildar, Bilaspur, issued a report that the
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income from the ancestral land was ₹21,750/- per annum from
1997 till 2001. The accused could not explain the deposit of
.
₹16,50,000/- and took a false defence that this amount was
deposited by some unknown person to implicate him. Hence,
FIR (Ex.PW6/A) was registered in the Police Station. Daulat Ram
(PW7) investigated the matter. He seized the photocopy of the
bank challan (Ex.PW2/A) vide memo (Ex.PW7/A). He also seized
the record of the admission of Chetan Chauhan vide memo
(Ex.PW1/A). He recorded the statements of witnesses as per their
version. After the completion of the investigation, the challan
was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court.
3. Learned Trial Court charged the accused of the
commission of an offence punishable under Section 13(2) read
with Section 13(1)(e)of the PC Act, to which he pleaded not guilty
and claimed to be tried.
4. The prosecution examined seven witnesses to prove
its case. Sarla (PW1) was working as a Clerk in Dr. B.R. Ambedkar
Medical College, who produced the record. Chikkamuthaiah
(PW2) was posted as a cashier and proved the deposit of
₹16,50,000/-. S. Gurrappaji (PW3) is the Chairman of Dr. B.R.
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Ambedkar Trust and proved that Chetan Chauhan had taken
admission in the College. Siddappaji (PW4) produced the
.
requisitioned record. V.M. Chinnaswami (PW5) proved the
deposit of the amount. Vinod Kumar (PW6) signed the FIR.
Daulat Ram (PW7) conducted the investigation.
5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section
313 of Cr.P.C., admitted that he was posted as Deputy Director,
Health Services in the year 1997 and was promoted as Director,
Health Services. He admitted that his son had taken admission
in the MBBS Course in Dr. B.R. Ambedkar Medical College,
Bangalore. He denied that he had given any undertaking
regarding the payment of the money. He stated that he had only
paid the tuition fee. He claimed that Chetan Chauhan had
appeared in the PET in Karnataka and got admission against the
SC/ST Quota. He admitted various amounts deposited in his
account. He stated that a false case was made against him. He
did not produce any defence evidence.
6. Learned Trial Court held that the payment of money
by the accused in the name of his son was not proved. The
prosecution witnesses relied upon the entry made in the account
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books, which is not sufficient to implicate the accused.
Therefore, the accused was acquitted.
.
7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the
learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal,
asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the
accused. The judgment is based on hypotheses, conjectures, and
surmises. The evidence was not appreciated in its proper
perspective. Statements of prosecution witnesses were
discarded without any reason. The accused had paid ₹13.00 lacs
as donation at the time of admission of his son. He had
furnished an undertaking to deposit the rest of the amount. It
was duly proved that the medical college had deposited ₹26 lakh
in the bank account, which included ₹ 13 lakh deposited by the
accused at the time of admission of his son. This evidence was
ignored by the learned Trial Court. Therefore, it was prayed that
the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the
learned Trial Court be set aside.
8. I have heard Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy
Advocate General, for the appellant-State and Ms. Aakansha
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Chauhan, learned vice counsel representing the
respondent/accused.
.
9. Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General,
for the appellant/State, submitted that the learned Trial Court
erred in acquitting the accused. It was duly proved by the
statements of prosecution witnesses that the money was
deposited on behalf of the son of the accused. The plea taken by
the accused that he had only deposited the tuition fee is not
correct because the admission of the petitioner’s son was made
against the management quota. It is highly improbable that any
person would deposit a huge amount of ₹13.00 lacs to implicate
the accused. Learned Trial Court erred in discarding the cogent
evidence led before it. Therefore, he prayed that the present
appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial
Court be set aside.
10. Ms. Aakansha Chauhan, learned vice counsel
representing the respondent/accused, submitted that there is no
proof of the payment of the actual amount made by the accused
or on his behalf. Mere entries in the books of accounts are not
sufficient to charge any person with the liability. In the present
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case, there is no evidence of the payment of the money on behalf
of the son of the accused in Dr. B.R. Ambedkar Medical College,
.
Bangalore. Learned Trial Court rightly held that the deposit of
₹26.00 lacs in the bank account is not sufficient and the
payment made by the accused or on his behalf was required to be
proved. Such evidence is missing. Hence, she prayed that the
present appeal be dismissed.
11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment
of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176:
(2025) 5 SCC 433 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of
acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading of
evidence, omission to consider the material evidence and no
reasonable person would have recorded the acquittal based on
the evidence led before the learned Trial Court. It was observed:
“11. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda
Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka 2024 SCC OnLine SC
4035, a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a
Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the
legal position with regard to the scope of interference in
an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus:
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“38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the
principles laid down by this Court governing the scope
of interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by
the State for challenging the acquittal of the accused.
recorded by the trial court.
39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar [Rajesh
Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471: (2022) 2 SCC(Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal position covering the
field after considering various earlier judgments and
held as below: (SCC pp. 482-83, para 29)
“29. After referring to a catena of judgments, thisCourt culled out the following general principles
regarding the powers of the appellate court while
dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittalin the following words: (Chandrappa
case [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC415: (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325], SCC p. 432, para 42)
’42. From the above decisions, in our considered
view, the following general principles regardingthe powers of the appellate court while dealing
with an appeal against an order of acquittal
emerge:
(1) An appellate court has full power to
review, reappreciate, and reconsider theevidence upon which the order of acquittal is
founded.
(2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, puts
no limitation, restriction or condition on the
exercise of such power and an appellate
court, on the evidence before it, may reach its
own conclusion, both on questions of fact and
law.
(3) Various expressions, such as “substantial
and compelling reasons”, “good and
sufficient grounds”, “very strong
circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”,
“glaring mistakes”, etc., are not intended to::: Downloaded on – 05/08/2025 21:26:28 :::CIS
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2025:HHC:26120curtail the extensive powers of an appellate
court in an appeal against acquittal. Such
phraseologies are more in the nature of
“flourishes of language” to emphasise the.
reluctance of an appellate court to interfere
with an acquittal than to curtail the power of
the court to review the evidence and to come
to its own conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in
mind that in case of acquittal, there is a
double presumption in favour of the
accused. Firstly, the presumption of
innocence is available to him under the
fundamental principle of criminal
jurisprudence that every person shall be
presumed to be innocent unless he is proved
guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly,
the accused, having secured his acquittal, the
presumption of his innocence is further
reinforced, reaffirmed, and strengthened by
the trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible
on the basis of the evidence on record, the
appellate court should not disturb the finding
of acquittal recorded by the trial court.”
40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka [H.D.
Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581: (2023) 3
SCC (Cri) 748] this Court summarised the principles
governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while
dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section
378CrPC as follows: (SCC p. 584, para 8)
“8. … 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further
strengthens the presumption of innocence.
8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal
against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral
and documentary evidence;
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8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal
against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence,
is required to consider whether the view taken by
the trial court is a possible view which could have
.
been taken on the basis of the evidence on record;
8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the
appellate court cannot overturn the order of
acquittal on the ground that another view was also
possible; and
8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order
of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the
only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis
of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the
accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and
no other conclusion was possible.”
41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope
of interference by an appellate court for reversing the
judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in
favour of the accused has to be exercised within the
four corners of the following principles:
41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from
patent perversity;
41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission
to consider material evidence on record; and
41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and
only the view consistent with the guilt of the accusedis possible from the evidence available on record.”
12. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position
that the interference with the finding of acquittal
recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by
the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers
from patent perversity; that the same is based on a
misreading/omission to consider material evidence on
record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and
only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is
possible from the evidence available on record.”
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13. A similar view was taken in Bhupatbhai Bachubhai
Chavda v. State of Gujarat, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 523, wherein it was
.
observed: –
“6. It is true that while deciding an appeal against
acquittal, the Appellate Court has to reappreciate the
evidence. After re-appreciating the evidence, the first
question that needs to be answered by the Appellate Court
is whether the view taken by the Trial Court was aplausible view that could have been taken based on the
evidence on record. Perusal of the impugned judgment of
the High Court shows that this question has not been
adverted to. The Appellate Court can interfere with theorder of acquittal only if it is satisfied after reappreciating
the evidence that the only possible conclusion was that
the guilt of the accused had been established beyond a
reasonable doubt. The Appellate Court cannot overturn
the order of acquittal only on the ground that anotherview is possible. In other words, the judgment of acquittal
must be found to be perverse. Unless the Appellate Court
records such a finding, no interference can be made withthe order of acquittal. The High Court has ignored the
well-settled principle that an order of acquittal furtherstrengthens the presumption of innocence of the accused.
After having perused the judgment, we find that the High
Court has not addressed itself to the main question.”
14. The present appeal has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
15. Sarla (PW1) stated in her cross-examination that, as
per the record, Chetan Chauhan had paid ₹92,000/- at the time
of admission. Any payment received by the institution is
evidenced by a receipt showing the amount received. She could
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not say who had paid the amount mentioned in the receipt
(Ex.PW1/B). She clarified in response to the Court’s question
.
that she did not deal with the collection and deposit of the
amount and had handed over the documents from the office.
16. The statement of this witness does not show that the
accused had made the payment. She categorically stated that she
was not dealing with the collection of the money and could not
tell who had paid the amount.
17. Sarla (PW1) identified the signatures of Manchaiya
and P.L. Nanjudaswami. This is not sufficient as the bare proof of
the signatures without the examination of the person will be
hearsay and insufficient to implicate any person. It was laid
down by the Bombay High Court in Sir Mohammed Yusuf v. D,
1961 SCC OnLine Bom 5: AIR 1968 Bom. 112 that the evidence of
the contents of the documents is hearsay unless the author is
examined. It was observed:
“20. …… The evidence of the contents contained in the
document is hearsay evidence unless the writer
thereof is examined before the Court. We, therefore,
hold that the attempt to prove the contents of the
document by proving the signature or the
handwriting of the author thereof is to set at nought
the well-recognised rule that hearsay evidence
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2025:HHC:26120by Halsbury at paragraph 533 at p. 294 (Halsbury’s
Law of England, 3rd Edition, Vol. 15) under the heading
‘Hearsay’. Says Halsbury :
.
“.. .. .. Statements in documents may also be
hearsay. So, if A had taken counsel’s opinion
before acting, the contents of the opinion would
be admissible for the same purpose, but not toprove the truth of any statement of fact
therein”.
21. In paragraph (534), Halsbury has discussed the
reasons for the rejection of hearsay evidence and says :
“The reasons advanced for the rejection of
hearsay are numerous, among them being the
irresponsibility of the original declarant, thedepreciation of truth in the process of
repetition, the opportunities for fraud which its
admission would offer, and the waste of time
involved in listening to idle rumour. The two
principal objections, however, appear to be thelack of an oath administered to the originator of
the statement, and the absence of opportunity to
cross-examine him.”
22. The Advocate General drew our attention to a
decision of the House of Lords in Maria Sturla v. Filippo
Freccia, (1879) 5 A.C. 623. In that case, the report of a
committee appointed by a public department in a
foreign state was admitted in evidence as a public
document. It was, however, held that it was not
admissible as evidence of all the facts stated therein.
In that case, the facts were: The document in question,
a report of certain persons called the Ginunta di
Marina at Genoa, was sought to be put in evidence for
the purpose of proving that person who was formerly
consul for the Genoese Republic in London, and the
succession to whose daughter, Mrs Brown, was in
question, was a native of Quarto near Genoa and at the
time that report was made, aged about forty-five
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years. The document was tendered for that purpose
and for that purpose only.
23.It was conceded that the report was an authentic
.
public document of the Genoese Government. The
statements, however, contained in the report were not
based on the evidence of any of the relatives of the
consul at Genoa. The information contained therein
did not appear to have been received from any member
of Mangini’s family. One of the well-recognised
exceptions under the English Law of Evidence to the
reception of hearsay evidence is the evidence relating
to pedigree. The only question, which their Lordships
of the House of Lords were considering was, whether
the contents of the report fell within the purview of
the above exception and their Lordships held that it
did not, because the statements contained in the
report were not based on the evidence given before the
dispute started by any of the members of the
deceased’s family. We are not concerned with that part
of the decision of the House of Lords in the present
case. The point to be noted is that the statements
contained in the report were treated as hearsay, and
since they did not fall within the well-recognised
exceptions, they were excluded from evidence. To
conclude this part of the discussion, we hold, in the
first place, that what has been formally proved is the
signature of Abreo and not the writing of the body of
the document at Ex. 28 and secondly, that even if the
entire document is held formally proved, that does not
amount to a proof of the truth of the contents of the
document. The only person competent to give
evidence on the truthfulness of the contents of the
document was Abreo.”
18. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
J.D. Jain v. State Bank of India, (1982) 1 SCC 143, that the
statement of a witness made to a person, who is not called as
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a witness is hearsay and inadmissible when the object of the
evidence is to establish the truth of what is contained in the
.
statement. It was observed: –
“20. The next question is, is the evidence in the
domestic enquiry really hearsay, as held by the
Tribunal?
21. The word ‘hearsay’ is used in various senses.
Sometimes it means whatever a person is heard tosay; sometimes it means whatever a person declares
on the information given by someone else. (See
Stephen on Law of Evidence).
22. The Privy Council in the case of Subramaniam v.
Public Prosecutor, (1956) 1 WLR 965 observed:
“Evidence of a statement made to a witness
who is not himself called as a witness may or
may not be hearsay. It is hearsay andinadmissible when the object of the evidence is
to establish the truth of what is contained in the
statement. It is not hearsay and is admissiblewhen it is proposed to establish by the
evidence, not the truth of the statement, butthe fact that it was made. The fact that it was
made quite apart from its truth is frequently
relevant in considering the mental state andconduct thereafter of the witness or some other
persons in whose presence these statements
are made.”
19. In Madholal Sindhu v. Asian Assurance Co. Ltd., 1945
SCC OnLine Bom 44= AIR 1954 Bom 305, the documents were
proved by examining the persons acquainted with the
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handwriting of the person. This was held to be hearsay and
inadmissible. It was observed:
.
“As I have already observed, it was futile for Mr Somjee
to merely prove the signatures or the handwriting of the
persons who signed or wrote the various documentswithout calling the said persons, who were the only
persons who could depose to the correctness of the
contents of those Various documents. Whether
Deshpande, Paranjape or Jamnadas signed or wrote thevarious documents was not the only issue before me. If
that had been the only issue, the proof of the signatures
or the handwriting of Deshpande Paranjape or Jamnadas
would have been enough. What was in issue, however,before me was apart from Deshpande, Paranjape or
Jamnadas having signed or written those documents,
whether the contents of those various documents were
correct. This certainly could not be proved by Balkrishna
Bhagwan Deshmukh, who had no personal knowledgewhatever about the contents of those various documents. It
would have served no purpose whatsoever to admit those
documents in evidence with the reservation as suggested byMr. Taraporewalla. I was supported in this conclusion of
mine by the remarks of the appeal Court in – ’11 Bom HCR242 at p. 246, and I accordingly declined to admit in
evidence the said various documents in spite of Balkrishna
Bhagwan Deshmukh deposing before me that the saidvarious documents were signed by or were in the
handwriting of Deshpande, Paranjape or Jamnadas.”
(Emphasis supplied)
20. Therefore, the prosecution cannot derive any
advantage from her testimony.
21. Chikkamuthaiah (PW2) did not support the
prosecution case and was permitted to be cross-examined by the
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learned Pubic Prosecutor. He stated in cross-examination by the
accused that the amount was deposited in the account of
.
Principal, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar Medical College, Bangalore and he
could not say about the source. He is an employee of the bank,
and the money was not deposited with him or in his presence.
Therefore, his testimony also does not prove that the money was
deposited by the accused on behalf of his son.
22. S. Siddappaji (PW3) is the Chairman of Dr. B.R.
Ambedkar Trust. He stated that a student has to pay a fee of
₹92,000/- per year. He has to pay other charges and University
fee, Laboratory fee, hostel fee, etc. Chetan Chauhan had not paid
any amount except the tuition fee of ₹92,000/- and Hostel
charges. ₹26.00 lacs was not paid by Neetu Sood and Chetan
Chauhan to the Medical College. He was permitted to be cross-
examined by the learned Public Prosecutor. He admitted that the
receipt for the amount paid by the guardian of the student was
issued. He denied that he had handed over ₹26.00 lacs to his
cashier Chikkamuthaiah with a direction to deposit it in the bank
account. He stated in cross-examination by the accused that
Chetan Chauhan and Neetu Sood had not paid any amount in the
form of a contribution fee except the tuition fee and University
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charges. Neetu Sood and Chetan Chauhan had not paid the
amount of ₹26.00 lacs to him at any point in time. The receipt
.
register does not have any record of the payment of ₹26.00 lacs
by the students. He stated in reply to the Court question that the
amount deposited with the College is subject to the audit, and
the recognition of the College could have been cancelled in case
of receipt of the unaccounted money.
23. This witness has also categorically denied that the
accused had deposited the money. Hence, his testimony is not
sufficient to prove the prosecution’s case.
24. V.M. Chinnaswami (PW5) was working as a cashier in
Dr. B.R. Ambedkar Medical College, Bangalore. He stated that he
made an entry in the remittance register. The Chairman called
him and Manchiya and told them to deposit the amount at the
bank. Neetu Sood and Chetan Chauhan had made the payment of
₹13.00 lacs each. No receipt for the donation was issued. He and
Manchiya deposited ₹26.00 lacs with the bank. He stated in his
cross-examination by the accused that a receipt is issued for the
payment received by the College. The payment was not made to
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him or in his presence. The payment was handed over to him by
the Chairman.
.
25. The statement of this witness will not help the
prosecution. He categorically stated that the payment was not
made in his presence or to him. He was told about the payment
by the Chairman; however, the Chairman, S. Gurrappaji, denied
the receipt of any payment from the guardians of Neetu Sood
and Chetan Chauhan. Therefore, the statement of this witness is
not sufficient to conclude that the accused had made a payment
of ₹13.00 lacs to the Medical College for the admission of his son.
26. A heavy reliance was placed upon the entry
(Ex.PW5/A), which reads amount remitted to the bank by
Chairman, GCAMC ₹26.00 lacs, Neetu Sood/Chetan Chauhan. It
was submitted based upon this entry that the payment of ₹26.00
lacs was made on behalf of Neetu Sood and Chetan Chauhan.
This submission is not acceptable. Section 34 of the Indian
Evidence Act makes the entry in the books of account regularly
kept in the course of the business relevant. However, it also
provides that such an entry by itself is not sufficient to charge a
person with liability. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
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Court in CBI v. V.C. Shukla, (1998) 3 SCC 410 that a person cannot
be charged with criminal liability merely based on an entry
.
recorded in the books of account. It was observed: –
35. The probative value of the liability created by an entry
in the books of account came up for consideration
in Chandradhar Goswami v. Gauhati Bank Ltd. [AIR 1967 SC
1058 : (1967) 1 SCR 898: 37 Comp Cas 108] That case arose
out of a suit filed by Gauhati Bank against Chandradhar(the appellant therein) for recovery of a loan of Rs
40,000. In defence, he contended, inter alia, that no loan
was taken. To substantiate their claim, the Bank solely
relied upon a certified copy of the accounts maintained bythem under Section 4 of the Bankers’ Book Evidence Act,
1891 and contended that certified copies became prima
facie evidence of the existence of the original entries in
the accounts and were admissible to prove the payment ofthe loan given. The suit was decreed by the trial court, and
the appeal preferred against it was dismissed by the High
Court. In setting aside the decree this Court observed thatin the face of the positive case made out by Chandradhar
that he did not ever borrow any sum from the Bank, theBank had to prove the fact of such payment and could not
rely on mere entries in the books of account even if they
were regularly kept in the course of business in view ofthe clear language of Section 34 of the Act. This Court
further observed that where the entries were not
admitted, it was the duty of the Bank, if it relied on such
entries to charge any person with liability, to produce
evidence in support of the entries to show that the money
was advanced as indicated therein, and thereafter the
entries would be of use as corroborative evidence.
36. The same question came up for consideration before
different High Courts on a number of occasions, but to
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2025:HHC:26120of the judgments on which Mr Sibal relied. In M.S.
Yesuvadiyan v. P.S.A. Subba Naicker [AIR 1919 Mad 132: 52
IC 704], one of the learned Judges constituting the Bench.
had this to say:
“Section 34, Evidence Act, lays down that the
entries in books of account, regularly kept in the
course of business, are relevant, but such astatement will not alone be sufficient to charge any
person with liability. That merely means that the
plaintiff cannot obtain a decree by merely proving
the existence of certain entries in his books ofaccount, even though those books are shown to be
kept in the regular course of business. He will have
to show further by some independent evidence thatthe entries represent real and honest transactions
and that the moneys were paid in accordance with
those entries. The legislature, however, does not
require any particular form or kind of evidence in
addition to entries in books of account, and I take itthat any relevant facts which can be treated as
evidence within the meaning of the Evidence Act
would be sufficient corroboration of the evidencefurnished by entries in books of account if true.”
While concurring with the above observations, the other
learned Judge stated as under:
“If no other evidence besides the accounts were given,
however strongly those accounts may be supported by
the probabilities, and however strong may be the
evidence as to the honesty of those who kept them,
such consideration could not alone with reference to
Section 34, Evidence Act, be the basis of a decree.”
(emphasis supplied)
37. In Beni v. Bisan Dayal [AIR 1925 Nag 445: 89 IC 371] it
was observed that entries in books of account are not by
themselves sufficient to charge any person with liability,
the reason being that a man cannot be allowed to make
evidence for himself by what he chooses to write in his
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2025:HHC:26120
own books behind the back of the parties. There must be
independent evidence of the transaction to which the
entries relate, and in the absence of such evidence, no
.
relief can be given to the party who relies upon such
entries to support his claim against another. In Hira
Lal v. Ram Rakha [AIR 1953 Pepsu 113] the High Court,
while negativing a contention that it having been proved
that the books of account were regularly kept in the
ordinary course of business and that, therefore, all
entries therein should be considered to be relevant and to
have been proved, said that the rule as laid down in
Section 34 of the Act that entries in the books of account
regularly kept in the course of business are relevant
whenever they refer to a matter in which the Court has to
enquire was subject to the salient proviso that such
entries shall not alone be sufficient evidence to charge
any person with liability. It is not, therefore, enough
merely to prove that the books have been regularly kept in
the course of business and the entries therein are correct.
It is further incumbent upon the person relying upon
those entries to prove that they were in accordance with
facts.
38. The evidentiary value of entries relevant under
Section 34 was also considered in Hiralal Mahabir
Pershad [ILR (1967) 1 P&H 435]. I.D. Dua, J. (as he then
was) speaking for the Court, observed that such entries,
though relevant, were only corroborative evidence, and it
is to be shown further by some independent evidence that
the entries represent honest and real transactions and
that monies were paid in accordance with those entries.
39. A conspectus of the above decisions makes it evident
that even correct and authentic entries in books of
account cannot, without independent evidence of their
trustworthiness, fix a liability upon a person. Keeping in
view the above principles, even if we proceed on the
assumption that the entries made in MR 71/91 are correct
and the entries in the other books and loose sheets (which
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2025:HHC:26120
we have already found to be not admissible in evidence
under Section 34) are admissible under Section 9 of the
Act to support an inference about the former’s
.
correctness still those entries would not be sufficient to
charge Shri Advani and Shri Shukla with the accusations
levelled against them for there is not an iota of
independent evidence in support thereof. In that view of
the matter, we need not discuss, delve into or decide upon
the contention raised by Mr Altaf Ahmed in this regard.
Suffice it to say that the statements of the four witnesses,
who have admitted receipts of the payments as shown
against them in MR 71/91, can at best be proof of the
reliability of the entries so far as they are concerned and
not others. In other words, the statements of the above
witnesses cannot be independent evidence under Section
34 as against the above two respondents. So far as Shri
Advani is concerned, Section 34 would not come in aid of
the prosecution for another reason also. According to the
prosecution case itself, his name finds a place only in one
of the loose sheets (Sheet No. 8) and not in MR 71/91.
Resultantly, in view of our earlier discussion, Section 34
cannot at all be pressed into service against him.
27. Therefore, this entry by itself is insufficient to charge
the accused with any liability.
28. A heavy reliance was placed upon the undertakings
(Ex.PW1/A4 and Ex.PW1/A5) in which the accused had
undertaken to pay ₹2.00 lacs on or before 28.2.2001, ₹1.00 lac on
or before 1.2.2002, ₹1.00 lac on or before 1.2.2003 and ₹5.00 lacs
on or before 20.9.2000. This undertaking by itself is not
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sufficient in the absence of proof of the fact that the amount
mentioned in the undertaking was, in fact, paid.
.
29. Thus, the learned Trial Court had rightly held that
the prosecution version regarding the payment of ₹13.00 by the
petitioner to the Medical College for admission of his son was
not proved. This was a reasonable view which could have been
taken based on the material placed on record, and no
interference is required with it while deciding the appeal against
acquittal.
30. In view of the above, the present appeal fails and the
same is dismissed.
31. A copy of the judgment and the record of the learned
Trial Court be sent back forthwith.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
5th August 2025
(Chander)
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