Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 29Th May vs Himachal Pradesh National Law … on 16 June, 2025
Author: Jyotsna Rewal Dua
Bench: Jyotsna Rewal Dua
2025:HHC:18256
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
CWP No.1434 of 2024
Reserved on: 29th May, 2025
Decided on: 16th June, 2025
————————————————————————————-
Sanjay Singh .....Petitioner
Versus
Himachal Pradesh National Law University .....Respondent
————————————————————————————-
Coram
Ms. Justice Jyotsna Rewal Dua
Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes.
For the Petitioner: Mr. Prem Chand Verma and
Mr. Aakash Thakur, Advocates.
For the Respondent: Mr. Sai Amar Vivek Aggrawal, Senior
Advocate through video conference with
Mr. Rajesh Kumar Parmar, Advocate.
Professor (Dr.) S.S. Jaswal, Registrar,
H.P. National Law University, present in
person.
————————————————————————————
Jyotsna Rewal Dua, Judge
Petitioner was a regular Class-IV employee of
the respondent. His services were terminated by the
respondent during probation period. He has assailed the
termination order in this petition.
1
Whether reporters of print and electronic media may be allowed to see the order? Yes.
2 2025:HHC:18256
2. Facts:-
2(i). On the basis of recommendations of the
selection committee, which were also approved by the
Executive Council, petitioner was appointed as Sweeper on
20.03.2022 on regular basis in the pay scale of Rs.4900-
10680+Rs.1300/- Grade Pay in the respondent-H.P.
National Law University. Some of the terms & conditions of
appointment order relevant to the context are as follows:-
“On the recommendations of the Selection
Committee, approved by the Executive Council, you are,
hereby, offered the Post of Sweeper in the Pay Scale of
Rs.490010680+1300 GP, along with other allowances
as per the relevant Regulations of the Himachal
Pradesh National Law University, Shimla.
This Offer is made on the following terms and
conditions.
1. You shall remain on probation for a period of two
years, extendable by another period of one year,
from the date of your joining at Himachal Pradesh
National Law University, Shimla. Your services shall
be confirmed only on your satisfactory work
performance during the probation period.
2. That your services can be terminated at any time
during the probation period on the ground of
unsatisfactory work performance………….”
In terms of above, petitioner was to remain on
probation for a minimum period of two years, extendable by
one more year. During probation, his services could be
terminated any time on ground of unsatisfactory work
performance.
3 2025:HHC:18256
2(ii). Petitioner had completed 01 year and 07 months
of probation period, when on 06.11.2023, he received
following order terminating his services forthwith:-
“Subject: Re: Bringing Probation Period to an End Mr.
Sanjay Singh, Sweeper.
In terms of Clause 2 of the appointment letter,
the probation period of Mr. Sanjay Singh, Sweeper is
being brought to an end.
Consequently, his services are, hereby,
terminated forthwith with immediate effect.
Sd/
Registrar
HPNLU, Shimla”
Petitioner seeks quashing of the above order and
his reinstatement with all consequential benefits.
3. Submissions:-
Learned counsel for the petitioner was at
pains to submit that the respondent-University had not
issued any warning, reprimand, notice or any kind of
advisory, whatsoever, to the petitioner that his work and
conduct was not satisfactory during his entire tenure.
Petitioner had always performed his work to the satisfaction
of all concerned with no complaints whatsoever. There was
no occasion to terminate his service invoking Clause 2 of
the appointment order.
As against above, the pleaded case of the
respondent as also urged by learned Senior Counsel is as
under:-
4 2025:HHC:18256
a. “The overall assessment of the work and conduct of
the probationer during the period of probation are
the yardsticks, which justify the retention or
discharge after or during the period of probation.
Therefore in case of probationer, only on the basis of
the assessment of work and conduct by the
appointing authority his services could be brought
to an end any time.”
b. “The answering respondent thoroughly evaluated the
petitioner’s performance across various parameters
during the probationary period and determined that
he was unsuitable for continuation of his services
and strictly in accordance with Petitioner’s terms of
appointment letter, his services have been brought
to an end without assigning any reason.”
c. “The non-extension of the Petitioner’s services
and certain deficiencies in the work and conduct
of the petitioner, led to the assessment of his
work and conduct upon which Petitioner’s
services were discharged. Similarly, there was
abject failure on the part of the Petitioner in
carrying out specific tasks and duties assigned.
Due to which the petitioner did not achieve the
desired results and the Petitioner was a non-
performer in estimation of the BOG.”
d. “The Petitioner during his probationary period,
has displayed a consistent pattern of behavior
that raised serious concerns regarding
Petitioner’s work and conduct, coupled with
utter lack of his commitment, dedication and
loyalty towards the organization. Throughout his
tenure, the Petitioner has exhibited a profound
disregard for the core responsibilities associated
5 2025:HHC:18256
with his position. His performance has been
marred by a palpable lack of dedications, and a
general apathy towards the duties assigned to
him.”
e. “The Petitioner’s services have been subjected to
reassessment by the Answering Respondent, which
formed basis for not extending Petitioner’s services
and relieving the Petitioner’s services in terms of his
appointment letter.”
f. “It is well-established law that any termination of a
Probationer upon an assessment of an employee’s
performance during probation is ordinarily not
subject to judicial review.”
g. “This Hon’ble Court would not sit as an appellate
authority in reviewing and reassessing the instant
decision of the Answering Respondent University,
who had undertaken an exercise to review
Petitioner’s work and conduct by a highly academic
body, due to which the instant Writ Petition by the
Petitioner is not maintainable before this Hon’ble
Court.”
h. “In any case, the decision of the academic body in
assessing the work and conduct of the Petitioner in
accordance with terms of his appointment, would
not be re-appreciated by this Hon’ble Court in writ
proceedings, due to self-imposed restrictions by this
Hon’ble Court through a catena of its rulings.”
Reiterating the above, learned Senior Counsel
for the respondent-University also submitted that
petitioner’s appointment letter dated 20.03.2022 had
clearly envisaged a probation period of two years,
6 2025:HHC:18256
extendable by one more year. Services of the petitioner were
liable to be terminated during probation period without
assigning any reason in the sole discretion of the competent
authority as per norms. In view of terms of petitioner’s
appointment letter, he cannot be heard to complain about
denial of opportunity of hearing or non-compliance of the
principles of natural justice before terminating his services.
4. The Record and related submissions:-
Reply filed by the respondent only emphasized
that the petitioner did not work satisfactorily. Since the
reply filed by the respondent-University time and again
harped upon petitioners’ work, performance and conduct
being not upto the mark; way short of standards; alleged
lack of his commitment, dedication, loyalty to organization;
him allegedly being a non-performer throughout his tenure
“in the estimation of BOG”; and all this leading to
termination of his probation on 06.11.2023, it was deemed
appropriate to inspect the related record. Vide order dated
16.05.2025, the respondent-University was directed to
produce the record.
4(i). Record was produced on 22.05.2025. There
were total five loose noting sheets alongwith personal file of
the petitioner.
7 2025:HHC:18256
4(i)(a). Looking at the five pages of loose noting sheets,
following order was passed on 22.05.2025:-
“Learned counsel for the respondentNational Law
University has produced the record. The record also
contains loose noting sheets/pages, 05 in number. The
pages have been marked/numbered at the center. To the
naked eye, it is quite evident that page No.1 has been
added to the loose noting sheets subsequently and as a
consequence thereof, original page No.1 has been altered
in handwriting to ‘2’. Similarly, original page No.2
becomes ‘3’, ‘3’ becomes ‘4’ and ‘4’ has been altered to
‘5’.
Before proceeding further in the matter, let the
Registrar of the respondentNational Law University
remain present in the Court on the next date of hearing.
List on 29.05.2025.
The original record is retained in the custody of the
learned Registrar (Judicial).”
The Registrar of the respondent-University
attended the next hearing of the case on 29.05.2025 and
admitted having himself placed first page subsequently to
the noting sheets (originally paginated as 1 to 4) and
altering in his own handwriting the pagination consequent
upon his pre-fixing one more page to the four pages of loose
noting sheets, whereafter, following order was passed in the
matter on 29.05.2025:-
“Pursuant to the directions issued on
16.05.2025, the respondentNational Law University
produced the record on 22.05.2025. Upon pursuing the
record, the order as under was passed:
“Learned counsel for the respondent
National Law University has produced the
record. The record also contains loose noting
sheets/pages, 05 in number. The pages have
8 2025:HHC:18256
been marked/numbered at the center. To the
naked eye, it is quite evident that page No.1 has
been added to the loose noting sheets
subsequently and as a consequence thereof,
original page No.1 has been altered in
handwriting to ‘2’. Similarly, original page No.2
becomes ‘3’, ‘3’ becomes ‘4’ and ‘4’ has been
altered to ‘5’.
Before proceeding further in the matter, let
the Registrar of the respondentNational Law
University remain present in the Court on the
next date of hearing.
List on 29.05.2025.
The original record is retained in the
custody of the learned Registrar (Judicial).”
2. In view of above, Professor S.S. Jaswal,
RegistrarNational Law University has attended today’s
hearing. He admitted the facts noticed in the order
dated 22.05.2025, but, submitted that page now
numbered as 1 was already in existence, lying loosely
in the file. That he in his wisdom, appended the page
alongwith loose noting sheets & paginated it as Number
1 and consequently changed the numbering of the loose
sheets as noticed in the previous order. That the same
was done by him without any mala fide intention
whatsoever.
3. To a query of the Court, as to why the pagination
of official record of a premier establishmentthe H.P.
National Law University had been altered that too by its
Registrar, the response was that the same had been
done in good faith and without any ill motive.
4. Learned Senior Counsel for the respondentH.P.
National Law University apprised that after the last
order passed in this matter, the University of its own
took cognizance of the issue and found out that not just
the file pertaining to this matter but there are several
official files containing loose sheets/documents without
proper pagination. That the University is contemplating
taking appropriate action in accordance with law.
5. Arguments have been heard on merits. Judgment
reserved.”
4(i)(b). The first two pages of the noting sheets (the first
page-admittedly added to noting sheets subsequently, while
9 2025:HHC:18256
producing the record, though stated to be in existence and
lying loose in the file) read as under:-
“Page-1
File No.HPNLUB(15)92(R.O.)/2021
Himachal Pradesh national Law University,
Ghandal, Shimla
Dated 11th April, 2023OFFICE NOTE ON PERFORMANCE REVIEW OF SANJAY
SINGH SWEEPER 21032022 TO 31032023It is brought to the notice of the authorities that Sanjay
Singh has been working as a sweeper for last one year. His
annual appraisal is due, as he has been working on
1
probation. During last one year, it has been observed that
generally his work and conduct suffers from series of
shortcomings.
It has been reported on numerous occasions that he rarely
reports on duty, on time. Many times the work carried out
2 by him is not upto the mark and is not upto the satisfaction
and repeatedly he has to be told that there are
shortcomings and scope of improvement in his work.
The biggest shortfall is his behaviour and conduct. He is
basically of aggressive nature and picks up fights at
slightest provocation. If he is to be warned, or told anything
about his work and conduct by his superior, he would
3
indulge in arguments instead of bringing improvement in his
work and behaviour. Often he indulges in name dropping
when told to improve.
There have also been verbal complaints from students on
cleanliness issues.
It has also been reported that Sanjay Singh regularly
indulges in petty politics and at the workplace he is often
seen indulging in heated exchanges and arguments over
4 nonissues, with one and all. Under the circumstances, clear
cut attractions are solicited as to whether his annual
confidential report should be given negative or below
average rating.
Since Sanjay Singh’s services are on Probation for a period
of two years, let a comprehensive performance review of his
work and conduct be carried out after a close monitoring of
10 2025:HHC:18256
5 his work in conduct for one more year. At the end of second
year, a call could be taken as to whether further retention is
justified or not.
Meanwhile Sanjay Singh’s performance should be kept on
close watch and any untoward conductor behaviour should
6 be reported to the authorities for appropriate decision. For
the time being his ACR / appraisal should be kept on hold
and the same should be filled at the expiry of two years’
after observing his work and conduct for two years.
Sd/
Registrar,
HPNLU, Shimla
Page-2
No.59/22HPNLU (Estt.)
Himachal Pradesh National Law University
Ghandal, Shimla
……………
Dated, the Shimla14 06th November, 2023
Placed below on the file an application, received from
Mr. Sanjay Singh (Sweeper) (Annexure I) of this University,
regarding complaint against Mr. Rohit Kumar (Caretaker)
who allegedly assaulted him on 05/11/2023 at 8:15 AM in
the reception area.
In this regard, the undersigned along with the Dean
Students Welfare and Registrar looked into the matter and
inquire about the veracity of the occurrence with other
7 employees present on the spot and also watched the video
record of the incident provided by the IT Cell. After thorough
inquiry, it has been found that the complainant was also
taking part in the scuffle at parking area of the University.
Further, it also appears from the CCTV footage that both the
employees were misbehaving and causing physical injury to
each other and exchanging abusive languages. The same is
placed on record as Annexure II.
In view of the available facts and records, the conduct of
both the employees amounts to:
(i) An act of serious misbehaviour and indiscipline which is
totally against the code of conduct and nature of their duties.
Therefore, this office is of the opinion that strict action should
8 be taken against both officials as per the relevant provision
of conduct rules.
(ii) The abovementioned officials, who visited and inspected
the cleanliness of the floor assigned to the complainant (i.e.,
Mr. Sanjay) were not satisfied with the cleanliness.
11 2025:HHC:18256
Therefore, it amounts to nonsatisfactory work performance
on the part of the complainant.
(iii) Mr. Sanjay Singh joined to the post of Sweeper from
20.03.2022 and is on probation till 19.03.2024. His
probation may be brought to an end, in terms of Clause 2 of
his appointment letter, with immediate effect.
Hence, this office is of the opinion that retains the said
employee namely Mr. Sanjay Singh is not in the interest of
University and therefore, his probation period may be
9
brought to an end, henceforth his services may be
terminated.
Submitted for information and approval please.
Sd/
(Deputy Registrar Estt.)”
4(ii). Learned counsel for the petitioner in relation to
the incident referred to at the second page of the noting
sheet, submitted that on 05.11.2023, i.e. a day prior to the
termination of petitioner’s services, while the petitioner was
discharging his duties in the respondent-University, a
scuffle took place between him and one other co-worker Sh.
Rohit, also a probationer. During this scuffle, petitioner
suffered injuries on his head. He complained about the
incident to the Police (Police Post Dhami) the same day.
However, he and Sh. Rohit compromised the matter the
same day, which was duly taken cognizance of by the Police
at G.D. No.18 on 05.11.2023. The dispute between
petitioner and Sh. Rohit was resolved. Petitioner himself
brought this fact to the notice of the respondent-University.
12 2025:HHC:18256
Learned counsel submitted that the aforesaid stray and
minor incident cannot be held against the petitioner for
terminating his service.
Commenting upon the incident of 05.11.2023,
learned Senior Counsel for the respondent-University
elaborated that fight between two probationers employed in
the respondent-University had taken place in broad
daylight in the campus of the University. Such unbecoming,
irresponsible and indisciplined act of employees could not
be tolerated by the employer/respondent-University, which
could also leave negative impact upon the students and the
staff members. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the
CCTV footage of the incident is available with the
respondent. The same was seen and accordingly a decision
was taken to put an end to petitioner’s probation period.
5. Consideration:-
5(i). Legal Position:- 5(i)(a). Krishnadevaraya Education Trust and
others Versus L.A. Balakrishna2, inter alia, holds that if
the termination order on the face of it states that
employee’s services are being terminated because his
performance is not satisfactory, the employer runs the risk
2
AIR 2001 SC 625
13 2025:HHC:18256of the allegation being made that the order itself casts a
stigma. Normally, it is preferred that the order itself does
not mention the reason why the services are being
terminated. If such order is challenged, the employer will
have to indicate the grounds on which the services of a
probationer were terminated. Mere fact that in response to
the challenge, the employer states that services were not
satisfactory would not ipso facto mean that services of the
probationer were being terminated by way of punishment.
The probationer is on test and if the services are not found
satisfactory, the employer has, in terms of letter of
appointment, the right to terminate the services. Relevant
paras of the judgment are as under:-
“5. There can be no manner of doubt that the employer is
entitled to engage the services of a person on probation.
During the period of probation, the suitability of the
recruit/appointee has to be seen. If his services are not
satisfactory which means that he is not suitable for the
job than the employer has a right to terminate the
services as a reason thereof. If the termination during
probationary period is without any reason, perhaps
such an order Would be sought to be challenged on the
ground of being arbitrary. Therefore, normally services
of an employee on probation would be terminated, when
he is found not to be suitable for the job for which he
was engaged, without assigning any reason. If the
order on the face of it states that his services are being
terminated because his performance is not satisfactory,
the employer runs the risk of the allegation being made
that the order itself casts a stigma. We do not say that
such a contention will succeed. Normally, therefore, it is
preferred that the order itself does not mention the
reason why the services are being terminated.
14 2025:HHC:18256
6. If such an order is challenged, the employer will have to
indicate the grounds on which the services of a
probationer were terminated. Mere fact that in response
to the challenge, the employer states that the services
were. not satisfactory would not ipso facto mean that
the services of the probationer were being terminated by
way of punishment. The probationer is on test and if the
services are found not to be satisfactory, the employer
has, in terms of the letter of appointment, the right to
terminate the services.”
5(i)(b). In Shamsher Singh and Ors. Vs. State of
Punjab3, Hon’ble Apex Court reiterated the principles laid
down in Purshottam Lal Dhingra Versus Union of India4
that if the termination of service during probation period is
sought to be founded on misconduct, negligence,
inefficiency or other disqualification, then, it is a
punishment; No abstract proposition can be laid down that
where the services of a probationer are terminated without
saying anything more in the order of termination than that
the services are terminated, it can never amount to a
punishment in the facts and circumstances of the case. If a
probationer is discharged on the ground of misconduct or
inefficiency or for similar reason without a proper inquiry
and without getting a reasonable opportunity of showing
cause against his discharge, it may in a given case amount
3
AIR 1974 SC 2192
4
AIR 1958 SC 36
15 2025:HHC:18256
to removal from service. Paras relevant to the context are
extracted below:-
“62. The position of a probationer. was considered by this
Court in Purshottam Lal Dhingra v. Union of
India (1958) ILLJ 544 SC, Das, C.J., speaking for the
Court said that where a person is appointed to a
permanent post in Government service on probation the
termination of his service during or at the end of the
period of probation will not ordinarily and by itself be a
punishment because the Government servant so
appointed has no right to continue to hold such a post
any more than a servant employed on probation by a
private employer is entitled to do so. Such a termination
does not operate as a forfeiture of any right of a servant
to hold the post, for he has no such right. Obviously
such a termination cannot be a dismissal, removal or
reduction in rank by way of punishment. There are,
however, two important observations of Das, C.J., in
Dhingra‘s case (supra). One is that if a right exists
under a contract or service Rules to terminate the
service the motive operating on the mind of the
Government is wholly irrelevant. The other is that
if the termination of service is sought to be
founded on misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or
other disqualification, then it is a punishment
and violates Article 311 of the constitution. The
reasoning why motive is said to be irrelevant is
that it inheres in the state of mind which is not
discernible. on the other hand, if termination is
founded on misconduct it is objective and is
manifest.
63. No abstract proposition can be laid down that
where the services of a probationer are terminated
without saying anything more in the, order of
termination than that the services are terminated
it can never amount to a punishment in the facts
and circumstances of the case. If a probationer is
discharged on the ground of misconduct, or
inefficiency or for similar reason without a proper
enquiry and without his getting a reasonable
opportunity of showing cause against his
discharge it may in a given case amount to
removal from service within the meaning of Article
311(2) of the Constitution.”
16 2025:HHC:18256
5(i)(c). Rajasthan High Court Vs. Ved Priya and
Ors.5 holds that the form of an order is not crucial to
determine whether it is simpliciter or punitive in nature. An
order of termination of service though innocuously worded
may also be aimed at punishing the official on probation
and in that case it would undoubtedly be an infraction of
Article 311 of the Constitution. The Court in the process of
judicial review of such order can always lift the veil to find
out as to whether or not the order was meant to visit the
probationer with penal consequences. If the Court finds
that the real motive behind the order was to punish the
official, it may always strike down the same for want of
reasonable opportunity of being heard. Relevant paras of
the judgment are as under:-
“18. Furthermore, there is a subtle, yet fundamental,
difference between termination of a probationer and
that of a confirmed employee. Although it is undisputed
that the State cannot act arbitrarily in either case, yet
there has to be a difference in judicial approach
between the two. Whereas in the case of a confirmed
employee the scope of judicial interference would be
more expansive given the protection under Article 311 of
the Constitution or the Service Rules but such may not
be true in the case of probationers who are denuded of
such protection(s) while working on trial basis.
19. Probationers have no indefeasible right to continue in
employment until confirmed, and they can be relieved
by the competent authority if found unsuitable. Its only
in a very limited category of cases that such5
(2021) 13 SCC 151
17 2025:HHC:18256
probationers can seek protection under the principles of
natural justice, say when they are ‘removed’ in a
manner which prejudices their future prospects in
alternate fields or casts aspersions on their character or
violates their constitutional rights. In such cases of
‘stigmatic’ removal only that a reasonable opportunity
of hearing is sinequanon. Way back in Parshotam Lal
Dhingra v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 36, a
Constitution Bench opined that:
“28…. In short, if the termination of service is
founded on the right flowing from contract or the
service rules then, prima facie, the termination is
not a punishment and carries with it no evil
consequences and so Article 311 is not attracted.
But even if the Government has, by contract or
under the rules, the right to terminate the
employment without going through the
procedure prescribed for inflicting the
punishment of dismissal or removal or
reduction in rank, the Government may,
nevertheless, choose to punish the servant and
if the termination of service is sought to be
founded on misconduct, negligence,
inefficiency or other disqualification, then it
is a punishment and the requirements of
Article 311 must be complied with.”
20. The order of termination of services of Respondent 1
recites that:
“the Rajasthan High Court, Jodhpur, after
examining all the relevant records has been of the
opinion that Shri Ved Priya has not made sufficient
use of his opportunities and has otherwise also
failed to give satisfaction as a probationer in the
Rajasthan Judicial Service.”
It is explicit from these contents that
neither any specific misconduct has been
attributed to Respondent 1 nor any allegation
made. The order is based upon overall assessment
of the performance of Respondent 1 during the
period of probation, which was not found
satisfactory. Such an inference which can be a
valid foundation to dispense with services of a
probationer does not warrant holding of an
enquiry in terms of Article 311 of the
Constitution. It is thus not true on the part of
18 2025:HHC:18256
Respondent 1 to allege that it was a case of an
indictment following allegations of corruption
against him.
21. True it is that the form of an order is not crucial to
determine whether it is simpliciter or punitive in nature.
An order of termination of service though innocuously
worded may, in the facts and circumstances of a
peculiar case, also be aimed at punishing the official on
probation and in that case it would undoubtedly be an
infraction of Article 311 of the Constitution. The Court in
the process of judicial review of such order can always
lift the veil to find out as to whether or not the order
was meant to visit the probationer with penal
consequences. If the Court finds that the real motive be
hind the order was to “punish” the official, it may
always strike down the same for want of reasonable
opportunity of being heard.
22. There is nothing on record in the present case to infer
that the motivation behind the removal was any
allegation. Instead, it was routine confirmation exercise.
The evaluation of services rendered during the
probationary period was made at the end of the first
respondent’s tenure, along with 92 others. Vigilance
reports were called not just for Respondent 1petitioner,
but also for at least ten other candidates. It is thus clear
that the object was not to verify whether the allegations
against the first respondent had been proved or not, but
merely to ascertain whether there were sufficient
reasons or a possible cloud on his suitability, given the
higher standard of probity expected of a Judge.”
5(i)(d). In Dipti Prakash Banerjee Versus Satyendra
Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, Calcutta
and others6, Hon’ble Supreme Court while considering the
case of termination of probationer’s services, framed
following points for consideration:-
“18. On the basis of the above contentions, the following points
arise for consideration:
6
(1999) 3 SCC 60
19 2025:HHC:18256(1) In what circumstances, the termination of a
probationer’s services can be said to be founded on
misconduct and in what circumstances could it be
said that the allegations were only the motive?
(2) When can an order of termination of a probationer be
said to contain an express stigma?
(3) Can the stigma be gathered by referring back to
proceedings referred to in the order of termination?
(4) To what relief?”
It was held as under on Point No.1 that if the
findings were arrived at in an inquiry as to misconduct,
behind the back of the officer or without a regular
departmental inquiry, the simple order of termination is to
be treated as “founded” on the allegations and will be bad.
But if the inquiry was not held, no findings were arrived at
and the employer was not inclined to conduct an inquiry,
but at the same time, he did not want to continue the
employee against whom there were complaints, it would
only be a case of motive and the order would not be bad.
Similarly, if the employer did not want to inquire into the
truth of allegations, in such circumstances, allegations
would be motive & not the foundation and simple order of
termination would be valid:-
“19. As to in what circumstances an order of
termination of a probationer can be said to be
punitive or not depends upon whether certain
allegations which are the cause of the termination
are the motive or foundation. In this area, as pointed
out by Shah, J. (as he then was) in Madan Gopal v.
20 2025:HHC:18256
State of Punjab7 there is no difference between cases
where services of a temporary employee are terminated
and where a probationer is discharged. This very
question was gone into recently in Radhey Shyam
Gupta v. U.P. State Agro Industries Corpn. Ltd.8 and
reference was made to the development of the law from
time to time starting from Parshotam Lal Dhingra v.
Union of India9 to the concept of “purpose of enquiry”
introduced by Shah, J. (as he then was) in State of
Orissa v. Ram Narayan Das10 and to the sevenJudge
Bench decision in Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab11
and to postSamsher Singh caselaw. This Court had
occasion to make a detailed examination of what
is the “motive” and what is the “foundation” on
which the innocuous order is based.
21. If findings were arrived at in an inquiry as to
misconduct, behind the back of the officer or
without a regular departmental enquiry, the
simple order of termination is to be treated as
“founded” on the allegations and will be bad. But
if the enquiry was not held, no findings were
arrived at and the employer was not inclined to
conduct an enquiry but, at the same time, he did
not want to continue the employee against whom
there were complaints, it would only be a case of
motive and the order would not be bad. Similar is
the position if the employer did not want to enquire into
the truth of the allegations because of delay in regular
departmental proceedings or he was doubtful about
securing adequate evidence. In such a circumstance, the
allegations would be a motive and not the foundation
and the simple order of termination would be valid.
22. In the light of the above principles, laid down in R.S.
Gupta case, we do not think anything more is to be
added. Point 1 is decided accordingly.”
On Point No.2, Hon’ble Apex Court held as
under:-
7
AIR 1963 SC 531
8
(1999) 2 SCC 21
9
AIR 1958 SC 36
10
AIR 1961 SC 177
11
(1974) 2 SCC 831
21 2025:HHC:18256
“23. In the present case before us, the order of termination
dated 3041997 is not a simple order of termination but
is a lengthy order which we have extracted above. It not
only says that performance during probation is not
satisfactory but also refers to a letter dated 3041996
by which the period of probation was extended by six
months from 251996, and to letters dated 17101996
and 31101996. It concludes by saying that the
appellant’s “conduct, performance, ability and capacity
during the whole period of probation” was not
satisfactory and that he was considered “unsuitable”
for the post for which he was appointed.
25. In the matter of ‘stigma’, this Court has held that the
effect which an order of termination may have on a
person’s future prospects of employment is a matter of
relevant consideration. In the seven Judge case in
Samsher Singh vs. State of Punjab12, Ray, CJ observed
that if a simple order of termination was passed, that
would enable the officer to “make good in other walks of
life without a stigma. “It was also stated in Bishan Lal
Gupta vs. State of Haryana13 that if the order contained
a stigma, the termination would be bad for “the
individual concerned must suffer a substantial loss of
reputation which may affect his future prospects”.
26. There is, however, considerable difficulty in finding out
whether in a given case where the order of termination
is not a simple order of termination, the words used in
the order can be said to contain a ‘stigma’. The other
issue in the case before us is whether even if the
words used in the order of termination are
innocuous, the court can go into the words used or
language employed in other orders or proceedings
referred to by the employer in the order of
termination?
29. We may advert to a few cases on the question of
stigma. We shall refer initially to cases where a special
Rule relating to termination of probationer required a
particular condition to be satisfied and where the said
condition was referred to in the order of termination. In
Hari Singh Mann v. State of Punjab14, the probationer
was governed by Rule 8(b) of the Punjab Service Rules,
1959 and the fact that the word ‘unfit’ as required by
the Rules was used, was held not to be a ground for
12
(1974) 2 SCC 831
13
(1978) 1 SCC 202
14
(1975) 3 SCC 182
22 2025:HHC:18256
quashing the order on the ground of ‘stigma’, for to hold
that it amounted to ‘stigma’ would amount to robbing
the authority of the right under the rule. Similarly where
a Rule required a show cause notice issued and an
inquiry to be conducted before terminating probation,
such as Rule 55B of the Central Civil Services (CCA)
Rules, there would be no question of characterizing the
simple order of termination as one founded on the
allegations which were the subject of the inquiry. That
was because, in such a case, the purpose of the inquiry
was to find out if the officer was to be continued in
service and not to find out if he was guilty (State of
Orissa v. Ram Narayan Das15, Ranendra Chandra
Banerjee v. Union of India16). In State of Gujarat v.
Akhilesh C. Bhargav17, the termination order merely
referred to Rule 12(bb) of the Indian Police Service
(Probationer) Rules, 1959. It was contended that the
reference to the said Rule 12(bb) itself amounted to a
stigma but this was rejected following Ram Narayan
Das case15.”
On point No.3, it was held that words
amounting to ‘stigma’ need not be contained in the order of
termination, but may also be contained in an order or
proceeding referred to in the order of termination or in an
annexure thereto and would vitiate the order of
termination. The said point was decided as under:-
“35. The above decision is, in our view, clear authority
for the proposition that the material which
amounts to stigma need not be contained in the
order of termination of the probationer but might
be contained in any document referred to in the
termination order or in its annexures. Obviously
such a document could be asked for or called for
by any future employer of the probationer. In such
a case, the order of termination would stand15
AIR 1961 SC 177
16
AIR 1963 SC 1552
17
(1987) 4 SCC 482
23 2025:HHC:18256
vitiated on the ground that no regular inquiry was
conducted. We shall presently consider whether, on
the facts of the case before us, the documents referred
to in the impugned order contain any stigma.
36. It was in this context argued for the Respondent that
the employer in the present case had given ample
opportunity to the employee by giving him warnings,
asking him to improve and even extended his probation
twice and this was not a case of unfairness and this
Court should not interfere. It is true that where the
employee had been given suitable warnings, requested
to improve, or where he was given a long rope by way
of extension of probation, this Court has said that the
termination orders cannot be held to be punitive. [See in
this connection Hindustan Paper Corpn v. Purnendu
Chakrobarty18, Oil & Natural Gas Commission v. Dr.
Md. S. Iskender Ali19, Unit Trust of India v. T. Bijaya
Kumar20, Principal, Institute of Postgraduate Medical
Education & Research, Pondicherry v. S. Andel21 and a
labour case Oswal Pressure Die Casting Industry v.
Presiding Officer22. But in all these cases, the orders
were simple orders of termination which did not contain
any words amounting to stigma. In case we come to the
conclusion that there is stigma in the impugned order,
we cannot ignore the effect it will have on the
probationer’s future whatever be earlier opportunities
granted by the respondent organization to the appellant
to improve.
37. On this point, therefore, we hold that the words
amounting to “stigma” need not be contained in the
order of termination but may also be contained in an
order or proceeding referred to in the order of
termination or in an annexure thereto and would vitiate
the order of termination. Point 3 is decided accordingly.”
5(i)(e). In Pinky Meena Versus The High Court of
Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur & Anr., in context
of termination of a Judicial Officer in the State of Rajasthan
18
(1996) 11 SCC 404
19
(1980) 3 SCC 428
20
(1992) 5 SLR 855 (SC)
21
1995 Supp (4) SCC 609
22
(1998) 3 SCC 225
24 2025:HHC:18256
during her probation period, the related principles were
summarized by the Hon’ble Apex Court as under:-
“24. The services of a probationer could result either in a
confirmation in the post or ended by way of termination
simpliciter. However, if a probationer is terminated from
service owing to a misconduct as a punishment, the
termination would cause a stigma on him. If a
probationer is unsuitable for a job and has been
terminated then such a case is nonstigmatic as it is a
termination simpliciter. Thus, the performance of a
probationer has to be considered in order to ascertain
whether it has been satisfactory or unsatisfactory. If the
performance of a probationer has been unsatisfactory,
he is liable to be terminated by the employer without
conducting any inquiry. No right of hearing is also
reserved with the probationer and hence, there would
be no violation of principles of natural justice in such a
case.
25. As noted, if a termination from service is not visited with
any stigma and neither are there any civil consequences
and nor is founded on misconduct, then, it would be a
case of termination simpliciter. On the other hand, an
assessment of remarks pertaining to the discharge of
duties during the probationary period even without a
finding of misconduct and termination on the basis of
such remarks or assessment will be by way of
punishment because such remarks or assessment
would be stigmatic. According to the dictionary
meaning, stigma is indicative of a blemish, disgrace
indicating a deviation from a norm. Stigma might be
inferred from the references quoted in the termination
order although the order itself might not contain
anything offensive. Where there is a discharge from
service after prescribed probation period was completed
and the discharge order contain allegations against a
probationer and surrounding circumstances also
showed that discharge was not based solely on the
assessment of the employee’s work and conduct during
probation, the termination was held to be stigmatic and
punitive vide Jaswantsingh Pratapsingh Jadeja vs.
Rajkot Municipal Corporation, (2007) 10 SCC 71.
26. Even though a probationer has no right to hold a post, it
would not imply that the mandate of Articles 14 and 16
of the Constitution could be violated inasmuch as there
25 2025:HHC:18256
cannot be any arbitrary or discriminatory discharge or
an absence of application of mind in the matter of
assessment of performance and consideration of
relevant materials. Thus, in deciding whether, in a given
case, a termination was by way of punishment or not,
the courts have to look into the substance of the matter
and not the form.
27. Further, the order discharging the appellant from
service violates principles of natural justice, as the
appellant was not provided an opportunity to be heard
during the enquiry that was required to be conducted.
At this juncture, reliance is placed on Shamsher Singh
v. State of Punjab (1974) 2 SCC 831, which clarified
that:
“No abstract proposition can be laid down that
where the services of a probationer are terminated
without saying anything more in the order of
termination than that the services are terminated it
can never amount to a punishment in the facts and
circumstances of the case. If a probationer is
discharged on the ground of misconduct, or
inefficiency or for similar reason without a proper
enquiry and without his getting a reasonable
opportunity of showing cause against his discharge
it may in a given case amount of removal from
service within the meaning of Art. 311 (2) of the
Constitution.”
32. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the show cause
notice dated 17.02.2020 and the discharge order dated
29.05.2020 are quashed. The appellant shall be entitled
to reinstatement in service forthwith with all
consequential benefits, including, fixation of seniority as
per the merit list in the examination in question, notional
fixation of pay, except back wages. It is further clarified
that the respondent shall treat the appellant as to have
successfully completed her probation period and the
appellant shall be treated as a confirmed employee.”
5(ii). Before delving into merits of the matter against
backdrop of above legal position, it needs to be mentioned
that the respondent is the National Law University, a
26 2025:HHC:18256
premier legal education institute in the State of Himachal
Pradesh. It is expected of it to maintain its records in
accordance with the well-established conventions and
norms. It has been indeed very astonishing to note that not
only the records have not been maintained by the
University in accordance with established parameters, but
in the instant case, one page of noting sheet had been
admittedly pre-fixed to the already existing four noting
sheets, while producing the record of the case before the
Court thereby also altering the pagination of the noting
sheets. And all this was done by none else, but its
Registrar-the Senior-Most Officer of the respondent-
University.
Though learned Senior Counsel for the
respondent-University has assured that the University is
seriously viewing the whole matter as also this particular
episode and that it intends to take appropriate action in the
matter, yet this Court will be failing in its duty if it does not
express its deep displeasure in the matter. It is hoped &
expected that the respondent-University will take due &
appropriate call and action in accordance with law against
all concerned including those involved in producing the
record before the Court in this case.
27 2025:HHC:18256
5(ii)(a). Respondent-University has ‘terminated’
petitioner’s services and brought his probation period to an
end invoking & also citing Clause 2 of his appointment
order in the termination order. The said clause empowered
the respondent to terminate petitioner’s service at any time
during probation period on ground of unsatisfactory work
performance. At the time of termination of petitioner’s
service, he had completed 19 months out of his total 24
months of mandatory probation period, which of course
could have been extended by another 12 months by the
respondent.
For bringing petitioner’s probation period to an
end, the respondent in its reply had fixed the cause upon
petitioner being non-performer; derelict; his having
displayed a consistent negative pattern raising serious
concerns about his work & conduct; his lack of
commitment, dedication & loyalty to the respondent-
University. But for repetitive use of these adjectives to
describe petitioner’s work performance, the reply did not
elaborate the matter, viz. issuance of any notice, advice,
reprimand, warning or action taken against the petitioner
concerning his work and conduct. To ascertain this, record
was called for. The record so produced opened another
28 2025:HHC:18256
Pandora box, which as observed earlier, this Court is not
looking into with hope and trust placed upon respondent-
University’s affirmation that it would itself set its house in
order & take all appropriate measures for maintaining the
record in the manner it ought to be maintained and will
take action against all those responsible for not doing the
same as per established office procedure including the
instant case episode, where a page has been subsequently
added to the numbered noting sheets while producing the
record in Court.
No warning, reprimand, advice, advisory, oral or
written warning, notice ever issued to the petitioner about
deficiencies/shortcomings in petitioner’s work and conduct
was visible in the record produced by the respondent. It is
fine to emphatically plead in reply using strong words to
emphasize that petitioner’s probation period was put to an
end on account of unsatisfactory work performed by him
during his entire probation period, but this position should
have also been reflected by the record. It did not. There was
not even a single paper on record, which would
demonstrate respondent’s issuing any notice, advice,
advisory, warning or any letter to the petitioner, adversely
commenting upon his work and conduct. Without any
29 2025:HHC:18256
reservation, it can be concluded on facts that the defence
taken by the respondent about petitioner being a consistent
non-performer, has no foundation. The Registrar of the
respondent-University has admitted to having appended the
first page of the noting sheet to the existing four pages
while producing the record in the Court. In the given
admitted facts, the first page of the noting sheet, ideally
deserves to be discarded altogether, leaving it for the
University to decipher about the veracity of its contents and
its existence prior to production of the record in the Court.
Nonetheless, even if this page is taken into consideration,
primafacie it gives the impression of having been prepared
at a later date to pile up all alleged previous negligent acts
of the petitioner and at the same time, keeps the allegations
vague. If indeed there had been allegations against
petitioner’s work, the same are at least not discernible from
record. Not a single complaint against the petitioner forms
part of record. In case petitioner’s performance was way too
short of University’s standards and his work being
adversely commented upon by the teachers and students
alike throughout his probation period, this fact ought to
find mention and reflect from some contemporary record.
Furthermore, in case petitioner’s work and performance
30 2025:HHC:18256
was such as is alluded to in the first page of noting sheet
(added subsequently), then it is all the more surprising that
the respondent-University did not terminate petitioner’s
service earlier and allowed him to complete 19 out of 24
months of probationary service period and also deferred
recording his Annual Confidential Report. The first page of
the noting sheets, its contents and the circumstances
surrounding it are not enough to dispel the first
impression, which one gets of it having been generated
subsequently. Be that as it may, this aspect has been left at
the wisdom of the respondent-University to introspect and
take requisite action. Having observed this, nonetheless the
contents of the page were essential to be considered and
have otherwise been examined for the purpose of
ascertaining merits of respondent’s defence and are not
found to be supported by any other document/record. It is
a standalone page.
5(ii)(b). It is quite evident from the record that real
reason for putting an end to petitioner’s probation period on
06.11.2023 is the incident that happened on 05.11.2023.
This also finds mention at page 2 of the noting sheets
(originally numbered as page ‘1’). The contents of this page
[extracted in para 4(i)(b)] are that:-
31 2025:HHC:18256
Petitioner had lodged a written complaint
against his co-worker.
The Deputy Registrar (Estt.), Dean Students
Welfare and the Registrar of the respondent-University
inquired into the complaint and the incident. Veracity of the
occurrence was ascertained from the employees present on
spot. Video record of the incident provided by the IT Cell
was also viewed, which showed both the employees
misbehaving using abusive language (not clear whether
CCTV footage also had audio in it) and causing physical
injuries to each other.
‘After thorough inquiry, it was found that the
complainant had also taken part in the scuffle at the
parking area of the University’.
In view of above inquiry conducted into the
matter, the three officials of the respondent-University
concluded that petitioner’s probation period against a
substantive post should be brought to an end in terms of
Clause 2 of his appointment order.
5(iii). From the above sequence of events, definite
conclusions can be drawn that:-
32 2025:HHC:18256
It was the petitioner who on 05.11.2023, had
lodged a written complaint with respondent-University of
his having been assaulted by a co-worker.
Petitioner’s complaint was looked into. Three
officials of the respondent-University, viz. the Deputy
Registrar (Estt.), the Dean Students Welfare and the
Registrar, inquired in the matter:-
They obtained information from the employees
present on the spot.
Watched the video record of the incident
provided by the IT Cell and from the CCTV
footage, not only saw the two employees
including the petitioner engaged in scuffle with
each other, but also ‘heard’ them using abusive
language.
On the basis of above inquiry, the officials
deemed it appropriate to put to an end petitioner’s service
against a substantive post during probation period.
The respondent had admittedly conducted an
inquiry into the alleged incident. And, it was on the basis of
this inquiry that petitioner’s services were terminated. It
was a case of stigmatic termination of petitioner’s service
during probation period. It is not the case of respondent
33 2025:HHC:18256that petitioner was even associated during inquiry. It is not
the case of the respondent that any FIR was registered
against the petitioner about the incident or that he was
booked and detained in custody in relation to the
occurrence that took place on 05.11.2023, prompting them
to terminate petitioner’s service during probation period.
There is no specific denial to petitioner’s pleaded case that
he was the victim in the specific assault incident or that he
& the other employee had later mutually resolved the issue
between them. In the backdrop of law settled by Hon’ble
Apex Court, it is writ large from the case file and record
that:-
Respondent had terminated petitioner’s regular
service against a substantive post during
probation period citing Clause 2 of the
appointment order in the termination order.
Clause 2 of the appointment order pertained to
bringing probation period to an end on account
of unsatisfactory work performance.
The reply filed by the respondent uses very
strong adjectives to describe petitioner having
failed to discharge his duties to the satisfaction
of all concerned through his probational tenure,
which is said to have prompted the BOG to
terminate petitioner’s service during this period.
However, no particular incident, warning/notice
34 2025:HHC:18256etc. ever issued to the petitioner had been
mentioned in the reply.
Since the reply leveled serious, but generalized
allegations against petitioner’s work
performance during his probation period and
this was the given justification for terminating
his services, a need was felt for summoning the
record of the case. The record manifested
altering of pagination of noting sheets in order
to accommodate an additional page of noting
sheet. Incidentally, this additional page added
subsequently does not find mention in the later
noting sheets, wherein actual reason to
terminate petitioner’s services has been
elaborated. The later noting sheets originally
paginated as 1, 2, 3 and 4 (subsequently altered
in handwriting to 2, 3, 4 and 5) puts genesis of
termination of petitioner’s service during
probation period to an incident that took place
between petitioner and another worker on
05.11.2023. The record produced by the
respondent reveals that it was the petitioner,
who had complained in writing to the University
on 05.11.2023 about him being a victim of an
assault by a co-worker. It is an admitted
position that the aforesaid matter thereafter was
resolved by both the co-workers amongst
themselves. No FIR was registered in the matter.
However, the three officials of the respondent-
University conducted an inquiry into the matter,
35 2025:HHC:18256
verified the occurrence allegedly from those
present at the spot of occurrence, saw the CCTV
footage of the occurrence and as the noting
sheet puts it, also heard from the CCTV footage
the abuses allegedly hurled by the petitioner
during scuffle and on the basis of inquiry so
conducted drew a conclusion that petitioner was
also actively taking part in the scuffle and that
his services were liable to be terminated.
Petitioner’s termination during probation period
is based upon an inquiry conducted by the three
officials of the respondent-University during
which he was not associated. In the given facts
and circumstances, termination of petitioner’s
service during probation period cannot be
termed as simpliciter. It is punitive, stigmatic &
non-compliant to well established procedural
conventions & rules of natural justice and
hence, liable to be quashed.
5(iv). The Result:-
For all the foregoing reasons, this writ petition is
allowed. Impugned order dated 06.11.2023 (Annexure P-3),
terminating petitioner’s service during probation period, is
quashed and set aside. The respondent is directed to
reinstate the petitioner in service forthwith. It shall,
however, be open for the respondent-University to extend
36 2025:HHC:18256
the probation period of the petitioner and judge the same in
accordance with law.
The writ petition stands disposed of in the above
terms, so also the pending miscellaneous application(s), if
any.
Jyotsna Rewal Dua
June 16, 2025 Judge
Mukesh