3.3.2025 vs State Of Himachal Pradesh on 3 March, 2025

Date:

Himachal Pradesh High Court

Date Of Decision: 3.3.2025 vs State Of Himachal Pradesh on 3 March, 2025

Author: Sandeep Sharma

Bench: Sandeep Sharma

                                                                        2025:HHC:4242




IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
                                                 Cr.MP(M) No. 11 of 2025
                                              Date of Decision: 3.3.2025
________________________________________________________________
Hanuman
                                                               .........Petitioner
                                          Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh
                                                              .......Respondent
Coram
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting? Yes.
For the petitioner:       Mr. N.K. Thakur, Senior Advocate with Mr. Divya
                          Raj Singh, Advocate.
For the Respondent:       Mr. Anup Rattan, Advocate General with Mr. Rajan
                          Kahol, Mr. Vishal Panwar and Mr. B.C. Verma,
                          Additional Advocates General and Mr. Ravi
                          Chauhan, Deputy Advocate General.
___________________________________________________________________________
Sandeep Sharma, J. (Oral)

Bail petitioner namely Hanuman, who is behind the bars for

almost five and half years, has approached this Court in the instant

proceedings filed under Section 483 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha

Sanhita, 2023, for grant of regular bail in case FIR No.93/2019, dated

23.9.2019, under Sections 302 and 201 of Indian Penal Code, registered at

PS Haripur, District Kangra, Himachal Pradesh.

2. Pursuant to orders dated 2.1.2025 and 9.1.2025, respondent-

State has filed the status report and ASI Chaman Lal, has come present

with record. Record perused and returned.

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3. Close scrutiny of status report/record reveals that on

23.9.2019, complainant Sh. Mohan Singh got his statement recorded under

Section 154 CrPC, alleging therein that his son Ashwani Kumar i.e.

deceased, had purchased a new Swift Car and had gone to Baijnath Nag

Mandir on 22.9.2019, alongwith family. Complainant alleged that at

9:30am, all family members came back to the house and thereafter the

deceased went towards Padiarkhar for parking the vehicle. He alleged that

on same day at 11:30am, his son informed that he is going to Palampur

taking one passenger. He alleged that at 8:30pm, he called up his son, but

he did not pick up the phone. He alleged that he as well as other family

members repeatedly tried to contact deceased Ashwani Kumar as well as

his friends, but in vain and as such, appropriate action in accordance with

law be taken to trace his son. On the basis of aforesaid complaint made by

the complainant, police after having lodged FIR detailed herein above

started investigation and recovered the dead body of the deceased son from

the railway line near Ranital. During investigation, it emerged that bail

petitioner herein, who at the relevant time, was working in Indian Army,

had killed deceased son of the complainant on the suspicion of illicit

relationship of his wife with the deceased. Since 27.10.2019, petitioner is

behind the bars. Since investigation is complete and nothing remains to be
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recovered from the bail petitioner, he has approached this Court in the

instant proceedings for grant of regular bail on the ground of inordinate

delay in conclusion of trial. Prior to filing of the petition at hand, petitioner

had approached this Court by way of Cr.MP(M) No. 849 of 2024, which was

dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated 8.5.2024 with a direction to the

court below to conclude the trial expeditiously, preferably, within six

months. Since despite there being aforesaid direction issued by this

Court, court below has not been able to conclude the trial and as of today,

70 witnesses out of 84 witnesses remain to be examined, bail petitioner has

approached this Court in the instant proceedings for grant of bail.

4. While fairly admitting factum with regard to filing of challan in

the competent court of law, Mr. Rajan Kahol, learned Additional Advocate

General, states that taking note of gravity of offence alleged to have been

committed by him, he does not deserve any leniency and as such, prayer

made by the petitioner for bail on the ground of delay cannot be accepted.

He states that 14 prosecution witnesses out of 84 witnesses, already stand

examined and for recording the statements of remaining witnesses, court

below has already fixed the matter for 26.4.2025. While making this court

peruse record, Mr. Kahol states that bail petitioner has committed heinous

crime of murder by killing an innocent person on the suspicion of illicit
2025:HHC:4242
4

relations of his wife with him. He states that since petitioner hails from the

State of Haryana coupled with the fact that he has committed heinous

crime of murder, it may not be in the interest of justice to enlarge him on

bail because in that event, he may not only flee from justice but may also

tamper with the prosecution evidence.

5. Having heard the learned counsel representing the parties and

perused material available on record, this court is not persuaded to agree

with Mr. N.K. Thakur, learned Senior counsel, appearing for the petitioner

that bail petitioner has been falsely implicated, rather there is ample

material adduced on record suggestive of the fact that petitioner having

suspicion of illicit relationship inter-se his wife and deceased Ashwani

Kumar, killed him, however having taken note of the fact that bail

petitioner is behind bars for approximately five years and five months and

till date, prosecution has been able to examine only 14 witnesses out of 84

witnesses, prayer made by the bail petitioner for grant bail deserves to be

considered on the ground of inordinate delay in conclusion of trial.

6. Though Mr. Rajan Kahol, learned Additional Advocate General,

attempted to argue that delay, if any, in trial was on account of delay in

sanction of prosecution by the Army, but such fact, if any, may not be of

any relevance for the reason that on account of delay in prosecution
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sanction, freedom of the bail petitioner cannot be curtailed for an indefinite

period that too without his being held guilty. Moreover, this court finds

that prosecution evidence in the case at hand had commenced in the year

2022 and till date, prosecution has not been able to examine even half of

the witnesses. As of today, only 14 witnesses have been examined. Though

in the case at hand, trial court has fixed the matter for recording the

statement of witnesses in the month of April, but taking note of the fact

that it took almost 2½ years for the prosecution to examine 14 witnesses,

this Court has reason to presume and believe that considerable time is

likely to be consumed in conclusion of the trial and in case, petitioner is left

to incarcerate in jail for an indefinite period during trial, it would not only

amount to pre-trial conviction, rather same would also be in violation of

Article 21 of Constitution of India.

7. By now, it is well settled that speedy trial is legal right of the

accused and one cannot be made to suffer indefinitely for delay in trial and

as such, this Court sees no reason to keep the bail petitioner behind the

bars for indefinite period during trial. Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled

Umarmia Alias Mamumia v. State of Gujarat, (2017) 2 SCC 731, has

held delay in criminal trial to be in violation of right guaranteed to an
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accused under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Relevant para of the

afore judgment reads as under:-

“11. This Court has consistently recognised the right of the accused
for a speedy trial. Delay in criminal trial has been held to be in
violation of the right guaranteed to an accused under Article 21 of
the Constitution of India. (See: Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee
v. Union of India
, (1994) 6 SCC 731; Shaheen Welfare Assn. v. Union
of India
, (1996) 2 SCC 616) Accused, even in cases under TADA, have
been released on bail on the ground that they have been in jail for a
long period of time and there was no likelihood of the completion of
the trial at the earliest.
(See: Paramjit Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi),
(1999) 9 SCC 252 and Babba v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 11 SCC

569).

8. Recently, Hon’ble Apex Court in Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh

Vs. State of Maharashtra and Another, Criminal Appeal No.2787 of

2024, decided on 03.07.2024, adversely commented upon the approach of

trial Court as well as High Court while considering the prayer for grant of

bail. In the aforesaid judgment, Hon’ble Supreme Court having taken note

of the fact that appellant in that case was in jail for last four years and

Court till that date was not able to frame charges, proceeded to enlarge

accused on bail in a case registered under the provisions of Unlawful

Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. In no uncertain terms, Hon’ble Apex Court

in aforesaid judgment held that, however serious a crime may be, an

accused has right to speedy trial, as enshrined in Article 21 of the

Constitution of India. Relevant Paras of aforesaid judgment are reproduced

hereinbelow, which reads as under:

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“7. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and
having gone through the materials on record, we are inclined to exercise
our discretion in favour of the appellant herein keeping in mind the
following aspects:

(i) The appellant is in jail as an under-trial prisoner past four years;

(ii) Till this date, the trial court has not been able to even proceed to frame
charge; and

(iii) As pointed out by the counsel appearing for the State as well as NIA, the
prosecution intends to examine not less than eighty witnesses.

8. Having regard to the aforesaid, we wonder by what period of time,
the trial will ultimately conclude. Howsoever serious a crime may be, an
accused has a right to speedy trial as enshrined under the Constitution of
India.

9. Over a period of time, the trial courts and the High Courts have
forgotten a very well settled principle of law that bail is not to be withheld
as a punishment.

10. In the aforesaid context, we may remind the trial courts and the
High Courts of what came to be observed by this Court in Gudikanti
Narasimhulu & Ors. v. Public Prosecutor, High
Court reported in (1978)
1 SCC 240. We quote:

“What is often forgotten, and therefore warrants reminder, is the
object to keep a person in judicial custody pending trial or disposal
of an appeal. Lord Russel, C.J., said [R v. Rose, (1898) 18 Cox] :

“I observe that in this case bail was refused for the prisoner. It
cannot be too strongly impressed on the, magistracy of the
country that bail is not to be withheld as a punishment, but that
the requirements as to bail are merely to secure the attendance
of the prisoner at trial.”

11. The same principle has been reiterated by this Court in Gurbaksh
Singh Sibba v. State of Punjab
reported in (1980) 2 SCC 565 that the
object of bail is to secure the attendance of the accused at the trial, that the
proper test to be applied in the solution of the question whether bail should
be granted or refused is whether it is probable that the party will appear to
2025:HHC:4242
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take his trial and that it is indisputable that bail is not to be withheld as a
punishment.

12. Long back, in Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secy., State of Bihar
reported in (1980) 1 SCC 81, this court had declared that the right to
speedy trial of offenders facing criminal charges is “implicit in the broad
sweep and content of Article 21 as interpreted by this Court”. Remarking
that a valid procedure under Article 21 is one which contains a procedure
that is “reasonable, fair and just” it was held that:

“Now obviously procedure prescribed by law for depriving a
person of liberty cannot be “reasonable, fair or just”unless that
procedure ensures a speedy trial for determination of the guilt of
such person. No procedure which does not ensure a reasonably
quick trial can be regarded as “reasonable, fair or just” and it
would fall foul of Article 21. There can, therefore, be no doubt
that speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean reasonably
expeditious trial, is an integral and essential part of the
fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article21. The
question which would, however, arise is as to what would be the
consequence if a person accused of an offence is denied speedy
trial and is sought to be deprived of his liberty by imprisonment
as a result of along delayed trial in violation of his fundamental
right under Article 21.”

13. The aforesaid observations have resonated, time and again, in
several judgments, such as Kadra Pahadiya & Ors. v. State of Bihar
reported in (1981) 3 SCC 671 and Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak
reported in (1992) 1 SCC 225. In the latter the court re-emphasized the
right to speedy trial, and further held that an accused, facing prolonged
trial, has no option:

“The State or complainant prosecutes him. It is, thus, the obligation
of the State or the complainant, as the case maybe, to proceed with
the case with reasonable promptitude. Particularly, in this country,
where the large majority of accused come from poorer and weaker
sections of the society, not versed in the ways of law, where they do
2025:HHC:4242
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not often get competent legal advice, the application of the said rule
is wholly inadvisable. Of course, in a given case, if an accused
demands speedy trial and yet he is not given one,may be a relevant
factor in his favour. But we cannot disentitle an accused from
complaining of infringement of his right to speedy trial on the
ground that he did not ask for or insist upon a speedy trial.”

14. In Mohd Muslim @ Hussain v. State (NCT of Delhi) reported in
2023INSC 311, this Court observed as under:

“21. Before parting, it would be important to reflect that laws which
impose stringent conditions for grant of bail,may be necessary in
public interest; yet, if trials are not concluded in time, the injustice
wrecked on the individual is immeasurable. Jails are overcrowded
and their living conditions, more often than not, appalling.
According to the Union Home Ministry’s response to Parliament, the
National Crime Records Bureau had recorded that as on
31stDecember 2021, over 5,54,034 prisoners were lodged in jails
against total capacity of 4,25,069 lakhs in the country. Of these
122,852 were convicts; the rest 4,27,165 were undertrials.

22. The danger of unjust imprisonment, is that inmates are at risk
of “prisonisation” a term described by the KeralaHigh Court in A
Convict Prisoner v. State
reported in 1993Cri LJ 3242, as “a radical
transformation” whereby the prisoner:

“loses his identity. He is known by a number. He loses personal
possessions. He has no personal relationships. Psychological
problems result from loss of freedom,status, possessions, dignity
any autonomy of personal life. The inmate culture of prison
turns out to be dreadful. The prisoner becomes hostile by
ordinary standards. Self-perception changes.”

23. There is a further danger of the prisoner turning to crime, “as
crime not only turns admirable, but the more professional the
crime, more honour is paid to the criminal”(also see Donald
Clemmer’s ‘The Prison Community’ published in 1940).
Incarceration has further deleterious effects – where the accused
2025:HHC:4242
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belongs to the weakest economic strata: immediate loss of
livelihood, and in several cases, scattering of families as well as loss
of family bonds and alienation from society. The courts
therefore,have to be sensitive to these aspects (because in the event
of an acquittal, the loss to the accused is irreparable), and ensure
that trials – especially in cases, where special laws enact stringent
provisions, are taken up and concluded speedily.”

15. The requirement of law as being envisaged under Section 19 of the
National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 (hereinafter being referred to as
“the 2008 Act”) mandates that the trial under the Act of any offence by a
Special Court shall be held on day-to-day basis on all working days and
have precedence over the trial of any other case and Special Courts are to
be designated for such an offence by the Central Government in
consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court as contemplated
under Section 11 of the 2008.

16. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb
reported in (2021) 3 SCC 713] had an occasion to consider the long
incarceration and at the same time the effect of Section 43-D(5) of the UAP
Act and observed as under : (SCC p. 722, para 17)
“17. It is thus clear to us that the presence of statutory restrictions
like Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA per se does not oust the ability of
the constitutional courts to grant bail on grounds of violation of
Part III of the Constitution. Indeed,both the restrictions under a
statute as well as the powers exercisable under constitutional
jurisdiction can be well harmonised. Whereas at commencement of
proceedings,the courts are expected to appreciate the legislative
policy against grant of bail but the rigours of such provisions will
melt down where there is no likelihood of trial being completed
within a reasonable time and the period of incarceration already
undergone has exceeded a substantial part of the prescribed
sentence. Such an approach would safe-guard against the
possibility of provisions like Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA being used
2025:HHC:4242
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as the sole metric for denial of bail or for wholesale breach of
constitutional right to speedy trial.”

17. In the recent decision, Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau
of Investigation
reported in (2022) 10 SCC 51, prolonged incarceration
and inordinate delay engaged the attention of the court, which considered
the correct approach towards bail, with respect to several enactments,
including Section 37 NDPS Act. The court expressed the opinion that
Section 436A (which requires inter alia the accused to be enlarged on bail if
the trial is not concluded within specified periods) of the Criminal
Procedure Code
, 1973would apply:

“We do not wish to deal with individual enactments as each special
Act has got an objective behind it, followed by the rigour imposed.
The general principle governing delay would apply to these
categories also. To make it clear, the provision contained in Section
436-A of the Code would apply to the Special Acts also in the
absence of any specific provision. For example, the rigour as
provided under Section 37 of the NDPS Act would not come in the
way in such a case as we are dealing with the liberty of a person.
We do feel that more the rigour, the quicker the adjudication ought
to be. After all, in these types of cases number of witnesses would
be very less and there may not be any justification for prolonging
the trial. Perhaps there is a need to comply with the directions of
this Court to expedite the process and also a stricter compliance of
Section 309 of the Code.”

18. Criminals are not born out but made. The human potential in
everyone is good and so, never write off any criminal as beyond redemption.
This humanist fundamental is often missed when dealing with
delinquents,juvenile and adult. Indeed, every saint has a past and every
sinner a future. When a crime is committed, a variety of factors is
responsible for making the offender commit the crime. Those factors may be
social and economic, maybe, the result of value erosion or parental neglect;
may be, because of the stress of circumstances, or the manifestation of
2025:HHC:4242
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temptations in a milieu of affluence contrasted with indigence or other
privations.

19. If the State or any prosecuting agency including the court concerned
has no wherewithal to provide or protect the fundamental right of an
accused to have a speedy trial as enshrined under Article 21 of the
Constitution then the State or any other prosecuting agency should not
oppose the plea for bail on the ground that the crime committed is serious.
Article 21 of the Constitution applies irrespective of the nature of the
crime.”

9. Recently, in Tapas Kumar Palit v. State of Chhattisgarh

(Criminal Appeal No. 738 of 2025 arising of SLP (Criminal) No. 15971 of

2024) decided on 14.2.2025, the Hon’ble Apex Court has reiterated that

howsoever serious a crime may be the accused has a fundamental right of

speedy trial as enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. In the

afore case, accused was booked under Sections 10, 13, 17, 38(1)(2), 40, 22-

A and 22-C respectively of the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, 1967,

Sections 8(2), (3) and (5) of the Chhattisgarh Vishesh Jan Suraksha

Adhiniyam, 2005 and Sections 120B, 201 and 149 read with 34 of the

Indian Penal Code, 1860. In case under Section 10 of the Unlawful

Activities Prevention Act, there is provision of life imprisonment and death

sentence, however, in the afore case, Hon’ble Apex Court taking note of the

fact that accused is behind bars for more than five years and prosecution

has been not able to examine all the witnesses, proceeded to enlarge him

on bail on the ground of inordinate delay in conclusion of trial.

2025:HHC:4242
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10. Repeatedly, it has been held that one is deemed to be innocent

till the time guilt, if any, of his/her is not proved in accordance with law. In

the case at hand also, guilt, if any, of the accused is yet to be proved in

accordance with law, by leading cogent and convincing material on record.

Apprehension expressed by the learned Additional Advocate General that in

the event of petitioner’s being enlarged on bail, he may flee from justice,

can be best met by putting the bail petitioner to stringent conditions as has

been fairly stated by the learned counsel for the petitioner.

11. Needless to say, object of the bail is to secure the attendance of

the accused in the trial and the proper test to be applied in the solution of

the question whether bail should be granted or refused is whether it is

probable that the party will appear to take his trial. Otherwise, bail is not

to be withheld as a punishment. Otherwise also, normal rule is of bail and

not jail. Court has to keep in mind nature of accusations, nature of

evidence in support thereof, severity of the punishment which conviction

will entail, character of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to

the accused involved in that crime.

12. Hon’ble Apex Court in Criminal Appeal No. 227/2018,

Dataram Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr decided on 6.2.2018 has

held that freedom of an individual cannot be curtailed for indefinite period,
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14

especially when his/her guilt is yet to be proved. It has been further held by

the Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment that a person is believed

to be innocent until found guilty.

13. Hon’ble Apex Court in Sanjay Chandra versus Central Bureau

of Investigation (2012)1 Supreme Court Cases 49 has held that gravity

alone cannot be a decisive ground to deny bail, rather competing factors are

required to be balanced by the court while exercising its discretion. It has

been repeatedly held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that object of bail is to

secure the appearance of the accused person at his trial by reasonable

amount of bail. The object of bail is neither punitive nor preventative.

14. In Manoranjana Sinh alias Gupta versus CBI, (2017) 5 SCC

218, Hon’ble Apex Court has held that the object of the bail is to secure the

attendance of the accused in the trial and the proper test to be applied in

the solution of the question whether bail should be granted or refused is

whether it is probable that the party will appear to take his trial. Otherwise

also, normal rule is of bail and not jail. Apart from above, Court has to keep

in mind nature of accusations, nature of evidence in support thereof,

severity of the punishment, which conviction will entail, character of the

accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused involved in that

crime.

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15. The Apex Court in Prasanta Kumar Sarkar versus Ashis

Chatterjee and another (2010) 14 SCC 496, has laid down various

principles to be kept in mind, while deciding petition for bail viz. prima facie

case, nature and gravity of accusation, punishment involved, apprehension

of repetition of offence and witnesses being influenced.

16. In view of the aforesaid discussion as well as law laid down by

the Hon’ble Apex Court, bail petitioner has carved out a case for grant of

bail. Accordingly, the petition is allowed and the petitioner is ordered to be

enlarged on bail in aforesaid FIR, subject to his furnishing personal bond in

the sum of Rs. 5,00,000/- with one local surety in the like amount to the

satisfaction of concerned Chief Judicial Magistrate/trial Court, with

following conditions:

(a) He shall make himself available for the purpose of interrogation, if
so required and regularly attend the trial Court on each and every
date of hearing and if prevented by any reason to do so, seek
exemption from appearance by filing appropriate application;

(b) He shall not tamper with the prosecution evidence nor hamper
the investigation of the case in any manner whatsoever;

(c) He shall not make any inducement, threat or promises to any
person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade
him/her from disclosing such facts to the Court or the Police
Officer; and

(d) He shall not leave the territory of India without the prior
permission of the Court.

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17. It is clarified that if the petitioner misuses the liberty or violates

any of the conditions imposed upon him, the investigating agency shall be

free to move this Court for cancellation of the bail.

18. Any observations made hereinabove shall not be construed to

be a reflection on the merits of the case and shall remain confined to the

disposal of this application alone. The petition stands accordingly disposed

of.

19. The bail petitioner is permitted to produce copy of the order

downloaded from the High Court Website and the trial court shall not insist

for certified copy of the order, however, it may verify the order from the

High Court website or otherwise.

March 3, 2025                                          ( Sandeep Sharma ),
      (manjit)                                                 Judge
 



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