Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 30.07.2025 vs State Of H.P. And Others on 6 August, 2025
2025:HHC:26398
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MMO No. 703 of 2025
.
Reserved on: 30.07.2025
Date of Decision: 06.08.2025.
Balveer Singh ...Petitioner
Versus
State of H.P. and others
Coram
r to ...Respondents
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No.
For the Petitioner : Mr. Ram Lal Thakur,
Advocate.
For the Respondent/State : Mr. Jitender K. Sharma,
Additional Advocate General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition for
quashing of FIR No. 86 of 2025 dated 25.6.2025, registered for
the commission of offences punishable under Sections 126(2)
and 115(2) of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), at Police
Station Dhalli, District Shimla, H.P., based on the compromise
effected between the parties.
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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2. Mr. Ram Lal Thakur, learned counsel for the
petitioner, submitted that even though these offences are
.
compoundable yet the police have not filed the charge sheet
before the Court and, therefore, the FIR should be quashed based
on the compromise between the parties. He relied upon the
judgments titled Ramgopal & Anr. Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh Cr.
Appeal No. 1489 of 2012, decided on 29.9.2021, Sunita Devi Vs. State
of H.P. Cr.MP(M) No. 576 of 2022, decided on 5.8.2022 and Jagsir
Singh Vs. State of H.P. and another, 2024:PHHC:152133 in support
of his submission.
3. I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
4. The submission that the police have not yet filed the
charge sheet before the Court is contrary to the prayer made in
the petition wherein it was stated that the FIR and consequential
proceedings arising out of the FIR be quashed. It is undisputed
that the offences punishable under Section 126(2) and 115(2) of
BNS are compoundable under Section 259(1) of Bhartiya Nagrik
Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS). Therefore, the petitioner has an
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alternative remedy to approach the learned Trial Court for
compounding the offences.
.
5. It was held in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra
(1977) 4 SCC 551: 1978 SCC (Cri) 10 that inherent power should not
be exercised when a specific remedy exists. It was observed:
“At the outset, the following principles may be noticed
in relation to the exercise of the inherent power of the
High Court, which have been followed ordinarily and
generally, almost invariably, barring a few exceptions:
“(1) That the power is not to be resorted to if there
is a specific provision in the Code for the redress of
the grievance of the aggrieved party;
(2) That it should be exercised very sparingly to
prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwiseto secure the ends of justice;
(3) That it should not be exercised as against the
express bar of law engrafted in any other provisionof the Code.”
6. It was laid down by the Full Bench of Delhi High
Court in Gopal Dass vs State AIR 1978 Del 138 that the jurisdiction
under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is vested in the Court to make such
order as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the
Code, prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to
secure the ends of justice. This jurisdiction cannot be exercised
when a specific remedy is available under the other provisions of
the Code. It was observed: –
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“8. In order to determine the question under
consideration, as to consider the scope of the inherent
powers of the High Court becomes relevant. The
inherent powers of the High Court inhere in it because of.
its being at the apex of the judicial set-up in a State. The
inherent powers of the High Court, preserved by section
482 of the Code, are to be exercised in making orders as
may be necessary to give effect to any order under the
Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Section 482
envisages that nothing in the Code shall be deemed to
limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court
exercised by it with the object of achieving the above-
said three results. It is for this reason that section 482
does not prescribe the contours of the inherent powers
of the High Court, which are wide enough to be exercised
in suitable cases to afford relief to an aggrieved party.
While exercising inherent powers, it has to be borne in
mind that this power cannot be exercised in regard to
matters specifically covered by the other provisions of
the Code. (See R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 S.C.
866) (1). This principle of law had been reiterated
succinctly by the Supreme Court recently in Palanippa
Gounder v. The State of Tamil Nadu, (1977) 2 SCC 634: AIR
1977 S.C. 1323 (2) therein examining the scope of section
482 it was observed that a provision which saves the
inherent powers of a Court cannot override any express
provision in the statute which saves that power. Putting
it in another form, the Court observed that if there is an
express provision in a statute governing a particular subject,
there is no scope for invoking or exercising the inherent
powers of the Court because the Court ought to apply the
provisions of the statute which are made advisedly to govern
the particular subject matter.” (Emphasis supplied)
7. It was held in Arun Shankar Shukla v. State of U.P.,
(1999) 6 SCC 146: 1999 SCC (Cri) 1076: 1999 SCC OnLine SC 647 that
the jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is extraordinary and
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should not be exercised when a specific remedy has been
provided under the Code. It was observed:
.
“2. It appears that, unfortunately, the High Court, by
exercising its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of
the Criminal Procedure Code (for short “the Code”), hasprevented the flow of justice on the alleged contention of
the convicted accused that it was polluted by the so-
called misconduct of the judicial officer. It is true that
under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court hasinherent powers to make such orders as may be necessary
to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent
the abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure
the ends of justice. But the expressions “abuse of the processof law” or “to secure the ends of justice” do not confer
unlimited jurisdiction on the High Court, and the alleged
abuse of the process of law or the ends of justice could only be
secured in accordance with law, including procedural law
and not otherwise. Further, inherent powers are in the natureof extraordinary powers to be used sparingly for achieving
the object mentioned in Section 482 of the Code in cases
where there is no express provision empowering the HighCourt to achieve the said object. It is well-nigh settled that
inherent power is not to be invoked in respect of any mattercovered by specific provisions of the Code or if its exercise
would infringe any specific provision of the Code. In the
present case, the High Court overlooked the procedurallaw which empowered the convicted accused to prefer a
statutory appeal against the conviction of the offence.
The High Court has intervened at an uncalled-for stage
and soft-pedalled the course of justice at a very crucial
stage of the trial.
xxxxx
9. In our view, the order passed by the High Court
entertaining the petition of the convicted accused under
Section 482 of the Code is, on the face of it, illegal,
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2025:HHC:26398known to the High Court that the trial court passed
proceedings to the effect that a final judgment and order
convicting the accused were pronounced by the trial
court. It was also recorded by the trial court that, as the.
accused were absent, the Court had issued non-bailable
warrants. In such a situation, instead of directing the
accused to remain present before the Court for resortingto the steps contemplated by the law for passing the
sentence, the High Court has stayed further proceedings,
including the operation of the non-bailable warrants
issued by the trial court. It is disquieting that the High Courthas overlooked the important legal aspect that the accused
has a right of appeal against the order of conviction
purported to have been passed by the trial court. In such
circumstances, the High Court ought not to have entertaineda petition under Section 482 of the Code and stonewalled the
very efficacious alternative remedy of appeal as provided in
the Code. Merely because the accused made certain
allegations against the trial judge, the substantive law
cannot be bypassed.
8. It was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hamida
v. Rashid (2008) 1 SCC 474 that the inherent jurisdiction under
Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is to be exercised sparingly and should not
be exercised when an alternative remedy is available. It was
observed:
“7. It is a well-established principle that inherent power
conferred on the High Courts under Section 482 CrPC has
to be exercised sparingly with circumspection and in rare
cases, and that too to correct patent illegalities or when
some miscarriage of justice is done. The content and
scope of power under Section 482 CrPC were examined in
considerable detail in Madhu Limaye v. State of
Maharashtra [(1977) 4 SCC 551: 1978 SCC (Cri) 10: AIR 1978
SC 47], and it was held as under: (SCC p. 555, para 8)::: Downloaded on – 06/08/2025 21:31:36 :::CIS
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2025:HHC:26398The following principles may be stated in relation to
the exercise of the inherent power of the High Court:
(1) that the power is not to be resorted to if there is
.
a specific provision in the Code for the redress of
the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(2) that it should be exercised very sparingly to
prevent abuse of the process of any court or
otherwise to secure the ends of justice;
(3) that it should not be exercised as against the
express bar of law engrafted in any other provision
of the Code.
8. In State v. Navjot Sandhu [(2003) 6 SCC 641: 2003 SCC
(Cri) 1545], after a review of a large number of earlier
decisions, it was held as under: (SCC p. 657, para 29)
“29. … The inherent power is to be used only in cases
where there is an abuse of the process of the court or
where interference is absolutely necessary for securing
the ends of justice. The inherent power must be
exercised very sparingly, as cases which require
interference would be few and far between. The most
common case where inherent jurisdiction is generally
exercised is where criminal proceedings are required
to be quashed because they are initiated illegally,
vexatiously or without jurisdiction. Most of the cases
set out hereinabove fall in this category. It must be
remembered that the inherent power is not to be
resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code
or any other enactment for redress of the grievance of
the aggrieved party. This power should not be
exercised against an express bar of law engrafted in
any other provision of the Criminal Procedure Code.
This power cannot be exercised as against an express
bar in some other enactment.”
9. In Arun Shankar Shukla v. State of U.P. [(1999) 6 SCC 146:
1999 SCC (Cri) 1076] the High Court had entertained a
petition under Section 482 CrPC after an order of
conviction had been passed by the Sessions Judge and::: Downloaded on – 06/08/2025 21:31:36 :::CIS
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2025:HHC:26398before the sentence had been awarded and further
proceedings in the case had been stayed. In appeal, this
Court set aside the order of the High Court after
reiterating the principle that it is well settled that.
inherent power is not to be invoked in respect of any
matter covered by specific provisions of the Code or if its
exercise would infringe any specific provision of the Code.
It was further observed that the High Court overlooked
the procedural law which empowered the convicted
accused to prefer a statutory appeal against conviction of
the offence and intervened at an uncalled-for stage andsoft-pedalled the course of justice at a very crucial stage
of the trial. The order of the High Court was accordingly
set aside on the ground that a petition under Section 482
CrPC could not have been entertained as the accused hadan alternative remedy of an appeal as provided in the
Code. It is not necessary to burden this judgment with other
decisions of this Court, as the consistent view throughout has
been that a petition under Section 482 CrPC cannot be
entertained if there is any other specific provision in the Codeof Criminal Procedure for redress of the grievance of the
aggrieved party.
10. In the case in hand, the respondents-accused could
apply for bail afresh after the offence had been converted
into one under Section 304 IPC. They deliberately did not
do so and filed a petition under Section 482 CrPC in order
to circumvent the procedure whereunder they would have
been required to surrender, as the bail application could
be entertained and heard only if the accused were in
custody. It is important to note that no order adverse to
the respondents-accused had been passed by any court,
nor was there any miscarriage of justice or any illegality.
In such circumstances, the High Court committed a
manifest error of law in entertaining a petition under
Section 482 CrPC and issuing a direction to the
subordinate court to accept the sureties and bail bonds for
the offence under Section 304 IPC. The effect of the order
passed by the High Court is that the accused after getting
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bail in an offence under Sections 324, 352 and 506 IPC on
the very day on which they were taken into custody, got
an order of bail in their favour even after the injured had
succumbed to his injuries and the case had been
.
converted into one under Section 304 IPC without any
court examining the case on merits, as it stood after
conversion of the offence. The procedure laid down for
the grant of bail under Section 439 CrPC, though available
to the respondents-accused, having not been availed of,
the exercise of power by the High Court under Section 482
CrPC is clearly illegal and the impugned order passed by it
has to be set aside.” (Emphasis supplied)
9. Similarly, it was held in B.S. Joshi vs. State of Haryana
2003 (4) SCC 675 that the High Court can quash the F.I.R. for
non-compoundable offences based on compromise, indicating
that the jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. should not be
exercised regarding offences that are compoundable under
Section 320 of Cr.P.C., except in exceptional cases.
10. In the present case, the petition is silent as to why
the petitioner could not approach the learned Trial Court for
compounding the offences, rather it is stated in para 8 of the
petition that the petitioner has no alternative or efficacious
remedy except to approach the Court by way of filing the
petition which is factually incorrect because the remedy for
approaching the learned Trial Court is available to the petitioner.
The offences are compoundable without seeking permission of
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the Court under Section 359(1) of BNSS, and it cannot be said
that the petitioner is not likely to get the permission from the
.
Court, which forms a reason for the petitioner to approach this
Court.
11. In Ram Gopal (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
considered the quashing of FIR registered under Section 3
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, 1989 (SC/ST Act) and Sections 294, 323 and 306
read with Section 34 of the IPC. The offences punishable under
Sections 326 and 294 of the IPC and Section 3 of the SC/ST Act
are non-compoundable. Therefore, the cited judgment will not
assist the petitioner. In Sunita Devi (supra), the Court did not
consider the provisions of Section 320 of Cr.P.C., and this
judgment will also not help the petitioner. In Jagsir Singh
(supra), it was specifically held that the offences punishable
under Sections 297, 299, 300, 184(1) of BNS are not
compoundable under Section 359 of BNSS. Therefore, the cited
judgments do not apply to the present case, and no advantage
can be derived from the judgments cited on behalf of the
petitioner.
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12. In view of the above, the present petition fails, and
the same is dismissed.
.
13. The petition stands disposed of, so also the pending
miscellaneous applications, if any.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
6th August 2025
(Chander)
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