Uttarakhand High Court
4 July vs Lokendra Verma on 4 July, 2025
2025:UHC:5795
HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL
Appeal From Order No.241 of 2020
04 July, 2025
State of U.P. & Ors. --Appellants
Versus
Lokendra Verma --Respondent
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Presence:-
Mr. I.D. Paliwal, Standing Counsel for the State of U.P./appellants.
Mr. Harshit Sanwal, Advocate holding brief of Mr. Vijay Bhatt, Advocate for the respondent
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Hon'ble Subhash Upadhyay, J.
Present appeal from order has been filed under
Section 37 of The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996,
(for short, the Act) challenging the judgment dated
18.05.2016 passed by District Judge, Haridwar in Misc.
Case No.93 of 2014, whereby the objection filed by the
appellants under Section 34 of the Act, was rejected and
the order dated 01.03.2013 passed by Sole Arbitrator in
Arbitration Case No.16 of 2007, was upheld.
2. The sole Arbitrator was appointed to adjudicate
the claim between the appellants/Superintending Engineer,
U.P., Irrigation Department, Upper Ganga Canal Modernisation
Circle Ist, Haridwar Road, Roorkee and the respondent Lokendra
Verma qua payment of dues towards the construction of
Stop Log Structure at Km. 29.250 of Parallel Upper Ganga
Canal at Roorkee, Haridwar. The date of commencement of
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work was settled as 08.02.1994 and the entire work was
required to be completed upto 07.08.1995. The Arbitration
Case No.16/2007 was decided on 01.03.2013 and the
appellants were directed to pay to the respondent a sum of
Rs.19,77,251/- within a period of two months, failing which
interest @ 18% per annum was to be paid. Against the
Award passed by the Arbitrator on 01.03.2013, the
appellants preferred Objections u/s 34 of the Act before the
District Judge, Haridwar. Learned District Judge, Haridwar,
vide judgment dated 18.05.2016 rejected the objection of
the appellants. Hence, this appeal has been filed by the
appellants along with the Delay Condonation Application.
3. As per the report of Registry, there is a delay of
1560 days in filing the present appeal. The appellants have
stated the reasons for such inordinate delay in paragraphs
nos.3 to 17 of the affidavit filed in support of Delay
Condonation Application, which are reproduced below:-
“3. That the learned Civil Judge (S.D.) Dehradun passed
the impugned judgment on 18.05.2016.
4. That thereafter the legal opinion of the D.G.C. (Civil)
was obtained by the appellants, who opined that the
Judgment dated 18.05.2016 should be challenged before
the Hon’ble High Court Nainital. True and correct copy of
the Legal Opinion of the DGC (Civil) Saharanpur, dated
23.11.2016 is annexed and marked as Annexure No.A-1.
5. That after receiving the legal opinion of the D.G.C.
(Civil) the Executive Engineer, Northern Division, Ganga
Canal, Roorkee, wrote letter to the Superintending2
2025:UHC:5795Engineer, Ganga Canal Sanchalan Mandal, Meerut, for
seeking permission of the State Law Department for
granting sanction to file appeal against the Judgment
dated 18.05.2016. True and correct copy of the letter
no.244/m[kxUk:@dksVZ dsl dated 13.01.2017 is annexed and
marked as Annexure No.A-2.
6. That thereafter, vide letter no.2930/m[kxu:@dksVZ dsl]
dated 17.07.2018, a reminder was sent to the
Superintending Engineer, Ganga Canal Sanchalan Mandal,
Meerut. True and correct copy of the letter no.2930
m[kxu:@dksVZ dsl] dated 17.07.2018 is annexed and marked
as Annexure No.A-3.
7. That thereafter, the proposal to file appeal against the
Judgment dated 18.05.2016 was forwarded by the
Superintending Engineer, Ganga Canal Sanchalan Mandal,
Meerut to the Chief Engineer (Ganga), Irrigation and Water
Resources Department, Uttar Pradesh, Meerut, vide letter
no.4034/ xaule@dksVZ dsl dated 13.08.2018. True and correct
copy of the letter no.4034/ xaule@dksVZ dsl dated 13.08.2018
is annexed and marked as Annexure No.A-4.
8. That the Chief Engineer (Ganga), Irrigation and Water
Resources Department, Uttar Pradesh, Meerut, vide letter
no.10546/eqvxaxk@,l&3@dksVZ dsl dated 30.08.2018 forwarded
the proposal to Chief Engineer (Parivad), office of the
Engineer-in-Chief, Irrigation and Water Resources
Department, Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow. True and correct
copy of the letter no.10546/eqvxaxk@,l&3@dksVZ dsl dated
30.08.2018 is annexed and marked as Annexure No.A-4.
9. That thereafter, vide letter no.5254/yhxy lsy dated
07.09.2018, the Nodal Officer & Executive Engineer (Legal
Cell), office of the Engineer-in-Chief (Legal Cell) Irrigation
and Water Resources Department, Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow
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forwarded the proposal to the Chief Engineer (Advance
Planning), Irrigation and Water Resources Department,
Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow. True and correct copy of the letter
no.5254/yhxy lsy dated 07.09.2018 is annexed and marked
as Annexure No.A-6.
10. That thereafter, vide letter no.5430/yhxy lsy dated
04.10.2018 the proposal was forwarded to the Under
Secretary, Irrigation and Water Resources Section -3, Uttar
Pradesh Government, Lucknow. Tue and correct copy of
the letter no.5430/yhxy lsy dated 04.10.2018 is annexed
and marked as Annexure No.A-7.
11. That thereafter, further legal opinion from the Chief
Standing Counsel, High Court, Allahabad, for filing Appeal,
challenging the Order dated 18.05.2016 was proposed by
the Joint Secretary, Irrigation and Water Resources
Section-3, Uttar Pradesh Government, vide letter
no.1440/18-27-fl0&3-27-5 fookpu /15 dated 30.10.2018.
True and correct copy of the letter no. 1440/18-27-fl0&3-
27-5 fookpu /15 dated 30.10.2018 is annexed and marked
as Annexure No.A-8.
12. That after receiving Legal Opinion from the Chief
Standing Counsel, High Court, Allahabad, the proposal was
again forwarded to the Joint Secretary, Irrigation and
Water Resources Section -3, Uttar Pradesh Government,
vide letter no.220/ m[kxu:@dksVZ dsl dated 21.01.2019, after
which a reminder vide letter no.lh&171@m[kxu:@dksVZ dsl
dated 17.01.2020 was sent by the office of Executive
Engineer, Northern Division, Ganga Canal, Roorkee. True
and correct copies of the letters no. letter no.220/
m[kxu:@dksVZ dsl dated 21.01.2019 and letter no.
no.lh&171@m[kxu:@dksVZ dsl dated 17.01.2020 are annexed
and marked as Annexure No.A-9 & 10 respectively.
13. That the State Law Department U.P. Government,
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Lucknow granted sanction vide G.O. No.;w0vks0&636@lkr&U;k;-
6-20-05 fookpu /15 flapkbZ vuqHkkx&3 dated 12.02.2020 is
annexed herewith and marked as Annexure no.A-11 to this
affidavit.
14. That vide letter no.62/20-27-fla-3-05 fookpu /15 dated
25.02.2020, the State Government granted permission to
the Irrigation Department to file Appeal before the
Uttarakhand High Court, Nainital. True and correct copy of
the letter no. 62/20-27-fla-3-05 fookpu /15 dated
25.02.2020 is annexed herewith and marked as Annexure
no.A-12 to this affidavit.
15. That after receiving the requisite sanction to file the
present Appeal from the State Government, the requisite
and relevant documents were collected and the pairokar of
the appeal department was deputed to file the present
Appeal with a direction to contact with the Standing
Counsel, State of U.P., Uttarakhand High Court, Nainital.
16. That the pairokar reached the Nainital and contacted
with the Standing Counsel, State of U.P. Uttarakhand High
Court, Nainital on 23rd March 2020. Since some more
documents and a Certified Copy of the Impugned
Judgment dated 18.05.2016 were required by the Standing
Counsel to prepare the Appeal, the pairokar returned to
Roorkee.
17. That thereafter due to Covid-19 pandemic and
lockdown the matter was further delayed as the Courts
below were not functioning.”
4. The above referred facts depict that the
judgment dated 18.05.2016 was passed in presence of
counsel for the appellants and as such the appellants were
well aware of the aforesaid judgment. In para-4 of the
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affidavit filed in support of the delay condonation
application, it has been stated that legal opinion of the DGC
was obtained, who submitted his opinion on 23.11.2016,
however, there is no mention as to on which date the said
legal opinion was sought from the DGC and when the said
opinion was received by the Department. Thus, it is clear
that from 18.05.2016 till 23.11.2016 already six months
time period had elapsed.
5. Further, in para-5, it has been stated that
thereafter, the Executive Engineer, Northern Division, Ganga
Canal, Roorkee wrote a letter to the Superintending
Engineer on 13.01.2017 communicating the legal opinion of
the DGC for seeking permission to file the appeal. The
affidavit filed in support of the delay condonation
application further reveals that on 17.07.2018 a reminder
was sent to Superintending Engineer, Ganga Canal, Meerut,
thus, it took more than 18 months to the Department to
send a reminder to the higher authority, for filing the
appeal. During this period already a delay of 2 years and 2
months had occurred.
6. A perusal of other paragraphs of the affidavit
filed in support of delay condonation application further
reveals that as per the case of the appellants, again opinion
was sought from learned C.S.C., High Court of Allahabad
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and thus it took time in the movement of file from one table
to another, which resulted in filing of appeal in the month of
November, 2020 before this Court. Thus, in total 1560 days
of delay occurred in filing the appeal.
7. Objection to the delay condonation application
has been filed by the respondent wherein it is stated that
there is huge delay in filing the appeal and the appellants
have failed to show sufficient cause for such delay and
therefore the delay condonation application is liable to be
dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. Reliance has
been placed upon the judgment passed by Hon’ble Apex
Court in “State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. Vs. Bherulal“
(2020) 10 SCC 654 and “State of Bihar vs. Deo Kumar
Singh” SLP (Civil) Diary No.13348 of 2019.
8. Heard submissions of learned counsel for the
parties and perused the entire material available on file.
9. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of “Government
of Maharashtra vs. Borse Brothers Engineers” (2021)
6 SCC 460 while considering the aspect of condonation of
delay in appeals filed u/s 37 of Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996 held that merely because government is involved,
a different yardstick for condonation of delay cannot be laid
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down. Paragraphs 30, 31 and 55 to 63 of this judgment are
quoted below:-
30. The judgment in Kandla Export Corpn. v. OCI Corpn.,
(2018) 14 SCC 715 also observed:
“27. The matter can be looked at from a slightly
different angle. Given the objects of both the statutes, it
is clear that arbitration itself is meant to be a speedy
resolution of disputes between parties. Equally,
enforcement of foreign awards should take place as soon
as possible if India is to remain as an equal partner,
commercially speaking, in the international community. In
point of fact, the raison d’être for the enactment of the
Commercial Courts Act is that commercial disputes
involving high amounts of money should be speedily
decided. Given the objects of both the enactments, if we
were to provide an additional appeal, when Section 50
does away with an appeal so as to speedily enforce
foreign awards, we would be turning the 35 Arbitration
Act and the Commercial Courts Act on their heads.
Admittedly, if the amount contained in a foreign award to
be enforced in India were less than Rs 1 crore, and a
Single Judge of a High Court were to enforce such award,
no appeal would lie, in keeping with the object of speedy
enforcement of foreign awards. However, if, in the same
fact circumstance, a foreign award were to be for Rs 1
crore or more, if the appellants are correct, enforcement
of such award would be further delayed by providing an
appeal under Section 13(1) of the Commercial Courts Act.
Any such interpretation would lead to absurdity, and
would be directly contrary to the object sought to be
achieved by the Commercial Courts Act viz. speedy
resolution of disputes of a commercial nature involving a
sum of Rs 1 crore and over. For this reason also, we feel
that Section 13(1) of the Commercial Courts Act must be
construed in accordance with the object sought to be
achieved by the Act. Any construction of Section 13 of the
Commercial Courts Act, which would lead to further delay,
instead of an expeditious enforcement of a foreign award
must, therefore, be eschewed. Even on applying the
doctrine of harmonious construction of both statutes, it is
clear that they are best harmonised by giving effect to the
special statute i.e. the Arbitration Act, vis-à-vis the more
general statute, namely, the Commercial Courts Act,
being left to operate in spheres other than arbitration.”
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31. A recent judgment of this Court in ICOMM Tele Ltd. v.
Punjab State Water Supply and Sewerage Board, (2019) 4 SCC
401, states:
“25. Several judgments of this Court have also reiterated
that the primary object of arbitration is to reach a final
disposal of disputes in a speedy, effective, inexpensive
and expeditious manner. Thus, in Centrotrade Minerals &
Metal Inc. v. Hindustan Copper Ltd. [Centrotrade Minerals
& Metal Inc. v. Hindustan Copper Ltd., (2017) 2 SCC 228
: 36 (2017) 1 SCC (Civ) 593] , this Court held: (SCC p.
250, para 39)
’39. In Union of India v. U.P. State Bridge Corpn.
Ltd. [Union of India v. U.P. State Bridge Corpn.
Ltd., (2015) 2 SCC 52 : (2015) 1 SCC (Civ) 732]
this Court accepted the view [ Indu Malhotra, O.P.
Malhotra on the Law and Practice of Arbitration and
Conciliation (3rd Edn., Thomson Reuters, 2014).]
that the A&C Act has four foundational pillars and
then observed in para 16 of the Report that: (SCC
p. 64)
“16. First and paramount principle of the first
pillar is ‘fair, speedy and inexpensive trial by
an Arbitral Tribunal’. Unnecessary delay or
expense would frustrate the very purpose of
arbitration.”‘”
55. Reading the Arbitration Act and the Commercial
Courts Act as a whole, it is clear that when section 37 of the
Arbitration Act is read with either Article 116 or 117 of the
Limitation Act or section 13(1A) of the Commercial Courts Act,
the object and context provided by the aforesaid statutes, read
as a whole, is the speedy disposal of appeals filed under section
37 of the Arbitration Act. To read section 5 of the Limitation Act
consistently with the aforesaid object, it is necessary to discover
as to what the expression “sufficient cause” means in the
context of condoning delay in filing appeals under section 37 of
the Arbitration Act.
56. The expression “sufficient cause” contained in section
5 of the Limitation Act is elastic enough to yield different results
depending upon the object and context of a statute. Thus, in
Ajmer Kaur v. State of Punjab, (2004) 7 SCC 381, this Court, in
the context of section 11(5) of the Punjab Land Reforms Act,
1972, held as follows:
“10. Permitting an application under Section 11(5) to be
9
2025:UHC:5795moved at any time would have disastrous consequences.
The State Government in which the land vests on being
declared as surplus, will not be able to utilise the same.
The State Government cannot be made to wait indefinitely
before putting the land to use. Where the land is utilised
by the State Government, a consequence of the order
passed subsequently could be of divesting it of the land.
Taking the facts of the present case by way of an
illustration, it would mean that the land which stood
mutated in the State Government in 1982 and which was
allotted by the State Government to third parties in 1983,
would as a result of reopening the settled position, lead to
third parties being asked to restore back the land to the
State Government and the State Government in turn
would have to be divested of the land. The land will in
turn be restored to the landowner. This will be the result
of the land being declared by the Collector as not surplus
with the landowner. The effect of permitting such a
situation will be that the land will remain in a situation of
flux. There will be no finality. The very purpose of the
legislation will be defeated. The allottee will not be able to
utilise the land for fear of being divested in the event of
deaths and births in the family of the landowners. Deaths
and births are events which are bound to occur.
Therefore, it is reasonable to read a time-limit in sub-
section (5) of Section 11. The concept of reasonable time
in the given facts would be most appropriate. An
application must be moved within a reasonable time. The
facts of the present case demonstrate that
redetermination under sub-section (5) of Section 11
almost 5 years after the death of Kartar Kaur and more
than 6 years after the order of the Collector declaring the
land as surplus had become final, has resulted in grave
injustice besides defeating the object of the legislation
which was envisaged as a socially beneficial piece of
legislation. Thus we hold that the application for
redetermination filed by Daya Singh under sub-section (5)
of Section 11 of the Act on 21-6-1985 was 58 liable to be
dismissed on the ground of inordinate delay and the
Collector was wrong in reopening the issue declaring the
land as not surplus in the hands of Daya Singh and Kartar
Kaur.
11. The above reasoning is in consonance with the
provision in sub-section (7) of Section 11 of the Act.
Subsection (7) uses the words “where succession has10
2025:UHC:5795opened after the surplus area or any part thereof has
been determined by the Collector …”. The words
“determined by the Collector” would mean that the order
of the Collector has attained finality. The provisions
regarding appeals, etc. contained in Sections 80-82 of the
Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887, as made applicable to
proceedings under the Punjab Land Reforms Act, 1972,
show that the maximum period of limitation in case of
appeal or review is ninety days. The appeal against the
final order of the Collector dated 30-9- 1976 whereby
3.12 hectares of land had been declared as surplus was
dismissed on 27-3-1979. The order was allowed to
become final as it was not challenged any further. Thus
the determination by the Collector became final on 27-3-
1979. The same could not be reopened after a lapse of
more than 6 years by order dated 23-7-1985. The
subsequent proceedings before the Revenue Authorities
did not lie. The order dated 23-7-1985 is non est. All the
subsequent proceedings therefore fall through. The issue
could not have been reopened.” (emphasis supplied)
57. Nearer home, in Brahampal v. National Insurance
Company, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 1053, this Court specifically
referred to the difference between a delay in filing commercial
claims under the Arbitration Act or the Commercial Courts Act
and claims under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, as follows:
“14. This Court has firstly held that purpose of
conferment of such power must be examined for the
determination of the scope of such discretion conferred
upon the court. [refer to Bhaiya Punjalal Bhagwandin v.
Dave Bhagwatprasad Prabhuprasad, AIR 1963 SC 120; Shri
Prakash Chand Agarwal v. Hindustan Steel Ltd., (1970) 2
SCC 806]. Our analysis of the purpose of the Act suggests
that such discretionary power is conferred upon the Courts,
to enforce the rights of the victims and their dependents.
The legislature intended that Courts must have such power
so as to ensure that substantive justice is not trumped by
technicalities.
* * *
20. Therefore, the aforesaid provision being a
beneficial legislation, must be given liberal interpretation to
serve its object. Keeping in view the substantive rights of
the parties, undue emphasis should not be given to
technicalities. In such cases delay in filing and refiling11
2025:UHC:5795cannot be viewed strictly, as compared to commercial
claims under the Arbitration and Concilliation Act, 1996 or
the Commercial Courts Act, 2015.
21. In P. Radha Bai v. P. Ashok Kumar, (2019) 13
SCC 445, wherein this Court while interpreting Section 34
of the Arbitration Act, held that the right to object to an
award itself is substantively bound with the limitation period
prescribed therein and the same cannot merely a
procedural prescription. In effect the Court held that a
complete petition, has to be filed within the time prescribed
under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and ‘not thereafter’.
The Court while coming to the aforesaid conclusion,
reasoned as under:
“36.1 First, the purpose of the Arbitration Act was to
provide for a speedy dispute resolution process. The
Statement of Objects and Reasons reveal that the
legislative intent of enacting the Arbitration Act was to
provide parties with an 60 efficient alternative dispute
resolution system which gives litigants an expedited
resolution of disputes while reducing the burden on the
courts. Article 34(3) reflects this intent when it defines
the commencement and concluding period for
challenging an award. This Court in Popular
Construction case [Union of India v. Popular
Construction Co., (2001) 8 SCC 470] highlighted the
importance of the fixed periods under the Arbitration
Act. We may also add that the finality is a fundamental
principle enshrined under the Arbitration Act and a
definitive time limit for challenging an award is
necessary for ensuring finality. If Section 17 were to be
applied, an award can be challenged even after 120
days. This would defeat the Arbitration Act‘s objective of
speedy resolution of disputes. The finality of award
would also be in a limbo as a party can challenge an
award even after the 120 day period.”
Coming back to the Motor Vehicles Act, the legislative intent
is to provide appropriate compensation for the victims and
to protect their substantive rights, in pursuit of the same,
the interpretation should not be as strict as commercial
claims as elucidated above.
22. Undoubtedly, the statute has granted the
Courts with discretionary powers to condone the delay,
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however at the same time it also places an obligation
upon the party to justify that he was prevented from
abiding by the same due to the existence of “sufficient
cause”. Although there exists no strait jacket formula
for the Courts to condone delay, but the Courts must
not only take into consideration the entire facts and
circumstances of case but also the conduct of the
parties. The concept of reasonableness dictates that,
the 61 Courts even while taking a liberal approach must
weigh in the rights and obligations of both the parties.
When a right has accrued in favour of one party due to
gross negligence and lackadaisical attitude of the other,
this Court shall refrain from exercising the aforesaid
discretionary relief.
23. Taking into consideration the facts and
circumstances of the present case, we are of the opinion
that the delay of 45 days has been properly explained
by the appellants, which was on account of illness of the
wife of Appellant No. 1. It was not appropriate on the
part of the High Court to dismiss the appeal merely on
the ground of delay of short duration, particularly in
matters involving death in motor accident claims.
Moreover, in the present case no mala fide can be
imputable against the appellants for filing the appeal
after the expiry of ninety days. Therefore, we are of the
opinion that the strict approach taken in the impugned
order is hyper-technical and cannot be sustained in the
eyes of law.”
58. Given the object sought to be achieved under both the
Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act, that is, the
speedy resolution of disputes, the expression “sufficient cause”
is not elastic enough to cover long delays beyond the period
provided by the appeal provision itself. Besides, the expression
“sufficient cause” is not itself a loose panacea for the ill of
pressing negligent and stale claims. This Court, in Basawaraj v.
Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81, has held:
“9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the
defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The
meaning of the 62 word “sufficient” is “adequate” or
“enough”, inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the
purpose intended. Therefore, the word “sufficient”
embraces no more than that which provides a platitude,
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which when the act done suffices to accomplish the
purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing
in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a
reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context,
“sufficient cause” means that the party should not have
acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona
fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a
case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted
diligently” or “remained inactive”. However, the facts and
circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground
to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for
the reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it
has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy
the court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause”
from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory
explanation is furnished, the court should not allow the
application for condonation of delay. The court has to
examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely
a device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra Land
and Building Corpn. Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee [AIR 1964
SC 1336] , Mata Din v. A. Narayanan [(1969) 2 SCC 770 :
AIR 1970 SC 1953] , Parimal v. Veena [(2011) 3 SCC 545
: (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 1 : AIR 2011 SC 1150] and Maniben
Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai
[(2012) 5 SCC 157 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24 : AIR 2012
SC 1629] .
10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [AIR 1964
SC 993] this Court explained the difference between a
“good cause” and a “sufficient cause” and observed that
every “sufficient cause” is a good cause and vice versa.
However, if any difference exists it can only be that the
requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser
degree of proof than that of “sufficient cause”.
11. The expression “sufficient cause” should be
given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial
justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or
lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party
concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been
furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case
and no straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide Madanlal v.
Shyamlal [(2002) 1 SCC 535 : AIR 2002 SC 100] and
Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195 : AIR
2002 SC 1201])
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12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of
limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has
to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so
prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period
of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from
a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no
power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers
a distress resulting from its operation.” The statutory
provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a
particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce
it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex
sed lex which means “the law is hard but it is the law”,
stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently
been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to
be considered while interpreting a statute.
13. The statute of limitation is founded on public
policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to
suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to
prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past
which have not been agitated unexplainably and have
from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury’s
Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266:
“605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.–The courts
have expressed at least three differing reasons
supporting the existence of statutes of limitations
64 namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more
of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant
might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale
claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of
actions should pursue them with reasonable
diligence.”
An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of
insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation
prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have
been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or
what may have been lost by a party’s own inaction,
negligence or laches. (See Popat and Kotecha Property v.
SBI Staff Assn. [(2005) 7 SCC 510] , Rajender Singh v.
Santa Singh [(1973) 2 SCC 705 : AIR 1973 SC 2537] and
Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project [(2008) 17
SCC 448 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 907] .)
14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka
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[(2002) 4 SCC 578 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 830 : AIR 2002 SC
1856] this Court held that judicially engrafting principles
of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the
face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul
Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992
SCC (Cri) 93 : AIR 1992 SC 1701] .
15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the
effect that where a case has been presented in the court
beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court
as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an
adequate and enough reason which prevented him to
approach the court within limitation. In case a party is
found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part
in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to
have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there
cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No
court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate
delay by imposing any 65 condition whatsoever. The
application is to be decided only within the parameters
laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of
delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a
litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay
without any justification, putting any condition
whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of
the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing
utter disregard to the legislature.” (emphasis supplied)
59. Likewise, merely because the government is involved,
a different yardstick for condonation of delay cannot be laid
down. This was felicitously stated in Postmaster General v.
Living Media India Ltd., (2012) 3 SCC 563 [“Postmaster
General”], as follows:
“27. It is not in dispute that the person(s)
concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues
involved including the prescribed period of limitation for
taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave
petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a
separate period of limitation when the Department was
possessed with competent persons familiar with court
proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable
explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to
be condoned mechanically merely because the
Government or a wing of the Government is a party
before us.
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2025:UHC:5795
28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a
matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross
negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a
liberal concession has to be adopted to advance
substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts
and circumstances, the Department cannot take
advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on
account of impersonal machinery and inherited
bureaucratic 66 methodology of making several notes
cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies
being used and available. The law of limitation
undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government.
29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the
government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities
that unless they have reasonable and acceptable
explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort,
there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the
file was kept pending for several months/years due to
considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process.
The government departments are under a special
obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with
diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an
exception and should not be used as an anticipated
benefit for the government departments. The law shelters
everyone under the same light and should not be swirled
for the benefit of a few.”
60. The decision in Postmaster General (supra) has been
followed in the following subsequent judgments of this Court:
(i) State of Rajasthan v. Bal Kishan Mathur, (2014) 1 SCC 592
at paragraphs 8-8.2;
(ii) State of U.P. v. Amar Nath Yadav, (2014) 2 SCC 422 at
paragraphs 2-3;
(iii) State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709 at
paragraphs 11-13; and
(iv) State of M.P. v. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654 at
paragraphs 3-4.
61. In a recent judgment, namely, State of M.P. v. Chaitram
Maywade, (2020) 10 SCC 667, this Court referred to Postmaster
General (supra), and held as follows:
“1. The State of Madhya Pradesh continues to do
the same thing again and again and the conduct seems to
be incorrigible. The special leave petition has been filed17
2025:UHC:5795after a delay of 588 days. We had an occasion to deal
with such inordinately delayed filing of the appeal by the
State of Madhya Pradesh in State of M.P. v. Bherulal
[State of M.P. v. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654] in terms of
our order dated 15-10-2020.
2. We have penned down a detailed order in that
case and we see no purpose in repeating the same
reasoning again except to record what are stated to be
the facts on which the delay is sought to be condoned. On
5-1-2019, it is stated that the Government Advocate was
approached in respect of the judgment delivered on 13-
11-2018 [Chaitram Maywade v. State of M.P., 2018 SCC
OnLine HP 1632] and the Law Department permitted filing
of the SLP against the impugned order on 26-5-2020.
Thus, the Law Department took almost about 17 months’
time to decide whether the SLP had to be filed or not.
What greater certificate of incompetence would there be
for the Legal Department!
3. We consider it appropriate to direct the Chief
Secretary of the State of Madhya Pradesh to look into the
aspect of revamping the Legal Department as it appears
that the Department is unable to file appeals within any
reasonable period of time much less within limitation.
These kinds of excuses, as already recorded in the
aforesaid order, are no more admissible in view of the
judgment in Postmaster General v. Living Media (India)
Ltd. [Postmaster General v. Living Media (India) Ltd.,
(2012) 3 SCC 563 : (2012) 2 SCC 68 (Civ) 327 : (2012) 2
SCC (Cri) 580 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 649]
4. We have also expressed our concern that these
kinds of the cases are only “certificate cases” to obtain a
certificate of dismissal from the Supreme Court to put a
quietus to the issue. The object is to save the skin of
officers who may be in default. We have also recorded the
irony of the situation where no action is taken against the
officers who sit on these files and do nothing.
5. Looking to the period of delay and the casual
manner in which the application has been worded, the
wastage of judicial time involved, we impose costs on the
petitioner State of Rs 35,000 to be deposited with the
Mediation and Conciliation Project Committee. The
amount be deposited within four weeks. The amount be
recovered from the officer(s) responsible for the delay in
filing and sitting on the files and certificate of recovery of
the said amount be also filed in this Court within the said18
2025:UHC:5795period of time. We have put to Deputy Advocate General
to caution that for any successive matters of this kind the
costs will keep on going up.”
62. Also, it must be remembered that merely because sufficient
cause has been made out in the facts of a given case, there is
no right in the appellant to have delay condoned. This was
felicitously put in Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., (1962) 2 SCR
762 as follows:
“12. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even
after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not
entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a
matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a
condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary
jurisdiction vested in the court by s. 5. If sufficient cause
is not proved nothing 69 further has to be done; the
application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on
that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the
Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should
condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally
introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is
at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides
may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry
while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient
cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such
facts as the Court may regard as relevant. It cannot
justify an enquiry as to why the party was sitting idle
during all the time available to it. In this connection we
may point out that considerations of bona fides or due
diligence are always material and relevant when the Court
is dealing with applications made under s. 14 of the
Limitation Act. In dealing with such applications the Court
is called upon to consider the effect of the combined
provisions of ss. 5 and 14. Therefore, in our opinion,
considerations which have been expressly made material
and relevant by the provisions of s. 14 cannot to the
same extent and in the same manner be invoked in
dealing with applications which fall to be decided only
under s. 5 without reference to s. 14.”
63. Given the aforesaid and the object of speedy disposal
sought to be achieved both under the Arbitration Act and the
Commercial Courts Act, for appeals filed under section 37 of the
Arbitration Act that are governed by Articles 116 and 117 of the
Limitation Act or section 13(1A) of the Commercial Courts Act, a
19
2025:UHC:5795
delay beyond 90 days, 30 days or 60 days, respectively, is to be
condoned by way of exception and not by way of rule. In a fit
case in which a party has otherwise 70 acted bona fide and not
in a negligent manner, a short delay beyond such period can, in
the discretion of the court, be condoned, always bearing in mind
that the other side of the picture is that the opposite party may
have acquired both in equity and justice, what may now be lost
by the first party’s inaction, negligence or laches.”
10. Honble Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment,
while interpreting the scope and purpose of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act emphasized that the object sought to
be achieved by the Act is speedy disposal through
arbitration proceedings. In such circumstances, the Court
held that the period of limitation is to be followed and delay
can only be condoned in cases where sufficient cause is
shown by the party. The Court clarified that ‘sufficient
cause’ would mean that party seeking condonation of delay
has not acted in a negligent manner or it cannot be said
that such party was inactive or was not diligent in pursuing
his/her case.
11. In the present case, the appellants being the
State of U.P. were fully aware of the judgment dated
18.05.2016 from the very beginning, however, they acted in
a callous and negligent manner, resulting in an inordinate
delay of 1560 days in filing the appeal. The appellants have
failed to show any sufficient cause for such huge delay in
filing the appeal u/s 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation
20
2025:UHC:5795
Act. In such circumstances, this Court is of the considered
opinion that delay of 1560 days cannot be condoned.
Therefore, the delay condonation application is dismissed.
Consequently, the appeal also stands dismissed.
(Subhash Upadhyay, J.)
04.07.2025
Rajni
Digitally signed by RAJINI GUSAIN
DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF
RAJINI
UTTARAKHAND, ou=HIGH COURT OF
UTTARAKHAND,
2.5.4.20=97cfa6e4cbd49c07b876db4
8448ac3701a9ae475a2547e4b7f1d9b
1f17d01342, postalCode=263001,
GUSAIN
st=UTTARAKHAND,
serialNumber=8D039BC77BD1A2222
B4DF4FC80D4557562F95BEBA013F53
0616A158A0A878BD8, cn=RAJINI
GUSAIN
Date: 2025.07.08 22:31:37 -07’00’
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