Uttarakhand High Court
5 March vs Suresh Chandra on 5 March, 2025
Author: Manoj Kumar Tiwari
Bench: Manoj Kumar Tiwari, Vivek Bharti Sharma
2025:UHC:1518-DB
HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL
Writ Petition Service Bench No. 337 of 2021
05 March, 2025
State of Uttarakhand and another --Petitioners
Versus
Suresh Chandra --Respondent
Presence:-
Mr. J.P. Joshi, learned Additional Advocate General along with Mr.
G.S. Negi, learned Additional C.S.C for the State/petitioners.
Mr. A.S. Rawat, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. Girveer
Chand, learned counsel for the respondent.
Hon'ble Manoj Kumar Tiwari, J.
Hon'ble Vivek Bharti Sharma, J.
JUDGMENT:
(per Hon’ble Shri Manoj Kumar Tiwari, J)
This writ petition is directed against the
judgment and order dated 29.05.2020 passed by
Uttarakhand Public Services Tribunal, Dehradun in
Claim Petition No.71/DB/2019, “Suresh Chandra Vs.
State of Uttarakhand and another“.
2. By the said judgment, claim petition filed by
respondent was partly allowed and the punishment
imposed upon respondent was modified.
3. Operative portion of the judgment rendered by
learned Tribunal is extracted below:-
“41. The claim petition is partly allowed and
partly dismissed. Such part of the impugned order
(Annexure:A1) which provides for the recovery of
Rs.3478.89 is hereby affirmed. So far as the
remaining part of the impugned order relating to
stoppage of increments with cumulative effect is
concerned, the same is hereby set aside.”
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4. The judgment rendered by the learned Tribunal
is challenged mainly on the ground that learned Tribunal
has erred in holding that there are mitigating
circumstances for interfering with the quantum of
punishment, while there is no mitigating circumstance
whatsoever for such interference.
5. It is contended on behalf of the petitioners that
the Disciplinary Authority had imposed punishment of
stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect upon
respondent vide order dated 07.05.2019 and recovery of
₹3,478.89/- was also ordered to be made from
respondent by the same order.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits
that the punishment of stoppage of two increments with
cumulative effect was set aside by the learned Tribunal,
treating it to be excessive and only the order for recovery
of ₹3,478.89/- was maintained. This, according to
learned counsel for the petitioners, is impermissible as
there is no finding returned by the learned Tribunal that
the punishment imposed upon respondent was
shockingly disproportionate to the nature and gravity of
charges against respondent, which is condition precedent
for interfering with quantum of punishment.
7. In support of his first contention, learned State
Counsel has placed reliance upon the judgment rendered
by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of
India and another Vs. K.S. Vishwanath, (2022) 15
SCC 190. Paragraph nos.20 and 21 of the said judgment
are extracted below:-
“20. That thereafter this Court has observed
and held in paras 7, 8 and 15 as under: (N. Gangaraj
case [State of Karnataka v. N. Gangaraj, (2020) 3
SCC 423: (2020) 1 SCC (L&S) 547] , SCC pp. 426 &
430)
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“7. The disciplinary authority has taken
into consideration the evidence led before the
IO to return a finding that the charges levelled
against the respondent stand proved.
8. We find that the interference in the
order of punishment by the Tribunal as
affirmed [State of Karnataka v. N. Gangaraj,
2011 SCC OnLine Kar 4510] by the High Court
suffers from patent error. The power of judicial
review is confined to the decision-making
process. The power of judicial review conferred
on the constitutional court or on the Tribunal
is not that of an appellate authority.
***
15. The disciplinary authority agreed with
the findings of the enquiry officer and had
passed an order of punishment. An appeal
before the State Government was also
dismissed. Once the evidence has been
accepted by the departmental authority, in
exercise of power of judicial review, the
Tribunal or the High Court could not interfere
with the findings of facts recorded by
reappreciating evidence as if the courts are the
appellate authority. We may notice that the
said judgment has not noticed the larger Bench
judgments in S. Sree Rama Rao [State of
A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao, 1963 SCC OnLine SC
6 : AIR 1963 SC 1723] and B.C.
Chaturvedi [B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India,
(1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80] as
mentioned above. Therefore, the orders passed
by the Tribunal and the High Court [State of
Karnataka v. N. Gangaraj, 2011 SCC OnLine
Kar 4510] suffer from patent illegality and thus
cannot be sustained in law.”
21. Applying the law laid down by this Court in
the aforesaid decisions to the facts of the case on
hand, we are of the opinion that the High Court has
committed a grave error in interfering with the order
passed by the disciplinary authority dismissing the
respondent delinquent officer from service. The High
Court has erred in reappreciating the entire evidence
on record and thereafter interfering with the findings
of fact recorded by the enquiry officer and accepted
by the disciplinary authority. By interfering with the
findings recorded by the enquiry officer which as
such were on appreciation of evidence on record, the
order passed by the High Court suffers from patent
illegality. From the findings recorded by the enquiry
officer recorded hereinabove, it cannot be said that
there was no evidence at all which may reasonably
support the conclusion that the Delinquent officer is
guilty of the charge.”
[Emphasis Supplied]
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8. In support of second submission of learned
State Counsel that interference of Courts/Tribunal on the
quantum of punishment is permissible only when the
punishment imposed was shockingly disproportionate to
the nature and gravity of charge, learned State Counsel
has placed reliance on various judgments which shall be
discussed hereinafter.
9. Law is well settled that Courts should not
interfere with the decision taken by an Administrative
Authority unless it is shown that the decision is illogical
or suffers from procedural impropriety or is shocking to
the conscience of Court, in the sense that it is in defiance
of logic or moral standards, and Courts would not go into
the correctness of decision made by Administrative
Authority nor should they substitute its decision to that
of an Administrative Authority. The scope of judicial
review is limited to the deficiency in the decision making
process and not the decision itself.
10. Learned State Counsel also relied upon another
judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
case of Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank and another
Vs. Rajendra Singh reported in (2013) 12 SCC 372.
Paragraph nos.15 and 19 of the said judgment are
extracted below:-
“15. As is clear from the above that the judicial
review of the quantum of punishment is available with
a very limited scope. It is only when the penalty
imposed appears to be shockingly disproportionate to
the nature of misconduct that the courts would frown
upon. Even in such a case, after setting aside the
penalty order, it is to be left to the
disciplinary/appellate authority to take a decision
afresh and it is not for the court to substitute its
decision by prescribing the quantum of punishment.
16…..
17….
18….
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19. The principles discussed above can be
summed up and summarised as follows:
19.1. When charge(s) of misconduct is proved in
an enquiry the quantum of punishment to be imposed
in a particular case is essentially the domain of the
departmental authorities.
19.2. The courts cannot assume the function of
disciplinary/departmental authorities and to decide
the quantum of punishment and nature of penalty to
be awarded, as this function is exclusively within the
jurisdiction of the competent authority.
19.3. Limited judicial review is available to
interfere with the punishment imposed by the
disciplinary authority, only in cases where such
penalty is found to be shocking to the conscience of
the court.
19.4. Even in such a case when the punishment
is set aside as shockingly disproportionate to the
nature of charges framed against the delinquent
employee, the appropriate course of action is to remit
the matter back to the disciplinary authority or the
appellate authority with direction to pass appropriate
order of penalty. The court by itself cannot mandate
as to what should be the penalty in such a case.
19.5. The only exception to the principle stated
in para 19.4 above, would be in those cases where the
co-delinquent is awarded lesser punishment by the
disciplinary authority even when the charges of
misconduct were identical or the co-delinquent was
foisted with more serious charges. This would be on
the doctrine of equality when it is found that the
employee concerned and the co-delinquent are equally
placed. However, there has to be a complete parity
between the two, not only in respect of nature of
charge but subsequent conduct as well after the
service of charge-sheet in the two cases. If the co-
delinquent accepts the charges, indicating remorse
with unqualified apology, lesser punishment to him
would be justifiable.”
[Emphasis Supplied]
11. In the case of Indian Oil Corporation Limited
Vs. Rajendra D. Harmalkar (2022) 17 SCC 361,
Hon’ble Supreme Court considered and discussed various
judgments on the scope of judicial review of punishment
order passed in disciplinary proceedings. Paragraph
nos.19, 20, 21 and 29 of the said judgments are
reproduced below:
“19. In Om Kumar (2001) 2 SCC 386, this
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Court, after considering the Wednesbury principles
and the doctrine of proportionality, has observed and
held that the question of the quantum of punishment
in disciplinary matters is primarily for the
disciplinary authority to order and the jurisdiction of
the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution
or of the Administrative Tribunals is limited and is
confined to the applicability of one or other of the
well-known principles known as “Wednesbury
principles”. In Wednesbury Case, it was said that
when a statute gave discretion to an administrator to
take a decision, the scope of judicial review would
remain limited. Lord Greene further said that
interference was not permissible unless one or the
other of the following conditions was satisfied,
namely, the order was contrary to law, or relevant
factors were not considered, or irrelevant factors
were considered, or the decision was one which no
reasonable person could have taken.
20. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India (1995)
6 SCC 749, in para 18, this Court observed and held
as under: (SCC p. 762).
“18. A review of the above legal position
would establish that the disciplinary authority,
and on appeal the appellate authority, being
fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to
consider the evidence with a view to maintain
discipline. They are invested with the discretion
to impose appropriate punishment keeping in
view the magnitude or gravity of the
misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while
exercising the power of judicial review, cannot
normally substitute its own conclusion on
penalty and impose some other penalty. If the
punishment imposed by the disciplinary
authority or the appellate authority shocks the
conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it
would appropriately mould the relief, either
directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to
reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten
the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and
rare cases, impose appropriate punishment
with cogent reasons in support thereof.”
“21. In Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank v.
Rajendra Singh, in para 19, it was observed and held
as under: (SCC p. 382)
“19. The principles discussed above can
be summed up and summarised as follows:
19.1. When charge(s) of misconduct is
proved in an enquiry the quantum of
punishment to be imposed in a particular case
is essentially the domain of the departmental
authorities.
19.2. The courts cannot assume the
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function of disciplinary/departmental
authorities and to decide the quantum of
punishment and nature of penalty to be
awarded, as this function is exclusively within
the jurisdiction of the competent authority.
19.3. Limited judicial review is available
to interfere with the punishment imposed by
the disciplinary authority, only in cases where
such penalty is found to be shocking to the
conscience of the court.
19.4. Even in such a case when the
punishment is set aside as shockingly
disproportionate to the nature of charges
framed against the delinquent employee, the
appropriate course of action is to remit the
matter back to the disciplinary authority or the
appellate authority with direction to pass
appropriate order of penalty. The court by itself
cannot mandate as to what should be the
penalty in such a case.
19.5. The only exception to the principle
stated in para 19.4 above, would be in those
cases where the co-delinquent is awarded
lesser punishment by the disciplinary authority
even when the charges of misconduct were
identical or the co-delinquent was foisted with
more serious charges. This would be on the
doctrine of equality when it is found that the
employee concerned and the co-delinquent are
equally placed. However, there has to be a
complete parity between the two, not only in
respect of nature of charge but subsequent
conduct as well after the service of charge-
sheet in the two cases. If the co-delinquent
accepts the charges, indicating remorse with
unqualified apology, lesser punishment to him
would be justifiable.”
29. In any case in the facts and
circumstances of the case and for the reasons stated
above and considering the charge and misconduct of
producing the fake and false SSLC Certificate proved,
when a conscious decision was taken by the
disciplinary authority to dismiss him from service,
the same could not have been interfered with by the
High Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India. The High Court has
exceeded in its jurisdiction in interfering with the
order of punishment imposed by the disciplinary
authority while exercising its powers under Article
226 of the Constitution of India.”
12. In the case of State of Tamil Nadu and
Another Vs. M. Mangayarkarasi and Others (2019) 15
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SCC 515, Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that “the
imposition of a penalty in disciplinary proceeding lies in
the sole domain of the employer. Unless the penalty is
found to be shockingly disproportionate to the charges
which are proved, the element of discretion which is
attributed to the employer cannot be interfered with”.
13. In the case of U.P. State Road Transport
Corporation, Dehradun Vs. Suresh Pal (2006) 8 SCC
108, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in paragraph no.8 held
as under:-
“8. Normally, the courts do not substitute the
punishment unless they are shockingly
disproportionate and if the punishment is interfered
or substituted lightly in the punishment in exercise
of their extraordinary jurisdiction then it will amount
to abuse of the process of court. If such kind of
misconduct is dealt with lightly and the courts start
substituting the lighter punishment in exercising the
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution
then it will give a wrong signal in the society. All the
State Road Transport Corporations in the country
have gone in red because of the misconduct of such
kind of incumbents, therefore, it is time that
misconduct should be dealt with an iron hand and
not leniently.”
14. In the present case there is no finding by
learned Tribunal that the punishment imposed upon the
respondent is shockingly disproportionate to the gravity
of charge.
15. Learned Tribunal has pointed out certain
mitigating circumstances for imposing lesser punishment
upon the respondent, however, there is no finding that
the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority
was shockingly disproportionate to the nature and
gravity of charges. The course adopted by learned
Tribunal is not available to Court or Tribunal exercising
power of judicial review. Thus, in view of the law of the
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land, as discussed above, the impugned judgment is
unsustainable. Moreover, a Court or Tribunal can remit
the matter back to the Disciplinary Authority for
imposing appropriate penalty, if it comes to the
conclusion that punishment imposed is shockingly
disproportionate, but a Court cannot itself decide the
punishment to be given.
16. Mr. A.S. Rawat, learned Senior Counsel
appearing for respondent contended that the scheme in
question, namely, Accelerated Irrigation Benefit Scheme,
was looked after by the Assistant Engineer of the
concerned Sub-division, Gram Pradhan and Up-Pradhan
of the concerned village and his client had nothing to do
with the said scheme and he was charge-sheeted merely
because he happened to be Executive Engineer of the
concerned Division.
17. Learned counsel for the petitioners, however,
submits that this contention raised by learned Senior
Counsel for respondent is contrary to pleadings made in
paragraph no.11 of the counter affidavit.
18. Be that as it may, while exercising power of
judicial review in such matters, this Court does not sit in
appeal over the punishment order by reassessing
evidence and this Court has to examine as to whether
disciplinary inquiry was held, as per the applicable rules,
or the charge-sheeted employee was given reasonable
opportunity of defending himself. This Court will not
examine evidence so as to ascertain the extent of
culpability of the petitioners, in its writ jurisdiction.
19. As discussed above, impugned judgment
nowhere indicates that the punishment of withholding of
increments with cumulative effect is shockingly
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disproportionate to nature and gravity of charges. No
reason has also been indicated for interfering with the
quantum of punishment except that it is excessive. For
the reasons indicated above, impugned judgment dated
29.05.2020 deserves to be set aside and the same is
accordingly set aside.
20. Claim Petition No.71/DB/2019 is restored to
the file of learned Tribunal. Learned Tribunal shall decide
the claim petition filed by respondent, on merits afresh.
21. Pending applications, if any, also stand
disposed of.
( Vivek Bharti Sharma, J.) (Manoj Kumar Tiwari, J.)
05.03.2025
SS
Digitally signed by SUKHBANT SINGH
SUKHBANT DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND, ou=HIGH COURT OF
UTTARAKHAND,
2.5.4.20=71978f9c61bfde0ba69967c787b1764ea7bc7dd129a8a6380d49
b1885e628615, postalCode=263001, st=UTTARAKHAND,
SINGH serialNumber=2D8B71B8D8E345F6B7F95B1DD4FB4BEBD2B7D72C4226
1361AED33172F152148D, cn=SUKHBANT SINGH
Date: 2025.03.11 15:30:13 +05’30’
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