Allahabad High Court
Afzal And 4 Others vs State Of U.P. And Another on 24 February, 2025
Author: Rajeev Misra
Bench: Rajeev Misra
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD ?Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC:29049 Court No. - 71 Case :- APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 30167 of 2023 Applicant :- Afzal And 4 Others Opposite Party :- State of U.P. and Another Counsel for Applicant :- Indra Bhan Yadav,Sudhir Kumar Agarwal Counsel for Opposite Party :- Dinesh Kumar Singh,G.A. Hon'ble Rajeev Misra,J.
1. Heard Mr. Anoop Trivedi, the learned Senior counsel assisted by Mr. Indra Bhan Yadav, the learned counsel for applicants, the learned A.G.A. for State-opposite party-1 and Mr. Dinesh Kumar Singh, the learned counsel representing first informant-opposite party-2.
2. Perused the record.
3. Applicants-Afzal and 4 Others, who are charge sheeted accused and facing trial before Court below, have approached this Court by means of present application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. with the following prayer:-
“It is therefore, most respectfully prayed that the Hon’ble Court may be pleased to allow the present application and quash the entire proceeding of S.T. No. 1239 of 2023 (State Vs. Washil and others), arising out of Case Crime No. 625 of 2022 under section 307, 504, 506, 120-B I.P.C. Police Station Behat, District Saharanpur pending in the court of Additional Session Judge, Court No.1, Saharanpur in the light of compromise;
It is further be pleased to stay the further proceeding of the S.T. No. 1239 of 2023 (State Vs. Washil and others), arising out of Case Crime No. 625 of 2022 under section 307, 504, 506, 120-B I.P.C. Police Station Behat, District Saharanpur pending in the court of Additional Session Judge, Court No.1, Saharanpur in the light of compromise during pendency of present case before this Hon’ble Court, otherwise the applicants shall suffer irreparable loss and injury;
And/or pass such and further order which this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper under the facts and circumstances of case, in favour of applicants, so that justice may be done.”
4. At the very outset, it is apposite to mention here that present application was dismissed, vide judgment and order dated 31.10.2023 passed by His Lordship Hon’ble Raj Beer Singh J. For ready Reference, the order dated 31.10.2023 is reproduced herein below:-
“1. Heard learned counsel for the applicants, learned counsel for opposite party no. 2 and learned AGA for the State.
2. By means of the instant second application under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the applicants have prayed for quashing of the entire proceedings of S.T. No. 1239 of 2023, (State v. Washil & Ors.), arising out of Case Crime No. 625 of 2022, u/s 307, 504, 506, 120-B I.P.C., P.S. Behat, District Saharanpur, pending in the court of Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 1, Saharanpur.
3. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the applicants that as both the parties have amicably settled the dispute and compromised the matter, thus, on the basis of compromise arrived at between the parties, the impugned proceedings of the case may be quashed. In support of his contentions, learned counsel has placed reliance upon the case of Narinder Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Anr., [criminal appeal no. 686 of 2014], decided on 27.03.2014, Ramgopal v. The State of M.P., [criminal appeal no. 1489 of 2012], decided on 29.09.2021 and Dharmendra Singh & Anr. v. State of U.P. & Anr., [application u/s 482 No. 12094 of 2021], decided on 23.03.2022.
4. Learned counsel for opposite party no.2/informant has not opposed the application and submitted that as both the parties have compromised the matter, thus, the impugned proceedings may be quashed.
5. Learned A.G.A. has opposed the application and submitted that the applicants-accused have been summoned for the offence under Section 307 IPC, besides the other sections of IPC and that in the alleged incident, the injured has sustained serious firearm injuries and thus, the impugned proceedings must not be quashed on the basis of compromise between the parties. It is further submitted that the informant is being threatened by the accused persons for compromise and he has submitted an affidavit before the Circle Officer, Behat, Saharanpur, wherein, he has stated that he has not compromised the case and that the accused persons were pressurizing for compromise, copy of which has been produced before this Court and the same is taken on record.
6. I have considered rival submissions and perused the record.
7. At the outset, it may be mentioned that earlier applicants have approached this Court for quashing of proceedings by filing application u/s 482 Cr.P.C. No. 15915 of 2023, which was dismissed vide order dated 10.05.2023. This second application u/s 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed for quashing of the proceedings on the ground of compromise between the parties but the fact regarding earlier application was concealed in this second application.
8. So far as position of law on the point of quashing of proceedings on ground of settlement, is concerned, in Criminal Appeal No. 349 of 2019, State of Madhya Pradesh Versus Laxmi Narayan and others, decided on 05.03.2019, Hon’ble Apex Court after considering its earlier decisions in case of Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303; State of Rajasthan vs. Shambhu Kewat, (2014) 4 SCC 149; State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Deepak (2014) 10 SCC 285; State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Manish (2015) 8 SCC 307; J.Ramesh Kamath vs. Mohana Kurup (2016) 12 SCC 179; State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Rajveer Singh (2016) 12 SCC 471; Parbatbhai AAhir vs. State of Gujarat (2017) 9 SCC 641; and 2019 SCC Online SC 7, State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Kalyan Singh, decided on 4.1.2019 in Criminal Appeal No. 14/2019 and State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Dhruv Gurjar, decided on 22.02.2019 vide Criminal Appeal @ SLP(Criminal) No.9859/2013, has held as under:
“13. Considering the law on the point and the other decisions of this Court on the point, referred to hereinabove, it is observed and held as under:
i) that the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised having overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes and when the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves;
ii) such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involved heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society;
iii) similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences under the special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender;
iv) offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act etc. would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC and/or the Arms Act etc. which have a serious impact on the society cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code, on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to framing the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. However, such an exercise by the High Court would be permissible only after the evidence is collected after investigation and the charge sheet is filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not permissible when the matter is still under investigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paragraphs 29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of this Court in the case of Narinder Singh (supra) should be read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the circumstances stated hereinabove;
v) while exercising the power under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings in respect of non-compoundable offences, which are private in nature and do not have a serious impart on society, on the ground that there is a settlement/compromise between the victim and the offender, the High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the accused; the conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused was absconding and why he was absconding, how he had managed with the complainant to enter into a compromise etc.”
9. Keeping the aforesaid position of law in view, in the instant case, it is apparent from the record that the informant has lodged the first information report of this case, alleging that the accused persons have illegally taken over possession of his land and that they were continuously threatening to the informant and on 01.12.2022 while he was going on motorcycle to Saharanpur, accused-applicant No. 5 Washil stopped him and he abused and threatened to kill him and thereafter he fired a shot from a country made pistol and consequently the informant has sustained firearm injuries at his hand. The injury was superficial to muscle deep. The facts of the case of Narinder Singh & Ors. (supra), relied by learned counsel for the applicants, are quite different and that judgment pertains to the year 2013. In the aforesaid case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court has considered several earlier judgements and has given detailed guidelines. As per law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, an offence under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and such an offence has to be treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone and proceedings of such cases cannot be quashed on the basis of compromise. In the case of Ramgopal (supra), relied by learned counsel for the applicants, the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing of proceedings have to be exercised carefully and that nature and effect of the offence on the conscious of the society, seriousness of the injury and voluntary nature of compromise between the accused and the victim has to be considered. In the instant matter, it was also pointed out by learned AGA that the informant/victim is being threatened by the accused persons for compromise and he has submitted an affidavit before the police authority that he did not compromise the matter. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, applicants do not get any benefit from the case laws referred by learned counsel for the applicants.
10. Considering the fact that in the alleged incident, victim/informant has sustained firearm injuries and that on the behalf of the State it was submitted that the informant is being threatened by the accused persons for compromise and he was coerced to enter into the compromise, this Court does not find it a fit case for quashing the proceedings of the case on the basis of alleged compromise. Accordingly the instant application u/s 482 Cr.P.C. is hereby dismissed.”
5. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid order dated 31.10.2023, applicants approached the Supreme Court by filing Criminal Appeal No. 2008 of 2024 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 16038 of 2023 (Afzal and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Another). Aforesaid Criminal Appeal was allowed by the Apex Court, vide judgment and order dated 08.04.2024. For ready reference, the order dated 08.04.2024 is extracted herein under:-
“Leave granted.
Heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties.
The appellants filed a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for quashing the offence punishable under Sections 307, 504, 506, 120-B of the Indian Penal Code. The prayer was based on an amicable settlement between the appellants and the second respondent. Though before the High Court, as noted in the impugned judgment, the second respondent did not oppose the prayer, the State produced on record a copy of the affidavit sworn by the second respondent wherein he purported to state that he has not compromised the case and he was being pressurized by the appellants to compromise.
The submission of the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants is that firstly, a copy of the affidavit, referred in paragraph 5 of the impugned judgment, was not provided to the appellants. Secondly. he submits that by filing a counter affidavit in the present appeal, the second respondent has taken a stand that he had compromised the dispute.
There are two conflicting versions of the second respondent. Ultimately, when the prayer for quashing is based on the alleged settlement, the High Court ought to have made an inquiry to decide which of the two versions of the second respondent was correct. Only if the High Court was satisfied that there was a compromise, the question of further consideration whether the First Information Report should be quashed in view of the settled law ought to have been considered.
Therefore, we set aside the impugned judgment dated 31st October, 2023 and restore the application under Section 482 No.30167 of 2023 to the file of the High Court.
The Registrar (Judicial) of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad shall place the restored application before the concerned roster Bench on 29th April, 2024 at 10.30 a.m. when the parties who are appearing today before this Court shall appear before the High Court.
The High Court will decide the application afresh in accordance with law after ascertaining whether there is really a compromise between the appellants and the second respondent.
If the High Court is not able to take up the application for hearing at the earliest, the High Court will have to consider of staying the further proceedings of the case by an interim oder.
The appeal is partly allowed on the above terms.
A copy of this order shall be forwarded to the Registrar (Judicial) of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Uttar Pradesh.”
6. Record shows that in respect of an incident, which is alleged to have occurred on 01.12.2022, a prompt FIR dated 01.12.2022 was lodged by first informant-opposite party-2 Suhail and was registered as Case Crime No. 0625 of 2022, under Sections 307, 504, 506, 120-B IPC, Police Station-Behat, District-Saharanpur. In the aforesaid FIR, 6 persons namely (1) Wasil, (2) Hazi Iqbal, (3) Mahmood Ali, (4) Wazid, (5) Zaved and (6) Afzal have been nominated as named accused.
7. In the occurrence giving rise to present criminal proceedings, one Suhail sustained injuries. The injury report of injured Suhail as well as the radio logical report of aforesaid injured are extracted herein under:-
” Injury Report:-
Multiple LW in an area 12 x 8 cm C. No. 81 in an area 12 x 8 cm as ….. Lt. upper arm and size about 1 x 0.9 cm back ….”
Radio Logical Report :-
Lt. upper Arm – Fracture of Bone not seen.
There is metallic density foreign body.
Multiple in number superficial to muscle deep in nature largest size of foreign body is 7.79 mm x 2.91 mm and another 6.74 mm x 3.59 mm most of them are in deltoid muscle.”
8. After complection of statutory investigation of concerned case crime number in terms of Chaper-XII Cr.P.C., the Investigating Officer submitted the charge sheet/police report dated 24.01.2023 in terms of Section 173(2) Cr.P.C., whereby and whereunder, 5 of the named accused namely (1) Afzal, (2) Mahmood Ali, (3) Wazid, (4) Zaved and (5) Wasil have been charge sheeted under Sections 307, 504, 506, 120-B IPC, whereas one of the named accused Hazi Iqbal was exculpated.
9. Upon submission of aforementioned charge sheet/police report, cognizance was taken upon same by the Jurisdictional Magistrate i.e. Special Court, MP/MLA-2, ACJ (S.D.)/ACJM, Saharanpur, vide Cognizance Taking Order dated 23.02.2023, in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 190(1)(b) Cr.P.C. However, as offence complained of is triable exclusively by the Court of Sessions, therefore, the Jurisdictional Magistrate committed the case to the Court of Sessions. Resultantly, Sessions Trial No. 1239 of 2023 (State Vs. Washil and Others) came to be registered and is now pending in the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Court No.-1, Saharanpur.
10. During pendency of aforementioned Sessions Trial, parties amicably settled their dispute outside the Court. On the basis of settlement so arrived at by the parties, a compromise was entered into. Thereafter, on the basis of compromise, a joint application dated 01.08.2023 was filed before Court below praying therein that the proceedings of aforementioned Sessions Trial be terminated in view of the compromise entered into by the parties. The said application was supported by the affidavit of the first informant-opposite party-2 Suhail.
11. Present application came up for admission on 13.12.2024 and this Court directed the Court below to verify the compromise entered into by the parties.
12. In compliance of above order dated 13.12.2024 passed by this Court, Court below has verified the compromise entered into by the parties, vide order dated 06.01.2025. The certified copy of the order dated 06.01.2025 has been brought on record as Annexure-S.A.-1 to the supplementary affidavit dated 27.01.2025 filed by the learned counsel for applicants.
13. On the above premise, the learned Senior counsel for applicants submits that the dispute between the parties is primarily a private dispute. The criminality alleged to have been committed by applicants is not against State or Society. Furthermore, once the parties have entered into a compromise, therefore, no useful purpose shall be served in prolonging the criminal prosecution of applicants. Moreover, in view of the compromise entered into by the parties, the chances of conviction of accused-applicants are not only remote but also bleak. On the above conspectus, the learned Senior counsel for applicants thus contends that present application is liable to be allowed and the proceedings of aforementioned Sessions Trial be quashed.
14. Per contra, the learned Learned A.G.A. for State-opposite party-1 has vehemently opposed the present application. Learned A.G.A. contends that since the injured had sustained injuries on his person on account of deliberate act of accused-applicants, therefore, the proceedings of aforementioned Sessions Trial are not liable to be terminated in view of the compromise entered into by the parties.
15. However, Mr. Dinesh Kumar Singh, the learned counsel representing first informant-opposite party-2 on the other hand submits that he has received insturctions not to oppose the present application. He further submits that it is an undisputed fact that the parties have entered into a compromise. It is thus urged by the learned counsel representing first informant-opposite party-2 that once the first informant-opposite party-2 has himself entered into a compromise with the accused-applicants, he cannot have any objection, in case, the present application is allowed by this Court in the light of above.
16. Be that as it may, the crux of the matter is that the parties have entered into a compromise, which has not only been acted upon but also verified by Court below.
17. This Court is not unmindful of the following judgements of Apex Court, wherein Court has dealt with the issue regarding compromise in criminal matters:-
i. B.S. Joshi and others Vs. State of Haryana and another (2003) 4 SCC 675
ii. Madan Mohan Abbot Vs. State of Punjab, (2008) 4 SCC 582
iii. Nikhil Merchant Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation[2008)9 SCC 677]
iv. Manoj Sharma Vs. State and others ( 2008) 16 SCC 1
v. Shiji @ Pappu and Others VS. Radhika and Another, (2011) 10 SCC 705
vi. Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303
vii. K. Srinivas Rao Vs. D.A Deepa, (2013) 5 SCC 226
viii. Dimpey Gujral and others Vs. Union Territory through Administrator, U.T. Chandigarh and others, (2013) 11 SCC 497
ix. Narindra Singh and others Vs. State of Punjab ( 2014) 6 SCC 466
x. Yogendra Yadav and Ors. Vs. State of Jharkhand and another (2014) 9 SCC 653
xi. Shlok Bhardwaj Vs. Runika Bhardwaj, (2015) 2 SCC 721
xii. C.B.I. Vs. Maninder Singh (2016) 1 SCC 389
xiii. C.B.I. Vs. Sadhu Ram Singla and Others, (2017) 5 SCC 350
xiv. Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur and Others Vs. State of Gujarat and another, (2017) 9 SCC 641
xv. Anita Maria Dias and Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, (2018) 3 SCC 290
xvi. Social Action Forum For Manav Adhikar and Another Vs. Union of India and others, (2018) 10 SCC, 443 (Constitution Bench)
xvii. State of M.P. VS. Dhruv Gurjar and Another, (2019) 5 SCC 570
xviii. State of M.P. V/s Laxmi Narayan & Ors., (2019) 5 SCC 688
xix. Rampal Vs. State of Haryana, AIR online 2019 SC 1716
xx. Arun Singh and Others VS. State of U.P. and Another (2020) 3 SCC 736
xxi. (Ramgopal and Another Vs. The State of M.P.), 2021 SCC OnLine SC 834
xxii. Daxaben Vs. State of Gujarat, 2022 SCC Online 936.
xxiii. State of Kerala VS. Hafsal Rahman N.R., Special Leave Petition (Criminal) Diary Nos. 24362 of 2021.
xiv. Shatrughna Atmaram Patil and Another Vs. Vinod Dodhu Chaudhary and Another, (2024) 4 SCC 458.
xv. Suraj Singh Gujar and Another Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2414.
xvi. K. Bharti Devi and Another Vs. State of Telangana and Another, (2024) 10 SCC 384.
xvii. Ramji Lal Bairwa and Another Vs. State of Rajasthan and Others, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3193.
The Apex Court in aforemention judgments has categorically held that compromise can be made between the parties even in respect of certain cognizable and non bailable offences. However, Apex Court in State of M.P. Vs. Laxmi Narayan (Supra) held that no compromise can be made in respect of offences against society as they are not private in nature. Similarly in Ram Pal Vs. State of Haryana (Supra) it has been held that no compromise can be made in cases relating to rape and sexual assault. Recently, the Apex Court in Daxaben (supra) has held that no compromise can be made in matter under Section 306 IPC. In state of Kerala Vs. Hafsal Rahman (Supra), Court has held that no compromise can be entertained in matters under the POCSO Acts. Reference may also be made to the decision given by this Court in Shaifullah and others Vs. State of U.P. And another [2013 (83) ACC 278] in which the law expounded by the Apex court in some of the aforesaid cases has been explained in detail.
Recently Apex court in Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur (Supra) has laid down the following guidelines with regard to quashing of criminal proceedings as well compromise in criminal proceedings in paragraphs 16 to 16.10 of the report, which read as under:
“16. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the subject, may be summarized in the following propositions
16.1. Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court;
16.2. The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a First Information Report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.
16.3. In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power;
16.4. While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court;
16.5. The decision as to whether a complaint or First Information Report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated;
16.6. In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences;
16.7. As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing in so far as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned;
16.8. Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute;
16.9. In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and
16.10. There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions 16.8 and 16.9 above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the state have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance.”
In Ramgopal and another (supra), Court has again reiterated the guidelines regarding quashing of criminal proceedings in view of compromise. Following has been observed in paragraph 18-19:-
“18. It is now a well crystalized axiom that plenary jurisdiction of this Court to impart complete justice under Article 142 cannot ipso facto be limited or restricted by ordinary statutory provisions. It is also noteworthy that even in the absence of an express provision akin to Section 482 Cr.P.C. conferring powers on the Supreme Court to abrogate and set aside criminal proceedings, the jurisdiction exercisable under Article 142 of the Constitution embraces this Court with scopious powers to quash criminal proceedings also, so as to secure complete justice. In doing so, due regard must be given to the overarching objective of sentencing in the criminal justice system, which is grounded on the sub-lime philosophy of maintenance of peace of the collective and that the rationale of placing an individual behind bars is aimed at his reformation.
19. We thus sum-up and hold that as opposed to Section 320 Cr.P.C. where the Court is squarely guided by the compromise between the parties in respect of offences ‘compoundable’ within the statutory framework, the extra-ordinary power enjoined upon a High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, can be invoked beyond the metes and bounds of Section 320 Cr.P.C. Nonetheless, we reiterate that such powers of wide amplitude ought to be exercise carefully in the context of quashing criminal proceedings, bearing in mind: (i) Nature and effect of the offence on the conscious of the society; (ii) Seriousness of the injury, if any; (iii) Voluntary nature of compromise between accused and the victim; & (iv) Conduct of the accused persons, prior to and after the occurrence of the purported offence and/or other relevant considerations.”
18. In State of M.P. Vs. Laxmi Narayan (Supra), the Apex Court held that mere mention of Section 307 IPC cannot be sole basis for not quashing the proceedings. Court has to examine whether the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence for framing of charge under Section 307 IPC. The Court has further required to examine the weapons used and nature of injury and whether injury has been inflicted on vital/delicate parts of the body, the previous antecedents of accused and whether they are absconding and how the compromise was got entered into by the parties are relevant factors, which must be considered. The above observations can be clearly delineated from the recital occurring in paragraphs 11 to 18 of the aforementioned report.
19. Having heard the learned Senior counsel for applicants, the learned A.G.A. for State-opposite party-1, the learned counsel representing first informant-opposite party-2, upon perusal of record, in view of the facts and circumstances of the case as mentioned above and the observations made by the Apex Court as noted herein above, this Court finds that admittedly, during pendency of aforementioned Sessions Trial, the parties amicably settled their dispute outside the Court. On the basis of settlement so arrived at by the parties, a compromise was entered into. In view of above, a joint application dated 01.08.2023 was filed by the parties before Court below praying therein that the proceedings of aforementioned Sessions Trial be terminated in view of the compromise entered into by the parties. The said compromise has been acted upon and also verified by Court below. In view of above, in case, the criminal prosecution of applicants is allowed to continue, the same shall be a futile exercise. As the parties have entered into a compromise, the chances of conviction of accused-applicants are not only remote but also bleak. As per the injury report of the injured, the injured had not sustained any grievious or fatal injury, therefore, there does not exist any legal impediment for not accepting the compromise entered into by the parties. As such, continuation of proceedings would itself cause injustice to the parties. The trial would only entail loss of judicial time in a futile pursuit particularly when torrents of litigation drown the Courts with an unimaginable flood of dockets.
20. In view of the discussion made above, the present application succeeds and is liable to be allowed.
21. It is, accordingly, allowed.
22. The entire proceedings of Sessions Trial No. 1239 of 2023 (State Vs. Washil and Others), under Sections 307, 504, 506, 120-B IPC, Police Station-Behat, District-Saharanpur now pending in the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Court No.-1, Saharanpur are, hereby, quashed.
23. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs.
Order Date :- 24.2.2025
Vinay