Madhya Pradesh High Court
Neeraj Jatav vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 1 March, 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:4538
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA
PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE ASHISH SHROTI
ON THE 1st OF MARCH, 2025
WRIT PETITION No. 1139 of 2019
NEERAJ JATAV
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Prashant Sharma, Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Prabhat Pateriya, Government Advocate for
respondents/State.
ORDER
Petitioner has filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India challenging the order dated 12.12.2018 (Annexure
P-1). Petitioner, who is working as Constable, had participated in the
process of selection for the post of Subedar. His candidature has been
rejected by the respondents on account of his involvement in a criminal
case tried for offences punishable under Sections 452, 323, 436/34, 506
(Part-II) and 294 of IPC.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned
order passed by the respondents suffers from non-application of mind,
inasmuch as vide judgment dated 21.11.2013 (Annexure P-4), he has
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been acquitted by the learned Trial Court under Section 232 of CrPC. He
submits that the respondents have failed to take into account the fact of
his acquittal under Section 232 of CrPC. Learned counsel for the
petitioner placed reliance upon the judgments of this Court in the case of
Devendra Singh Gurjar Vs. State of M.P. and others (W.A.
No.1954/2019), Vijay Paras Vs. State of M.P. and others (W.A.
No.249/2021) a n d Monu Singh Vs. State of M.P. and others (W.A.
No.55/2023).
3. Per contra, learned Government Advocate supports the
impugned order and submits that the petitioner is aspiring for
appointment on the post of Subedar which is a disciplined force. The
employer was competent to take into account the conduct of the
petitioner. He submits that while passing the impugned order, the
respondents have taken into account the law laid down by Hon’ble Apex
Court in the case of State of M.P. and others Vs Parvej Khan reported in
(2015) 2 SCC 591, Commissioner of Police, New Delhi and another Vs.
Mehar Singh reported in (2013) 7 SC 685 and Avtar Singh Vs. Union of
India and others reported in (2016) 8 SCC 471. He, therefore, prays for
dismissal of the writ petition.
4. For decision of this case, certain provisions to Code of Criminal
Procedure are required to be looked into. Under Section 228 of CrPC,
starts with framing of charge whereafter the plea of the accused is
recorded and when the accused pleads innocence then evidence is
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produced by the prosecution in support of the prosecution case and
charges are framed. Witnesses so produced by the prosecution are
subject to examination-in-chief, cross-examination and further
examination. Thereafter before the defence is called upon to adduce
evidence, learned Trial Court has to decide as to whether on the face of
prosecution evidence, defence is required to be called upon. This is
required under Section 232 of CrPC. If the prosecution evidence
recorded under Section 231 of CrPC is found insufficient to give an
impression that the accused has committed offence alleged against him,
the Trial Court has to acquit the accused under Section 232 of CrPC.
Thus, such an acquittal is invariably and unquestionably a
clean/honourable acquittal with no element of benefit of doubt.
5. In the instant case, the Trial Court has acquitted the petitioner
by exercising the powers under Section 232 of CrPC vide judgment
dated 21.11.2013 passed in Sessions Case No.126/2013. This Court at
more than one occasion has considered the effect of acquittal of a
candidate under Section 232 of CrPC. In the case of Monu Singh
(supra), the Division Bench of this Court in Para 9 held as under:-
“9. If the authorities are swayed by the thought of mere
registration of offence or mere conduct of the trial or acquittal
or clean acquittal or otherwise then they may be ignoring the‘LIFE’ into that ‘FILE because each ‘FILE’ has its own ‘LIFE’.
Here in the present case, appellant faced trial in two cases.
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One is Crime No.292/2014 for the offence punishable under
Sections 307, 323, 294 & 34 of IPC in which acquittal was
recorded by the trial Court at the stage of Section 232 of
Cr.P.C. which means after prosecution evidence has been led,
the trial Court found no case made out against the petitioner to
move further in the trial for defence evidence. Case was
dismissed and acquittal was recorded then and there only.
Therefore, it was infact a false case registered against the
petitioner or prosecution could not prove its case for further
trial with scanty evidence. Another case vide Crime
No.390/2015 for the offence under Sections 294, 336, 341,
427 and 506-B of IPC but the said case resulted into acquittal
because none of the prosecution witness supported the
prosecution case and infact there was no evidence against the
petitioner, therefore, he was acquitted. Both these proceedings
indicate that false cases have been registered against the
petitioner. When petitioner came out acquitted and his
innocence stood vindicated then it cannot be too harsh for the
department to take such pedantic and hyper-technical view.
Neither the impugned order dated 10-04-2019 passed by the
13th Battalion, SAF, Gwalior discloses any specific reason
nor it appears that the whole file/ documents were verified.
This Court in W.A. No.1954/2019 (Devendra Singh GurjarSignature Not Verified
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Vs. State of M.P. and Others) decided on 01-05-2020
discussed this aspect in detail and has considered impact of
acquittal under Section 232 of Cr.P.C. In paragraphs 6 to 11
of the said order, detail discussion was made about various
contours of the subject matter. In the conspectus of facts and
circumstances of the case, petitioner deserves re-consideration
by the concerned authority and therefore, petition deserves to
be allowed.”
6. Similarly, in the case of Vijay Paras (supra), the Division Bench
of this Court in Para 7 held as under:-
“7. Upon hearing learned counsel for the parties, we are
of the considered view that the learned Single Judge has fallen
in error while justifying the impugned order as we find
substantial force in the submissions of Shri Prashant Sharma,
learned counsel for the appellant while he criticized the
impugned order for both the reasons as elaborated in
preceding paras. We conclude that regard being had to the
nature of the order passed by the trial court under Section 232
of Cr.P.C, it was a case of clean acquittal, whereunder the
appellant was acquitted of charges for want of sufficient
evidence on record. As such, there was no need of elaborate
trial. Besides, the justification of the impugned order as
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contained in para 4 of the impugned order dt.28.09.2019 is
found to be factually incorrect for want of any such case
registered or tried against the appellant at any point of time.”
7. Thus, it has been consistent view of this Court that the acquittal
of a person under Section 232 of CrPC stands on a better footing than
the acquittal after full trial.
8. Now the question arises as to what is the role and responsibility
of employer in such cases ? The Division Bench of this Court in the case
of Devendra Singh Gurjar (supra) in para 10 held as under:-
“10. In the background of above discussion, it is always
appropriate and safe to consider certain other facts before
concluding as to whether an ultimate acquittal rendered is
clean/honourable or not. This Court in one of its earlier
decisions had an occasion to dwell upon some of the relevant
factors which ought to be taken into account by the appointing
authority as guiding principles to ascertain the true nature of
acquittal (clean/honourable or not). The relevant extract of the
said judgment dated 02.03.2020 passed in W.A. No.7/2020 is
reproduced below for ready reference and convenience:-
“12. Thus what comes out loud and clear from the
above discussion is that appointing authority while
assessing suitability of a candidate to enter publicSignature Not Verified
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employment has a heavy responsibility of considering lot
many factors. Mere registration of offence which
according to the appointing authority involves moral
turpitude especially when the Court of competent
jurisdiction has not pronounced judgment on merits, is
not per se good enough to declare a candidate unfit for
public employment.
1 2 . 1 Employer in discharge of this onerous
responsibility is required to inter alia consider following
factors:-
(i) The nature of allegations;
(ii) Overt act alleged against candidate;
(iii) Whether the allegations are solely against
individual candidate or have been alleged with the aid of
section 34/149 of IPC
(iv) The criminal antecedents of the candidate;
(v) Overall reputation of the candidate in his
locality/society etc.
13. The aforesaid factors are illustrative and not
exhaustive. There can be other relevant factors which the
Competent Authority can consider. The concern of this
Court is that it is seen time and again that the appointing
authorities are not discharging this onerous duty whileSignature Not Verified
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considering candidature of persons seeking public
employment. The appointing authority often adopts
cursory and perfunctory approach. The appointing
authority ought to remember that it is dealing with
prospects of employment of a citizen of the country,
which if not dealt with appropriately in accordance with
the rule of law, can jeopardize the entire future of a
candidate and render her/him demoralized.”
9. A perusal of the impugned order dated 12.12.2018 goes to show
that the Screening Committee/Appointing Authority has not discharged
its responsibility as described in Para 12.1 of Devendra Singh Gurjar
(supra). It is gain-set that the petitioner is already working as a
Constable in the department and, therefore, the authorities have benefit
of looking into his overall reputation.
10. Learned counsel for the respondents relied upon the judgment
of Apex Court in the case of Union Territory, Chandigarh
Administration and others Vs. Pradeep Kumar and another [(2018) 1
SCC 797]. In the case of Pradeep Kumar (supra), the facts were that the
persons concerned were acquitted on account of compromise between
the parties. The Screening Committee recorded that it is not an
honourable acquittal. The Apex Court in facts of said case held that
while considering the candidature of a candidate for appointment on
civil post, the employer is entitled to look into the nature of the offence
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alleged against the petitioner. The said legal proposition is not in
dispute. However, the competent authority is required to appreciate the
facts obtaining in each case independently.
11. In the impugned order, the authorities have referred to Apex
Court judgment rendered in Mehar Singh (supra). In that case, Apex
Court in Para 23 held as under:-
“23. A careful perusal of the policy leads us to conclude
that the Screening Committee would be entitled to keep
persons involved in grave cases of moral turpitude out of the
police force even if they are acquitted or discharged if it feels
that the acquittal or discharge is on technical grounds or not
honourable. The Screening Committee will be within its rights
to cancel the candidature of a candidate if it finds that the
acquittal is based on some serious flaw in the conduct of the
prosecution case or is the result of material witnesses turning
hostile. It is only experienced officers of the Screening
Committee who will be able to judge whether the acquitted or
discharged candidate is likely to revert to similar activities in
future with more strength and vigour, if appointed, to the post
in a police force. The Screening Committee will have to
consider the nature and extent of such person’s involvement in
the crime and his propensity of becoming a cause for
worsening the law and order situation rather than maintainingSignature Not Verified
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it. In our opinion, this policy framed by the Delhi Police does
not merit any interference from this Court as its object
appears to be to ensure that only persons with impeccable
character enter the police force.”
12. Similarly, in the case of Parvej Khan (supra), the Apex Court
relied upon the judgment in the case of Mehar Singh (supra). The case
was decided against the incumbent because the acquittal was for want of
evidence or discharge based on compounding.
13. In the case of Avtar Singh (supra), the Apex Court reiterated
the same legal provision.
14. Thus, apparently, the Screening Committee has only referred
to judgments without actually following the ratio of the cases.
15. In the instant case, competent authority has failed to do the
exercise, inasmuch as the impugned order is completely silent. The
report of Screening Committee is also not placed on record. Thus, the
impugned order dated 12.12.2018 (Annexrue P-1) is set aside. The
matter is remitted to the appointing authority to reconsider the
petitioner’s candidature for the post of Subedar, keeping in view the law
laid down by the Apex Court and Division Bench of this Court in
judgments referred hereinabove and take a fresh decision without being
influenced by the impugned order.
16. Let this exercise be done within a period of 90 days from the
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date of submission of certified copy of this order.
17. This writ petition stands disposed of.
(ASHISH SHROTI)
JUDGE
Abhi
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