Karnataka High Court
M/S Alliance University vs Mr Madhukar G Angur on 3 March, 2025
Author: H.T. Narendra Prasad
Bench: H.T. Narendra Prasad
1 R
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 03RD DAY OF MARCH 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE H. T. NARENDRA PRASAD
WP No.781 OF 2025 (GM -CPC)
c/w
WP No.782 OF 2025 (GM -CPC)
IN WP 781/2025
BETWEEN
M/S ALLIANCE UNIVERSITY
(A PRIVATE UNIVERSITY ESTABLISHED
UNDER AN ACT OF THE GOVERNMENT
OF KARNATAKA NAMELY ALLIANCE
UNIVERSITY ACT, 2010)
HAVING OPERATIONS OFFICE AT
NO.2 AND 3, 36TH MAIN
DOLLARS SCHEME, BTM I STAGE
BANGALORE-560068
AND HAVING ITS CAMPUS AT
CHIKKAHAGADE, ANEKAL
CHANDAPURA ROAD, BANGALORE
BY ITS REGISTRAR.
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI. SHYAMSUNDAR M.S., SENIOR COUNSEL FOR
SMT. VANDANA P.L., ADVOCATE)
AND
1. MR. MADHUKAR G ANGUR
AGED ABOUT 61 YEARS
2
S/O LATE SHRI GUDDAPPA ANGUR
NO. 803, G- BLOCK, MANTRI ESPANA
NEAR SAKRA WORLD HOSPITAL
OUTER RING ROAD, KARIYAMMANNA
AGRAHAARA, BELLANDUR
BANGALORE-560 103.
2. MRS. PRIYANKA B S
W/O MR MADHUKAR G ANGUR
AGED ABOUT 32 YEARS
NO. 803, G- BLOCK, MANTRI ESPANA
NEAR SAKRA WORLD HOSPITAL
OUTER RING ROAD, KARIYAMMANNA
AGRAHAARA, BELLANDUR
BANGALORE-560 103.
3. MR SATCHIDANANDA RAO MACHINENI
S/O SHRIRAO MACHINENI
AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS
R/O HOUSE NO.7.1.79 AND 80
FLAT NO.506, ANANDANILAYAM
AMEERPET, HYDERABAD-560016.
4. MR RAVINDRA REDDY
S/O LATE MR K YELLA REDDY
AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS
R/O NO.8-2-293/82/519F
ROAD NO.28, BANJARA HILLS
HYDERABAD-560 0034.
5. MOHAN KUMAR B.L
AGED BOUT 45 YEARS
R/AT NO.2A/5, 4TH CROSS
MESHWARA NAGAR, JAYANAGAR
1ST BLOCK EAST BANGALORE-560011.
6. MR. RAJENDRUDU B
AGED MAJOR
No.72, 3RD CROSS, GAURAVNAGAR
KOTHANUR ROAD
3
J P NAGAR, 7TH PHASE
BANGALORE-560 078.
7. MR. K.S. VENKATESHAPPA
S/O SEEMANNA
AGED ABOUT 63 YEARS
C/O MADHUKAR ANGUR
R/AT NO.235, 5TH BLOCK
JAYANAGAR, BANGALORE CITY.
8. MR. C.S. RAMESH
AGED MAJOR
NO. 18/13, 58TH CROSS
6TH MAIN, IV BLOCK
RAJAJINAGAR, BANGALORE-560010.
9. MR SRIPAD MARKANDE
AGED MAJOR
106, "VISHWAVALLABHA APARTMENTS"
4TH CROSS, NAVODAYA NAGAR
JP NAGAR 7TH PHASE
BANGALORE-560 078.
10. MR. B K RAVINDRA
AGED MAJOR
DOOR NO.2-107/1
GANDHIJI ROAD, MARY-HILL
MANGALORE-575008.
11. MR. NIRANJANA K R
AGED MAJOR
22, SRI RAGHAVENDRA NILAYAM
7TH MAIN, 12TH CROSS
SHREYAS COLONY
JP NAGAR 7TH PHASE
BANGALORE-560 078.
12. MR. KIRAN HEGDE
AGED MAJOR
101, ANEKAL-CHANDAPURA ROAD
4
KAVALAHOSAHALLI
BANGALORE-562106.
13. SHERIN BOVAS
AGED MAJOR
C/O AYURVEDSALA
RAMAIAH REDDY COLONY
NEXT TATA SHERWOOD
ADJECENT TO SAMHITA SQUARE
BASAVANAGAR, BANGALORE-560037.
14. MS. DEEPA LADAWA
AGED MAJOR
DESHPANDE FOUNDATIONS
3RD FLOOR, AKSHAY PLAZZA
AKSHAY COLONY,NEAR CHETAN COLLEGE
SIRUR PARK ROAD, HUBLI-580021.
15. MR. RAHUL N BORAWANE
S/O NARAYANA BORAWANE
AGED MAJOR
"MATRUCHAYA" NEAR AGARWAL HOSPITAL
SANGHRSH CHOWK
CHANDAN NAGAR, PUNE-411014.
16. MR SYED THOUSIF
S/O MR BABU AHMED
AGED MAJOR
SIRAJ LAYOUT ROAD
ROAD NO.5, OPPOSITE KIDZEE SCHOOL
MARGANDANAHALLI VILLAGE
HULIMANGALA POST
ELECTRONIC CITY, PHASE 1
BENGALURU-560 105.
17. MR SOMANNA
AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS
C/O MADHUKAR ANGUR
R/AT NO.235, 5TH BLOCK, JAYANAGAR
BENGALURU CITY-560041.
5
18. MR. CHANDRASHEKAR
AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS
C/O MADHUKAR ANGUR
R/AT NO.235, 5TH BLOCK
JAYANAGAR, BENGALURU CITY-560041
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. D.R. RAVISHANKAR, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR
SRI. H.K. SRIVASTHAVA, ADVOCATE FOR C/R1 & 2:
SRI. V.S. SHYAM SUNDAR, ADVOCATE FOR R11)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 227 OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO ISSUE AN ORDER
OR DIRECTION PROHIBITING AND ABROGATING THE
JURISDICTION OF THE PRINCIPAL CITY CIVIL COURT
BANGALORE IN ACCEPTING, ENTERTAINING AND
PROPOSING TO EXERCISE JURISDICTION UNDER SECTION
24 OF CPC NOT VESTED WITH IT BY VIRTUE OF OVERRIDING
EFFECT OF PROVISIONS OF THE BANGALORE CITY CIVIL
COURT ACT 1979 WHILE DEALING WITH THE MISC PETITION
NO.1118/2024 FILED BY THE R1 & R2 VIDE ANNEXURE A
AND ETC.
IN WP 782/2025
BETWEEN
M/S ALLIANCE BUSINESS SCHOOL
(A COMPANY INCORPORATED UNDER
THE PROVISIONS OF INDIAN COMPANIES ACT)
A SECTION 25 COMPANY (SECTION 8 UNDER
THE ACT OF 2013)
HAVING ITS REGISTERED OFFICE AT
NO.2 AND 3, 2ND CROSS, 36TH MAIN
DOLLARS SCHEME, BTM I STAGE
BANGALORE-560068
REPRESENTED BY ITS DIRECTOR
ABHAY CHEBBI
6
S/O G B CHEBBI
AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI. JAYAKUMAR S PATIL., SENIOR COUNSEL FOR
SRI. CYRIL PRASAD PAIS., ADVOCATE)
AND
1. MR. MADHUKAR G ANGUR
AGED ABOUT 61 YEARS
S/O LATE SHRI GUDDAPPA ANGUR
NO. 803, G- BLOCK, MANTRI ESPANA
NEAR SAKRA WORLD HOSPITAL
OUTER RING ROAD, KARIYAMMANNA
AGRAHAARA, BELLANDUR
BANGALORE-560 103.
2. MRS. PRIYANKA B S
W/O MR MADHUKAR G ANGUR
AGED ABOUT 32 YEARS
NO. 803, G- BLOCK, MANTRI ESPANA
NEAR SAKRA WORLD HOSPITAL
OUTER RING ROAD, KARIYAMMANNA
AGRAHAARA, BELLANDUR
BANGALORE-560 103.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. D.R. RAVISHANKAR, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR
SRI. H.K. SRIVASTHAVA, ADVOCATE FOR C/RESPONDENTS)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO ISSUE AN ORDER
OR DIRECTION TO PROHIBITING AND ABROGATING THE
JURISDICTION OF THE PRINCIPAL CITY CIVIL COURT
BANGALORE IN ACCEPTING, ENTERTAINING AND
PROPOSING TO EXERCISE JURISDICTION UNDER SECTION
24 OF CPC NOT VESTED WITH IT BY VIRTUE OF OVERRIDING
EFFECT OF PROVISIONS OF THE BANGALORE CITY CIVIL
7
COURT ACT 1979 WHILE DEALING WITH THE MISC PETITION
NO.1117/2024 FILED BY THE R1 & R2 VIDE ANNEXURE A
AND ETC.
THESE WRIT PETITIONS HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 21.02.2025, COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT, THIS DAY, THE COURT, MADE THE
FOLLOWING:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE H.T. NARENDRA PRASAD
CAV ORDER
These writ petitions are filed by the plaintiff
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, seeking
for quashing of the proceedings in Misc.Nos.
1118/2024 and 1117/2024, respectively, which are
pending before the Principal City Civil and Sessions
Judge, Bengaluru.
2. The petitioner herein filed two suits, seeking a
decree of permanent prohibitory injunction against the
defendants/respondents herein, from entering upon
the suit schedule premises and interfering, in any
manner, either directly or indirectly in the day-today
8
administration, management and affairs of the plaintiff
- University.
3. The respondents herein/defendants, after
service of summons appeared through counsel and
have filed Misc.Nos.1118/2024 and 1117/2024,
respectively, before the Principal City Civil and
Sessions Judge, Bengaluru, praying to transfer O.S.
Nos.3932/2017 and 5148/2017, respectively, pending
on the file of XLIII Additional City Civil and Sessions
Judge (CCH-44), Bengaluru, to any other Court.
Being aggrieved by the same, the petitioner/plaintiff
approached this Court, seeking for quashing of the
proceedings pending in Misc.Nos.1118/2024 and
1117/2024, respectively, on the ground that Principal
City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru has no power
to withdraw or transfer any suit from one court to
another court.
9
4. Sri Jayakumar S.Patil and Sri Shyamsundar
M.H., learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner raised
the following contentions:
(i) Firstly, the Principal City Civil and Sessions
Judge, Bengaluru has no jurisdiction to entertain Misc.
Petitions seeking transfer of case from one court to
another court.
(ii) Secondly, the general power of transfer and
withdrawal under Section 24 of the Civil Procedure
Code (hereinafter referred to as the 'CPC') vested in
the District Court can be exercised in respect of any
suit, appeal or other proceedings pending in any court
subordinate to it and not in respect of the matter
pending in the court of Additional District Judge, which
is not a subordinate court to the District Court.
(iii) Thirdly, as per Section 3 of the Bangalore City
Civil Court Act, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as the
'1979 Act') City Civil Court is established for the City
10
of Bangalore. As per Section 5(1) of the 1979 Act, the
City Civil Judges are not subordinate or inferior to the
Principal City Civil Judge, the senior-most City Civil
Judge would be appointed as the Principal City Civil
Judge, all of them belong to the same cadre.
Therefore, the Principal City Civil Judge has no power
to transfer or withdraw the suit from one court to
another court.
(iv) Fourthly, under Section 5(2) of the 1979 Act,
the Principal City Civil Judge has only the power of
distribution and arrangement of the work, that too, as
per the orders of the High Court. Except that, he has
no other authority to interfere in the course of work or
administration of justice by other City Civil Judges.
(v) Fifthly, the Principal City Civil and Sessions
Judge, Bangalore who is placed as equal as the
Additional City Civil Court Judges, Bangalore is given
or embedded with the power of transferring the case
11
only on the ground mentioned in Section 13 of the
1979 Act. Other than that the Principal City Civil
Judge has no power to transfer the case from one civil
court to the other.
(vi) Sixthly, even under Section 5 of the 1979
Act and under Section 24 of CPC, the Principal City
Civil and Sessions Judge has no power to transfer and
withdraw the case from one court to another court. In
support of their contentions, they relied on the
judgment of this Court in the case of
M/S.VALLIAPPA SOFTWARE TECHNOLOGIESL
PARTK (P) LTD. Vs. C.SUNDARAM reported in AIR
2002 Kar.HCR 2720 and contended that the
Additional City Civil Judges are not subordinate or
inferior to the Principal City Civil and Sessions Judge.
They have also placed reliance on the judgment of the
High Court of Andhra Pradesh in the case of
MANCHUKONDA VENKATA JAGANNADHAM vs.
12
CHETTIPALLI BULLAMMA (CRP No.5212/2010
decided on 25.02.2011) to contend that, even
under Section 24 of CPC, the Additional District Judges
are not subordinate to the District Court. They have
also placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex
Court in the case of SHAH NEWAZ KHAN AND
OTHERS vs. STATE OF NAGALAND AND OTHERS
reported in AIR 2023 SC 1338 and specifically relied
on paragraph 41 and contended that the court which
gives transfer should be subordinate to the court
which is sought to be transferred. Since the
Additional City Civil Court is not subordinate to the
Principal City Civil and Sessions Court, therefore, the
Misc. Petitions filed before the Principal City Civil and
Sessions Judge are not maintainable. They have also
relied on the Commendatory on Bangalore Principles
of Judicial Conduct. Hence, they sought for allowing
the writ petitions.
13
5. Per contra, Sri D.R.Ravishankar, the learned
Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent Nos. 1
and 2 has raised the following contentions:
(i) Firstly, the issue relating to the power of the
Principal City Civil and Sessions Judge to transfer or
withdraw the case from one court to another court is
no more res-integra. This issue has been already
decided by this Court in the case of SATHYA SHREE
vs. M.KUMRESHAN reported in 1999 (5) Kant.L.J.
540.
(ii) Secondly, a similar issue has been referred to
the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court
in the case of TADIKONDA SURYA VENKATA
SATYANARAYANA MURTHY vs. TAMMANA
SEETHAMAHALAKSHMI reported in Laws (APH)-
2016-6-11, wherein it is held that, Additional and
Assistant District Judges are subordinates to the
Principal District Judge. Therefore, the Misc. Petitions
14
filed by the respondents herein is maintainable before
the Principal City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bangalore.
Hence, he sought to dismiss the writ petitions.
6. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and
perused the writ papers.
7. The point that arises for consideration before
this Court is, 'Whether the Principal City Civil Judge
can transfer the case from one City Civil Court to
another City Civil Court?'
8. To decide this point, it is relevant to extract
Section 5 of the 1979 Act and also Section 24 of CPC.
"Section 5 of 1979 Act
Powers of Judges.-
(1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act,
each of the Judges may exercise all or any of
the powers conferred on the City Civil Court by
this Act or any other law for the time being in
force.
15
(2) The Principal City Civil Judge may, subject
to the General or Special Orders of the High
Court, from time to time, make such
arrangement as he thinks fit for the
distribution of the business of the City Civil
Court among the Judges thereof.
...........
Section 24 of CPC
24. General power of transfer and withdrawal
(1) On the application of any of the parties and
after notice to the parties and after hearing
such of them as desired to be heard, or of its
own motion, without such notice, the High
Court or the District Court may, at any stage.-
(a) transfer any suit, appeal or other
proceeding pending before it for trial or
disposal to any court subordinate to it and
competent to try or dispose of the same, or
(b) withdraw any suit, appeal or other
proceeding pending in any court subordinate to
it; and
(i) try or dispose of the same, or
16
(ii) transfer the same for trial or disposal to
any court subordinate to it and competent to
try or dispose of the same, or
(iii) re-transfer the same for trial or disposal to
the court from which it was withdrawn.
(2) Where any suit or proceeding has been
transferred or withdrawn under sub-section
(1), the court which [is thereafter to try or
dispose of such suit or proceeding) may,
subject to any special directions in the case of
an order of transfer, either retry it or proceed
from the point at which it was transferred or
withdrawn.
[(3) For the purposes of this section,
(a) courts of Additional and Assistant Judges
shall be deemed to be subordinate to the
District Court:
(b) “proceeding” includes a proceeding for the
execution of a decree or order.]
4) The court trying any suit transferred or
withdrawn under this section from a court of
small causes shall, for the purposes of such
suit, be deemed to be a court of small causes.
17
[(5) A suit or proceeding may be transferred
under this section from a court which has no
jurisdiction to try it.]”
9. A plain reading of Section 5(1) of the 1979 Act
would indicate that each of the Judges of the City Civil
Court are conferred to exercise all or any of the
powers conferred on the City Civil Court. Section 5(2)
of the 1979 Act would indicate that the Principal City
Civil Judge, may, subject to general and special order
of the High Court, from time to time, make such
arrangement, as he thinks fit, for distribution of
business of the City Civil Court among the judges
thereof.
10. A Co-ordinate Bench of this Court has
considered the power and ambit of the Principal
District Judge vis-à-vis Section 5 of the 1979 Act and
Section 24 of CPC in the case of SATHYA SHREE
(supra). Relevant paragraph 9 is extracted below:
18
“9. Whenever the expression “District
Court” has been used in the Code of Civil
Procedure, it means and refers to the Principal
Civil Court of original jurisdiction. Hierarchy of
the Courts for administration of justice had
been created by the Constitution of the Courts
under the Karnataka Civil Courts Act, as well
as by Bangalore City Civil Court Act with
respect to the City of Bangalore. Karnataka
State Legislature enacted Bangalore City Civil
Court Act, 1979. Section 3 of the Bangalore
City Civil Court Act, 1979 provides for the
establishment of a City Civil Court for the City
of Bangalore. The City Civil Court under sub-
section (3) of Section 2 of the Bangalore City
Civil Court Act, 1979, means the Court
established under sub-section (1) of Section 3.
Sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act,
provides that there shall be a City Civil Court
for the City of Bangalore. Sub-section (2) of
Section 3 provides that the City Civil Court
shall consist of a Principal City Civil Judge and
such number of other City Civil Judges as the
State Government may, in consultation with
the High Court determine. Sub-section (3) of
Section 3 provides that “Notwithstanding
19anything contained in any law, the City Civil
Court – (a) shall be deemed to be the Principal
Civil Court of original jurisdiction in the City of
Bangalore”, it means, by this deeming clause
the state of affairs as enacted has to be
deemed. Even for a moment it may be said
that the Principal City Civil Court may
ordinarily be the City Civil Court but by legal
fiction the City Civil Court has to be deemed to
be the Principal City Civil Court of original
jurisdiction for the City of Bangalore and there
it has been provided that there shall be a
Principal City Civil Judge and such number of
other City Civil Judges as State Government in
consultation with High Court may determine.
With respect to the Bangalore District Courts,
the Courts of the Civil Judges and the Munsiffs
Court established under the Karnataka Civil
Courts Act, 1964 (Karnataka Act 21 of 1964),
exercising jurisdiction only within the local
limits of the City of Bangalore immediately
before the appointed date shall, on and from
the said date, cease to function and are hereby
abolished. Section 4 provides that the City Civil
Court shall be deemed to be a Court
subordinate to and subject to the control and
20superintendence of the High Court. Section 5
provides that each of the Judges may exercise
all or any of the powers conferred on the City
Civil Court by this Act or any other law for the
time being in force. Section 5(2) is more
important and it provides that the Principal
City Civil Judge may, subject to the general or
special orders of the High Court from time to
time make such arrangement as he thinks fit
for the distribution of the business of the City
Civil Court among the Judges thereof. This
power is no doubt subject to the general or
special order of the High Court. Therefore the
power of distribution of work among the
Judges of the City Civil Court vests in the
Principal City Civil Judge. The expression
“distribution” includes in its allocation of work
to different City Civil Judges and this power is
vested in the Principal City Civil Judge. The
City Civil Court has been deemed to be the
Court of original jurisdiction, unless any
direction to the contrary is shown, it lies within
the power of Principal City Civil Judge to
allocate work or to distribute work of the
various Judges of the City Civil Court and this
power may be said to include transferring of a
21case from the Court of one Additional City Civil
Judge to the Court of another Additional City
Civil Judge. Section 24(3)(a) of the Code of
Civil Procedure, also introduces a deeming
clause that Courts of Additional and Assistant
Judges shall be deemed to be subordinate to
the District Court/If Additional District Judges
can be deemed to be subordinate to the
Principal District Judge for the purpose of
distribution of work and transfer of cases under
Section 24 of the Code, in my opinion the
same will be the position of other Judges of the
City Civil Court. The Principal City Civil Judge
may make such arrangement as he thinks fit
for the transfer and distribution of the work of
the City Civil Court among other Judges. In
this view of the matter, in my opinion it cannot
be said that the Principal City Civil Judge had
committed any jurisdictional error or acted in
excess of jurisdiction when it passed the
impugned order. The Principal City Civil Judge,
Bangalore, has got full power to transfer the
case under Section 24 of the Code of Civil
Procedure read with Section 5(2) of the
Bangalore City Civil Court Act, 1979. The order
impugned in this revision petition does not
22suffer any error or jurisdictional error. The
Court below had considered the matter and
applied his mind to the necessity of directing
O.S. No. 4438 of 1996 pending on the file of
the Additional City Civil Judge, CCH. 14 has to
be withdrawn and transferred to the Court of
Additional City Civil Judge, CCH. 16, where the
suit O.S. No. 3221 of 1996 is pending”.
11. On a bare reading of Section 24 of CPC, two
conditions are to be satisfied for exercising the power
under Section 24 (1)(a) of CPC. The first is that, the
court to which the case is to be transferred, should be
subordinate to the court ordering the transfer. The
second is that the transferee court should also be
competent to try and dispose of the same.
12. A Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High
Court in the case of TADIKONDA SURYA VENKATA
SATYANARAYANA MURTHY (supra) has considered
the provisions of Section 24 of CPC and held that for
23
the purpose of Section 24 of CPC the Additional and
Assistant District Courts are subordinates to the
Principal District Judge. The relevant paragraphs are
extracted below:
“(10.) The salient features of sub-section (1) of
Section 24 are as follows:
1) The general power of transfer and withdrawal
vests both with the High Court as well as the
District Court;
2) the power could be exercised either suo moto
or on an application of any of the parties;
3) if the power is exercised suo moto, no notice
is required to be served on the parties, but, if
the power is sought to be exercised on the
application of any of the parties, it can be done
only after notice to the other party and after
hearing such of them as desired to be heard;
4) the power may be exercised at any of stage
of the proceeding;
5) the principal condition for the exercise of the
general power of transfer and withdrawal is that
the Court from whose file the suit, appeal or
other proceeding is sought to be transferred,
should be a Court subordinate to the Court
24seeking to exercise the general power of
transfer and withdrawal.
(11.) The power conferred upon the High Court
and the District Court by sub-section (1) of
Section 24 is of three types. They are, –
1) the power to transfer a suit, appeal or other
proceeding pending before the very Court
ordering the transfer, for trial or disposal to any
other court subordinate to it and which is also
competent to try and dispose of the same,
2) the power to withdraw a suit, appeal or other
proceeding pending in any Court subordinate to
the Court ordering the transfer, for the purpose
of trial and disposal by the very Court ordering
the transfer; and
3) the power to withdraw any suit, appeal or
other proceeding pending in any court
subordinate to the court ordering the transfer,
and to transfer the same for trial or disposal to
any other court subordinate to it and which is
also competent to try and dispose of the same.
Deeming fictions created in section 24
(12.) Sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 24
create two deeming sections. Clause (a) sub-
25
section (3) creates one deeming fiction by
holding that for the purpose of Section 24, the
Courts of Additional and Assistant Judges shall
be deemed to be subordinate to the District
Court. Sub-section (4) creates another deeming
fiction by providing that if a suit is transferred
from a Court of Small Causes to any other
Court, the transferee Court will be deemed to be
a Court of Small Causes. Purport of clause (a) of
sub-section (3) of Section 24.
(13.) As we have indicated above, the nature of
the power conferred upon the High Court and
the District Court is of three types, the first of
which is found in clause (a) of sub-section (1).
Interestingly, the power under Section 24 (1)
(a) is akin to the power of distribution and
allocation of work. Under this provision, a suit,
appeal or other proceeding pending before the
High Court or the District Court itself can be
transferred for trial and disposal to any other
Court subordinate to it, if that other Court is
competent to try and dispose of the same. What
is provided in Sections 6 and 11 (2) of the A.P.
Civil Courts Act, 1972, is similar to what is
provided in sub-section 24 (1) (a). Therefore,
the opinion expressed in Manchukonda Venkata
26
Jagannadham v. Chettipalli Bullamma that the
distribution and allocation of work under
Sections 6 and 11 (2) of the A.P. Civil Courts
Act, 1972 is completely different from the power
conferred by Section 24 of the Code, does not
appear to be correct. Difference in the language
employed.
(14.) Another important aspect that has not
been taken note of in Manchukonda Venkata
Jagannadham that in the entirety of Section 24,
which contains five sub-sections, there is only
one part viz., clause (a) of sub-section (3),
where the word Judge is used. In all other parts
of Section 24, the statute uses only the
expression Court and not Judge. Therefore, let
us see what a District Court is.
(15.) Section 2 (4) of the Code defines District
to mean the local limits of the jurisdiction of a
principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction. It
includes the local limits of the ordinary original
civil jurisdiction of a High Court. The expression
District court, though not directly defined, is
indirectly defined in Section 2 (4) itself to mean
the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction of
a District.
27
(16.) Therefore, the expression District Court
always denotes the principal Civil Court of
original jurisdiction of a District. All other civil
Courts of original jurisdiction, even if presided
over by officers of the very same rank and
status, will not be treated as District Courts
within the meaning of Section 2 (4), if they do
not happen to be the Principal Civil Court of the
district.
(17.) The expression Judge is defined in Section
2 (8) of the Code to mean the presiding officer
of a Civil Court. Therefore, to be a judge within
the meaning of Section 2 (8), the person
concerned need not be the presiding officer of a
Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction.
(18.) If we keep in mind the distinction between
the expressions District Court and Judges, it will
be clear that the general power of withdrawal
and transfer conferred under Section 24 (1) is
upon 2 courts namely: –
(i) the High Court and
(ii) the Principal Civil Court of original
jurisdiction of a district, which satisfies the
definition under Section 2 (4).
28
(19.) From this, if we go to clause (a) of sub-
section (3) of Section 24, it will be clear that the
deeming fiction created therein is about the
Courts of Additional and Assistant Judges vis-a
-vis the District Court. Once this is clear, there
is no difficulty in concluding that the absence of
the word district after the words additional and
assistant is of no consequence. The emphasis in
clause (a) of sub-section (3) is not simply on
Additional Judges and Assistant Judges, but is
actually on Courts of Additional and Assistant
Judges vis-à-vis District Court. This important
aspect has not been taken note of in
Manchukonda Venkata Jagannadham.
(20.) A careful look at clause (a) of sub-section
(3) of Section 24 would show that the phrase
courts of additional and assistant judges
appearing therein, is ejusdem generis with what
follows, namely the phrase District Court. When
clause (a) speaks of the courts of Additional and
Assistant Judges with specific reference to the
District court, it can be construed only as a
reference to the Additional and Assistant District
Judges, irrespective of whether the word District
is used or not in between the words Additional
Judges and Assistant Judges.
29
(21) A few decisions are cited by the learned
counsel for the petitioner in support of his
contention that the courts are not empowered
to supply words into a statutory provision. We
do not think that we need to refer to any of
them, as the principle of causus omissus is too
well recognised. We are not, in this case,
supplying the word District in clause (a) of sub-
section (3), when it is conspicuous by its
absence. We are just pointing out that the word
already exists in the statutory provision, but it is
more visible when we apply the rule of ejusdem
generis. Principle of subordination.
(22.) In Manchukonda, the learned Judge
appears to have been perturbed by the fact that
if the power to transfer a case from the file of
one Additional District Judge to the file of
another Additional District Judge is recognised
as available to the Principal District Judge, the
general principles of judicial hierarchy and
subordination of courts, will suffer a severe jolt.
That is why the learned Judge drew a reference
to Section 3 of the Code, which speaks about
subordination of Courts.
30
(23.) Section 3 of the Code reads as follows:
Subordination of Courts: – For the purposes
of this Code, the District Court is subordinate to
the High Court, and every Civil Court of a grade
inferior to that of a District Court and every
Court of Small Causes is subordinate to the High
Court and District Court.
(24.) As per Section 3, a Civil Court will be
treated as subordinate to the District Court, only
if that Civil Court happens to be of a grade
inferior to the District Court. Since in terms of
judicial powers, all District Judges enjoy the
same status, the learned Judge thought in
Manchukonda that the presiding officer of an
Additional District Court cannot be treated as a
grade inferior to the Presiding Officer of the
Principal District Court.
(25.) But, insofar as this aspect is concerned, it
must be pointed out that Section 3 does not
speak either about the hierarchy of the Judges
or about the subordination of one or more
Judges to another. Section 3 speaks only about
the subordination of Courts and not
subordination of Judges.
31
(26.) Section 24 (1) (a) empowers the District
Court to transfer a case pending before it, to
any Court subordinate to it, provided such a
Court has jurisdiction to try and dispose of the
same. If the interpretation given in
Manchukonda is correct, a Principal District
Court cannot transfer any case pending on its
file to the Court of an Additional District Judge,
because the Additional District Judge cannot be
treated as subordinate to the Principal District
Judge. The Principal District Judge cannot also
transfer a regular appeal pending before him to
the Court of a Junior Civil Judge, since such a
Judge, though subordinate to the Principal
District Judge, will have no jurisdiction to try
and dispose of an appeal. These consequences
arising out of such an interpretation, would
make the provision, a dead letter.
(27.) To put it differently, two conditions are to
be satisfied for the exercise of the power under
Section 24 (1) (a). The first is that the Court to
which the case is to be transferred should be
subordinate to the Court ordering the transfer.
The second is that the transferee Court should
also be competent (have jurisdiction) to try and
dispose of the same.
32
(28) Both the conditions laid down in Section 24
(1) (a) will stand satisfied only when the
transfer is made from the Principal District
Court, to any one of the Additional District
Courts. Therefore, Section 24 (1) (a) itself
contains a clue as to how we should resolve the
problem on hand. Contention based on the
distinction between administrative power and
judicial power.
(29.) Interestingly, the learned counsel for the
respondents had no option but to agree that the
Principal District Court, upon receipt of a case,
would have the power to distribute, allocate or
assign any suit, appeal or other proceeding to
any of the Additional District Courts. But, his
contention was that the distribution and
allocation of work on the administrative side by
a Principal District Judge stands on a different
footing from the exercise of a general power of
withdrawal and transfer on judicial side. In
other words, his contention is that what a
Principal District Judge can do in exercise of the
administrative powers conferred upon him,
cannot be done by him in the exercise of judicial
powers, as the Courts of the Additional District
33
Judges are not subordinate to the Court of the
Principal District Judge.
(30.) The answer to the above contentions is
two fold. The first is that it is only because the
Courts of Additional District Judges are not
judicially subordinate to the Court of the
Principal District Judge, that a deeming fiction is
created by Section 24 (1) (a). The second is
that an order transferring a suit, appeal or other
proceeding from one Court to another cannot be
treated as a judgment. Order of transfer not a
judgment.
(31.) Section 2 (9) of the Code defines the word
judgment to mean the statement given by the
Judge of the grounds of a decree or order. The
three segments of a judgment as propounded
by the Supreme Court in Omprakash Verma v.
State of Andhra Pradesh (Scale 2010 (10) 707)
are:
(i) facts and points in issue;
(ii) reasons for decision and
(iii) find order containing decision.
34
(32.) A declaration of final determination of the
rights of the parties in a matter before the Court
is what a judgment is. An order of transfer of a
case from one Court to another does not bring
to an end any dispute between the parties. The
order would not also be a decision on the
respective claims.
(33.) The fact that the Principal District Judge
cannot sit in Judgment or appeal over the
judgment of an Additional District Judge, is not
a ground to hold that the Principal District Judge
would not even have a power to transfer a case
pending on the file of one Additional Judge to
another. While ordering the transfer of a case
from the file of one Additional Judge to that of
another, the District Court (or the Principal
District Judge) neither pronounces a judgment
on the merits of the case nor exercises the
power of judicial review over any decision
rendered by the Additional District Judge.
Therefore, the expression subordinate need not
be a cause for worry.
(34.) In Asrumati Debi Kumar V. Rupendra Deb
Raikot (AIR 1953 SC 198), the Supreme Court
held that an order of transfer of a suit made
35
under clause 13 of the Letters Patent is not a
judgment within the meaning of clause 15 of the
Letters Patent. The said decision was followed
by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in
K.V. Govindarajulu Mudaliar v. Devar and Co.
(AIR 1954 Madras 248). The decision in K.V.
Govindarajulu Mudaliar was rendered on 06-07-
1953. Therefore, by virtue of the decision of the
Full Bench of this Court in M. Subbarayudu v.
the State (AIR 1955 AP 87), the decision in K.V.
Govindarajulu Mudaliar is good as a binding
precedent.
(35.) Apart from the fact that an order of
transfer is not a judgment, it must also be noted
that in a petition for transfer of a case from one
Court to another, no order or decision of the
subordinate Court is called in question. It is only
when the decision or order of a Court is called in
question before another Court, the former
should be subordinate to the latter, in terms of
judicial hierarchy. This is why Section 3 of the
Code carefully uses the expression of a grade
inferior. Answer to the reference:
36
13. In respect of the very same parties, on an
earlier occasion, this Court has held that the Principal
City Civil Judge has the power to transfer the case
from one City Civil Judge Court to another City Civil
Judge Court, i.e., in the case of ALLIANCE
BUSINESS SCHOOL vs. MADHUKAR G. ANGUR
AND OTHERS (WP No.19160/2016 disposed of
on 12.04.2016). The relevant paragraph is
extracted below:
“(10.) In the light of the afore stated
discussion neither of the parties can be heard
to contend that there is no power available to
the Principal District Judge under Sec. 5(2) to
withdraw a particular case from one Court and
allot it or distribute it to another Additional City
Civil Court. On doubts, surmises and
conjectures decision making process adopted
by District Judge in the instant case by
impugned order cannot be looked into with
coloured glasses as sought to be canvassed. As
seen from the averments made in the petition,
writ petitioners are only expressing that a
37“doubtful situation” had arisen on account of
sequential events that has unfolded or
obtained in the facts and circumstances of the
case. In the light of such apprehension, it
cannot be gainsaid by petitioners that Principal
District Judge erred in exercising power under
Sec. 5(2) or the decision of Principal District
Judge is to be faulted with. However, at this
juncture itself it would be apt to state that any
threat posed by litigant public to pollute the
stream of justice would not be allowed and
Courts are strong enough toward off such
threats.”
14. As per Section 5(2) of the 1979 Act, the
power of distribution of work among the Judges of the
City Civil Court vested in the Principal City Civil Judge.
The expression ‘distribution’ includes in its allocation
of work to different City Civil Judges, as held by this
Court in the case of SATHYA SHREE (supra).
Therefore, the contention of the learned Senior
Counsel for the petitioner that power of the Principal
City Civil Judge for distribution of the business of the
38
City Civil Court under Section 5(2) of 1979 Act, only
related to Section 13 of the 1979 Act, does not hold
water.
15. Relying upon the aforesaid judicial
pronouncements, I am of the view that the Principal
City Civil and Sessions Judge has the power under
Section 24 of CPC r/w. Section 5 of the 1979 Act, to
withdraw a case pending on the file of one Additional
City Civil Court and transfer the same to the file of
another Additional City Civil Court, Bangalore. Hence,
the Misc. Petitions filed by the respondents herein
under Section 24 of CPC before the Principal City Civil
and Sessions Judge are maintainable. Accordingly, the
point for consideration is answered in the affirmative.
16. In respect of the judgment relied upon by
the petitioners in the case of. M/S.VALLIAPPA
SOFTWARE TECHNOLOGIESL PARK (P) LTD.
(supra), the issue in that case is regarding judicial
39
work is concerned. In the judicial work is concerned,
there is no distinction between the Principal City Civil
Judge and Additional City Civil Judge, all of them
belongs to same cadre and enjoy the same status but
the senior-most amongst them is appointed as the
Principal City Civil Judge. It is not in respect of
exercising the power under Section 24 of CPC.
Therefore, the said judgments are not applicable to
the facts of the present case.
17. Accordingly, writ petitions are dismissed.
However, the trial court is directed to dispose of Misc.
Petitions filed by the respondents herein, as
expeditiously as possible.
Sd/-
(H. T. NARENDRA PRASAD)
JUDGE
Cm/-
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