Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 03.03.2025 vs Shashi Kumar on 6 March, 2025
Bench: Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Sushil Kukreja
1 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5038-DB )
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA
Cr. Appeal No. 125 of 2015
Reserved on: 03.03.2025
Decided on: 06.03.2025
____________________________________________________
State of Himachal Pradesh …..Appellant.
Versus
Shashi Kumar ......Respondent.
_____________________________________________________
Coram
The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge.
The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sushil Kukreja, Judge.
1
Whether approved for reporting? Yes.
_____________________________________________________
For the appellant: Mr. I.N. Mehta, Mr. Y.W. Chauhan,
Senior Additional Advocates General,
with Mr. Navlesh Verma, Ms.
Sharmila Patial, Additional Advocates
General and Mr. Raj Negi, Deputy
Advocate General.
For the respondent: Mr. Vijender Katoch, Advocate.
Sushil Kukreja, Judge.
The instant appeal has been preferred by the
appellant/State under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure against the judgment, dated 20.08.2014, passed by
learned Additional Sessions Judge-III, Kangra at Dharamshala,
District Kangra, H.P., in Sessions Case No. 37-P/VII/13/12,
whereby the accused (respondent herein) was acquitted for the
offences punishable under Section 498-A and 306 of the Indian
Penal Code (for short “IPC“).
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
2 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5038-DB )
2. The facts giving rise to the present appeal, as per the
prosecution story, can be summarized as under:
2(a). On 02.07.2012, Meena Kumari (deceased) wife of
Shashi Kumar (accused), committed suicide at her in-laws’ house
at village Arla, by hanging herself with the help of her dupatta, due
to the maltreatment of the accused, who compelled and abetted
her to commit suicide. As per the prosecution story, the accused
used to beat and harass his wife (deceased) due to which she
committed suicide. On the same day, around 09:25 p.m., the then
Pradhan of Gram Panchayat Arla telephonically informed the police
qua the suicide committed by the deceased, whereupon LHC
Krishana Kumari alongwith other police officials went to the spot.
LHC Krishna Kumari telephonically informed CDPO, Palampur and
ASI Ram Swarup, Investigating Officer, Police Station, Palampur,
was also sent to the spot, who recorded the statement of Shri
Roomi Ram under Section 154 Cr.P.C. PSI Raj Kumar, I.O. Police
Station, Palampur, and ASI Jaspal Singh, I.O., Police Station
Bhawarna, took up the investigation. During the course of their
investigation RFSL team visited the spot, photographs were
clicked, spot map was prepared, post mortem on the corpse of the
deceased was got conducted at Civil Hospital, Palampur, and post
mortem report was procured. Police also effected relevant
3 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5038-DB )
recoveries from the spot and sample parcels were sent to RFSL,
Dharamshala, for chemical analysis and report was procured.
Statements of the witnesses were recorded and the accused was
arrested. During the further case of the investigation, police took
into possession the complaint lodged by the deceased under the
Domestic Violence Act alongwith the relevant records. After
completion of the investigation, police presented the charge-sheet
before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the
commission of the offences punishable under Sections 498-A and
306 IPC.
3. The prosecution, in order to prove its case, examined
nineteen witnesses. Statement of the accused under Section 313
Cr.P.C. was recorded, wherein he claimed innocence and denied
the prosecution case, however, in defence he did not lead any
evidence.
4. The learned Trial Court, vide impugned judgment dated
20.08.2014 acquitted the accused for the commission of the
offences punishable under Section 498-A and 306 IPC, hence the
instant appeal preferred by the appellant/State.
5. The learned Senior Additional Advocate General for the
appellant/State contended that the impugned judgment is against
the law and facts, based upon mis-appreciation of evidence, which
4 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5038-DB )
ultimately resulted into miscarriage of justice, as such the same is
liable to set-aside. He has further contended that the learned Trial
Court has appreciated the evidence in a slip-shod and perfunctory
manner and the impugned judgment is based on hypothetical
reasoning, surmises and conjectures. Lastly, he submitted that the
impugned judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be quashed
and set-aside by allowing the instant appeal and the accused be
convicted.
6. Conversely, the learned counsel for the
respondent/accused contended that the impugned judgment
passed by the learned Trial Court is the result of proper
appreciation of the material on record and the same was passed
after appreciating the evidence and law in its right and true
perspective. He has further contended that there was nothing
against the accused and the judgment of acquittal passed by the
learned Trial Court is a well reasoned judgment, which does not
require any interference, thus the instant appeal, which sans
merits, be dismissed.
7. We have heard the learned Senior Additional Advocate
General for the appellant/State, learned Counsel for the
respondent/accused, and carefully examined the entire records.
8. It is well settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court in a catena
5 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5038-DB )
of decisions that an Appellate Court has full power to review, re-
appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of
acquittal is founded. However, Appellate Court must bear in mind
that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of
the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to
him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that
every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved
guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having
secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further
reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. Further,
if two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence
on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the finding of
acquittal recorded by the trial Court.
9. The scope of power of Appellate Court in case of
appeal against acquittal has been dealt with by the Hon’ble Apex
Court in Muralidhar alias Gidda & another vs. State of Karnatka
reported in (2014) 5 SCC 730, which reads as under:
“10. Lord Russell in Sheo Swarup[1], highlighted the
approach of the High Court as an appellate court
hearing the appeal against acquittal. Lord Russell
said,
“… the High Court should and will always give proper
weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the
views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the
witnesses; (2) the presumption of innocence in favour
of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened
by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3)
the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt;
6 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5038-DB )
and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in
disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who
had the advantage of seeing the witnesses.” The
opinion of the Lord Russell has been followed over the
years.
11. As early as in 1952, this Court in Surajpal Singh[2]
while dealing with the powers of the High Court in an
appeal against acquittal under Section 417 of the
Criminal Procedure Code observed:
“7………..the High Court has full power to review the
evidence upon which the order of acquittal was
founded, but it is equally well settled that the
presumption of innocence of the accused is
further reinforced by his acquittal by the trial court,
and the findings of the trial court which had the
advantage of seeing the witnesses and hearing
their evidence can be reversed only for very
substantial and compelling reasons.”
12. The approach of the appellate court in the appeal
against acquittal has been dealt with by this Court in
Tulsiram Kanu [3], Madan Mohan Singh [4], Atley [5] , Aher
Raja Khima [6], Balbir Singh [7], M.G. Agarwal [8], Noor
Khan [9], Khedu Mohton [10], Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade
[11], Lekha Yadav [12], Khem Karan [13], Bishan Singh
[14], Umedbhai Jadavbhai [15], K. Gopal Reddy [16], Tota
Singh [17], Ram Kumar [18], Madan Lal [19], Sambasivan
[20], Bhagwan Singh [21], Harijana Thirupala [22], C.
Antony [23], K. Gopalakrishna [24], Sanjay Thakran [25]
and Chandrappa [26]. It is not necessary to deal with
these cases individually. Suffice it to say that this Court
has consistently held that in dealing with appeals against
acquittal, the appellate court must bear in mind the
following:
(i) There is presumption of innocence in favour of an
accused person and such presumption is
strengthened by the order of acquittal passed in
his favour by the trial court,
(ii) The accused person is entitled to the benefit of
reasonable doubt when it deals with the merit of
the appeal against acquittal,
(iii) Though, the power of the appellate court in
considering the appeals against acquittal are as
extensive as its powers in appeals against
convictions but the appellate court is generally
loath in disturbing the finding of fact recorded by
the trial court. It is so because the trial court had
7 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5038-DB )an advantage of seeing the demeanor of the
witnesses. If the trial court takes a reasonable
view of the facts of the case, interference by the
appellate court with the judgment of acquittal is
not justified. Unless, the conclusions reached by
the trial court are palpably wrong or based on
erroneous view of the law or if such conclusions
are allowed to stand, they are likely to result in
grave injustice, the reluctance on the part of the
appellate court in interfering with such
conclusions is fully justified, and
(iv) Merely because the appellate court on re-
appreciation and re-evaluation of the evidence is
inclined to take a different view, interference with
the judgment of acquittal is not justified if the
view taken by the trial court is a possible view.
The evenly balanced views of the evidence must
not result in the interference by the appellate
court in the judgment of the trial court.”
10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajesh Prasad vs.
State of Bihar & another, (2022) 3 SCC 471, observed as under:
“31. The circumstances under which an appeal would be
entertained by this Court from an order of acquittal
passed by a High Court may be summarized as
follows:
31.1. Ordinarily, this Court is cautious in
interfering with an order of acquittal, especially
when the order of acquittal has been confirmed up
to the High Court. It is only in rarest of rare
cases, where the High Court, on an absolutely
wrong process of reasoning and a legally
erroneous and perverse approach to the facts of
the case, ignoring some of the most vital facts,
has acquitted the accused, that the same may be
reversed by this Court, exercising jurisdiction
under Article 136 of the Constitution. [State of U.P.
v. Sahai (1982) 1 SCC 352] Such fetters on the
right to entertain an appeal are prompted by the
reluctance to expose a person, who has been
acquitted by a competent court of a criminal
charge, to the anxiety and tension of a further
examination of the case, even though it is held by
a superior court. [Arunchalam v. P.S.R.
Sadhanantham (1979) 2 SCC 297] An appeal
cannot be entertained against an order of acquittal
which has, after recording valid and weighty
reasons, has arrived at an unassailable, logical
8 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5038-DB )conclusion which justifies acquittal. [State of
Haryana vs. Lakhbir]31.2. However, this Court has on certain
occasions, set aside the order of acquittal passed
by a High Court. The circumstances under which
this Court may entertain an appeal against an
order of acquittal and pass an order of conviction,
may be summarized as follows:
31.2.1. Where the approach or reasoning of the
High Court is perverse;
(a) Where incontrovertible evidence has been rejected
by the High Court based on suspicion and surmises,
which are rather unrealistic. [State of Rajasthan v.
Sukhpal Singh (1983) 1 SCC 393] For example,
where direct, unanimous accounts of the
eyewitnesses, were discounted without cogent
reasoning. [State of U.P. vs. Shanker 1980 Supp
SCC 489]
(b) Where the intrinsic merits of the testimony of
relatives, living in the same house as the victim,
were discounted on the ground that they were
“interested” witnesses. [State of U.P. v. Hakim Singh
(1980)
(c) Where testimony of witnesses had been disbelieved
by the High Court, on an unrealistic conjecture of
personal motive on the part of witnesses to implicate
the accused, when in fact, the witnesses had no axe
to grind in the said matter. [State of Rajasthan v.
Sukhpal Singh (1983) 1 SCC 393]
(d) Where dying declaration of the deceased victim was
rejected by the High Court on an irrelevant ground
that they did not explain the injury found on one of
the persons present at the site of occurrence of the
crime. [Arunachalam vs. P.S.R. Sadhanantham
(1979) 2 SCC 297]
(e) Where the High Court applied an unrealistic standard
of “implicit proof” rather than that of “proof beyond
reasonable doubt” and therefore evaluated the
evidence in a flawed manner. [State of U.P. v. Ranjha
Ram (1986) 4 SCC 99]
(f) Where the High Court rejected circumstantial
evidence, based on an exaggerated and capricious
theory, which were beyond the plea of the accused;
[State of Maharashtra v. Champalal Punjaji Shah
(1981) 3 SCC 610]
(g) Where the High Court acquitted the accused on the
ground that he had no adequate motive to commit
the offence, although, in the said case, there was
strong direct evidence establishing the guilt of the
accused, thereby making it necessary on the part of
9 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5038-DB )
the prosecution to establish “motive”. [State of A.P. v.
Bogam Chandraiah (1990) 1 SCC 445]
31.2.2.Where acquittal would result is gross
miscarriage of justice;
(a) Where the findings of the High Court, disconnecting
the accused persons with the crime, were based on
a perfunctory consideration of evidence, [State of
U.P. v. Pheru Singh 1989 Supp (1) SCC] or based on
extenuating circumstances which were purely based
in imagination and fantasy [State of U.P. v. Pussu
(1983) 3 SCC 502]
(b) Where the accused had been acquitted on ground of
delay in conducting trial, which delay was attributable
not to the tardiness or indifference of the prosecuting
agencies, but to the conduct of the accused himself;
or where accused had been acquitted on ground of
delay in conducting trial relating to an offence which
is not of a trivial nature. [State of Maharashtra v.
Champalal Punjaji Shah (1981) 3 SCC 610].”
11. In H.D. Sundara & others vs. State of Karnataka,
(2023) 9 SCC 581, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that
the appellate court cannot overturn acquittal only on the ground
that after re-appreciating evidence, it is of the view that the guilt of
the accused was established beyond a reasonable doubt. The
relevant portion of the above judgment is as under:
“8. In this appeal, were are called upon to consider the
legality and validity of the impugned judgment rendered
by the High Court while deciding an appeal against
acquittal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (for short “CrPC“). The principles
which govern the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while
dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section
378 CrPC can be summarized as follows:
8.1.The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the
presumption of innocence;
8.2.The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against
acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and
documentary evidence;
10 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5038-DB )
8.3.The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against
acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required
to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is
possible view which could have been taken on the
basis of the evidence on record;
8.4.If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court
cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that
another view was also possible; and8.5.The appellate court can interfere with the order of
acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only
conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the
evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused
was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other
conclusion was possible.
9. Normally, when an appellate court exercises appellate
jurisdiction, the duty of the appellate court is to find out
whether the verdict which is under challenge is correct
or incorrect in law and on facts. The appellate court
normally ascertains whether the decision under
challenge is legal or illegal. But while dealing with an
appeal against acquittal, the appellate court cannot
examine the impugned judgment only to find out
whether the view taken was correct or incorrect. After
re-appreciating the oral and documentary evidence, the
appellate court must first decide whether the trial court’s
view was a possible view. The appellate court cannot
overturn acquittal only on the ground that after re-
appreciating evidence, it is of the view that the guilt of
the accused was established beyond a reasonable
doubt. Only recording such a conclusion an order of
acquittal cannot be reversed unless the appellate court
also concludes that it was the only possible conclusion.
Thus, the appellate court must see whether the view
taken by the trial court while acquitting an accused can
be reasonably taken on the basis of the evidence on
record. If the view taken by the trial court is a possible
view, the appellate court cannot interfere with the order
of acquittal on the ground that another view could have
been taken.”
12. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarized to the
effect that in exceptional cases where there are compelling
circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be
perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of
11 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5038-DB )
acquittal. Further, if two views were possible on the basis of the
evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the
finding of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court, merely, because the
Appellate Court could have arrived at a different conclusion than
that of the Trial Court.
13. The burden of proof in a criminal trial never shifts and it
is always the burden of the prosecution to prove its case beyond
reasonable doubt on the basis of acceptable evidence. In fact, it is
a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that the more serious
the offence, the stricter the degree of proof required, since a higher
degree of assurance is required to convict the accused.
14. In the instant case, the accused has been tried under
Section 498-A and 306 IPC for cruelty and abetment of suicide.
Section 306 incorporates the offence of abetment of suicide and
the main ingredients of the offence are the suicidal death and
abetment thereof. The suicide is an intentional killing of oneself.
The relevant provisions, which are now required to be looked into,
are reproduced herein below:-
Section 306 of Indian Penal Code reads as under :
“If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the
commission of such suicide, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine, thereby
showing the commission of suicide must be pursuant to the
abetment committed by any person. It is the case of the
prosecution that the husband abetted the deceased wife to
commit suicide.
12 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5038-DB )
15. Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
relates to presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married
woman, which reads as follows:-
“113A. Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married
women.- When the question is whether the commission of
suicide by a woman had been abetted by her husband or
any relative of her husband and it is shown that she had
committed suicide within a period of seven years from the
date of her marriage and that her husband or such relative
of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the court may
presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the
case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or
by such relative of her husband.
Explanation- For the purposes of this section, “cruelty” shall
have the same meaning as in section 498A of the Indian
Panel Code (45 of 1860).”
16. Explanation to Section 498-A IPC defines cruelty
caused on wife by husband or his relatives as follows:-
1[Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband
of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be
punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to
three years and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation.-For the purposes of this section, “cruelty
means”–
(a) any willful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely
to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave
injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or
physical) of the woman; or
(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is
with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to
meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable
security or is on account of failure by her or any person
related to her to meet such demand.]”
17. To substantiate the charges framed against the
respondent/accused and to bring home the guilt of the accused,
the prosecution examined as many as 19 witnesses. However, the
13 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5038-DB )
case of the prosecution mainly rests upon the statements of PW-1,
Shri Rumi Ram, father of the deceased (complainant), PW-2, Smt
Malka Devi, mother of the deceased, PW-3, Miss Shikha, minor
daughter of the deceased, PW-4, Shri Babu Ram, the then
Pradhan, Gram Panchayat, Arla, PW-11, Smt. Veena Devi, the
then Supervisor-cum-Protection Officer in the CDPO Office
Bhawarna, Palampur and PW-18, Dr. Anupama Singh, who had
conducted postmortem on the corpse of the deceased.
18. Shri Rumi Ram (complainant), father of the deceased,
who had appeared in the witness-box as PW-1, deposed that he
had four daughters and out of them three were married and one
unmarried. His daughter, Smt. Meena Kumari (deceased) was
married with accused Shashi Kumar, as per the Hindu rites and
customs about six years ago and out of their wedlock two
daughters were born. This witness has further stated that after the
marriage the accused started quarreling with the deceased and he
used to beat her. As per this witness, the mental health of the
deceased was good and she used to complain that accused used
to beat her. The deceased also showed injury sustained by her on
her back. She also complained to him that the accused, after
confining the daughters in a room, used to consume liquor with his
friends in the house. The accused also used to threaten the
14 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5038-DB )
deceased that he would kill both the daughters and thereafter get
remarried with some lady. He has further deposed that the
deceased narrated her story to her sister, who in turn, narrated the
same to his wife and his wife ultimately disclose the same to him.
The deceased left her matrimonial home and started living with
them, but the accused telephonically asked her to come to his
residence by intimidating her, so she went to her matrimonial
house. He has also deposed that after four days the accused
informed them that the deceased had committed suicide by
hanging herself from ceiling fan. He along with other villagers
visited the house of the accused and saw the deceased hanging
from ceiling fan. He also saw that the deceased had kept clothes
in a tub after washing and she was not wearing bangles. As per
this witness, the deceased committed suicide, as the accused used
to torture her mentally and physically. His statement was recorded
by the police under Section 154 Cr.P.C.. He has further stated that
police visited the spot and clicked photographs. As per this
witness, the deceased had also reported the matter to Gram
Panchayat Arla complaining that the accused used to torture her
and the complaint was forwarded to CDPO for inquiry. This
witness, in his cross-examination, denied that both the daughters
were born in the house of the accused and self stated that they
15 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5038-DB )
were born in their house. He feigned ignorance about the date of
birth of the daughters of the deceased. He has stated that the
accused telephonically informed the deceased that if she wanted to
come to his house, she should immediately return, else she might
stay at the residence of her father. As per this witness, he had told
this fact to the police, but he was confronted with his statements
made under Section 154 Cr.P.C., Ex. PW-1/A, and under Section
161, wherein it was not so recorded. He has deposed that four
days prior to the death of the deceased, he had noticed injury
marks on her person and these injuries were sustained with shoe
beatings caused by the accused, as it was told by the deceased to
his younger daughter Asha.
19. PW-2, Smt. Malka Devi, mother of the deceased,
deposed that her daughter (the deceased) was married with the
accused six years ago and out of their wedlock two daughters were
born. As per this witness, the accused used to maltreat and beat
the deceased and she was driven out of her matrimonial home
many times by the accused. She has further stated that the
deceased came to her residence and moved an application at
Police Station Bhawarana, which was inquired by concerned
CDPO. The accused inflicted injuries on neck, hip and other parts
of the body of the deceased. During the month of May, the
16 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5038-DB )
deceased visited their house and the accused telephonically asked
her to come to his house, on this the deceased told him that she
would come next day, but the accused directed her to come
immediately, as there was no one to cook food. This witness has
further deposed that after five days, the deceased committed
suicide on 02.07.2012 and they came to know about the incident
pursuant to a telephonic message received from the accused from
the house of Pardhan. She has stated that she alongwith her
husband (PW-1) and relatives went to the house of the accused
and saw her daughter hanging from the ceiling fan in her house. As
per this witness, the accused used to threaten them with dire
consequences and also to get divorce from the deceased. This
witness, in her cross-examination, deposed that the deceased
visited their house only four times within six years of marriage.
She has further deposed that the complaint given by them to police
and to the CDPO was being inquired into by the concerned officer
and the deceased was advised to get her medically examined, but
she was not interested to get herself medically examined and
treated.
20. PW-3, Miss Shikha, minor daughter of the deceased,
was also examined by the learned Trial Court, after ascertaining
her maturity to give statement on oath. The child witness deposed
17 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5038-DB )
that her father (accused) applied electric current on her mother
(deceased), he caught hold of her from her neck and hanged her
with ceiling fan. Subsequently, the deceased became unconscious
and her father asked them to leave the room where her mother
was hanging. She further stated that her mother (deceased) used
to cook food and her father (accused) used to give kick blows to
her.
21. Shri Babu Ram, the then Pradhan, Gram Panchayat,
Arla, appeared in the witness-box as PW-4, and he deposed that
on 03.07.2012 he remained associated in the investigation of the
case. He further deposed that Shri Suresh Kumar, the then
Panchayat Pradhan was also present on the spot. As per this
witness, he was telephonically requested by the accused to visit
his house, as his wife (deceased) had hanged herself. He
alongwith Ward Panch Sarwan Kumar immediately rushed to the
house of the accused at 07:00 p.m. and he informed the police qua
the occurrence and the police also visited the house of the
accused immediately. He has deposed that he saw the deceased
hanging with the ceiling of the room. The parents of the deceased
did not allow the corpse to be removed from hanging position from
the ceiling. Forensic experts also reached the spot on the
subsequent day and only then the corpse of the deceased was got
18 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5038-DB )
down and it was sent to SDH, Palampur for postmortem
examination. He has also stated that after conducting post mortem
examination, the corpse was handed over to the uncle-in-law of the
deceased, namely Shri Prem Chand. As per this witness, once the
deceased made a complaint to him orally that the accused used to
torture her and he visited the house of the accused and the matter
was resolved amicably. Complaints, Ex. PW-4/A and Ex. PW-4/B
which bear the seal of panchayat and his signatures and these
applications were addressed to the Protection Officer alleging
maltreatment by the deceased at the hands of the accused. The
matter was compromised between the parties.
22. Smt. Veena Devi, the then Supervisor-cum-Protection
Officer in the CDPO Office Bhawarna, Palampur, appeared in the
witness-box as PW-11. She deposed that an application was
received from Police Station, Bhawarna, copy of which is Ex. PW-
5/B, and she inquired the matter. She visited the spot on
29.05.2012 and the deceased told that earlier quarrel took place
between her and the accused, but now their relations were cordial.
Document to this effect was prepared, Ex. PW-4/B, which bears
her signatures and the signatures of the deceased. She has
further deposed that on 07.06.2012 she had visited the spot, where
an application, Ex. PW-4/A, was given to her by the deceased for
19 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5038-DB )
withdrawal of her complaint, which was made against her husband.
She remained associated in the investigation of the case and on
09.07.2012 she handed over the documents qua the inquiry to the
police, vide memo, Ex. PW-5/A, which bears her and the
signatures of Shri Babu Ram and Smt. Sushma.
23. Dr. Anupama Singh, who had conducted post mortem
examination on the dead body of the deceased, was examined as
PW-18, and as per her opinion, no poison could be detected in the
contents sent for chemical examination and the cause of death
was asphyxia due to ante mortem hanging.
24. We have closely scrutinized the entire evidence on
record led by the prosecution and from the closest scrutiny thereof,
we are of the considered view that the prosecution has failed to
establish that the deceased had been abetted by the accused to
commit suicide and that he had subjected her to cruelty in any
manner.
25. Though PW-1, Shri Rumi Ram, father of the deceased,
and PW-2, Smt. Malka Devi, deposed that the accused used to
take quarrels with his daughter and also used to beat her.
However, their evidence is just hear say evidence, as PW-1
categorically deposed that the deceased used to complain about
the alleged harassment and beatings by the accused to her sister
20 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5038-DB )
Asha, who further told the same to her mother, i.e., PW-2, Smt.
Malka Devi and thereafter PW-2 told this to him. Meaning thereby
that the deceased has not directly disclosed about the alleged
harassment and beatings given to her by the accused to her
father, PW-1 Shri Rumi Ram, who is the complainant and the
complainant gathered this information from PW-2, Smt. Malka
Devi, who also gathered this information from her another daughter
Asha. Thus, it has become clear that whatever PW 1 and PW-2
have deposed, that is hearsay, as they have gathered the
information about the alleged harassment and beatings to the
deceased from their another daughter Asha. Surprisingly, for the
reasons best known to the prosecution Asha has neither been
examined nor even cited as a witness by the prosecution.
26. PW-1 deposed that the accused used to beat the
deceased and she had also shown an injury sustained by her on
her back four days prior to her death. PW-2, Smt. Malka Devi
deposed that there were injuries on the neck, hip and other parts of
the body of the deceased. However, there is no corroborative
evidence that the accused had inflicted injuries on the neck, hip
and other parts of the body of the deceased. The deceased was
not got medically examined when she was alive. PW-2, mother of
the deceased had advised the deceased to get her medically
21 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5038-DB )
examined, but she was not willing to get herself medically
examined. Had the accused inflicted the injuries on the deceased,
then why she had not got herself medically examined, which
creates doubt on the case of the prosecution. Even the complaint
lodged by the deceased is silent about the injuries. There is no
corroborative evidence to suggest that the deceased sustained any
injury, as deposed by PW-1 as well as PW-2, i.e., father and
mother of the deceased, respectively. PW-18, Dr. Anupama Singh,
Medical Officer, who conducted the postmortem on the corpse of
the deceased, specifically deposed during her cross-examination
that except injury on the neck, i.e., ligature mark injury by the
dupatta, there was no other injury on the dead body of the
deceased.
27. PW-17, ASI Ram Swarup, who visited the spot
immediately, also did not notice any injury on the dead body of the
deceased except the ligature mark injury on her neck. Therefore,
in the absence of any corroborative evidence qua the alleged
injuries, the statements of PW-1 and PW-2 cannot be relied upon.
28. PW-3, Miss Sikha is the child witness, who is the
daughter of the deceased and she had deposed that the accused
firstly applied electric current on the deceased and thereafter he
caught hold of her neck and hanged her with the ceiling fan.
22 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5038-DB )
However, this witness has introduced a totally different story
altogether, whereas post mortem report is absolutely silent about
this fact. During her cross-examination this witness has
categorically stated that whatever she had stated in the Court was
told to her by her matrimonial grand-mother. Thus, this child
witness is a tutored witness and no credence can be attached to
her statement being contrary to the medical evidence.
29. The prosecution has failed to lead any evidence on record
that immediately before her death the deceased was physically
assaulted by the accused. There is also no evidence on record
that the deceased was mentally harassed by the accused in any
manner. As per the evidence on record, the relationship between
the deceased and the accused was cordial, as such she had
withdrawn her complaint, which was lodged by her against the
accused and she also made a statement before the Protection
Officer.
30. PW-2, Smt. Malka Devi, mother of the deceased, has
categorically deposed during her cross-examination that the
deceased visited her parental house only four times within six
years of her marriage, meaning thereby that the deceased was
living happily in her matrimonial home. Admittedly, it is not the
case of the prosecution that the accused had demanded dowry at
23 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5038-DB )
any point of time at the time of marriage or thereafter. Thus, the
prosecution has failed to lead any cogent and satisfactory evidence
on record to show that the deceased was compelled by the
accused to commit suicide.
31. The mere fact that deceased had committed suicide
within six years of her marriage and that she had been allegedly
subjected to cruelty by her husband, does not automatically give
rise to the presumption that the suicide had been abetted by her
husband. There is no direct evidence that accused aided or
instigated the deceased to commit suicide or entered into any
conspiracy to aid her in committing suicide.
32. In Ghulam Mustafa vs State of Uttarakhand, AIR
2015 SC 3101, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that a casual
remark or something said in a routine way or in usual conversation
should not be construed or misunderstood to mean ‘abetment.’ A
conviction on mere allegation of harassment without any positive
action in proximity to the time of occurrence on the part of accused
that led a person to commit suicide is not sustainable under section
306 IPC.
33. Again, in Gurucharan vs State of Punjab, AIR 2017 SC
74, it has been held that to constitute the offence under section
306 IPC, there should be a live link between abetment and suicide
24 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5038-DB )
and the intention and involvement of the accused to aid or instigate
the commission of suicide is imperative. So far as the grievance of
dowry demand and consequential harassment is concerned, it
should not be general in nature and there should be some specific
incident and should have provocative capability to drive the
deceased to such distressed state, mental and physical that she
could elect to end her life.
34. In Nachhatter Singh vs State of Punjab, (2011) 11
SCC 542, the Court observed that in case of abetment of suicide
by married woman, the cruelty and harassment meted out must be
of nature to drive a person of common prudence to commit suicide.
Every quarrel between husband and wife which results in suicide
cannot be taken to abetment by husband. For abetment, standard
of reasonable or practical woman as compared to headstrong and
over sensitive one is to be applied.
35. In Sohan Raj Sharma Vs. State of Haryana, AIR 2008
Supreme Court 2108, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held:-
“9. In State of West Bengal Vs. Orilal Jaiswal (AIR 1994
SC 1418) this Court has observed that the courts
should be extremely careful in assessing the facts and
circumstances of each case and the evidence adduced
in the trial for the purpose of finding whether the cruelty
meted out to the victim had in fact induced her to end
her life by committing suicide. If it transpires to the
Court that a victim committing suicide was
hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and
differences in domestic life quite common to the
society to which the victim belonged and such
petulance discord and differences were not expected
25 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5038-DB )
to induce a similarly circumstanced individual in a
given society to commit suicide, the conscience of the
Court should not be satisfied for basing a finding that
the accused charged of abetting the offence of suicide
should be found guilty.
10. Section 107 IPC defines abetment of a thing. The
offence of abetment is a separate and distinct offence
provided in the Act as an offence. A person abets the
doing of a thing when (1) he instigates any person to
do that thing; or (2) engages with one or more other
persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing; or
(3) intentionally aids, by act or illegal omission, the
doing of that thing. These things are essential to
complete abetment as a crime. The word “instigate”
literally means to provide, incite, urge on or bring about
by persuasion to do any thing. The abetment may be
by instigation, conspiracy or intentional aid, as
provided in the three clauses of Section 107. Section
109 provides that if the act abetted is committed in
consequence of abetment and there is no provision for
the punishment of such abetment, then the offender is
to be punished with the punishment provided for the
original offence. ‘Abetted’ in Section 109 means the
specific offence abetted. Therefore, the offence for the
abetment of which a person is charged with the
abetment is normally linked with the proved offence.
11. In cases of alleged abetment of suicide there must be
proof of direct or indirect acts of incitement to the
commission of suicide. The mere fact that the husband
treated the deceased-wife with cruelty is not enough.
[See Mahinder Singh Vs. State of M.P. (1955 AIR SCW
4570)].”
36. In Harjit Singh Vs. State of Punjab, AIR 2006
Supreme Court 680, it is held as under:-
“26. Before invoking the provisions of Section 306 IPC,
it is necessary to establish that : (1) the deceased
committed suicide, and (ii) she had been subjected
to cruelty within the meaning of Section 498 A IPC.
27. Only in the event those facts are established, a
presumption in terms of Section 113 A of the Indian
Evidence Act could be raised. In the instant case,
the prosecution has not been able to prove that the
deceased was subjected to cruelty within the
meaning of Section 498 A, IPC. No case that the
deceased committed suicide was also made out.”
26 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5038-DB )
37. The legal position has been reiterated by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Mariano Anto Bruno & another vs. Inspector
of Police, AIR 2022 Supreme Court 4994, wherein it has been
held as follows:-
” 25. The ingredients of Section 306 IPC have been
extensively laid out in M. Arjunan Vs. State, represented by
its Inspector of Police 7 which are as under:-
“The essential ingredients of the offence under
Section 306 IPC are: (i) the abetment; (ii) the intention
of the accused to aid or instigate or abet the deceased
to commit suicide. The act of the accused, however,
insulting the deceased by using abusive language will
not, by itself, constitute the abetment of suicide. There
should be evidence capable of suggesting that the
accused intended by such act to instigate the
deceased to commit suicide. Unless the ingredients of
instigation/abetment to commit suicide are satisfied,
accused cannot be convicted under Section 306 IPC.”
26. In order to convict an accused under Section 306 IPC,
the state of mind to commit a particular crime must be
visible with regard to determining the culpability. With regard
to the same, a two-judge bench of this Court in Ude Singh &
Ors. State of Haryana observed as under:-
“16. In cases of alleged abetment of suicide, there
must be a proof of direct or indirect act/s of incitement
to the commission of suicide. It could hardly be
disputed that the question of cause of a suicide,
particularly in the context of an offence of abetment of
suicide, remains a vexed one, involving multifaceted
and complex attributes of human behavior and
responses/reactions. In the case of accusation for
abetment of suicide, the Court would be looking for
cogent and convincing proof of the act/s of incitement
to the commission of suicide. In the case of suicide,
mere allegation of harassment of the deceased by
another person would not suffice unless there be such
action on the part of the accused which compels the
person to commit suicide; and such an offending
action ought to be proximate to the time of occurrence.
Whether a person has abetted in the commission of
suicide by another or not, could only be gathered from
the facts and circumstances of each case.
16.1. For the purpose of finding out if a person has
abetted commission of suicide by another; the
consideration would be if the accused is guilty of the
act of instigation of the act of suicide. As explained
27 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5038-DB )
and reiterated by this Court in the decisions above-
referred, instigation means to goad, urge forward,
provoke, incite or encourage to do an act. If the
persons who committed suicide had been
hypersensitive and the action of accused is otherwise
not ordinarily expected to induce a similarly
circumstanced person to commit suicide, it may not be
safe to hold the accused guilty of abetment of suicide.
But, on the other hand, if the accused by his acts and
by his continuous course of conduct creates a
situation which leads the deceased perceiving no
other option except to commit suicide, the case may
fall within the four-corners of Section 306 IPC. If the
accused plays an active role in tarnishing the self-
esteem and self-respect of the victim, which eventually
draws the victim to commit suicide, the accused may
be held guilty of abetment of suicide. The question of
mens rea on the part of the accused in such cases
would be examined with reference to the actual acts
and deeds of the accused and if the acts and deeds
are only of such nature where the accused intended
nothing more than harassment or snap show of anger,
a particular case may fall short of the offence of
abetment of suicide. However, if the accused kept on
irritating or annoying the deceased by words or deeds
until the deceased reacted or was provoked, a
particular case may be that of abetment of suicide.
Such being the matter of delicate analysis of human
behaviour, each case is required to be examined on its
own facts, while taking note of all the surrounding
factors having bearing on the actions and psyche of
the accused and the deceased.”
38. In Hans Raj Vs. State of Haryana, (2004) 12 SCC
257, the Supreme Court held that the nature of presumption under
Section 113A is discretionary in the sense that from the mere fact
that the wife committed suicide within 07 years of marriage and
that she had been subjected to cruelty by the husband, there will
be no automatic presumption that the suicide had been abetted by
the husband.
39. Thus, in view of the aforesaid authoritative
28 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5038-DB )
pronouncements of Hon’ble Supreme Court, if the Court examines
the allegations made in this case, there is no direct evidence of
cruelty inflicted by the present accused against the deceased. The
facts suggest that there may have some strained relationship
between the accused and the deceased but that does not mean
that he inflicted physical and mental torture upon the victim which
led her to commit suicide. There is no principle of law that
wherever wife commits suicide, the husband would bear the
responsibility and would be held liable.
40. As per the evidence, the deceased moved an
application/complaint, Ex.PW-5/B, which was forwarded to the
Protection Officer in CDPO Office, Bhawarna. PW-11, Smt. Veena
Devi, the then Protection Officer, specifically deposed that on this
complaint of the deceased, she had inquired into the matter and
she was told by the deceased that earlier a quarrel had taken place
between her and her husband, but now their relations were cordial.
She prepared document, Ex. PW-4/B, to this effect, which was also
signed by the deceased. She further deposed that she again
visited the spot where the deceased had given an application for
withdrawal of the complaint made by her against her husband. As
per Ex. PW-4/B, the deceased stated that her relations with her
husband were cordial and she did not want to pursue her
29 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5038-DB )
complaint. Thus, as the matter was amicably settled between the
parties and the deceased herself made a statement about her
cordial relations with the accused, as such the story projected by
the prosecution that the accused used to beat and harass the
deceased does not appear to be plausible. The general allegations
of harassment cannot be sufficient to hold the accused guilty for
the offence of abetment of suicide. The prosecution has failed to
establish positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or to
compel the deceased to commit suicide. The allegations made by
the prosecution witnesses are general in nature and no specific
instance of the alleged maltreatment or cruelty has been given by
the prosecution witnesses, which can be construed as cruelty or
abetment to commit suicide on the part of the accused.
41. There is no satisfactory material on record to prove
cruelty and harassment with the deceased before the incident or
abetment in proximity of time for committing suicide. To attract the
offence under Section 306 IPC, the alleged cruelty, instigation or
encouragement by accused should not only be proved by
prosecution but also be of such nature which leaves no option to
the deceased except to commit suicide. There is no evidence led
by prosecution that there was abetment of such grave nature which
was likely to drive the deceased to commit suicide. The suicidal
30 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5038-DB )
death in this case cannot be due to any illegal act or illegal
omission or instigation, by anybody else. It may be the deceased’s
own act, being of hyper sensitive nature, for which, the husband
cannot be held guilty.
42. Thus, we are of the considered opinion that the view
taken by the trial Court while acquitting the accused is a
reasonable view based on the evidence on record and the same
cannot be said to be perverse or contrary to the material on record.
43. In view of what has been discussed hereinabove, no
interference in the judgment of acquittal dated 20.08.2014, passed
by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-III, Kangra at
Dharamshala, District Kangra, H.P., in Sessions Case No. 37-
P/VII/13/12 is required as the same is the result of proper
appreciation of evidence and law. The appeal, which is devoid of
merits, deserves dismissal and is accordingly dismissed. Bail
bonds are discharged.
Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed
of.
( Tarlok Singh Chauhan )
Judge
( Sushil Kukreja )
Judge
6th March, 2025
(virender)
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