Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On : 27.02.2025 vs Ashwani Kumar on 6 March, 2025
Author: Virender Singh
Bench: Virender Singh
2025:HHC:4966
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Appeal No.310 of 2010
Reserved on : 27.02.2025
Decided on : 06.03.2025
State of H.P. …Appellant
Versus
Ashwani Kumar …Respondent
Coram
The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes
For the appellant : Mr. H.S. Rawat, Additional Advocate
General and Mr. Rohit Sharma,
Deputy Advocate General.
For the respondent: Mr. Atharv Sharma, Advocate.
Virender Singh, Judge
By virtue of the present appeal, filed under
Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter
referred to as the ‘CrPC‘), the State of Himachal Pradesh
has assailed the judgment of acquittal dated 09.03.2010,
passed by the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate 1st
Class, Court No.I, Amb, District Una, H.P. (hereinafter
referred to as ‘trial Court’).
2. By way of the judgment of acquittal, dated
09.03.2010, the learned trial Court has acquitted
respondent-Ashwani Kumar (hereinafter referred to as the
1
Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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2025:HHC:4966
‘accused’), in Police Challan No.72-II-2005, from the
charges, framed against him, under Sections 279, 337 and
304A of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as
the ‘IPC‘).
3. Brief facts, leading to the filing of the present
appeal, before this Court, as per the record, may be
summed up, as under:-
4. The police of Police Station, Amb has filed the
final report, under Section 173(2) of CrPC, against the
accused, before the learned trial Court, mentioning therein
that on 14.01.2005, a telephonic information was received
in the Police Station, upon which, ASI Ashok Kumar, along
with other police officials, had reached at the spot, from
where, he came to know about the fact that two injured
were rushed to CHC, Gagret for treatment.
5. Subsequently, police party reached CHC,
Gagret and moved application, before the Medical Officer,
for recording the statement of one injured Rajesh Kumar,
upon which, the Medical Officer declared injured Rajesh
Kumar unfit to make statement.
6. Thereafter, ASI Surinder Kumar had recorded
the statement of one Varun Awasthi, under Section 154 of
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CrPC, disclosing therein that he is pursuing his
Engineering degree and his father is working as ETO on
Gagret Barrier.
7. According to the statement of the said Varun
Awasthi, before the police, on 14.01.2005, he was on his
way back to his home and de-boarded the bus at
Mubarikpur. Thereafter, he boarded Maruti Van bearing
registration No.HP20-B-2810 and proceeded towards
Gagret. The said Maruti Van was driven by one Rajesh
Kumar. When, the said Maruti Van, being driven by said
Rajesh Kumar, reached about one kilometer ahead of
Mubarikpur, then, one Indica car, bearing registration
No.HP-19A-8000, being driven by its driver in the wrong
direction, came there and hit the said Maruti Van. Rajesh
Kumar had applied the brakes, but, the accident could not
be avoided and vehicles collided. Due to the impact of
collision, the legs of the driver of the Maruti Van pressed in
the Van. Number of persons gathered there, who had taken
out the said injured from the vehicle.
8. In the said accident, Varun Awasthi had also
sustained injuries. According to him, the accident in
question had taken place because of the driver of Indica
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car, whose name, he has disclosed as Ashwani Kumar, as,
he had driven his vehicle in a rash and negligent manner.
Thereafter, the police registered the case under Sections
279 and 337 of IPC.
9. When, the Investigating Officer of the case was
busy in investigation, in the meanwhile, he had received
the information that injured Rajesh Kumar expired, while
he was being taken to hospital at Hoshiarpur for
treatment, upon which, a request for conducting the post-
mortem examination of the dead body of Rajesh Kumar
was made and accordingly, Section 304A of IPC was added,
in this case.
10. After completion of the investigation, the police
has submitted the report against the accused, under
Sections 279, 337 and 304A of IPC.
11. After complying with the provisions of Section
207 of IPC and after perusing the report, under Section
173(2) of CrPC, as well as, accompanying documents, the
learned trial Court found prima facie case against the
accused for the commission of offences punishable under
Section 279, 337 and 304A of IPC. As such, the accused
was charge-sheeted accordingly. When, the charges, so
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framed, were put to him, he had not admitted his guilt and
claimed to be tried.
12. Since the accused had refused to admit his
guilt, as such, prosecution was directed to adduce
evidence, upon which, the prosecution has examined as
many as 12 witnesses.
13. After closure of the prosecution evidence, the
entire incriminating evidence, appearing against the
accused, was put to him, in his statement, recorded under
Section 313 CrPC. The accused has denied the entire
prosecution case and taken the simplicitor defence that the
deceased was driving his vehicle in the wrong direction.
However, the accused has not opted to lead any evidence in
his defence.
14. Thereafter, the learned trial Court, after hearing
learned Additional Public Prosecutor and learned counsel
for the accused, has acquitted the accused from the
charges, framed against him, in this case, vide judgment
dated 09.03.2010.
15. Feeling aggrieved from the judgment of
acquittal, the present Criminal Appeal has been preferred,
before this Court, on the ground that the learned trial
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Court has not considered the evidence of PW-4 Mastan
Singh, whereas, according to learned Additional Advocate
General, the said witness had specifically stated about the
negligence, as well as, rashness of the accused.
16. According to the appellant-State, the
photographs, clicked by PW-3 and PW-11, have also not
been taken into consideration by the learned trial Court
and the learned trial Court has wrongly discarded the
statements of eye-witnesses, namely Mastan Singh and
Varun Awasthi.
17. On the basis of above facts, learned Additional
Advocate General has prayed that the present appeal may
be accepted and the judgment of acquittal may be set aside
by convicting the accused, for the commission of offences,
for which, he has been charge-sheeted, in this case.
18. Per contra, Mr. Atharv Sharma, learned
counsel, appearing for the accused, has supported the
impugned judgment of acquittal and has vehemently
argued that the learned trial Court has rightly considered
the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and right
conclusion has been drawn, which does not require any
interference by this Court, while exercising powers of the
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Appellate Court. Thus, a prayer has been made to dismiss
the appeal.
19. The State of Himachal Pradesh is before this
Court by way of the present Criminal Appeal, which has
been preferred against the judgment of acquittal, passed by
the learned trial Court. The scope of interference in an
appeal against the judgment of acquittal, has elaborately
been discussed by the three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in ‘Anwar Ali & Another Vs. State of
Himachal Pradesh‘, reported in (2020) 10 SCC 166.
Relevant paragraphs 14 to 14.3 are reproduced, as under:-
“14. Before considering the appeal on merits, the
law on the appeal against acquittal and the
scope and ambit of Section 378 Cr.P.C. and the
interference by the High Court in an appeal
against acquittal is required to be considered.
14.1. In the case of Babu (supra), this Court had
reiterated the principles to be followed in an
appeal against acquittal under Section
378 Cr.P.C. In paragraphs 12 to 19, it is
observed and held as under:
12. This Court time and again has laid
down the guidelines for the High Court to
interfere with the judgment and order of
acquittal passed by the trial court. The
appellate court should not ordinarily set
aside a judgment of acquittal in a case
where two views are possible, though the
view of the appellate court may be the more
probable one. While dealing with a
judgment of acquittal, the appellate court
has to consider the entire evidence on
record, so as to arrive at a finding as to
whether the views of the trial court were
8
2025:HHC:4966perverse or otherwise unsustainable. The
appellate court is entitled to consider
whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the
trial court had failed to take into
consideration admissible evidence and/or
had taken into consideration the evidence
brought on record contrary to law. Similarly,
wrong placing of burden of proof may also
be a subject matter of scrutiny by the
appellate court. (Vide Balak Ram v. State of
U.P (1975) 3 SCC 219, Shambhoo Missir v.
State of Bihar (1990) 4 SCC 17, Shailendra
Pratap v. State of U.P (2003) 1 SCC 761,
Narendra Singh v. State of M.P (2004) 10
SCC 699, Budh Singh v. State of U.P (2006)
9 SCC 731, State of U.P. v. Ram Veer
Singh (2007) 13 SCC 102, S. Rama Krishna
v. S. Rami Reddy (2008) 5 SCC 535,
Arulvelu v. State (2009) 10 SCC 206, Perla
Somasekhara Reddy v. State of A.P (2009)
16 SCC 98 and Ram Singh v. State of H.P
(2010) 2 SCC 445)
13. In Sheo Swarup v. King Emperor AIR
1934 PC 227, the Privy Council observed as
under: (IA p. 404)
“… the High Court should and will
always give proper weight and
consideration to such matters as (1) the
views of the trial Judge as to the
credibility of the witnesses; (2) the
presumption of innocence in favour of
the accused, a presumption certainly
not weakened by the fact that he has
been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right
of the accused to the benefit of any
doubt; and (4) the slowness of an
appellate court in disturbing a finding
of fact arrived at by a Judge who had
the advantage of seeing the
witnesses.”
14. The aforesaid principle of law has
consistently been followed by this Court.
(See Tulsiram Kanu v. State AIR 1954 SC
1, Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab AIR
1957 SC 216, M.G. Agarwal v. State of
Maharashtra AIR 1963 SC 200, Khedu
Mohton v. State of Bihar (1970) 2 SCC
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450, Sambasivan v. State of Kerala (1998)
5 SCC 412, Bhagwan Singh v. State of
M.P(2002) 4 SCC 85 and State of Goa v.
Sanjay Thakran (2007) 3 SCC 755)
15. In Chandrappa v. State of
Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415, this Court
reiterated the legal position as under: (SCC p.
432, para 42)
“(1) An appellate court has full power to
review, reappreciate and reconsider the
evidence upon which the order of acquittal is
founded.
(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
puts no limitation, restriction or condition on
exercise of such power and an appellate
court on the evidence before it may reach its
own conclusion, both on questions of fact and
of law.
(3) Various expressions, such as, ‘substantial
and compelling reasons’, ‘good and sufficient
grounds’, ‘very strong circumstances’,
‘distorted conclusions’, ‘glaring mistakes’,
etc. are not intended to curtail extensive
powers of an appellate court in an appeal
against acquittal. Such phraseologies are
more in the nature of ‘flourishes of language’
to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate
court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail
the power of the court to review the evidence
and to come to its own conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in
mind that in case of acquittal, there is double
presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly,
the presumption of innocence is available to
him under the fundamental principle of
criminal jurisprudence that every person
shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is
proved guilty by a competent court of law.
Secondly, the accused having secured his
acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is
further reinforced, reaffirmed and
strengthened by the trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible
on the basis of the evidence on record, the
appellate court should not disturb the finding
of acquittal recorded by the trial court.”
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16. In Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P (2008) 10 SCC
450, this Court reiterated the said view,
observing that the appellate court in dealing with
the cases in which the trial courts have acquitted
the accused, should bear in mind that the trial
court’s acquittal bolsters the presumption that he
is innocent. The appellate court must give due
weight and consideration to the decision of the
trial court as the trial court had the distinct
advantage of watching the demeanour of the
witnesses, and was in a better position to
evaluate the credibility of the witnesses.
17. In State of Rajasthan v. Naresh (2009) 9 SCC
368, the Court again examined the earlier
judgments of this Court and laid down that:
(SCC p. 374, para 20)
“20. … an order of acquittal should not be
lightly interfered with even if the court
believes that there is some evidence pointing
out the finger towards the accused.”
18. In State of U.P. v. Banne (2009) 4 SCC 271,
this Court gave certain illustrative circumstances
in which the Court would be justified in
interfering with a judgment of acquittal by the
High Court. The circumstances include: (SCC p.
286, para 28)
“(i) The High Court’s decision is based on
totally erroneous view of law by ignoring the
settled legal position;
(ii) The High Court’s conclusions are contrary
to evidence and documents on record;
(iii) The entire approach of the High Court in
dealing with the evidence was patently
illegal leading to grave miscarriage of justice;
(iv) The High Court’s judgment is manifestly
unjust and unreasonable based on erroneous
law and facts on the record of the case;
(v) This Court must always give proper
weight and consideration to the findings of
the High Court;
(vi) This Court would be extremely reluctant
in interfering with a case when both the
Sessions Court and the High Court have
recorded an order of acquittal.”
A similar view has been reiterated by this Court
in Dhanapal v. State (2009) 10 SCC 401.
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19. Thus, the law on the issue can be
summarised to the effect that in exceptional
cases where there are compelling circumstances,
and the judgment under appeal is found to be
perverse, the appellate court can interfere with
the order of acquittal. The appellate court should
bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the
accused and further that the trial court’s
acquittal bolsters the presumption of his
innocence. Interference in a routine manner
where the other view is possible should be
avoided, unless there are good reasons for
interference.”
(emphasis supplied)
14.2 When can the findings of fact recorded by
a court be held to be perverse has been dealt
with and considered in paragraph 20 of the
aforesaid decision, which reads as under:
“20. The findings of fact recorded by a court
can be held to be perverse if the findings
have been arrived at by ignoring or
excluding relevant material or by taking into
consideration irrelevant/inadmissible
material. The finding may also be said to be
perverse if it is “against the weight of
evidence”, or if the finding so outrageously
defies logic as to suffer from the vice of
irrationality. (Vide Rajinder Kumar Kindra v.
Delhi Admn (1984) 4 SCC 635, Excise and
Taxation OfficercumAssessing Authority v.
Gopi Nath & Sons 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312,
Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE 1994
Supp. (3) SCC 665, Gaya Din v. Hanuman
Prasad (2001) 1 SCC 501, Aruvelu v. State
(2009) 10 SCC 206 and Gamini Bala
Koteswara Rao v. State of A.P (2009) 10
SCC 636).”
(emphasis supplied)
It is further observed, after following the
decision of this Court in the case of Kuldeep
Singh v. Commissioner of Police (1999) 2 SCC
10, that if a decision is arrived at on the basis of
no evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence
and no reasonable person would act upon it, the
order would be perverse. But if there is some
evidence on record which is acceptable and
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which could be relied upon, the conclusions
would not be treated as perverse and the
findings would not be interfered with.
14.3 In the recent decision of Vijay Mohan
Singh (supra), this Court again had an occasion
to consider the scope of Section 378 Cr.P.C. and
the interference by the High Court in an appeal
against acquittal. This Court considered catena
of decisions of this Court right from 1952
onwards. In paragraph 31, it is observed and
held as under:
“31. An identical question came to be
considered before this Court in Umedbhai
Jadavbhai (1978) 1 SCC 228. In the case
before this Court, the High Court interfered
with the order of acquittal passed by the
learned trial court on reappreciation of the
entire evidence on record. However, the High
Court, while reversing the acquittal, did not
consider the reasons given by the learned
trial court while acquitting the accused.
Confirming the judgment of the High Court,
this Court observed and held in para 10 as
under: (SCC p. 233)
“10. Once the appeal was rightly
entertained against the order of acquittal,
the High Court was entitled to
reappreciate the entire evidence
independently and come to its own
conclusion.
Ordinarily, the High Court would give due
importance to the opinion of the Sessions
Judge if the same were arrived at after
proper appreciation of the evidence. This
rule will not be applicable in the present
case where the Sessions Judge has made
an absolutely wrong assumption of a very
material and clinching aspect in the
peculiar circumstances of the case.”
31.1. In Sambasivan v. State of
Kerala (1998) 5 SCC 412, the High Court
reversed the order of acquittal passed by the
learned trial court and held the accused
guilty on reappreciation of the entire evidence
on record, however, the High Court did not
record its conclusion on the question whether
the approach of the trial court in dealing with
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the evidence was patently illegal or the
conclusions arrived at by it were wholly
untenable. Confirming the order passed by
the High Court convicting the accused on
reversal of the acquittal passed by the
learned trial court, after being satisfied that
the order of acquittal passed by the learned
trial court was perverse and suffered from
infirmities, this Court declined to interfere
with the order of conviction passed by the
High Court. While confirming the order of
conviction passed by the High Court, this
Court observed in para 8 as under: (SCC p.
416)
“8. We have perused the judgment under
appeal to ascertain whether the High
Court has conformed to the
aforementioned principles. We find that
the High Court has not strictly proceeded
in the manner laid down by this Court
in Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of
Gujarat (1996) 9 SCC 225 viz. first
recording its conclusion on the question
whether the approach of the trial court in
dealing with the evidence was patently
illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it
were wholly untenable, which alone will
justify interference in an order of acquittal
though the High Court has rendered a
wellconsidered judgment duly meeting all
the contentions raised before it. But then
will this noncompliance per se justify
setting aside the judgment under appeal?
We think, not. In our view, in such a case,
the approach of the court which is
considering the validity of the judgment of
an appellate court which has reversed the
order of acquittal passed by the trial court,
should be to satisfy itself if the approach
of the trial court in dealing with the
evidence was patently illegal or
conclusions arrived at by it are
demonstrably unsustainable and whether
the judgment of the appellate court is free
from those infirmities; if so to hold that the
trial court judgment warranted
interference. In such a case, there is
obviously no reason why the appellate
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court’s judgment should be disturbed. But
if on the other hand the court comes to the
conclusion that the judgment of the trial
court does not suffer from any infirmity, it
cannot but be held that the interference by
the appellate court in the order of acquittal
was not justified; then in such a case the
judgment of the appellate court has to be
set aside as of the two reasonable views,
the one in support of the acquittal alone
has to stand. Having regard to the above
discussion, we shall proceed to examine
the judgment of the trial court in this
case.”
31.2. In K. Ramakrishnan Unnithan v. State of
Kerala (1999) 3 SCC 309, after observing that
though there is some substance in the grievance
of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
accused that the High Court has not adverted to
all the reasons given by the trial Judge for
according an order of acquittal, this Court
refused to set aside the order of conviction
passed by the High Court after having found
that the approach of the Sessions Judge in
recording the order of acquittal was not proper
and the conclusion arrived at by the learned
Sessions Judge on several aspects was
unsustainable. This Court further observed that
as the Sessions Judge was not justified in
discarding the relevant/material evidence while
acquitting the accused, the High Court, therefore,
was fully entitled to reappreciate the evidence
and record its own conclusion. This Court
scrutinised the evidence of the eyewitnesses and
opined that reasons adduced by the trial court
for discarding the testimony of the eyewitnesses
were not at all sound. This Court also observed
that as the evaluation of the evidence made by
the trial court was manifestly erroneous and
therefore it was the duty of the High Court to
interfere with an order of acquittal passed by the
learned Sessions Judge.
31.3. In Atley v. State of U.P. AIR 1955 SC 807,
in para 5, this Court observed and held as
under: (AIR pp. 80910)
“5. It has been argued by the learned
counsel for the appellant that the judgment
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of the trial court being one of acquittal, the
High Court should not have set it aside on
mere appreciation of the evidence led on
behalf of the prosecution unless it came to
the conclusion that the judgment of the trial
Judge was perverse. In our opinion, it is not
correct to say that unless the appellate
court in an appeal under Section 417 CrPC
came to the conclusion that the judgment of
acquittal under appeal was perverse it
could not set aside that order.
It has been laid down by this Court that it is
open to the High Court on an appeal against
an order of acquittal to review the entire
evidence and to come to its own conclusion,
of course, keeping in view the well-
established rule that the presumption of
innocence of the accused is not weakened
but strengthened by the judgment of
acquittal passed by the trial court which
had the advantage of observing the
demeanour of witnesses whose evidence
have been recorded in its presence.
It is also well settled that the court of
appeal has as wide powers of appreciation
of evidence in an appeal against an order of
acquittal as in the case of an appeal against
an order of conviction, subject to the riders
that the presumption of innocence with
which the accused person starts in the trial
court continues even up to the appellate
stage and that the appellate court should
attach due weight to the opinion of the trial
court which recorded the order of acquittal.
If the appellate court reviews the evidence,
keeping those principles in mind, and comes
to a contrary conclusion, the judgment
cannot be said to have been vitiated. (See in
this connection the very cases cited at the
Bar, namely, Surajpal Singh v. State AIR
1952 SC 52; Wilayat Khan v. State of
U.P AIR 1953 SC 122) In our opinion, there
is no substance in the contention raised on
behalf of the appellant that the High Court
was not justified in reviewing the entire
evidence and coming to its own
conclusions.’
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31.4. In K. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P. (1979)
1 SCC 355, this Court has observed that
where the trial court allows itself to be beset
with fanciful doubts, rejects creditworthy
evidence for slender reasons and takes a view
of the evidence which is but barely possible, it
is the obvious duty of the High Court to
interfere in the interest of justice, lest the
administration of justice be brought to
ridicule.” (emphasis supplied)
20. With the judgment of acquittal, passed in
favour of the accused, the presumption of innocence,
which was available to him, at the time of initiation of the
trial, becomes double and it is no longer res integra that
the Appellate Court should not interfere with the judgment
of acquittal, until or unless, the findings, so recorded by
the learned trial Court, fall within the definition of ‘perverse
findings’.
21. The term “perverse” has duly been elaborated
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ‘Arulvelu and Another
Versus State represented by the Public Prosecutor and
Another’, reported in (2009) 10 Supreme Court Cases
206. Relevant paragraphs 22 to 30 of the said judgment
are reproduced, as under:-
“22. We have carefully perused the judgment of
the trial court and the impugned judgment of the
High Court. The trial court very minutely
examined the entire evidence and all documents
and exhibits on record. The trial court’s analysis
of evidence also seems to be correct. The trial
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2025:HHC:4966court has not deviated from the normal norms or
methods of evaluation of the evidence. By no
stretch of imagination, we can hold that the
judgment of the trial court is based on no
evidence or evidence which is thoroughly
unreliable and no reasonable person would act
upon it and consequently the judgment of the
trial court is perverse.
23. We also fail to arrive at the conclusion that
the discussion and appreciation of the evidence
of the trial court is so outrageously defies logic
as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring
the blame of being perverse and the findings
rendered by the trial court are against the
weight of evidence. The law is well settled that,
in an appeal against acquittal, unless the
judgment of the trial court is perverse, the
Appellate Court would not be justified in
substituting its own view and reverse the
judgment of acquittal.
24. The expression `perverse’ has been dealt
with in number of cases. In Gaya Din (Dead)
through LRs. & Others v. Hanuman Prasad
(Dead) through LRs. & Others, this Court
observed that the expression `perverse’ means
that the findings of the subordinate authority are
not supported by the evidence brought on record
or they are against the law or suffer from the
vice of procedural irregularity.
25. In Parry’s (Calcutta ) Employees’ Union v.
Parry & Co. Ltd. & Others, the Court observed
that `perverse finding’ means a finding which is
not only against the weight of evidence but is
altogether against the evidence itself. In Triveni
Rubber & Plastics v. Collector of Central Excise,
Cochin, the Court observed that this is not a
case where it can be said that the findings of the
authorities are based on no evidence or that they
are so perverse that no reasonable person would
have arrived at those findings.
26. In M. S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma &
Another, the Court observed that any order
made in conscious violation of pleading and law
is a perverse order. In Moffett v. Gough, the
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Court observed that a perverse verdict may
probably be defined as one that is not only
against the weight of evidence but is altogether
against the evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey, the
Court defined `perverse’ as turned the wrong
way, not right; distorted from the right; turned
away or deviating from what is right, proper,
correct etc.
27. The expression “perverse” has been defined
by various dictionaries in the following manner:
1. Oxford Advanced Learner’s
Dictionary of Current English Sixth
Edition
Perverse: Showing deliberate
determination to behave in a way that
most people think is wrong,
unacceptable or unreasonable.
2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary
English –
International Edition
Perverse: Deliberately departing from
what is normal and reasonable.
3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English
– 1998 Edition
Perverse: Law (of a verdict) against the
weight of evidence or the direction of the
judge on a point of law.
4. New Webster’s Dictionary of the
English Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic
Edition)
Perverse: Purposely deviating from
accepted or expected behavior or
opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn;
cross or petulant.
5. Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary of Words
& Phrases, Fourth Edition
Perverse: A perverse verdict may
probably be defined as one that is not
only against the weight of evidence but
is altogether against the evidence.
28. In Shailendra Pratap & Another v. State of
U.P., the Court observed thus:
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“8. … We are of the opinion that the trial
court was quite justified in acquitting
the appellants of the charges as the
view taken by it was reasonable one
and the order of acquittal cannot be
said to be perverse. It is well settled
that appellate court would not be
justified in interfering with the order of
acquittal unless the same is found to be
perverse. In the present case, the High
Court has committed an error in
interfering with the order of acquittal of
the appellants recorded by the trial
court as the same did not suffer from
the vice of perversity.”
29. In Kuldeep Singh v. The Commissioner of
Police & Others, the Court while dealing with
the scope of Articles 32 and 226 of the
Constitution observed as under:
“9. Normally the High Court and this
Court would not interfere with the
findings of fact recorded at the domestic
enquiry but if the finding of “guilt” is
based on no evidence, it would be a
perverse finding and would be
amenable to judicial scrutiny.
10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to
be maintained between the decisions
which are perverse and those which are
not. If a decision is arrived at on no
evidence or evidence which is
thoroughly unreliable and no
reasonable person would act upon it,
the order would be perverse. But if there
is some evidence on record which is
acceptable and which could be relied
upon, howsoever compendious it may
be, the conclusions would not be treated
as perverse and the findings would not
be interfered with.”
30. The meaning of `perverse’ has been
examined in H. B. Gandhi, Excise and Taxation
Officer-cum- Assessing Authority, Karnal &
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Others v. Gopi Nath & Sons & Others 1992, this
Court observed as under:
“7. In the present case, the stage at and
the points on which the challenge to the
assessment in judicial review was
raised and entertained was not
appropriate. In our opinion, the High
Court was in error in constituting itself
into a court of appeal against the
assessment. While it was open to the
respondent to have raised and for the
High Court to have considered whether
the denial of relief under the proviso
to Section 39(5) was proper or not, it
was not open to the High Court re-
appreciate the primary or perceptive
facts which were otherwise within the
domain of the fact-finding authority
under the statute. The question whether
the transactions were or were not sales
exigible to sales tax constituted an
exercise in recording secondary or
inferential facts based on primary facts
found by the statutory authorities. But
what was assailed in review was, in
substance, the correctness – as
distinguished from the legal
permissibility – of the primary or
perceptive facts themselves. It is, no
doubt, true that if a finding of fact is
arrived at by ignoring or excluding
relevant material or by taking into
consideration irrelevant material or if
the finding so outrageously defies logic
as to suffer from the vice of irrationality
incurring the blame of being perverse,
then, the finding is rendered infirm in
law.”
22. Similar view has again been taken by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in ‘S.R. Tewari Versus Union of
India and Another’, reported in (2013) 6 Supreme Court
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Cases 602. Relevant paragraph 30 of the said judgment is
reproduced, as under:-
“30. The findings of fact recorded by a court can
be held to be perverse if the findings have been
arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant
material or by taking into consideration
irrelevant/inadmissible material. The finding
may also be said to be perverse if it is “against
the weight of evidence”, or if the finding so
outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the
vice of irrationality. If a decision is arrived at on
the basis of no evidence or thoroughly unreliable
evidence and no reasonable person would act
upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there
is some evidence on record which is acceptable
and which could be relied upon, the conclusions
would not be treated as perverse and the
findings would not be interfered with.
(Vide: Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi
Administration, Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner
of Police & Ors., Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao &
Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh thr. Secretary
and Babu v. State of Kerala).”
23. It is also no longer res integra that if two views
are possible, then the view, which has been adopted by the
learned trial Court, has to be adopted by the Appellate
Court, while deciding the appeal against the judgment of
acquittal.
24. In view of the discussions, made above, now,
this Court would proceed further with the evidence, so
adduced by the prosecution, in order to find out as to
whether the findings, recorded by the learned trial Court,
fall within the definition of ‘perverse findings’ or not.
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25. In this case, there are only two eye-witnesses,
one is PW-4 Mastan Singh and other is PW-8 Varun
Awasthi.
26. PW-4 Mastan Singh, when appeared in the
witness box, has deposed that he had heard the noise of
collision of the vehicle. Although, he has deposed that the
accident in question had taken place due to the driver of
the Indica car, but, categorically stated that he does not
know the name of the driver of the said car, but, can
identify him. Although, he has deposed that the driver of
the Indica car was under the influence of alcohol, but, in
the absence of identification of the accused as the driver of
the offending Indica car, the said evidence is
inconsequential.
27. Admittedly, in this case, no test identification
parade was got conducted by the police, nor this witness
has even bothered to identify the accused, when, he had
made the statement on 23.01.2006, before the learned trial
Court. In his statement, he has not even bothered to
mention the registration number of the Indica car. In such
situation, the learned trial Court has rightly discarded the
evidence of this witness to ascertain the guilt of the
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accused for the commission of the crime, for which, he has
been charge-sheeted by the learned trial Court.
28. So far as the evidence of another star witness
i.e. PW-8 Varun Awasthi, is concerned, although, this
witness sustained injuries in the accident, but,
whatsoever, he has deposed, becomes inconsequential,
when, he deposed that he does not identify the car driver,
however, his name is stated to be Ashwani Kumar. When,
the identification of the accused as driver of the Indica car
could not be established even from the evidence of PW-8
Varun Awasthi, then, the accused cannot be convicted
mainly on the ground that one valuable life has lost in the
accident in question.
29. As stated above, there are only two eye-
witnesses and the evidence of both the alleged eye-
witnesses is too short to bring home the guilt of the
accused beyond any shadow of doubt.
30. No other point has been urged or argued.
31. Considering all these facts, this Court is of the
view that the learned trial Court has rightly appreciated
the evidence of the prosecution, in this case, and,
thereafter, has rightly acquitted the accused from the
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charges, framed against him. As such, there is no occasion
for this Court to interfere with the findings of the learned
trial Court, as, the same do not fall within the definition of
‘perverse findings’.
32. Consequently, the judgment of acquittal,
passed by the learned trial Court, is upheld and the
present appeal is dismissed. Bail bonds are discharged.
33. Record be sent back.
( Virender Singh )
Judge
March 06, 2025
( Gaurav Thakur )
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