Bombay High Court
Mangalsingh Amarsingh Rathod vs Mahatma Phule Shikshan Sanstha, … on 7 March, 2025
Author: Avinash G. Gharote
Bench: Avinash G. Gharote
2025:BHC-NAG:2369-DB
WP 5840 of 2024- Judgment.odt
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH AT NAGPUR
WRIT PETITION NO.5840/2024
PETITIONER : Mangalsingh Amarsingh Rathod,
Aged about 45 years, Occupation : Service,
Head Master (Under Suspension), Mahatma
Phule High School, Nimgaon, Tah. Nandura,
Dist. Buldhana.
...VERSUS...
RESPONDENTS : 1. Mahatma Phule Shikshan Sanstha,
Nimgaon, Tah. Nandura, Dist. Buldhana,
Through its President and Conveynor of
Inquiry Shri K.R. Ingle.
2. Education Officer (Secondary), Zilla
Parishad, Buldhana.
3. Mahatma Phule High School Nimgaon,
Tah. Nandura, Dist. Buldhana, Through its
In-Charge Head Master.
Mr. R.B.Dhore, Advocate for petitioner
Mr. V.K.Paliwal, Advocate for respondent Nos.1 and 3
Mr. N.R.Patil, AGP for respondent No.2
5
CORAM : AVINASH G. GHAROTE
AND
ABHAY J. MANTRI, JJ.
DATE 07/03/2025
ORAL JUDGMENT : (PER : AVINASH G. GHAROTE, J.)
1. Heard. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith. Heard finally 10
with the consent of the learned Counsels for the parties.
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2
2. The question to be considered and answered is whether the
nominee of the Head in terms of Rule 36(2)(b)(ii) of the Maharashtra
Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Rules, 1981 (for
short hereinafter “MEPS Rules”), on the Enquiry Committee, which has
to be formed amongst the employees of any private school, can be a 5
retired/former employee of a school. The request of the petitioner, who
was the Head of the institution for appointing a retired employee, has
been rejected.
3. Mr. Dhore, learned Counsel for the petitioner, submits that
considering the purport and object of Rule 36(2)(b)(ii) of the MEPS 10
Rules, which permits the Head to nominate a person to be a member of
the Enquiry Committee, is to ensure a reasonable and fair opportunity
in the matter of balancing the composition of the Committee, it would
be permissible for the Head, facing an enquiry, to nominate a
former/retired employee on the Enquiry Committee. He further submits 15
that considering the fact that the enquiry may go on for a number of
days, it would be difficult for a serving/current employee to effectively
work on the Committee, as he would have to, at times, seek leave from
his parent institution and so also permission to participate in the
enquiry, which may or may not be granted, thereby hampering the 20
working of the Committee, the nomination of a former/retired
WP 5840 of 2024- Judgment.odt
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employee, would be apt and proper, for the effective functioning of the
Committee itself. It is also his contention that since the learned Full
Bench, in Shikshan Prasarak Mandal, Awasari (BK) Vs. Ramesh
Bhimrao Narayankar and others 2016 SCC Online Bom 562 while
considering Clause 36(2)(a)(iii) and 36(2)(b)(iii) which permits 5
State/National awardee teacher to be one of the members to be chosen
to the Disciplinary Committee, has held that such a person could also be
retired teacher, the same reasoning and logic would be applicable to the
member to be nominated by the Head/employee to the Enquiry
Committee in terms of Rule 36(2)(b)(ii) of the MEPS Rules. He further 10
submits that since the nomination by the Head of an employee, is for
the purpose of balancing the composition of the Committee, a
purposeful interpretation, should be given to the provision. Reliance is
placed upon Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay Vs. Dilipkumar
Raghavendranath Nadkarni Band and others 1983 (1) SCC 124 and 15
K.B. Khatavkar Vs. S. Taki Beligrami (1971) 73 Bom.L.R. 570 as well
as The Workmen of M/s. Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. of India (Pvt.)
Ltd. Vs. The Management and others (1973) 1 SCC 813, which dilate
upon how a beneficial legislation has to be interpreted, to support his
contention. 20
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4. Mr. Paliwal, learned Counsel for the respondent Nos.1
and 3 vehemently opposes the contention and submits that a retired /
former employee cannot be permitted to be nominated by the Head to
the Disciplinary Committee, in view of Section 2(7) of the Maharashtra
Employees of Private Schools (Condition of Service) Regulation Act, 5
1977 (for short hereinafter “MEPS Act“), which while defining an
’employee’, defines it to be an employee in service. Reliance is also
placed upon Rule 10 of the MEPS Rules, which defines categories of
employees and Namdev Tukaram Patil and Ors. Vs. The State of
Maharashtra and Ors., 2022 (1) Mh.L.J. 303. 10
5. Mr. Patil, learned Assistant Government Pleader for the
respondent No.2, invites our attention to the preamble of the
Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Condition of Service)
Regulation Act, 1977 to point out that the Act is a beneficial piece of
legislation, enacted to protect the interest of the employees and the 15
provisions in the Act and the Rules framed thereunder will have to be
viewed with that angle. He also invites our attention to Rule 36(2)(a)
(ii) and (b)(ii) of the MEPS Rules, to submit that when an option has
been granted to the Head/employee to nominate, the nomination can
be from anywhere, which also indicates that no restrictions are put on 20
the right of the Head/employee to nominate a retired employee to the
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Committee. Reliance is also placed upon Rule 37(2)(c) of the MEPS
Rules to submit that reasonable opportunity of defence has to be
granted which is the duty of the Committee. He also invites our
attention to Rule 8(8)(b) of the The Maharashtra Civil Services
(Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1979, which permits the Government 5
Servant to take the assistance of a former Government Servant to
present the case on his behalf. He, therefore, submits that a restriction
ought not to be put on the power of nomination of a person to the
Committee by restricting the meaning of the word ’employee’, to a
serving employee, as that would cause complications, in the 10
constitution, as well as working of the Committee and at times, would
lead to the Head or delinquent employee not having an effective
opportunity to balance the composition of the Committee.
6. Insofar as the purpose and object of the MEPS Act is
concerned, Mr. Patil, learned Assistant Government Pleader, is right in 15
contending that the MEPS Act and the Rules framed thereunder are a
beneficial piece of legislation, enacted for the benefit and protection of
the rights of the employees, which is indicated from a reading of the
language of its preamble. The MEPS Act and the Rules framed
thereunder will therefore have to be construed with this background 20
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and an interpretation which leans in favour of the employee, then
would be preferable, considering the intent of the enactment.
6.1. In The Workmen of M/s. Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. of
India (Pvt.) Ltd. (supra) while considering the manner in which
beneficial piece of legislation is to be interpreted, it has been held as 5
under :
“35. We cannot accept the extreme contentions advanced on
behalf of the workmen and the employers. We are aware that the
Act is a beneficial piece of legislation enacted in the interest of
employees. It is well settled that in construing the provisions of a 10
welfare legislation, courts should adopt, what is described as a
beneficent rule of construction. If two constructions are reasonably
possible to be placed on the section, it follows that the
construction which furthers the policy and object of the Act and is
more beneficial to the employees, has to be preferred. Another 15
principle to be borne in mind is that the Act in question which
intends to improve and safeguard the service conditions of an
employee, demands an interpretation liberal enough to achieve the
legislative purpose. But we should not also lose sight of another
canon of interpretation that a statute or for the matter of that even 20
a particular section, has to be interpreted according to its plain
words and without doing violence to the language used by the
legislature. Another aspect to be borne in mind will be that there
has been a long chain of decisions of this Court, referred to
exhaustively earlier, laying down various principles in relation to 25
adjudication of disputes by industrial courts arising out of orders
of discharge or dismissal. Therefore it will have to be found from
the words of the section whether it has altered the entire law, as
laid down by the decisions, and, if so, whether there is a clear
expression of that intention in the language of the section.” 306.2. In Dilipkumar Raghavendranath Nadkarni Band (supra),
the Hon’ble Apex Court while commenting on the change in scenario in
the conduct of domestic enquiries, has elucidated as under :
WP 5840 of 2024- Judgment.odt
7“9. We concern ourselves in this case with a narrow question
whether where in such a disciplinary enquiry by a domestic
tribunal, the employer appoints Presenting-cum-Prosecuting Officer
to represent the employer by persons who are legally trained, the
delinquent employee, if he seeks permission to appear and defend 5
himself by a legal practitioner, a denial of such a request would
vitiate the enquiry on the ground that the delinquent employee had
not been afforded a reasonable opportunity to defend himself,
thereby vitiating one of the essential principles of natural justice.
10
10. Even in a domestic enquiry there can be very serious charges,
and an adverse verdict may completely destroy the future of the
delinquent employee. The adverse verdict may so stigmatize him
that his future would be bleak and his reputation and livelihood
would be at stake. Such an enquiry is generally treated as a 15
managerial function and the Enquiry Officer is more often a man of
the establishment. Ordinarily he combines the role of a Presenting-
cum-Prosecuting Officer and an Enquiry Officer a Judge and a
prosecutor rolled into one. In the past it could be said that there
was an informal atmosphere before such a domestic tribunal and 20
that strict rules of evidence and pitfalls of procedural law did not
hamstring the enquiry by such a domestic tribunal. We have moved
far away from this stage. The situation is where the employer has
on his pay rolls labour officers, legal advisers — lawyers in the garb
of employees — and they are appointed Presenting-cum- 25
Prosecuting Officers and the delinquent employee pitted against
such legally trained personnel has to defend himself. Now if the
rules prescribed for such an enquiry did not place an embargo on
the right of the delinquent employee to be represented by a legal
practitioner, the matter would be in the discretion of the Enquiry 30
Officer whether looking to the nature of charges, the type of
evidence and complex or simple issues that may arise in the course
of enquiry, the delinquent employee in order to afford a reasonable
opportunity to defend himself should be permitted to appear
through a legal practitioner. Why do we say so? Let us recall the 35
nature of enquiry, who held it, where it is held and what is the
atmosphere? Domestic enquiry is claimed to be a managerial
function. A man of the establishment dons the robe of a Judge. It is
held in the establishment office or a part of it. Can it even be
compared to the adjudication by an impartial arbitrator or a court 40
presided over by an unbiased Judge?. The Enquiry Officer
combines the judge and prosecutor rolled into one. Witnesses are
generally employees of the employer who directs an enquiry into
misconduct. This is sufficient to raise serious apprehensions. Add to
WP 5840 of 2024- Judgment.odt
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these uneven scales, the weight of legally trained minds on behalf
of employer simultaneously denying that opportunity to delinquent
employee. The weighted scales and tilted balance can only be
partly restored if the delinquent is given the same legal assistance
as the employer enjoys. Justice must not only be done but must 5
seem to be done is not a euphemism for courts alone, it applies
with equal vigour and rigour to all those who must be responsible
for fair play in action. And a quasi-judicial tribunal cannot view the
matter with equanimity on inequality of representation. This Court
in M.H. Hoskot v. State of Maharashtra [(1978) 3 SCC 544 : 1978 10
SCC (Cri) 468 : AIR 1978 SC 1548 : 1978 Cri LJ 1678] clearly
ruled that in criminal trial where prosecution is in the hands of
public prosecutor, accused, for adequate representation, must have
legal aid at State cost. This will apply mutatis mutandis to the
present situation.” 15
Though the judgment in Dilipkumar Raghavendranath
Nadkarni Band (supra) has been rendered in the context of legal
representation being afforded to an employee in a domestic enquiry, 20
however, the spirit of the judgment in fact emphasizes that while
conducting the domestic enquiry, the scales must always be balanced,
for the management, has all the wherewithal and expertise at its
command, whereas the employee, does not, on account of which a
beneficial interpretation of the legislation is warranted, to afford a 25
reasonable and fair opportunity to the employee.
6.3. Reliance is also placed upon K.B. Khatavkar (supra) which
dilates upon how a beneficial legislation has to be interpreted, to
support his contention.
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7. In Ramesh Bhimrao Narayankar (supra) the learned Full
Bench, was considering the language of Rule 36(2)(b)(iii) and Rule
36(2)(b)(iii) of the MEPS Rules, which provides one member of the
Enquiry Committee to be from the panel of teachers/Head Masters on
whom State/National Award has been conferred, to be chosen by the 5
Chief Executive Officer/President. While considering the purpose of the
MEPS Act and the Rules framed there under, this is what has been said :
“37. All the provisions of the Act and the Rules especially those
outlining the qualifications, duties and responsibilities of the Head,
Teachers and Employees other than teachers coupled with the Code 10
of Conduct prescribed for them, the consequences of violation
thereof, the penalties for the same, demonstrate that a private
school employee performs a public duty. He can be penalised for
serious misconduct, indiscipline and immoral so also immodest
conduct. The inquiry leading to such penalty cannot be a private or 15
domestic affair. The State makes provision for the same by the
Rules for good reason. Even private education needs to be
regulated to subserve larger public good. The State as a trustee of
the public ensures that sanctity, purity and probity in the field of
education is not sacrificed when it goes in private hands. None can 20
profit or benefit at the cost of core moral and social values.
Education is not trade and business but a noble, charitable and
philanthropic activity. If that is the basis, then, penalties on
teachers and others ought to be imposed by treating them fairly,
reasonably and in a non-discriminatory manner. The respect for 25
them and their position, image in the society should be borne in
mind. While inflicting penalties and punishing them every attempt
is made to guarantee that their version is truthfully and completely
presented or placed before the inquiry Committee. That guarantee
and assurance comes by permitting and providing for effective 30
representation by all those involved in the inquiry and the silent,
yet most important third entity, namely, the society at large.
Further, a judicial officer in the form of a Presiding Officer of a
School Tribunal, if approached by the employee of a private school,
examines the record of such inquiry and determines the issue of its 35
WP 5840 of 2024- Judgment.odt
10legality and validity. For that examination and scrutiny as well, the
composition and constitution of the inquiry Committee is vital.”
In respect of the question as to whether the State/National
awardee teacher has to be a member of the teaching staff, this is what 5
has been held :
“38. We do not see how any interpretation other than as suggested
by Mr. Bandivadekar can be placed on sub-clause (iii) of clause (a)
of sub-rule (2) of Rule 36 of MEPS Rules. If the Chief Executive
Officer has to choose one member from the panel of teachers on 10
whom a State or National award has been conferred, such member
need not be a serving awardee teacher or a teacher who is
conferred with the award, empaneled and working as a member of
the teaching staff. All that the definition of the expression “Teacher”
as appearing in section 2(26) means that he should be a member of 15
the teaching staff and that will include a head of the school. Section
2(7) defines the expression “Employee” to mean any member of the
teaching and non-teaching staff of a recognized school. Thus, a
teacher is an employee but every employee is not a teacher. An
employee can be a part of non-teaching staff of a recognized school. 20
The head of a school and the member of teaching staff, both being
expected to teach, have thus been termed as teachers. However, by
aid of this definition and all these expressions, we cannot construe
sub-rule 2(a)(iii) of Rule 36 of the MEPS Rules restrictively. A
narrow or restricted interpretation would defeat the purpose of 25
insertion of sub clause (iii) totally. The Chief Executive Officer has
to choose one member from the panel of teachers on whom a State
or National award has been conferred. His choice is not narrowed
down to only members of the teaching staff of that particular
private school or other private school on whom a State or National 30
award has been conferred. Therefore, that member need not
necessarily be a serving awardee teacher. Even a retired empanelled
awardee teacher but from the panel can be chosen by the Chief
Executive Officer. The only requirement is that he should be an
empanelled awardee teacher. If the award is conferred on the 35
teacher, then, both a serving and a non-serving teacher meaning
thereby a retired awardee teacher, can be chosen by the Chief
Executive Officer, provided his name is in the panel of the awardee
teachers. If the interpretation suggested by Mr. Machhindra Patil
and others is placed on sub-clause (iii) of clause (a) of subrule (2) 40
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of Rule 36 of MEPS Rules, then in a given case, it would give rise to
a peculiar situation. In a given case, the panel may contain names
of both serving and retired teachers but by the time the choice is
exercised, such serving teachers may have retired or been
superannuated from service. The Legislature did not intend that the 5
inquiry Committee should not be constituted with three members.
Its constitution in terms of sub-clauses of clauses (a) and (b) of sub-
rule (2) of Rule 36 is the rule and the exception is only in the event
of a situation arising and contemplated by another sub-rule of Rule
36 of the MEPS Rules. Therefore, the Chief Executive Officer in the 10
case may choose one member from the panel of the teachers on
whom a State or National award has been conferred. He can be a
serving or a retired teacher but his name must appear in the panel
of awardee teachers. Similarly, in the case of inquiry against a head,
the President can choose from the panel of headmasters one 15
member on whom a State or National award has been conferred.
Again this member need not be a serving or working headmaster.
39. Ultimately we must be aware that we are construing a provision
which enables holding of an inquiry through a properly constituted 20
inquiry Committee. Such a Committee is obliged to conduct an
inquiry only in cases where major penalties are to be inflicted. Such
inquiry has to be conducted after the management takes a decision
in terms of sub-rule (1) of Rule 36 of MEPS Rules. The inquiry
Committee has to be constituted in the manner provided by sub 25
clauses (a) and (b) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 36 of MEPS Rules. Thus,
an interpretation which facilitates and assists the constitution of a
proper inquiry Committee must be placed on the provisions. It is
clear from what we have emphasised above that MEPS Act is an Act
which regulates the recruitment and conditions of service of 30
employees in certain private schools. The avowed object, namely, to
ensure that employees have security and stability in service with a
view to enable them to effectively and efficiently discharge their
duties towards pupils and guardians in particular and the institution
and society in general, should be borne in mind. Therefore, while 35
regulating recruitment and conditions of service of employees in
certain private schools, the Act contains comprehensive measures to
take care of situations where the employees are found to have
misconducted themselves. If their conduct and behaviour is
unbecoming of an employee of a private school, then that conduct 40
has to be inquired into. That cannot go unpunished. We have found
from a perusal of all the rules and the substantive provisions of the
Act, which must be read together and harmoniously, that major
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penalties include a reduction in rank and termination from service.
They are to be inflicted for misconduct, moral turpitude, wilful and
persistent negligence in duty and incompetence. There could be
minor penalties but misconduct, as defined, is an inclusive term and
includes all that is enumerated in Rule 28(5)(a). Hence, the public 5
interest further demands that the inquiry ought to be fair, just,
independent and impartial. An employee must have minimum
security as is envisaged in the preamble to the Act. The security and
stability of service cannot be compromised by inflicting light
heartedly or casually a punishment or a penalty which is major in 10
character. A disciplinary inquiry is a serious proceeding. The
principles of natural justice have to be followed as is apparent from
a reading of Rule 37 of the Rules, which sets out the procedure of
inquiry. In such circumstances, if the constitution of the inquiry
Committee is improper or incomplete, that will not only jeopardize 15
the security and stability assured to the employees but would be
detrimental to the public interest. If inquiry at the hands of an
improperly constituted inquiry Committee results in serious
prejudice or miscarriage of justice, then the public interest would
suffer immensely. An employee who has indulged in serious 20
misconduct amounting to moral turpitude may have to be retained
in service if inquiry is found to be defective or deficient in any
manner resulting in serious prejudice and a travesty of justice. It is
in these circumstances that we are not in agreement with the
counsel taking a contrary view who insist that only an in-service 25
awardee teacher can be part of the inquiry Committee.
40. The arguments of Advocate Machhindra Patil and others
overlook the plain words of the sub-clauses and the setting and
pattern in which they appear. There has to be a member from the 30
side of management and he/she has to be nominated by the
management from amongst its own members. Similarly, there has to
be a nomination from the employee’s side, often termed as a
defence representative. He/she could be nominated by the
employee, against whom an inquiry is directed, from amongst the 35
employees of another private school. That member need not be an
employee of a private school in which the employee is serving or
working. That freedom of nomination is given to the employee so
that he chooses as his representative a person in whom he has
complete faith and trust. The management cannot dictate terms to 40
him in this matter. He can nominate one person from amongst the
employees of any private school and communicate his or her name
in the manner set out in Rule 36. However, when the wording of
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sub-clause (iii) is perused carefully and minutely, it is apparent that
a third person’s involvement is contemplated, apart from the
nominee of the management and the employee who take care of
their respective interests. An awardee teacher, i.e., one on whom a
State or National award has been conferred, is expected to take care 5
of the society’s interest and of the public at large. He is expected to
be independent in true sense of the term. Meaning thereby not
influenced by any interested versions or views. It is in these
circumstances that the obligation on the Chief Executive Officer is
to choose, as a third member, a teacher from the panel of teachers 10
on whom a State or National award has been conferred. That such a
panel has been maintained by the State is not disputed. That from
such a panel a choice can be made by the Chief Executive Officer, is
also not disputed. The word “Panel” means in this case a list and the
legislature employs the word “chosen” deliberately. The act of 15
choosing means selecting out of a greater number. Once a choice is
given to the Chief Executive Officer to select a teacher from the
panel, then specific words would have been inserted to limit or
restrict such choice had that been the legislative intent. The absence
of such limiting or restrictive phrases would lend support to our 20
construction of this sub-clause as above. However, this does not
mean the choice of the Chief Executive Officer cannot be questioned
by the delinquent-employee and if a particular choice or selection is
challenged as vitiated by bias, arbitrariness and mala fides resulting
in the inquiry being unfair, unjust and unreasonable or partial, then, 25
depending upon the prejudice established and proved, the
Tribunal/Court can always interfere with the same. We do not read
anything more in the sub-clauses and which is not specifically
inserted therein. Once the words are plain, unambiguous and clear,
then, there is no warrant for prefixing the expression “Teacher” as 30
“in-service teacher”. In that event, it would not be possible for the
Chief Executive Officer to choose a third member. In all cases then,
the inquiry Committee would not be complete. It is in these
circumstances that we are unable to agree with the narrow
interpretation placed on this sub clause. 35
42. Thus the argument that the word “Teacher” appearing in of Rule
36(2)(a)(iii) must be construed and interpreted with the aid of
section 2(26) of MEPS Act, cannot be accepted because the same
overlooks the context. It is a well settled rule of interpretation that 40
in a statute where a word of wide and general amplitude may
require a narrow interpretation depending upon the context, that
word will carry a different meaning and connotation while
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14
construing and interpreting some other provision in the same Act.
Therefore, it would not be proper to apply the definition of the
expression “Teacher” as understood by the employees’ counsel. Even
otherwise, we have found that the definition of the word “Teacher”
is only to denote him as a member of the teaching staff and to 5
include therein the head of the school. It is not that this definition
would necessarily mean a member of the serving teaching staff or a
functional teaching staff or a member of the teaching staff working
in a private school. A teacher even after his superannuation or
retirement carries this nomenclature for the Act confers upon 10
members of the teaching staff certain benefits post retirement. We
have scanned the rules extensively and completely to see if
throughout the Rules, the use of the word ‘teacher’ is restricted to
mean an in-service teacher. We have not been able to find any such
restrictive or limited invariable use. Therefore, everything depends 15
on not just the text but the context. The Act lays down the
qualifications of the teachers, their scales of pay and allowances and
their service conditions which it seeks to regulate. Therefore, in
Rule 17 which is titled as superannuation and reemployment, there
is a specific age prescribed for superannuation but equally there is a 20
power to reemploy him even beyond the age of superannuation. We
therefore, do not see any scope for the rigid interpretation as is
placed on the definition of the term “Teacher” appearing in section
2(26) of the MEPS Act.
25
44. For the elaborate reasons that we have indicated above, we are
unable to accept the contentions of either Mr. Tapkir or Mr.
Kulkarni. There is no warrant for reading sub-clause (a)(iii) of sub-
rule (2) of Rule 36 of MEPS Rules as suggested by them. If their
interpretation is accepted, then, it would be easy to influence the 30
choice of the Chief Executive Officer. Apart from their own nominee
the management may include in the inquiry Committee only an
serving awardee teacher. Then a complaint would be made by the
delinquent employee that the scales are uneven. If the scales are to
be balanced and the inquiry should be unbiased and impartial, then 35
it is not possible to place a narrow interpretation as suggested by
both the learned counsel. The requirement is that the panel of
teachers on whom a State or National award is conferred as
maintained by the State Government or by the officers in the
Education Department, from that panel any teacher can be chosen 40
by the Chief Executive Officer. He may not necessarily be a teacher
serving the management which is holding the inquiry. He has to be
a awardee teacher but may not be serving for even a teacher on the
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15
verge of retirement can be awarded. It is only an award winning
teacher who can be empaneled and from such a panel the Chief
Executive Officer has to make a choice. There is no restriction
placed on his choice and advisedly. It is expected that he will not
choose an awardee teacher favourable or pliable to the 5
management. An award is conferred on a teacher for his excellence
and merit. It is his teaching abilities and his exemplary character
which won him an award. The presence of an awardee teacher
ensures impartiality of the inquiry. The inquiry has to be free of bias
and prejudice. If the interpretation suggested by Mr. Kulkarni and 10
Mr. Tapkir is accepted, that may facilitate inclusion of somebody
convenient or congenial or friendly to the employer/management.
In such circumstances, we are unable to accept the interpretation
placed by them. Mr. Kulkarni suggested that inclusion of third
member namely an awardee teacher is to ensure quality to the 15
inquiry. Thus, it is not the quantity that matters but a qualitative
presence, on his own showing. We cannot attribute to the
Legislature inclusion of somebody for the sake of inclusion and de
hors the context as well as the object and purpose sought to be
achieved by such inclusion. It is not a mere addition of one more 20
number. Once the object and purpose so also the context is
understood, then, these contentions deserve to be rejected. They are
accordingly rejected.”
It is, thus, apparent that while construing the provisions of 25
Rule 36(2)(a)(iii) and (b)(iii) of the MEPS Rules, and the appointment
of an awardee teacher to the Enquiry Committee, the learned Full
Bench, has given an expansive meaning to the word ‘teacher’, and has
held that the same has to be construed in the context in which it has
been used and its meaning cannot be restricted or controlled by the 30
definition in Section 2(26) of the MEPS Act and will have to depend on
the contextual background in which the word has been used. It has
therefore been held that though Section 2(26) of the MEPS Act defines
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16
‘teacher’, to mean a member of the teaching staff and includes the Head
of the School, this definition cannot be applied while construing the
word ‘teacher’, as occurring in Rule 36(2)(a) (iii) and (b) (iii) of the
MEPS Rules as the same would be totally out of context, altogether.
8. In D. K. Chaplot Vs. Regional Manager, National Insurance 5
Company & others 2001 SCC OnLine Raj 360, the learned Division
Bench, while considering the question as to whether a retired employee
of the company can be permitted to appear as a defence assistant to
defend the delinquent in the inquiry proceedings, has held as under :
“10. The disciplinary proceedings as against the employees of the 10
respondent Company are governed by the General Insurance
(Conduct, Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1975, (for short, to be
referred to as the Conduct Rules). To deal with the controversy, it
would be appropriate to first refer to the definition of ’employee’.
Rule 2(g) provides that ’employee’ means any employee of the 15
Corporation and/or its Subsidiaries other than the casual, work
charged or contingent staff. So far as appointment of defence
assistant by the delinquent is concerned, sub-rule (6) of Rule 25 of
the Conduct Rules provides that the employee may take the
assistance of any other employee but may not engage a legal 20
practitioner for this purpose. However, there is no specific
provision in the Conduct Rules framed by the respondent
Company so as to debar a retired employee to take part as a
defence assistance in the disciplinary proceedings.
25
11. A bare perusal of the language of sub-rule 6 of Rule 25 of the
Conduct Rules would make it clear that while framing the conduct
rules the only intention of the rules making authority was to
restrict the services of a legal practitioners to be utilised by the
delinquent in his/her defence in the departmental inquiry. 30
Admittedly, the rule does not specifically provides for taking
assistance of a retired employee, but at the same time it also does
not mention that only the existing employee may take part as a
defence assistance in the inquiry proceedings against an employee.
WP 5840 of 2024- Judgment.odt
17
12. To deal with the question, it must also be noted that the Rules
making authority while specifically restricting the services of a
legal practitioner only, have left open the services of ‘any other
employee’ for being utilised as defence assistant by a delinquent
employee in the inquiry proceedings. If the provisions of rule 2(g) 5
which defines the word ’employee’ and the provisions of Rule
25(6) of the Conduct Rules are read together, it would be crystal
clear that neither the retired employee is excluded from the
definition of employee contained in rule 2(g) nor there is any
exclusion of a retired employee from the words ‘any other 10
employee’ as contained in rule 25(6) of the Conduct Rules.
13. We may also take assistance of various conduct rules governing
the disciplinary proceedings framed by the different States,
Corporations, Semi Government Departments, Banking Institutions 15
and the Government of Rajasthan. Instead referring to various
conduct rules, we must refer only to the conduct rules framed by
the Government of Rajasthan, namely, the Rajasthan Civil Services
(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958. Like Rule 25(6)
in the instant case, there is rule 16(5) in the Rules of 1958. It 20
would be proper to quote rule 16(5) of the CCA Rules, 1958,
which reads as under:
“Rule 16(5) – The Disciplinary Authority may nominate any
person to present the case in support of the charges before the
authority inquiring into the charges (hereinafter referred to as 25
the Inquiring Authority). The Government servant may present
his case with the assistance of any other Government servant
or retired Government servant approved by the Disciplinary
Authority, but may not engage a legal practitioner for the
purpose unless the person nominated by the Disciplinary 30
Authority, having regard to the circumstances of the case, so
permit.”
14. Thus, it is evident from a bare reading of Rule 16(5) quoted
above that a Govt. servant may take the assistance of a retired 35
Govt. servant in the inquiry proceedings and rest of the provision
as to the restriction of services of a legal practitioner in both the
rules is same. In the present case, if we go through the language
of Rule 25(6) of the Conduct Rules, it would make it abundantly
clear that the Rules making authority intended only to restrict the 40
services of a legal practitioner and therefore, it can safely be
inferred that the Rules making authority left open very wide
options by using the words ‘the services of any other employee’
including a retired employee.
WP 5840 of 2024- Judgment.odt
18
15. Admittedly, to be an employee, it is essential that there must
exist relation of master and servant. It cannot be said that if a
person retires from services, he is ceased to be an employee. He is
always an employee and would remain as an employee, may be as
a retired employee, and the relation of master and servant 5
continues till he survives. Even after the death of a Government
servant, he is considered to be a deceased employee.
16. While interpreting the rule, we are conscious that general
words in a statute must receive a general construction unless 10
there is something in the Act itself such as the subject matter with
which the Act is dealing or the context in which the said words
are used to show the intention of the Legislature that they must be
given a restrictive meaning.
15
17.—-
18. The words ’employee may take assistance of any other
employee but may not engage a legal practitioner for the purpose’
appearing in Sub-Rule (6) of Rule 25 of the Rules must be given 20
wider effect and it must be construed that an employee may take
assistance of any other employee including a retired employee but
he may not be a legal practitioner. We do not find any ambiguity
in Rule 25(6) of the Rules. In our considered opinion, the
language of the rule is plain, clear and explicit and no question of 25
its interpretation does arise except that the words ‘any other
employee’ used in the rule should be given fair construction and
the words any other employee must include a retired employee as
well.”
30
Thus, considering the purpose and intent of the provision,
it has been held that the term ’employee’, in the background in which it
has been used, cannot be given a restrictive meaning and will have to
be construed to mean to include a retired employee too, as there is no
specific exclusion. 35
9. In K.B. Khatavkar (supra) another Full Bench of this Court,
while considering on reference a question, ‘whether a retrenched
WP 5840 of 2024- Judgment.odt
19
employee is an employee’, within Section 3(13) of the Bombay
Industrial Relations Act, 1949 and can apply for reinstatement to a
Labour Court under Section 78 and 79 of the said Act ?, in the
background of the definition of an ’employee’, as contained in
Section 3(13), held as under : 5
“Section 3(13) – ’employee’ means any person employed to do any
skilled or unskilled work for hire or reward in any industry, and
includes –
(a) a person employed by a contractor to do any work for him in
the execution of a contract with an employer within the meaning 10
of sub-clause (e) of clause (14);
(b) a person who has been dismissed or discharged from
employment on account of any dispute relating to change in
respect of which a notice is given or an application made under
S.42 whether before or after his dismissal or discharge;”this is 15
what has been held :
10. ——–. A mere consideration of these definitions gives rise to
certain important points which are noteworthy. The first is that in
the definition of an “employee” though its main part speaks of any
person employed in any industry, the second part containing the 20
inclusive definition, particularly clause (b), refers to a person who
has been dismissed or discharged from employment. In other
words, the person dismissed or discharged would be an employee
but curiously enough a retrenched employee does not find place in
the definition of “employee”. A dismissed or discharged employee 25
also has his employment terminated just like a retrenched
employee and yet the former is entitled to all the benefits of the
Act but not a retrenched employee because it is said he is nowhere
mentioned. Could it have been the intention in this Act to exclude
a retrenched employee when a dismissed or discharged employee 30
is considered an “employee” ? Secondly, a consideration of the
definition of “industrial matter” shows (from the main part of the
definition) that an industrial matter is any matter relating to
employment and we can see absolutely no reason why the person
who is retrenched and asks to be reinstated does not raise a 35
question “relating to employment”. It also speaks of rights or duties
of employers or employees or the mode, terms and conditions of
employment. Now retrenchment is matter of codified law in
chapter VA of the Central Industrial Disputes Act and employers
WP 5840 of 2024- Judgment.odt
20
have a duty to observe the provision and the employees have a
right to be reinstated therefore the question of retrenchment and
reinstatement would clearly fall within the definition of “industrial
matter”. What is more, the definition includes all matters
pertaining to “the dismissal or non-employment of any person”. 5
The expression “non-employment of any person” is somewhat
curious. In the definition of “employee” the words used are
“dismissed or discharged” whereas in the definition of “industrial
matter” in S. 3(18)(a) the words used are “the dismissal or non-
employment of any person”. Undoubtedly the expression “non- 10
employment” is much wider than the word “discharged”.
“Discharge” is only one form of non-employment and under “non-
employment” come termination of employment, dismissal,
discharge and retrenchment. The definitions themselves therefore
indicate beyond any shadow of doubt that where retrenchment 15
takes place and the employee applies to be reinstated it would be
an “industrial matter”. The question is whether in spite of this
definition of “industrial matter” it was intended to exclude an
employee who has been retrenched from the definition of
“employee”. 20
11. ——-. When the entry speaks of unemployment of persons
previously employed, we can see no reason whatsoever for holding
that retrenchment would not be included in this category. A person
who is retrenched by his employer would equally well be a person
who is unemployed but previously employed and who would also 25
be entitled to reinstatement as indeed the workers have claimed in
both these petitions.
14. We do not think such a conclusion is necessarily forced upon
us. On the other hand, it seems to us that the definition of
“employee” in S. 3(13) is wide enough to cover a retrenched 30
employee. All that it says is that “employee” means any person
employed to do any skilled or unskilled work for hire or reward in
any industry. The essential thing to find is therefore whether a
person is employed for work in any industry and receives
remuneration therefore. It is not necessary to limit the meaning of 35
the words “any person employed” to “any person employed at the
time that the dispute arose”, and therefore we can safely hold
having regard to the clear indications given by the other provisions
of the Act. That it means any person employed to do work at any
time and that the definition has no reference to the point of time 40
at which the person whose case is under consideration was doing
this work. It is also clear from what we have said that in the
context of the other provision of the Act to which we have referred
above it is necessary that we should hold that an employee means
WP 5840 of 2024- Judgment.odt
21
any person employed at any time to do any skilled or unskilled
work for hire or reward in any industry. If this construction of the
definition is not to be given it is clear that we would be rendering
nugatory large parts of the Act particularly the provisions which
we have mentioned above. What is still worse, we would be 5
rendering nugatory provision of Chapter VA of the Central
Industrial Disputes Act (India Act XIV of 1947) which deal with
the right of the worker not to be retrenched without the conditions
precedent under S. 25F the procedure for retrenchment under S.
25G and the re-employment of the retrenched workmen under S. 10
25H. If no remedy would be available to such persons who are
retrenched it would be idle to make these provisions in the
Industrial Disputes Act. Moreover, before we come to any such
conclusion, viz., that the retrenched worker has no remedy, we
must be compelled of the absolute necessity to do so which having 15
regard to the provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act we
have shown is not necessary.
21. In the result, we answer the question as follows :-
A “retrenched employee” is an employee within S. 3(13) of
the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 and can apply for 20
reinstatement to Labour Court under Ss. 78 and 79 of the
said Act. ——-.
It would be thus apparent that considering the nature of
the legislation, a wider and meaningful interpretation, which would 25
further protect the rights and entitlements of an employee, has to be
given preference, rather than the one which negates such rights and
entitlements.
10. Thus, what has been considered and held in the judgments
discussed above, in our considered opinion, we do not see any ground 30
as to why the same logic and reasoning as applied in Ramesh Bhimrao
Narayankar (supra) should also not apply to Section 2(7) of the MEPS
Act which defines employee to mean any member of the teaching and
WP 5840 of 2024- Judgment.odt
22non-teaching staff. If this is not so then the right granted to an
employee facing an enquiry, to nominate one person on the Enquiry
Committee, would become restrictive, resulting in denial of a fair and
reasonable opportunity to the delinquent employee, to balance the
composition of the Enquiry Committee. In fact, the conclusion by the 5
learned Full Bench in Ramesh Bhimrao Narayankar (supra) is clearly
supported by what has been held by the Learned Full Bench in K.B.
Khatavkar (supra).
11. In fact, if the ‘Employee’, to be nominated on the Enquiry
Committee by the Head is a non-serving/retired employee, then as 10
rightly contended by Mr. Dhore, learned Counsel for the petitioner, such
a retired/non-serving employee, would definitely be in a better position,
uninfluenced by the pulls and pressures of the management being in
employment apart from which a retired/non-serving employee, would
also be able to devote time to the enquiry, not being required to seek 15
leave from the management, which employs him, either to participate
in the enquiry by becoming a member of the Committee or to seek leave
to attend such meetings of the Enquiry Committee, the conclusion of
which cannot be predicted, in a given timeline.
12. This is more so as Rule 37(3) of the MEPS Rules enjoins 20
upon the delinquent employee to be responsible to see that his/her
WP 5840 of 2024- Judgment.odt
23nominee is present during the enquiry, which at times would be
difficult, if the nominee, is a serving employee, dependent upon the
discretion of his/her management to get leave for participating in the
enquiry.
13. The expression ‘from amongst the employees of any private 5
school’, as occurring in Rule 36(2)(a)(ii), (b) (ii); 37(2)(c) of the MEPS
Rules needs to be considered, which for the sake of ready reference, is
reproduced as under :
“36. Inquiry Committee :-
(1) If an employee is allegedly found to be guilty of any of the 10
grounds specified in sub-rule (5) of Rule 28 and the Management
decides to hold an inquiry, it shall do so through a properly
constituted Inquiry Committee. Such a Committee shall conduct an
inquiry only in such cases where major penalties are to be
inflicted. The Chief Executive Officer authorised by the 15
Management in this behalf ( and in the case of an inquiry against
the Head who is also the Chief Executive Officer, the President of
the Management) shall communicate to the employee or the Head
concerned by registered post acknowledgment due to the
allegations and demand from him a written explanation within 20
seven days from the date of receipt of the statement of allegations.
(2) If the Chief Executive Officer or the President, as the case may
be, finds that the explanation submitted by the employee or the
Head referred to in sub-rule (1) is not satisfactory, he shall place it
before the Management within fifteen days from the date of 25
receipt of the explanation. The Management shall in turn decide
within fifteen days whether an inquiry be conducted against the
employee and if it decides to conduct the inquiry, the inquiry shall
be conducted by an Inquiry Committee constituted in the following
manner, that is to say,- 30
(a) in the case of an employee-
(i) one member from amongst the members of the Management to
be nominated by the Management, or by the President of the
Management if so authorised by the Management, whose name
WP 5840 of 2024- Judgment.odt
24shall be communicated to the Chief Executive Officer within 15
days from the date of the decision of the Management;
(ii) one member to be nominated by the employee from amongst
the employees of any private school;
(iii) One member chosen by the Chief Executive Officer from the 5
panel of teachers on whom State/National Award has been
conferred.
(b) in the case of the Head referred to in sub-rule (1)-
(i) one member who shall be the President of the Management;
(ii) one member to be nominated by the Head from amongst the 10
employees of any private school;
(iii) One member chosen by the President from the panel of Head
Masters on whom State/National Award has been conferred”.
(3) The Chief Executive Officer or, as the case may be, the
President shall communicate the names of members nominated 15
under sub- rule (2) by registered post acknowledgment due to the
employee or the Head referred to in sub-rule (1), as the case may
be, directing him to nominate a person on his behalf on the
proposed Inquiry Committee and to forward the name alongwith
the written consent of the person so nominated to the Chief 20
Executive Officer or to the President, as the case may be, within
fifteen days of the receipt of the communication to the effect.”
(4) If the employee or the Head, as the case may be,
communicates the name of the person nominated by him to the
Inquiry Committee of three members shall be deemed to have 25
been constituted on the date of receipt of such communication by
the chief Executive Officer or the President, as the case may be. If
the employee or such Head fails to communicate the name of the
nominee within the stipulated period, the Inquiry Committee shall
be deemed to have been constituted on expiry of the stipulated 30
period consisting of only two members as provided in sub-rule (2).
37. Procedure of Inquiry :- :-
2 ( c ) The Inquiry Committee shall see that every reasonable
opportunity is extended to the employee for defending his case.”
35
The expression ‘from amongst the employees of any private
school’, will have to be read in the contextual background, in which it
has been used. The above expression, according to us, has been used in
a most generalized and wider sense, and not a restrictive one,
WP 5840 of 2024- Judgment.odt
25
for construing so, would result in restricting the freedom, which has
been granted to the Head/Employee, in the matter of nominating their
choice of the person to be a member of the Enquiry Committee, whose
result would at times, can be detrimental to the Head/Employee, which
therefore, calls for such Head/Employee, to exercise the right to 5
nominate a person of its choice, freely, without any fetters, whatsoever,
subject only to the condition that such a nominee, is or was an
employee of any private school, at some point of time or the other.
14. This, in our considered opinion, is further apparent from
the fact that in stark contradiction to the expression ‘from amongst the 10
employees of any private school’, as occurring in Rule 36(2)(a)(ii) ;
Rule 36(2) (b) (ii) and Rule 36(3) of the MEPS Rules in the same
contextual background uses the expression ‘directing him to nominate a
person on his behalf on the proposed Enquiry Committee’. Rule 36(4) of
the MEPS Rules also uses the expression ‘the person nominated by him’, 15
in the same contextual background of constitution of the Enquiry
Committee. Though it may be contended that the use of the expression
‘person’, has to be read in relation to the expression ‘from amongst the
employees of any private school’, doing so, in fact, creates an absurdity.
It is also material to note that there is no express exclusion of a 20
retired/non-serving employee, for being nominated on the Enquiry
WP 5840 of 2024- Judgment.odt
26
Committee as the nominee of the Head/Employee, for had it been so,
the Legislature would have definitely used terms of exclusion, by stating
that such an employee, necessarily has to be a serving employee and
none else, which are absent.
15. Let us consider the word ’employee’, as defined in 5
Section 2(7) of the MEPS Act, in the contextual background of some of
the provisions where it has been used, relevant for the discussion in the
present matter. Section 2(7) of the MEPS Act, defines the word
’employee’, as under :
“2(7) “employee” means any member of the teaching and non- 10
teaching staff of a recognised school and includes Assistant Teacher
(Probationary)”
In Ahmedabad Private Primary Teachers’ Association Vs.
Administrative Officer and others (2004) 1 SCC 755 , it has been held 15
that the word ’employee’, in different enactments has to be interrelated
having due regard to the different aims and objects of the various
labour legislations.
16. In the above background, let us consider the word
‘Employee’ as defined Section 2(7) of the MEPS Act in context of right 20
of appeal under Section 9, which also uses the word ’employee’ in
Sub- Section (1) and (2). Section 9 of the MEPS Act reads as under :
“9. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law or contract
for the time being in force, any employee in a private school —
WP 5840 of 2024- Judgment.odt
27
(a) who is dismissed or removed or whose services are
otherwise terminated or who is reduced in rank, by the order
passed by the management ; or
(b) who is superseded by the Management while making an
appointment to any post by promotion; 5
and who is aggrieved, shall have a right of appeal and may
appeal against any such order or supersession to the Tribunal
constituted under section 8 :
Provided that, no such appeal shall lie to the Tribunal in any
case where the matter has already been decided by a Court of 10
competent jurisdiction or is pending before such Court, on the
appointed date or where the order of dismissal, removal,
otherwise termination of service or reduction in rank was passed
by the Management at any time before the 1st July 1976.
(2) Such appeal shall be made by the employee to the 15
Tribunal, within thirty days from the date of receipt by him of the
order of dismissal, removal, otherwise termination of service or
reduction in rank, as the case may be :
Provided that, where such order was made before the
appointed date, such appeal may be made within sixty days from 20
the said date.
[the other sub-sections not being relevant for the present
discussion are not reproduced].”
17. If the word ’employee’, is granted a restricted meaning to 25
mean a serving employee only, as is sought to be canvassed by
Mr. Paliwal, learned Counsel for the respondent Nos.1 and 3, based
upon its definition as contained in Section 2(7) of the MEPS Act, then
Section 9 would become unworkable, as would be deemed to confer
rights on an ’employee’ -meaning a serving employee- of a right to file 30
an appeal against his termination, which termination would then no
longer permit him, to be construed as an employee. A meaningful,
purposeful and contextual interpretation, will therefore have to be
WP 5840 of 2024- Judgment.odt
28
given to the word ’employee’, based upon the context in which it is
used. In the context of Section 9, where the word ’employee’, is used in
conjunction with granting such ’employee’, a right to file an appeal
against his/her termination, the same necessarily will have to be held to
mean a former or out of service or non-serving employee, which 5
expression shall hold good, till such time, the appeal is allowed by the
Tribunal, restoring the status of the non-serving employee, to that of a
serving employee, which would then be in consonance with the
definition in Section 2(7) of the MEPS Act.
18. A similar reading of the word ’employee’, as occurring in 10
Section 11 (2) (a), (b), (e), (f) and (3) will have to be done, as that
contemplates reliefs which may be granted to an employee by the
Tribunal, upon such employee succeeding in his appeal under Section 9
of the MEPS Act before the Tribunal, which would be impermissible to
be granted if the word ’employee’, is restricted to an employee in 15
service.
19. It would thus be apparent that the word ’employee’, as
defined in Section 2(7) of the MEPS Act and the Rules framed
thereunder cannot be given a rigid meaning to say that it means only a
serving employee, but will have to be given a purposive meaning based 20
upon the context in which it is used, which considering the contextual
WP 5840 of 2024- Judgment.odt
29
background would also mean and include a former/non-serving
employee, so as to avoid any absurdity.
20. That a contextual interpretation is called for is indicated
from the English language, itself, specially, in regard to what has been
said about a Homonym. A Homonym is a word that is spelt and 5
pronounced like another word but that has a different meaning. To cite
an example the word ‘Bank’ means a place where money is kept when
used in the context of commerce, and when used in the context of
flowing water means the edge of the water flow. The word, therefore
has to be understood in the context in which it has been used. The word 10
‘current’, used in the context of water or electricity would mean ‘flow of
water/electricity’ but when used in the context of events would mean
‘up-to-date’. Thus, a contextual interpretation is the norm and not an
exception. It is, thus, apparent that the expression ’employee’, as
occurring in Rule 36(2)(a)(ii) and (b) (ii) of the MEPS Rules will have 15
to be read and construed independently and its meaning cannot be
controlled by the definition of the word ’employee’, as defined in
Section 2(7) of the MEPS Act, as doing so would lead to a situation,
where their meaning cannot be reconciled with each other.
21. The word ’employee’, as used in Rule 36(2)(a)(ii) and (b) 20
(ii) of the MEPS Rules having regard to the purpose and intent of the
WP 5840 of 2024- Judgment.odt
30
Rules, in granting an opportunity to the employee/Head in nominating
a person to the Enquiry Committee, as already indicated above, has
been used in a most generalized sense, of the term, and according to us,
does not preclude a retired/non-serving employee, being included
within its ambit, as doing so would give a purposeful meaning to the 5
provisions, considering that such a nomination is for balancing the
composition of the Enquiry Committee.
22. Though Mr. Paliwal, learned Counsel for the respondent
Nos. 1 and 3, relies upon Rule 10 of the MEPS Rules, it merely defines
the categories of employees and nothing else and thus would have no 10
relevance and bearing upon the question under consideration. Namdev
Tukaram Patil (supra) relied upon by him, is of no relevance to the
matter in issue in hand as it considers the definition of employee under
Section 2 (7) of the MEPS Act in the context of transfer in terms of
Rule 41 of the MEPS Rules. 15
23. In the result, in view of the discussion made above, we
hold that it would be permissible for a Head/Employee, in exercise of
the provisions of Rule 36(2)(a)(ii) and (b) (ii) of the MEPS Rules to
nominate a former/retired employee as his representative on the
Enquiry Committee. We, therefore, allow the writ petition in the above 20
terms. The consequence of this would be that the Enquiry Committee
WP 5840 of 2024- Judgment.odt
31
constituted in contravention to what has been held above would be
illegal, on account of which the enquiry report, dated 16/10/2024 and
consequently the resultant termination of the petitioner by the order
dated 16/10/2024 from the post of Headmaster, as well as the
communications dated 24/08/2024 and 01/07/2024 rejecting/ 5
disqualifying the nominee of the petitioner on the Enquiry Committee
all are hereby quashed and set aside and we direct the constitution of
the Enquiry Committee, in light of what has been held in this judgment.
24. Rule is made absolute in the aforesaid terms. In the
circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs. 10
(ABHAY J. MANTRI, J.) (AVINASH G. GHAROTE, J.)
At this stage, Mr. Paliwal, learned Counsel for the 15
respondent Nos.1 and 3 seeks stay to the effect and implementation of
the judgment for a period of four weeks.
Though the learned Counsel for the petitioner objects to
the same, however, considering the request and the fact that the
petitioner has been terminated on 16/10/2024 from the post of 20
WP 5840 of 2024- Judgment.odt
32
Headmaster, we grant the request and stay the effect and operation of
the judgment for a period of four weeks from today.
(ABHAY J. MANTRI, J.) (AVINASH G. GHAROTE, J.) 5
Wadkar
Signed by: S.S. Wadkar (SSW)
Designation: PS To Honourable Judge
Date: 07/03/2025 18:08:45