Andhra Pradesh High Court – Amravati
M. Venkata Pulla Rao Pulla Rao vs Maddala Udaya Lakshmi on 19 February, 2025
* THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
*THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE CHALLA GUNARANJAN
+ I.A.Nos.1& 2 of 2024 and 1 of 2025
in/and
CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL No. 1017 of 2013
% .0 .2025
# M.Venkata Pulla rao @ Pulla Rao
......Petitioner
And:
$ Maddala Udaya Lakshmi
....Respondent.
!Counsel for the petitioner : Sri P.Ravikanth
rep. Sri Venkat Challa
^Counsel for the respondent : Sri Ramji Varma
Rep. Sri K.Sarva Bhouma Rao
<Gist:
>Head Note:
? Cases referred:
1. 1985 SCC OnLine AP 98
2. 2013 Supreme (Online) (KER) 8607
3. (2017) 8 SCC 746
4. (2023) 14 SCC 231
2
HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI
****
I.A.Nos.1& 2 of 2024 and 1 of 2025
in/and
CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL No. 1017 of 2013
DATE OF JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED: .0 .2025
SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
&
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE CHALLA GUNARANJAN
1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers Yes/No
may be allowed to see the Judgments?
2. Whether the copies of judgment may be Yes/No
marked to Law Reporters/Journals
3. Whether Your Lordships wish to see the fair Yes/No
copy of the Judgment?
____________________
RAVI NATH TILHARI,J
_______________________
CHALLA GUNARANJAN,J
3
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
&
THE HON'BL SRI JUSTICE CHALLA GUNARANJAN
I.A.Nos.1& 2 of 2024 and 1 of 2025
in/and
CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL No. 1017 of 2013
JUDGMENT:
(per Hon‟ble Sri Justice Ravi Nath Tilhari)
Heard Sri P.Ravikanth, learned counsel representing Sri Venkat
Challa, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri Ramji Varma, learned
counsel representing Sri K.Sarva Bhouma Rao, learned counsel for the
respondent.
2. This appeal under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 has
been filed by the appellant/husband being aggrieved from the dismissal of
his petition seeking divorce by an order dated 02.07.2013 in OP.No.124
of 2010 by the I Additional Senior Civil Judge, Rajahmundry. The OP was
filed by the appellant/husband under Section 13 (1) (ia) of the Hindu
Marriage Act, 1955 seeking divorce on the ground of cruelty. After
contest, the OP was dismissed, holding that there was no merit in the
petition to grant divorce.
3. During the pendency of the appeal, I.A.No.2 of 2024 was filed to record
the memorandum of compromise dated 05.09.2024 and to set aside the
order dated 02.07.2013 in OP No.124 of 2010 in terms of the compromise
and thereby dissolving the marriage dated 17.12.2004.
4
4. The Memorandum of compromise containing Terms of Compromise
are annexed to I.A.No.2 of 2024 and are signed by both the parties and
their respective counsels.
5. I.A.No.1 of 2024 was also filed with affidavit to permit the appellant
to file compromise petition.
6. I.A.No.1 of 2025 has further been filed to waive the waiting period
of six months under Section 13-B (2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, and to
allow the HMOP No.124 of 2010 in terms of the compromise and
Mediated Settlement Agreement dated 31.12.2024 and grant divorce.
7. In terms of memorandum of compromise, both the parties are
residing separately after two years of marriage. They have one daughter.
There is no relationship of husband and wife between them after two
years of marriage. The husband issued notice seeking divorce and the
wife filed Crl.No.64 of 2010 under Section 498A IPC, which finally
resulted in acquittal in C.C.No.760 of 2010 by the Court of II Additional
Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Tanuku against which Crl.A.No.179 of 2016
was allowed by the learned Sessions judge, Eluru, which resulted in
conviction of the husband against which the Crl.A.No.786 of 2017 filed by
husband is pending in this Court. The parties have decided to take
divorce by mutual consent by arriving at compromise.
8. The terms of compromise, as per para-2 of Memorandum of
Compromise, are as under:
5
“2. It is submitted that at the intervention of elders, the parties have
compromised with the following conditions and have reduced the terms of
compromise into writing.
Now this deed of memorandum of compromise witnesseth as follows :
1) Both the parties are agreed to dissolve the marriage by mutual consent and the
decree of divorce comes into effect immediately.
2) Both the parties have agreed, that the Petitioner shall pay Rs. 15,00,000/- to
the Respondent in which he had already paid Rs.5,00,000/- vide a
D.D.No.919422 which was revalidated on 22-07-2024 and the same was
received by the daughter towards her permanent alimony and the remaining
Rs.10,00,000/- shall be paid to the Respondent at the time of Compromise in
return both the Respondent and the daughter have agreed not to make any
claims against the Petitioner or his family members.
3) The same was recorded in the proceedings before Il Addl Judicial 15t Class
Magistrate in M.C.No.102 of 2011 and accordingly, the compromise was
allowed.
4) It is submitted that, as per the said understanding, the Petitioner shall pay the
rest of amount of Rs. 10,00,000 to the Respondent on the day when the
Criminal Appeal is allowed and the judgement and the order of the sentence
rendered against the Petitioner is set aside by this Court in Criminal Appeal
No. 786 of 2017.
5) It is submitted that both the parties have no claim against each other and each
of them can lead independent life and neither of the parties would intervene in
the life of the other and it is specifically agreed that both of them have no claim
against each other.
6) Each clause shall be in the considerations for each other.”
9. On 05.12.2024 this Court passed the following Order:
“On 07.08.2023, the parties were referred to mediation before Mediation
and Conciliation Centre of this Court. As per the report of the Mediator
dated 05.10.2023, the parties could not settle.
2. Learned counsels for the parties submit that thereafter, they settled
out of the Court.
6
3. The parties have filed memo of compromise dated 05.09.2024
alleging some settlement outside the Court and prays for reversing the
decree of the learned Court.
4. Learned counsels could not address whether based on compromise
out of Court, the decree of learned Court can be reversed granting divorce.
The compromise out of Court; is not taking recourse to any of the mode
recognised in law under Alternative Dispute Resolution.
5. At this stage, we are of the view and as also by learned
counsels for both the parties that the parties be referred to mediation
proceedings before the Mediation and Conciliation Centre of this
Court, again for amicable resolution of the dispute.
6. The parties shall appear before Mediation and Conciliation
Centre of this Court on 12.12.2024.
7. The Mediator shall try to complete the mediation process
within a period of three weeks from the date of 1st appearance.
8. Let the fresh report of mediation be sent to this Court.
9. Post on 09.01.2025.”
10. The report of the mediator dated 03.01.2025 was received. As per
the said report parties arrived at „Mediated Settlement Agreement‟ dated
31.12.2024. Para-5 of such agreement is as under:
5. The both parties hereto confirm and declare that they have voluntarily and
of their own free will, once again reiterated in the presence of Mediator,
arrived at the following terms of settlement:
a) Both parties are agreed to dissolve their marriage by mutual consent in
view of non possibility of their reunion.
b) Both parties are agreed to live their life independently without interference
of each other.
c) Both parties agreed that they would not interfere in the matters of the
other party and shall not trouble in any manner whatsoever, including
sending messages or comments in social media on their past life.
d) Both the parties voluntarily agreed that there will not be any monetary
claims between each other‟s against their person and property hereafter
7anymore in what so ever form, in any given circumstances after the
conclusion of the settlement agreed herein this day.
e) Both the parties agreed that the Appellant/Petitioner shall pay
Rs.15,00,000/- (Rupees Fifteen Lakhs only) to the respondent/respondent in
which the petitioner already paid Rs.5,00,000/- (Five Lakhs Rupees only) to
the Daughter towards her Permanent alimony by way of D.D.No.919422
which was revalidated on 22.07.2024 and the same was acknowledged by
the Respondent, the remaining Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupess Ten Lakhs only)
shall be paid by the petitioner to the Respondent by way of Demand Draft
No.919421 which was revalidated on 21.10.2024 in favour of Respondent
i.e., Maddala Udaya Lakshmi.
f) As per the said understanding, the petitioner shall pay the rest of amount
of Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) to the Respondent on the day
when the CRLA.No.786 of 2017 is allowed and the order of the sentence
rendered against the petitioner is set aside by the Hon‟ble High Court.
g) The Respondent voluntarily agreed that she will not pursue any criminal
cases pending before the courts, police stations or authorities.
h) Both parties shall not rise any dispute on their past life and litigations,
accusations in any form.
i) The petitioner and respondent shall not inherit each other.
11. The learned counsel for the appellant, as also the respondent,
submitted that the marriage has been broken down irretrievably and there
are no chances for reunion. Both the parties are residing separately for
the last more than 9 years, and they have one daughter. The amount of
permanent alimony has been settled for wife and also for the daughter.
The parties have arrived at the settlement without any pressure, coercion
or undue influence by any of the parties.
12. Learned counsels for the parties contended that the cooling off
period of six months under Sec.13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act may be
8
waived off and also that an application under Sec.13-B of Hindu Marriage
Act, 1955 can be filed at the stage of appeal as well.
13. We have considered the aforesaid submissions and perused the
material on record.
14. In K. Omprakash v. K. Nalini1 the application of the husband
under Section 13 of Hindu Marriage Act for dissolution of marriage was
dismissed by the learned Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. He
filed appeal. During pendency of the appeal, the parties entered into
settlement. In appeal before the High Court, they filed the compromise
memo to pass a decree for divorce declaring the marriage to be dissolved
by mutual consent, ignoring the allegations and the counter allegations
made by the parties against each other in the petition under Section 13.
This Court framed the question, whether Section 13 B (2) of the Hindu
Marriage Act under which divorce by mutual consent can be granted,
permits the granting of such decree of divorce in the appeal, and held that
Section 13-B (2) does not impose any fetter on the powers of the Court to
grant instant decree of divorce. It was also observed that the time table
fixed by Section 13-B (2) does not apply to an appellate Court. It was
held that it could not have been the intention of Section 13-B (2) that the
appellate Court should always drive the fighting parties to go through the
purposeless forms of meaningless ceremony of petitioning again for
1
1985 SCC OnLine AP 98
9
consent divorce waiting and watching the completion of necessary
number of revolutions of this mother earth around the unmoving sun.
15. Paragraphs 8 and 9 of K. Omprakash (supra) are as under:
“8. Section13-B is introduced into the statute book by means of the
Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976. It permits, for the first time,
dissolution of a Hindu marriage by mutual consent of parties provided
the parties have been living separately after their marriage for a period
of one year or more and that they have not been able to live together
and that they have mutually agreed that the marriage should be
dissolved. Section 13-B radically altered the legal basis of a Hindu
marriage by treating it as an ordinary form of contract which competent
parties can enter into and put an end to like any other contract by mutual
consent. Just as the parties can obtain a consent decree from the
Courts under Order 23 Rule 3 C.P.C., so they can now under Section
13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act obtain a consent divorce. Sri S.V. Gupta
in his Hindu Law 3rd (1981) Edition, Volume 2 page 300. commenting
on this change, wrote:
“This is a very radical amendment as it enables divorce by consent. It
also virtually puts a death -nail on the old of Hindu Law and Hindu
morality that marriage is a sacrament and not a contract”.
However, a petition filed for divorce by consent under Section 13-B of
the Hindu Marriage Act is required to be kept in abeyance for a minimum
period of six months. This is in sharp contrast with a petition filed for
divorce by consent under Special Marriage Act which is liable to be kept
in abeyance at least for one year. This liberalising trend of law in the
matter of granting divorce by consent cannot be lost sight of by Courts in
interpreting that Section. But even, then Clause (2) of Section 13-B
requires a Court not to pass a decree for divorce before six months of
time lapses and after 18 months of time passes from the date of filing of
such a petition for divorce by mutual consent. This is the last hope of the
10
legislature for saving the marriage. The intention of the legislature is to
provide a minimum period of six months for re-thinking of the parties. If
the above time-table fixed by Section 13-B (2) of the Hindu Marriage Act
is applied to the present application made by the parties in this case on
12th July, 1985. We have to adjourn this case till January, 1986 for
passing a decree for divorce under that Section, notwithstanding the fact
that we are of the opinion that there is no chance of reconciliation
between the parties who have been living away from each other for the
last years and are to-day most anxious and ready to obtain such a
decree here and now. That situation raises somewhat an important legal
question as to the meaning which we should attribute to Section 13-B
(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act. That question is whether the Legislature
intended that Section 13-B (2) of the Hindu Marriage Act should be
treated as a mandatory provision of law or the Legislature intended that
Section to be treated merely as a directory provision of law. We have
already noticed the language of Section 13-B (2). On first impressions it
is not impossible to hold Section 13-B (2) to be mandatory. As a
mandatory provision of law calls for its pound of flesh and requires to be
complied strictly and it not being satisfied with offerings of more
substantial compliance of its commands, we will have to adjourn this
matter for six months and postpone the deliverance to the parties from
this deadlock by that period of time. It is well settled proposition of law
that a statutory provision, though mandatory in form can yet be treated
as directory in substance. The question then arises whether there is
anything in the text of this Section 13-B (2) or its context or purpose or
design that calls for Section 13-B (2) being interpreted as directory ? In
our opinion, there are weighty reasons warranting the reading of Section
13-B Clause (2) as directory. In that context we must first call attention
to the design of the law expressed in its liberalising tendency of
providing relief to parties on the basis of their mutual consent from their
broken marriages. We must remember that this relief is granted by
bringing about a profound alteration in the concept of a Hindu Marriage
11
from that of a sacrament to a contract. By that alteration law has
definitely set its fact against forcible perpetuation of the status of
matrimony between unwilling partners. Next we must note that this six
month’s time fixed by Section 13-B (2) is not a rule relating to the
jurisdiction of the Courts to entertain a petition filed for divorce by
consent. That question of jurisdiction is dealt with, by Section 13-B (1) of
the Act and must be strictly complied with. Section 13-B (2) is a part of
mere procedure. A procedural provision must be interpreted as a
handmaid of justice in order to advance and further the interests of
justice and not as a technical rule. Above all we should note that if
Section 13 B (2) is read as a mandatory provision and as applicable to
the exercise of matrimonial jurisdiction by the Appellate Courts also,
Section 13-B (2) becomes totally unworkable. According to the literal
reading of Section 13-B (2). the Courts cannot pass consent decree of
divorce beyond 18 months period from the date of its filing, in the event
such an application is filed by the parties and the Courts for some
reason of human error or failure did not or could not dispose it of within
the said period of 18 months, the literal reading of Section 13-B (2)
prevents the Courts from granting that relief thereafter. Similarly if a
petition for divorce by mutual consent is filed before the lower Court and
was dismissed by the lower Court for some reason, the appellate Court
would be powerless to grant that relief on the basis of the application
filed in the lower Court because 18 months must had elapsed by the
time the matter reached the appellate forum although the parties are still
fighting relentlessly in the appellate Court. These considerations lead us
to hold that it could not have been the intention of Section 13-B (2) that
the appellate court should always drive the fighting parties to go through
the purposeless forms of meaningless ceremony of petitioning again for
consent divorce waiting and watching the completion of necessary
number of revolutions of this mother earth around the unmoving sun.
9. For all the above reasons, we are of the opinion that Section
13-B (2) of the Hindu Marriage Act should be read as directory only.
12
Section 13-B (2), no doubt cautions the Courts of its duty to fight the last
ditch battle to save the marriage; but when the Court is fully satisfied, on
the basis of the proved facts, that in the interests of justice of the society
and the individuals marriage tie should be put as under immediately.
Section 13-B (2) does not impose any fetter on the powers of the Court
to grant instant decree of divorce. At any rate, we are clearly of the
opinion that the time-table fixed by Section 13-B(2) does not apply to an
appellate Court. The great Telugu Poet Vemana said that the broken
iron can be Joined together, but not broken, hearts. Parties have been
living apart for long and their wedlock has now virtually become a
deadlock. Chances of reunion had completely faded away. In these
circumstances, we think it just and proper to grant a decree of divorce
straightaway. Accordingly we pass a decree of divorce declaring the
marriage between the appellant and the respondent as dissolved with
immediate effect.”
16. So, it has been held in K. Omprakash (supra) that an application
under Section 13-B of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 is maintainable at the
stage of appeal against the decree passed in divorce case and also that
the waiting period under Section 13-B (2) is directory and not mandatory.
17. In R. Sraswathy Devi v. M. Manoharan2, the Division Bench of the
Kerala High Court held, that the legislative policy disclosed in the
requirement that the Court should wait for six months is to give an
opportunity to the parties to see if the marriage can be saved. However,
in cases like the present one where the parties are before the appellate
Court after having fought a battle in the trial Court and where the Court is
2
2013 Supreme (Online) (KER) 8607
13
satisfied that the parties had sufficient time to think over their own future
and have come to a definite conclusion that the marital relationship has to
be terminated, the Court should take a liberal view of the procedural
requirement and refrain from insisting on the waiting period of six months.
In the said case, the parties were residing separately for more than 5
years, and the wife encashed the cheque given by the husband in terms
of the compromise. So, it was held that the parties should not be
subjected to a fresh waiting period of six months, and dispensed with the
requirement of waiting period.
18. Paragraph-5 of R. Sraswathy Devi (supra) is as under:
“5. The surviving question is whether the prayer of the parties for
dispensing with the six months waiting period is to be allowed. It is true
that under Section 13B (1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, it is mandatory
that once an application for divorce is filed, the Court should wait for six
months period after presentation of the application. This is a case
where the Family Court has already granted a decree of divorce by its
order dated 6.12.2012 and by I.A.No.2160/2013, the said order of
divorce is sought to be modified into one based on mutual consent.”
19. In Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur3 the question for
consideration was whether the minimum period of six months stipulated
under Section 13-B(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for a motion for
passing decree of divorce on the basis of mutual consent is mandatory or
3
(2017) 8 SCC 746
14
can be relaxed in any exceptional situations. The Hon‟ble Apex Court
held that the period mentioned in Section 13-B(2) is not mandatory but
directory, it will be open to the Court to exercise its discretion in the facts
and circumstances of each case where there is no possibility of parties
resuming cohabitation and there are chances of alternative rehabilitation.
20. In Amardeep Singh (supra) the Hon‟ble Apex Court held as under
in paras-19 and 20:
“19. Applying the above to the present situation, we are of the view
that where the court dealing with a matter is satisfied that a case is
made out to waive the statutory period under Section 13-B(2), it can do
so after considering the following:
(i) the statutory period of six months specified in Section 13-B(2), in
addition to the statutory period of one year under Section 13-B(1) of
separation of parties is already over before the first motion itself;
(ii) all efforts for mediation/conciliation including efforts in terms of
Order 32-A Rule 3 CPC/Section 23(2) of the Act/Section 9 of the Family
Courts Act to reunite the parties have failed and there is no likelihood of
success in that direction by any further efforts;
(iii) the parties have genuinely settled their differences including
alimony, custody of child or any other pending issues between the
parties;
(iv) the waiting period will only prolong their agony.
The waiver application can be filed one week after the first motion giving
reasons for the prayer for waiver. If the above conditions are satisfied,
the waiver of the waiting period for the second motion will be in the
discretion of the court concerned.
20. Since we are of the view that the period mentioned in Section
13-B(2) is not mandatory but directory, it will be open to the court to
exercise its discretion in the facts and circumstances of each case
15
where there is no possibility of parties resuming cohabitation and there
are chances of alternative rehabilitation.”
21. Recently, in Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan4 the
Constitution Bench observed and held that the object of cooling off period
is not to stretch the already disintegrated marriage, or to prolong the
agony and misery of the parties when there are no chances of the
marriage working out. However, the waiver is not to be given on mere
asking, but on the Court being satisfied beyond doubt that the marriage
has shattered beyond repair.
22. Paras-24, 25, 26 and 28 of Shilpa Sailesh (supra) read as under:
“24. Section 13-B(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act states that a decree
of divorce may be granted on a joint petition by the parties on fulfilment
of the following conditions:
(a) the parties have been living separately for a period of one year or
more before presentation of the petition;
(b) they have not been able to live together; and
(c) they have mutually agreed that the marriage should be dissolved.
25. Sub-section (2) to Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act
provides that after the first motion is passed, the couple/parties would
have to move to the court with the second motion, if the petition is not
withdrawn in the meanwhile, after six months and not later than eighteen
months of the first motion. No action can be taken by the parties before
the lapse of six months since the first motion. When the second motion
is filed, the court is to make an inquiry, and on satisfaction that the
averments made in the petition are true, a decree of divorce is granted.
Clearly, the legislative intent behind incorporating sub-section (2) to
4
(2023) 14 SCC 231
16
Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act is that the couple/party must
have time to introspect and consider the decision to separate before the
second motion is moved.
26. However, there are cases of exceptional hardship, where
after some years of acrimonious litigation and prolonged suffering, the
parties, with a view to have a fresh start, jointly pray to the court to
dissolve the marriage, and seek waiver of the need to move the second
motion. On account of irreconcilable differences, allegations and
aspersions made against each other and the family members, and in
some cases multiple litigations including criminal cases, continuation of
the marital relationship is an impossibility. The divorce is inevitable, and
the cooling off period of six months, if at all, breeds misery and pain,
without any gain and benefit. These are cases where the object and
purpose behind sub-section (2) to Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage
Act to safeguard against hurried and hasty decisions are not in issue
and question, and the procedural requirement to move the court with the
second motion after a gap of six months acts as an impediment in the
settlement. At times, payment of alimony and permanent lump sum
maintenance gets delayed, while anxiety and suspicion remain. Here,
the procedure should give way to a larger public and personal interest of
the parties in ending the litigation(s), and the pain and sorrow effected,
by passing a formal decree of divorce, as de facto the marriage had
ended much earlier.
28. The time-gap is meant to enable the parties to cogitate,
analyse and take a deliberated decision. The object of the cooling off
period is not to stretch the already disintegrated marriage, or to prolong
the agony and misery of the parties when there are no chances of the
marriage working out. Therefore, once every effort has been made to
salvage the marriage and there remains no possibility of reunion and
cohabitation, the court is not powerless in enabling the parties to avail a
better option, which is to grant divorce. The waiver is not to be given on
mere asking, but on the court being satisfied beyond doubt that the
17
marriage has shattered beyond repair. The judgment in Amardeep
Singh [Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur, (2017) 8 SCC 746 : (2017) 4
SCC (Civ) 804 : (2017) 3 SCC (Cri) 505] refers to several questions that
the court would ask before passing an order one way or the other.
However, this judgment proceeds on the interpretation of Section 13-
B(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, and does not examine whether this
Court can take on record a settlement agreement and grant divorce by
mutual consent under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act in
exercise of the power under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India.”
23. After considering the submissions advanced jointly from both the
sides that there are no chances of reconciliation and reunion, the parties
are living separately, in spite of the fact that the petition filed by the
husband for divorce was dismissed, and still they are not able to reunite,
as also that they entered into a mediation settlement agreement, making
the provision for permanent alimony to the wife and the daughter and I.A.
for divorce by mutual consent is voluntarily filed and there is no coercion,
we are of the view that there is no purpose, under the circumstances of
this case, directing the parties to wait for six months cooling off period, to
obliviate and continue their miseries. When the marriage has been
broken down irretrievably and the parties are living separately for the last
more than 9 years, we allow the divorce by mutual consent and waive of
waiting period to grant divorce by mutual consent as under Section 13B of
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
18
24. Consequently, the Appeal is allowed. The decree dated
02.07.2013, rejecting the divorce petition OP.No.124 of 2010 by the
learned I Additional Senior Civil Judge, Rajahmundry, is set aside and the
marriage between the appellant and the respondent is dissolved under
Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act with effect from the date of this
judgment.
25. The „Mediated Settlement Agreement‟ dated 31.12.2024 shall form
part of the decree in this appeal.
26. The I.A.Nos.1 & 2 of 2024 and I.A.No.1 of 2025 stands disposed of
in terms of the decision in this appeal.
27. It is clarified that the Mediated Settlement Agreement dated
31.12.2024, prevails over the previous memorandum of compromise
dated 05.09.2024 filed with I.A.No.2 of 2024.
Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed in
consequence.
____________________
RAVI NATH TILHARI, J
_______________________
CHALLA GUNARANJAN, J
Dated:
Note: L.R. copy be marked
B/o.
AG
19THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
&
THE HON’BL SRI JUSTICE CHALLA GUNARANJANI.A.Nos.1& 2 of 2024 and 1 of 2025
in/and
CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL No. 1017 of 2013Dated:
Note: L.R. copy be marked
B/o.
AG
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