E.Shankar Reddy vs The State Of Telangana, on 10 March, 2025

Telangana High Court

E.Shankar Reddy vs The State Of Telangana, on 10 March, 2025

Author: Abhinand Kumar Shavili

Bench: Abhinand Kumar Shavili

            THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE K.C.BHANU
                          AND
              THE HON'BLE SMT JUSTICE ANIS

WRIT PETITION NOS.21172, 23212, 25885, 25889, 25893, 22265,
      26027, 26207, 25388, 31423 AND 33953 OF 2014


COMMON ORDER:

(per the HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE K.C.BHANU )

There are two sets of writ petitions. Since they
involve common question of law, they are being disposed
of by this common order.

2. First set of writ petitions relates to G.O.
Ms.No.208 Home (Legal II) Department, dated
31-08-2013 issued by the Government reducing minimum
service from 6 years to 4 years in respect of Sub-
Inspector of Police (Civil) by transfer from Reserve Sub-
Inspector of Police for the purpose of getting eligibility for
promotion as Inspector of Police (Civil) by an amendment
by substituting sub-rule (b) of Rule 6 of Andhra Pradesh
Police (Civil) Service Rules, 1998.

3. Second set of writ petitions relates to
G.O.Ms.No.212 Home (Legal I) Department, dated
06-09-2013 reducing minimum service from 5 years to 3
years as eligibility criteria for promotion to the post of
Head Constable (Civil) to such of those Police Constables
(Civil) who were appointed by conversion from Armed
Reserve etc.,

4. With regard to the first set of writ petitions, the
applicants in the Original Applications (for short ‘O.A.’) were
appointed by way of direct recruitment to the post of Sub-
Inspector of Police (Civil) (for short ‘S.I.’) whereas unofficial
respondents were initially recruited as Reserve Sub-Inspector of
Police (for short ‘R.S.I.’). Common selection of S.Is and R.S.Is is
taken up by the Police Recruitment Board by issuance of
combined notification duly specifying number of vacancies to be
filled in for each category. A.P. Police (Civil) Subordinate Service
Rules, issued under G.O.Ms.No.374, dated 14-12-1999 was
amended thereby fixing 5% quota for R.S.Is by appointment by
transfer as S.I.. Accordingly, some of the writ petitioners were
appointed by conversion as S.Is from the category or cadre of
R.S.Is. It is not in dispute that the regular S.Is and the persons
who were converted by transfer from R.S.Is to S.Is have to put up
minimum service of 6 years for eligibility to be promoted as
Inspector of Police. In pursuance of the amendment to the Andhra
Pradesh Police (Civil) Service Rules, 1998 (for short ‘the Rules’)
in G.O.Ms.No.208, Home (Legal II) Department, dated
31-08-2013, the period of 6 years has been reduced to 4 years in
respect of S.Is who are appointed by conversion from R.S.Is and
that period has to be counted from the date of conversion. That
was under challenge before the Andhra Pradesh Administrative
Tribunal, Hyderabad (for short ‘the Tribunal’) by the direct recruit
S.Is.

5. In the other set of writ petitions, the writ petitioners
therein were initially appointed as Armed Police Constables and
subsequently they were converted as Police Constables (Civil).
The Government amended Rule 7 of the Rules thereby the
converted Reserve Constables have to put up not less than 3
years of service for promotion as Head Constables. Earlier for
promotion from the category of Police Constables (Civil) to the
Head Constable, the direct recruit police constables or reserved
constables, who have been converted to regular Police
Constables, have to put up minimum of 5 years of service which is
eligibility criteria. That 5 years of service was reduced to 3 years
in respect of Reserve Constables who have been appointed by
conversion to the post of Police Constables (Civil). This
amendment was brought in G.O.Ms.No.212, Home (Legal I )
Department, dated 06-09-2013. The source of recruitment to the
Police Constables and Armed Constables is different. But the
Rules permit for conversion of Armed Constables to Police
Constables. The said amendment was under challenge before the
Tribunal by the directly recruited Police Constables as the
amendment violates Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.

6. The Tribunal after considering the material available
on record, held thus:

“We are of the considered view that the Civil Police and
the Armed Reserve Police come under different
organizations and the personnel in those organizations
are governed by different set of Rules. When once Armed
Reserved Police is converted as Civil Police, the Rules
applicable to the Civil Police are applicable to the persons
converted from Armed Reserve. After conversion, they
become one class along with the persons working in Civil
Police. It is an established proposition that there cannot
be any further classification among one class and there
cannot be any distinction or discrimination between
persons directly recruited as Civil Police and the persons
appointed by transfer from Armed Reserve Police ,
G.,O.Ms.No.208 gave scope for further classification
among the same class by prescribing four years
experience to the candidates appointed by transfer from
Armed Reserve and six years experience to the
candidates, who are appointed as Civil Police, which is in
violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.
The right to be considered is violated in G.O.Ms.No.208
as this leads to discrimination. Therefore, there is
violation of fundamental rights. G.O.Ms.No.208 creates a
situation of discrimination between the direct recruit S.I.
(Civil) and convertee S.I. (Civil). The contention of wrong
interim order passed by the Tribunal dated 07-10-2013 we
have to say that by doing so, the Court did not allow the
main prayer of the applicants as contended and it was
passed after hearing both parties. Regarding
permissibility of differential treatment in terms of citation
(1991) 2 SCC 48, we have to observe that intelligible
differentia between S.I. (Civil) and Convertee S.I. (Civil) is
not based on any rational in G.O.Ms.No.208 and therefore,
G.O.Ms.No.208, dated 31-08-2013 is bad in law and
accordingly allowed the O.As setting aside the
G.O.Ms.No.208, Home (Legal II) Department, dated 31-08-

2013.”

In respect of Police Constables (Civil), the Tribunal held
thus:

“After going through all the citations and the position
analysed above, We are of the considered view that the
Civil Police and the Armed Reserve Police come under
different organizations and the personnel in those
organizations are governed by different set of Rules.
When once Armed Reserved Police is converted as Civil
Police, the Rules applicable to the Civil Police are
applicable to the persons converted from Armed Reserve.
After conversion, they become one class along with the
persons working in Civil Police. It is an established
proposition that there cannot be any further classification
among one class and there cannot be any distinction or
discrimination between persons directly recruited as Civil
Police and the persons appointed by transfer from Armed
Reserve Police , G.,O.Ms.No.212 gave scope for further
classification among the same class by prescribing three
years experience to the candidates appointed by transfer
from Armed Reserve and five years experience to the
candidates, who are appointed as Civil Police, which is in
violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.
The right to be considered for promotion is violated in
G.O.Ms.No.212 as this leads to discrimination. Therefore,
there is violation of fundamental rights. G.O.Ms.No.212
creates a situation of discrimination between the direct
recruit P.C. (Civil) and Armed Reserve P.C. (Civil)
converted as P.C. (Civil). The contention of wrong interim
order passed by the Tribunal we have to say that by doing
so, the Court did not allow the main prayer of the
applicants as contended and it was passed after hearing
both parties. Regarding permissibility of differential
treatment, we have to observe that intelligible differentia
between P.C. (Civil) and Armed Reserve P.C. converted
as P.C. (Civil) is not based on any rational in
G.O.Ms.No.212 and therefore, G.O.Ms.No.212, dated 06-
09-2013 is bad in law and accordingly struck down
G.O.Ms.No.212, dated
06-09-2013 as unconstitutional.

Challenging the same, the present writ petitions are
filed.

7. The facts which are necessary for disposal of
the present writ petitions may be stated as follows:

A common notification was issued for recruitment to
the posts of S.Is and R.S.Is. Number of vacancies for
each category i.e., regular S.Is and R.S.Is were notified
depending upon the vacancies in both categories.
Selection process is common for both the categories of
posts. Depending upon the number of vacancies notified
for both the categories, merit will be taken into
consideration in filling up of the posts of S.Is in the first
instance basing upon the order of merit. After identifying
the candidates for filling up of the posts of S.Is, the next
meritorious candidates in the merit list will be taken into
consideration for selection as R.S.Is. In short, less
meritorious persons than the selected candidates of S.I
category will be appointed as R.S.I. in the order of merit.
The same selection process will be taken up in the similar
way in recruiting constables as well as Armed Reserve
Constables. Conversion of Armed Reserve S.Is to the
regular Civil S.Is is permissible as per rules subject to
limitation of 5% of cadre strength. In respect of Reserve
Constables, it is 10%. Insofar as S.I. is concerned, after
conversion from Armed Reserve to regular S.I., 6 years
minimum service is required to be put in for promotion to
the post of Inspector of Police. That length of service was
reduced to 4 years in respect of R.S.Is converted to
regular S.Is, whereas that minimum length of service of 6
years continues to be the same in respect of directly
recruited S.Is. In respect of Constables, one has to put up
minimum service of 5 years in the category of constable to
get promotion to the post of Head Constable. That period
of service has been reduced to 3 years in respect of
Constables who were converted as Civil Constables from
Armed Reserve.

In both the category of cases, the contention of the
direct recruit appointees is that their right to be considered
for promotion to the higher category would be reduced or
condensed by virtue of cutting short the length of eligibility
service in respect of converted Reserve Police and
therefore, it is violative of Article 16 of the Constitution of
India. The contention of the directly recruited S.Is and
directly recruited Police Constables is that once Armed
Reserve S.I. or the Armed Reserve Constable is
appointed by transfer, they became one service as their
birth-mark obliterated into one category/service once they
were converted into regular police and therefore, there
cannot be any further classification among one class and
it violates Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

8. In the factual background, the question of law
involved is whether the further classification of one class
is reasonable classification among the same group and if
so, does it amount to discrimination between persons of
the same group or class?

9. Mr.G.V.Sivaji, learned counsel for the
petitioners in W.P.No.21172 of 2014 contended that
R.S.Is after conversion as Civil S.Is are entitled to count
their service from the date of their initial appointment as
R.S.I and their conversion as S.I. (Civil) shall not be
treated as first appointment and that there was nexus
between basis of classification and the object of the
amendment sought to be achieved as the persons who
are appointed as R.S.Is could not get conversion even
after putting service for more than 8 years and after
conversion, he has to put up minimum service of 11 years
in post of regular S.I and in some cases, one has to put
up 16 years of service to get promotion as Inspector of
Police and therefore, R.S.Is. who are converted as S.I.
(Civil) represented to the Government for reducing
minimum service required for promotion as Inspector of
Police and accordingly, Government issued amendment
to the Rules reducing minimum service from 6 years to 4
years and hence, he prays to set aside the impugned
order.

10. Learned counsel for the petitioners in
W.P.No.23212 of 2014 contended that 5% quota by R.S.I.
into Civil S.I. is not under challenge, that counting of past
seniority in the R.S.I. when they were converted as regular
S.I. is upheld by the Courts, that the Government, after
taking note of hardship of R.S.Is into account, carved out
a particular class of persons out of homogeneous group
and reduced the period of service, that the classification is
only based upon the source of recruitment, that it would
not be irrational in reducing the length of service for the
R.S.Is, that the seniority of R.S.Is is settled and the
eligibility criteria i.e., length of service which has reduced
by the Government by amending the rules is based upon
seniority and experience and hence, it is a rational and
reasonable classification between the two groups of those
direct recruit S.Is and converted R.S.Is, that the writ
petitioners are direct recruits of 1996-98 batch R.S.Is
whereas applicants are of 2004-07 batch of direct recruits
Civil S.Is and the applicants failed to discharge their initial
burden as to how their fundamental rights are violated and
hence, he prays to set aside the impugned order.

11. Mr.Y.S.Venkat Rao, learned counsel for the
petitioners in W.P.No.25885 and 33953 of 2014
contended that the applicants and the unofficial
respondents cannot be formed as same homogeneous
group by themselves because they have come from two
different sources, that if any discrimination is shown to one
particular group namely either direct recruits S.I.s or
R.S.Is, it attracts the wrath of Article 14 of the Constitution
of India, that it is not such a case and hence, he prays to
set aside the impugned order.

12. Mr.E.Manohar, learned senior counsel
appearing for Mr.G.Ramgopal, learned counsel appearing
for the petitioners in W.P.No.22265 of 2014 contended
that the amendment to G.O.Ms.No.208 will not in any
manner affect the rights of the applicants under Articles 14
and 16 of the Constitution of India, that the right to
promotion to the unofficial respondents herein has not
been taken away in pursuance of G.O.Ms.No.208 and
therefore, the unofficial respondents cannot complain
about the violation of fundamental right and it is for the
Government to prescribe eligibility criteria for effecting
promotion to the next higher post depending upon
hardship caused to the group of persons, that reducing
eligibility criteria from 6 years to 4 years cannot be said to
be arbitrary and that has been reduced considering
arduous nature of work rendered by R.S.Is in effectively
handling Maoists and terrorists and that the observation of
Tribunal that after conversion, R.S.Is. became one class
and there cannot be any further classification is contrary
to the ratio laid down in various decisions of the Supreme
Court, that except paras 22 and 23 of the impugned order,
no reasons were recorded or assigned for striking down
the rules impugned in O.As. and the pleas taken up by the
writ petitioners have not been taken into consideration
and adverted and hence, he prays to set aside the
impugned order of the Tribunal.

13. Mr.P.V.Krishnaiah, learned counsel for the
petitioner contended that the amendment which was
impugned in the O.A. was not shown to be arbitrary,
unreasonable and irrational, that the Armed Reserve
Constables and Civil Constables form a separate and
distinct class and hence, they cannot be treated as
equals and therefore, treating equals and unequals
differently would not amount to violation of Article 14 of the
Constitution of India as constitution permits reasonable
classification and that before conversion they worked for
more than 10 years as Armed Constables and as per the
Rules, 10% only Armed Reserve can be converted to the
regular police and they have completed more than 10
years of service before conversion as regular police and
therefore, considering the length of service put up by them
reducing the minimum service of 5 years to 3 years for
getting next promotion cannot be said to be
unreasonable and unjust, that the applicants failed to give
justifiable reason to establish as to how amendment
under challenge before the Tribunal violates the
Constitutional provisions and the Tribunal has no power to
grant interim suspension of the Rules except in
extraordinary circumstances when the O.A. was pending
and hence, he prays to set aside the impugned order.

14. Mr.N.Janardhan Reddy, learned counsel for the
petitioners in Writ Petition Nos.25889 and 25893 of 2014
and Smt.S.V.Indira, learned counsel for the petitioner in
Writ Petition No.25388 of 2014 and Mr.K.Gopal, learned
counsel for the petitioner in Writ Petition No.3142 of 2014
adopted the arguments submitted by the other counsel for
the petitioners.

15. On the other hand, Mr.C.V.Mohan Reddy,
learned senior counsel appearing for Mr.Gode Satish,
learned counsel appearing for the respondents in Writ
Petition No.21172 for 2014 contended that direct recruits
S.Is and converted Armed Reserve to regular S.Is were
integrated into one class and one cadre, that no
discrimination thereafter could be shown to the Armed
Reserve S.Is. and converted S.Is and therefore, putting a
condition such as a particular period of service selectively
on the converted R.S.Is to the disadvantage of the regular
S.Is. becomes discriminatory and violates Article 14 of the
Constitution of India, that when both the categories formed
into one class and further classification among the one
class for the purpose of promotion on the basis of the birth
source of one class which they were drawing can be said
to be unjust and unreasonable and it will cause prejudice
and disadvantage to the directly recruited S.Is, that after
conversion of S.Is as regular S.Is, they are to be treated
similarly with regard to their service conditions and there
should not be any discrimination among one class and
that the two categories of S.Is inducted as a fusion into
one class and so, there could not be any differential
treatment to the members of the same group of persons,
that the Government by reducing the eligibility criteria from
6 years to 4 years, there is no justification as to how it is
intelligible differentia and the nexus between the object
sought to be achieved in reducing eligibility criteria for
certain persons for promotion to higher category when the
two sources of persons were grouped or formed as one
class, that if the entire judgment is read as a whole, it is
very clear that the Tribunal has considered the point
raised by the applicants with regard to distinction based
on the birth-mark of two sources of persons and that
following the decisions of the Supreme Court, it was
observed that the recruits from different sources are
integrated into one class and no further discrimination is
permissible and hence, he prays to dismiss the writ
petitions.

16. Mr.V.Ravichandran, learned counsel appearing
for the respondents in Writ Petition No.26027 of 2014
contended that when the Armed Reserve Constables and
Armed Reserve S.Is were converted by appointment by
transfer to the post of Constables and S.I. (Civil)
respectively, both categories were governed by the Rules
and as such both the S.Is and R.S.Is come under class I
of category I whereas Constable come under Class I of
Category VII and that the training undergone by the
directly recruited Armed Reserve S.Is is entirely different
from that of the directly recruited S.Is. and the writ
petitioners failed to substantiate as to how the nature of
duties of Police Constables and Armed Reserve
Constables or Armed Reserve S.Is and S.Is are one and
the same, that the Civil Police are discharging their duties
right from the date of their appointment relating to law and
order whereas the nature of duties of Armed Reserve
Police, is entirely different and that Armed Reserve Police
or Constables have become main class with that of S.Is
and thereafter if any undue and unjust preference in the
matter of next promotional post is arbitrary per se which
violates Article 14 of the Constitution of India and the
sediment was brought over to get over judgment of this
Court where it is held that concept of seniority and
eligibility is one and the same and that appointment to one
cadre to birth mark i.e., source of recruitment loose its
relevance and significance as any classification basing on
the source of recruitment was held to be bad in law and
hence, he prays to dismiss the writ petitions.

17. Learned counsel for some of the respondent in
Writ Petition No.26207 of 2014 contended that statutory
period prescribed of putting 5 years of eligibility service in
the category of Civil Constables to the promotion to the
next higher category has to be followed irrespective of
their mode of recruitment/appointment and reducing
minimum service of 5 years to 3 years in respect of
convertee Civil Constable creates two classes among
same class by prescribing different eligibility criteria for
promotion and it violates Article 14 of the Constitution of
India and that by virtue of the impugned order in the O.A.,
the Government has chosen to create two different class
among same group resulting into discrimination and that
the eligibility criteria prescribed under the Rules is
altogether different from the concept of seniority and the
1st respondent issued amendment without assigning
reasons for classification and without specifying the object
sought to be achieved and it is without any independent
application of mind by the Rule making authority and that
the nature of duties of both Armed Reserve and Civil
Constables are altogether different and thereby injustice
was done to the Civil Constables who were directly
recruited and hence, he prays to dismiss the writ petitions.

18. Mr.Challa Dhanunjaya, learned counsel
appearing for the respondents in Writ Petition No.21172 of
2014 contended that Rule 11-A of the Rules provides
details of training undergone by the regular S.Is and
those who are transferred from Armed Reserve Police,
that A.P. Police (Civil) Rules, 1966 were superceded by
A.P. Police (Civil) Service Rules 1998 and in both the
Rules, the requirement of minimum of 6 years of service
by S.I.s (Civil) for the promotion to the post of Inspector of
Police was not dispensed with, that the petitioners failed to
show about the nature of duties of S.Is. and Armed
Reserve S.Is as one and the same right from the training
to discharge regular duties and that everything is different
and distinct and in view of undertaking given by the
convertees at the time of conversion, they are not entitled
to be promoted to the next post and hence, he prays to
dismiss the writ petitions.

19. There cannot be any dispute that Article 14 of
the Constitution of India prohibits class legislation and not
reasonable classification for the purpose of legislation. So
the doctrine of equal protection does not take away from
the State the power of classifying persons for legitimate
purpose. The legislature is competent to exercise its
discretion and make reasonable classification. Every
reasonable classification is in some degree likely to
produce some inequality and mere production of
inequality is not enough. Differential treatment does not
per se constitute violation of Article 14 of the Constitution
of India. It denies equal protection only when there is no
reasonable basis in the differentiation. The finding of the
Tribunal that there cannot be any further classification
among one class and it is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of
the Constitution of India can be said to be perverse and
against the law laid down by the Supreme Court. It is well
settled principle of law that in order to pass the test of
permissible classification, two conditions must be fulfilled
viz., 1) that the classification must be founded on an
intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or
things that are grouped together from other left out of the
group and 2) that differentia must have a rational relation
to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in
question.

20. Mr.G.V.Sivaji, learned counsel for the
petitioners relied on a decision reported in BUDHAN
[1]
CHOUDARY V STATE OF BIHAR , wherein it was held thus:

“Again, in Budhan Choudhry v. State of Bihar, [(1955) 1
SCR 1045: AIR 1955 SC 191], after considering earlier
decisions, this Court stated;

“It is now well-established that while article 14 forbids
class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable
classification for the purposes of legislation. In order,
however, to pass the test of permissible classification two
conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (i) that the
classification must be founded on an intelligible
differential which distinguishes persons or things that are
grouped together from others left out of the group and (ii)
that that differentia must have a rational relation to the
object sought to be achieved by the statute in question.
The classification may be founded on different bases;
namely, geographical, or according to objects or
occupations or the like. What is necessary is that there
must be a nexus between the basis of classification and
the object of the Act under consideration.”

21. Mr. J.Sudheer, learned counsel appearing for
the petitioners relied on a Constitution Bench decision of
the Supreme Court reported in CONFEDERATION OF EX-
SERVICEMEN ASSOCIATRIONS AND OTHERS V UNION OF INDIA
[2]
AND OTHERS , wherein it was held thus:

“In our judgment, therefore, it is clear that every
classification to be legal, valid and permissible, must fulfill
the twin-test, namely;

(i) the classification must be founded on an intelligible
differentia which must distinguish persons or things that
are grouped together from others leaving out or left out;

and (ii) such a differentia must have rational nexus to the
object sought to be achieved by the statute or legislation
in question.”

From the above decisions, it is clear that Article 14 of the
Constitution of India does not prohibit classification if otherwise it
is legal, valid and reasonable. What is prohibited is classification
based upon discrimination or a class legislation.

22. He further relied on a decision reported in STATE OF
BIHAR AND OTHERS V BIHAR STATE ‘PLUS 2’ LECTURERS
[3]
ASSOCIATION AND OTHERS , wherein it was held thus:

“. NOW, it is well settled and cannot be disputed that
Article 14 of the Constitution guarantees equality before
the law and confers equal protection of laws. It prohibits
the State from denying persons or class of persons equal
treatment; provided they are equals and are similarly
situated. It, however, does not forbid classification. In
other words, what Article 14 prohibits is discrimination
and not classification if otherwise such classification is
legal, valid and reasonable.”

23. He further relied on a decision reported in UTTAR
PRADESH POWERCORPORATION LIMITED V AYODHYA
[4]
PRASADMISHRA AND ANOTHER , wherein it was held thus:

“IT is well settled that Article 14 is designed to prevent
discrimination. It seeks to prohibit a person or class of
persons from being singled out from others similarly
situated or circumstanced for the purpose of being
specially subjected to discrimination by hostile legislation.
It, however, does not prohibit classification, if such
classification is based on legal and relevant
considerations.

Every classification, to be legal, valid and permissible,
must fulfil the twin- test, namely, (i) the classification must
be founded on an intelligible differentia which
distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together
from others left out of the group; and (ii) such differentia
must have a rational relation to the object sought to be
achieved by the statute or legislation in question.”

24. He further relied on a decision reported in
KALLAKKURICHI TALUKRETIRED OFFICIALS ASSOCIATION, TAMIL
[5]
NADU AND OTHERS V STATE OF TAMIL NADU , wherein it was
held thus:

“At this juncture it is also necessary to examine the
concept of valid classification. A valid classification is truly
a valid discrimination. Article 16 of the Constitution of
India permits a valid classification (see, State of Kerala vs.
N.M. Thomas (1976) 2 SCC 310). A valid classification is
based on a just objective. The result to be achieved by the
just objective presupposes, the choice of some for
differential consideration/treatment, over others. A
classification to be valid must necessarily satisfy two tests.
Firstly, the distinguishing rationale has to be based on a
just objective. And secondly, the choice of differentiating
one set of persons from another, must have a reasonable
nexus to the objective sought to be achieved.
Legalistically, the test for a valid classification may be
summarized as, a distinction based on a classification
founded on an intelligible differentia, which has a rational
relationship with the object sought to be achieved.
Whenever a cut off date (as in the present controversy) is
fixed to categorise one set of pensioners for favourable
consideration over others, the twin test for valid
classification (or valid discrimination) must necessarily be
satisfied.”

From the above decisions, it is clear that Article 14 prohibits
discrimination. But such discrimination must be shown to have
involving an element of intentional and purposeful differentiation
thereby creating unfavourable bias. In other words, it implies an
unfair classification. Dictionary meaning of fairness is treating
people equally without favoritism or discrimination.

25. Mr. E.Manohar, learned senior counsel appearing for the
petitioners relied on a decision reported in ROOP CHAND
ADLAKHA AND OTHERS V DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY AND
[6]
OTHERS , wherein it was held thus:

“But then the process of classification is in itself productive
of inequality and in that sense antithetical of equality. The
process would be constitutionally valid if it recognises a
pre-existing inequality and acts in aid of amelioration of
the effects of such pre-existent inequality. But the process
cannot in itself generate or aggrevate the inequality. The
process cannot merely blow up or magnify insubstantial or
microscopic differences on merely meretricious or
plausible differences. The over-emphasis on the doctrine
of classification or any anxious and sustained attempts to
discover some basis for classification may gradually and
imperceptibly deprive the article of its precious content
and end in replacing Doctrine of equality by the doctrine of
classification. The presumption of good faith in and of
constitutionality of a classification cannot be pushed “to
the point of predicating some possible or hypothetical but
undisclosed and unknown reason for a classification
rendering the precious guarantee of equality “a mere rope
of sand”.

“To overdo classification is to undo equality”. The idea of
similarity or dissimilarity of situations of persons, to justify
classification, cannot rest on merely differentia which may,
by themselves be rational or logical but depends on
whether the differences are relevant to the goals sought to
be reached by the law which seeks to classify. The
justification of the classification must needs, therefore, to
be sought beyond the classification. All marks of
distinction do not necessarily justify classification
irrespective of the relevance or nexus to objects sought to
be achieved by the law imposing the classification.”

26. He further relied on a decision reported in STATE OF
[7]
KERALA AND ANOTHER V N.M.THOMAS AND OTHERS , wherein
it was held thus:

“Discrimination is the essence of classification. Equality is
violated if it rests on unreasonable basis. The concept of
equality has an inherent limitation arising from the very
nature of the constitutional guarantee. Those who are
similarly circumstanced are entitled to an equal treatment.
Equality is amongst equals. Classification is, therefore, to
be founded on substantial differences which distinguish
persons grouped together from those left out of the groups
and such differential attributes must bear a just and
rational relation to the object sought to be achieved.”

27. He further relied on a decision reported in CHARANJIT
[8]
LAL CHOWDARY V UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS , wherein it
was held thus:

“The only serious point, which in my opinion, arises in
the case is whether Art. 14 of the Constitution is in any
way infringed by the impugned Act. This article
corresponds to the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States of America, which declares that “no State shall
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws”. Professor Wills dealing with this
clause sums up the law as prevailing in the United
States in regard to it in these words:

“Meaning and effect of the guaranty-The guaranty of the
equal protection of the laws means the protection of
equal laws. It forbids class legislation, but does not forbid
classification which rests upon reasonable grounds of
distinction. It does not prohibit legislation, which is
limited either in the objects to whole it is directed or by
the territory within which it is to operate. ‘It merely
requires that all persons subjected to such legislation
shall be treated alike under like circumstances and
conditions both in the privileges conferred and in the
liabilities imposed.’ ‘The inhibition of the amendment . . . .
was designed to prevent any person or class of persons
from being singled out as a special subject for
discriminating and hostile legislation.’ It does not take
from the states the power to classify either in the
adoption of police laws, or tax laws, or eminent domain
laws, but permits to them the exercise of a wide scope of
discretion, and nullifies what they do only when it is
without any reasonable basis. Mathematical nicety and
perfects equality are not required. Similarity, not identity
of treatment, is enough. If any state of facts can
reasonably be conceived to sustain a classification, the
existence of that state of facts must be assumed. One
who assails a classification must carry the burden of
showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis.”

Having summed up the law in this way, the same learned
author adds :

“Many different classifications of persons have been
upheld as constitutional. A law applying to one person or
one class of persons is constitutional if there is sufficient
basis or reason for it.”

There can be no doubt that Art. 14 provides one of the
most valuable and important guarantees in the
Constitution which should not be allowed to be whittled
down, and, while accepting the statement of Professor
Willis as a correct exposition of the principles underlying
this guarantee, I wish to lay particular emphasis on the
principle enunciated by him that any classification which
is arbitrary and which is made without any basis is no
classification and a proper classification must always
rest upon some difference and must bear a reasonable
and just relation to the things in respect of which it is
proposed.”

From the above decisions, it is clear that Article 14 does not
forbid classification, which rests upon reasonable ground of
distinction. Equal protection must mean that there will not be
arbitrary discrimination made by the laws themselves in their
administration. The word equality means equality among equals
and it does not provide an absolute equality of all in all
circumstances.

28. On the other hand, Mr.C.V.Mohan Reddy, learned
senior counsel appearing for some of the respondents relied on
Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court reported in THE
STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR V SHRI TRIKOKI NATH KHOSHA
[9]
AND OTHERS , wherein it was held thus:

“CLASSIFICATION, however, is fraught with the danger
that it may produce artificial inequalities and therefore, the
right to classify is hedged in with salient restraints; or else,
the guarantee of equality will be submerged in class
legislation masquerading as laws meant to govern well
marked classes characterized by different and distinct
attainments. CLASSIFICATION, therefore, must be truly
founded on substantial differences which distinguish
persons grouped together from those left out of the group
and such differential attributes must bear a just and
rational relation to the object sought to be achieved.

18. JUDICIAL scrutiny can therefore extend only to the
consideration whether the classification rests on a
reasonable basis and whether it bears nexus with the
object in view. It cannot extend to embarking upon a nice
or mathematical evaluation of the basis of classification for
were such an inquiry permissible it would be open to the
courts to substitute their own judgment for that of the
legislature or the rule-making authority on the need to
classify or the desirability of achieving a particular object.
Judged from this point of view, it seems to us impossible
to accept the respondents’ submission that the
classification of Assistant Engineers into Degree-holders
and Diploma-holders rests on any unreal or unreasonable
basis. The classification, according to the appellant, was
made with a view to achieving administrative efficiency in
the Engineering services. If this be the object, the
classification is clearly correlated to it for higher
educational qualifications are at least presumptive
evidence of a higher mental equipment. This is not to
suggest that administrative efficiency can be achieved
only through the medium of those possessing
comparatively higher educational qualifications but that is
beside the point. What is relevant is that the object to be
achieved here is not a mere presence for an
indiscriminate imposition of inequalities and the
classification cannot be characterized as arbitrary or
absurd. That is the farthest that judicial scrutiny can
extend.”

29. He further relied on Constitution Bench decision of the
Supreme Court reported in ROSHAN LAL TANDON V UNION OF
[10]
INDIA AND ANOTHER , wherein it was held thus:

“The main question to be considered in this case is
whether the notification by the first respondent dated
27/10/1965 is violative of Arts. 14 and 16 of the
Constitution in so far as it makes a discrimination against
the petitioner for promotion to Grade ‘C’. According to the
impugned notification the existing Apprentice Train
Examiners who had already been absorbed in grade ‘D’
by 31/03/1966 should first be accommodated in grade ‘C’
in 80% of the vacancies reserved for them without
undergoing any selection. With regard to 20% of the
vacancies there is a reservation in favour of the
departmental Train Examiners, but the promotion is by
selection and not by the test of seniority- cum-suitability
which prevailed before the date of the impugned
notification. It was not disputed by Mr. Mehta on behalf of
the petitioner that the Railway Board was competent to
say that with effect from 1/04/1966 vacancies in the Entry
grade posts of Train Examiners should not be filled from
Apprentice Train Examiners upto 50% but should be
exclusively filled by promotion from amongst artisan staff.
As regards the recruitment to grade ‘C’, the impugned
notification states that with effect from 1/04/1966 all the
Apprentice. Train Examiners on successful completion of
their training should be straightaway brought on to the
scale Rs. 205-280 instead of being first absorbed in scale
Rs. 180-6-240 as at present. The period of training was
also increased to 5 years on completion of which they
should be put on to the working posts in scale Rs. 205-

280. So far as this portion of the notification is concerned,
Counsel for the petitioner did not raise any constitutional
objection. But the contention of the petitioner is that the
following portion of the notification was. constitutionally
invalid: ‘The Apprentice TXRS. who have already been or
will be absorbed in scale Rs. 180-240 upto 31- 3-66
should first be accommodated in scale Rs. 205-280
against the quota 80% vacancies reserved for them. Such
staff should not be required to undergo a ‘Selection’ before
being absorbed in that grade. The upgraded vacancies in
scale Rs. 205-280 left over after earmarking those for the
apprentices under training on 2-4-66 should be filled by
promotion of TXRs in scale Rs. 180-240 on a selection
basis.’ In our opinion, the constitutional objection taken by
the petitioner to this part of the notification is well-founded
and must be accepted as correct. At the time when the
petitioner and the direct recruits were appointed to Grade
‘D’, there was one class in Grade ‘D’ formed of direct
recruits and the promotees from the grade of artisans. The
recruits from both the sources to Grade ‘D’ were integrated
into one class and no discrimination could thereafter be
made in favour of recruits from one source as against the
recruits from the other source in the matter of promotion to
Grade ‘C’. To put it differently, once the direct recruits and
promotees are absorbed in one cadre, they form one class
and they cannot be discriminated for the purpose of further
promotion to the higher grade ‘C’. In the present case, it is
not disputed on behalf of the first respondent that before
the impugned notification was issued there was only one
rule of promotion for both the departmental promotees and
the direct recruits and that rule was seniority-cum-
suitability, and there was no rule of promotion separately
made for application to the direct recruits. As a
consequence of the impugned notification a discriminatory
treatment is made in favour of the existing Apprentice
Train Examiners who have already been absorbed in
Grade ‘D’ by March 31, 1966, because the notification
provides that this group of Apprentice Train Examiners
should first be accommodated en bloc in grade ‘C’ upto 80
per cent of vacancies reserved for them without
undergoing any selection. As regards the 20 per cent of
the vacancies made available for the category of Train
Examiners to which the petitioner belongs the basis of
recruitment was selection on merit and the previous test of
seniority-cum-suitability was abandoned. In our opinion,
the present case falls within the principle of the recent
decision of this court in Mervyn v. Collector(1). In that
case, the petitioners who were Appraisers in the Customs
Department filed a writ petition under Art. 32, challenging
the validity of the ‘rotational’ system as applied in fixing
the seniority of Appraisers and Principal Appraisers. The
system, as laid down in the relevant departmental
circulars was that vacancies occurring in the cadre of
Appraisers were to go alternatively to ‘promotees’ and
‘direct recruits’. According to the petitioners of that case
this resulted in inequality, especially in view of the fact
that the number of direct recruits over the years was very
low. Promotion to the grade of Principal Appraisers was
from the cadre of Appraisers; only those who had served
as Appraisers for five years were entitled to be promoted
to the higher grade. Since the direct recruits had to wait for
five years before they could become Principal Appraiser
the promotees below them who had put in five years as
Appraisers became Principal Appraisers. In order to
restore the seniority of the direct recruits thus lost, the
rotational system was applied to the cadre of Principal
Appraisers also i.e., one vacancy was to go to a promotee
and the other to a direct recruit. The plea of inequality in
violation of Art. 16(1) of the Constitution was raised by the
petitioners in respect of this also. It was held by this court,
in the first place, that there was no inherent vice in the
principle of fixing seniority by rotation in a case when a
service is composed in fixed proportion of direct recruits
and promotees. It was held in the second place that the
same could not be said when the rotational system was
applied to the recruitment of Principal Appraisers. The
source of recruitment for these was one only, namely, the
grade of Appraisers. There was no question of any quota
being reserved from two sources in their case. In so far
therefore as the government was doing what it called
restoration of seniority of direct recruits in Appraisers
grade on their promotion to the higher grade it was clearly
denying equality of opportunity under Art. 16 of the
Constitution. At page 606 of the Report Wanchoo, J., as
he then was, speaking for the court observed as follows:

‘This brings us to the question of Principles Appraisers.
We are of opinion that the petitioners have a legitimate
grievance in this respect. The source of recruitment of
Principal Appraisers is one, namely, from the grade of
Appraisers. There is therefore no question of any quota
being reserved from two sources in their cases. The
rotational system cannot therefore apply when there is
only one source of recruitment and not two sources of
recruitment. In a case therefore where there is only one
source of recruitment, the normal rule will apply, namely,
that a person promoted to a higher grade gets his seniority
in that grade according to the date of promotion subject
always to his being found fit and being confirmed in the
higher grade after the period of probation is over. In such a
case it is continuous appointment in the higher grade
which determines seniority for the source of recruitment is
one. There is no question in such a case of reflecting in
the higher grade the seniority of the grade from which
promotion is made to the higher grade. In so far therefore
as the respondent is doing what it calls restoration of
seniority of direct recruits in Appraisers’ grade when they
are promoted to the Principal Appraisers’ grade, it is
clearly denying equality of opportunity LP(N)ISCI-14 to
Apprasiers which is the only source of recruitment to the
Principal Appraisers’ grade. There is only one source from
which the Principal Appraisers are drawn, namely,
Appraisers, the promotion being by selection and five,
years’ experience as Appraiser is the minimum
qualification. Subject to the above all Appraisers selected
for the post of Principal Appraisers must be treated
equally. That means they will rank in seniority from the
date of their continuous acting in the Principal Appraisers’
grade subject of course to the right of government to revert
any of them who have not been found fit during the period
of probation. But if they are found fit after the period of
probation they rank in seniority from the date they have
acted continuously as Principal Appraisers whether they
are promotees or direct recruits. The present method by
which the respondent puts a direct recruit from the grade
of Appraiser, though he is promoted later, above a
promotee who is promoted to the grade of Principal
Appraiser on an earlier date clearly denies equality of
opportunity where the grade of Principal Appraiser has
only one source of recruitment, namely from the grade of
Appraisers. In such a case the seniority in the grade of
Principal Appraisers must be determined according to the
date of continuous appointment in that grade irrespective
of whether the person promoted to that grade from the
Appraisers’ grade is a direct recruit or a promotee. This
will as we have already said be subject to the
government’s right to revert any one promoted as a
Princivil Appraiser if he is not found fit for the post during
the period of probation. The petition therefore will have to
be allowed with respect to the method by which seniority
is fixed, in the grade of Principal Appraisers. That method
denies equality of opportunity of employment to the
Appraisers who are the only source of recruitment to the
grade of Principal Appraisers. What the impugned method
seeks to do is to introduce a kind of reservation in respect
of the two categories of Appraisers from which the
promotions are made, and that cannot be done when the
source of promotion is one.'”

30. He further relied on Constitution Bench decision of the
Supreme Court reported in MOHAMMAD SHUJAT ALI AND OTHERS
[11]
VUNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS , wherein it was held thus:

“BUT the question is: what does this ambiguous and
crucial phrase “similarly situated” mean ? Where are we
to look for the test of similarity of situation which
determines the reasonableness of a classification ? The
inescapable answer is that we must look beyond the
classification to the purpose of the law. A reasonable
classification is one which includes all persons or things
similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law.
There should be no discrimination between one person or
thing and another, if as regards the subject-matter of the
legislation their position is substantially the same. This is
sometimes epigrammatically described by saying that
what the constitutional code of equality and equal
opportunity requires is that among equals, the law should
be equal and that like should be treated alike. BUT the
basic principle underlying the doctrine is that the
Legislature should have the right to classify and impose
special burdens upon or grant special benefits to persons
or things grouped together under the classification, so
long as the classification is of persons or things similarly
situated with respect to the purpose of the legislation, so
that all persons or things similarly situated are treated
alike by law. The test which has been evolved for this
purpose is and this test has been consistently applied by
this court in all decided cases since the commencement of
the Constitution that the classification must be founded on
an intelligible differentia which distinguishes certain
persons or things that are grouped together from others
and that differentia must have a rational relation to the
object sought to be achieved by the legislation”

31. He further relied on decision reported in FOOD
CORPORATION OF INDIA AND OTHERS V BHARTIYA KHADYA
[12]
NIGAM KARMACHARI SANGHAND ANOTHER , wherein it was
held thus:

“IT is trite law that Article 14 of the Constitution, which
enshrines the principle of equality, is of wide import. IT
guarantees equality before the law and equal protection
of the laws within the territory of India. IT implies right to
equal treatment in similar circumstances, except in cases
where the two persons form a separate and distinct class
and such classification is a reasonable one based on
intelligible differentia having nexus with the object
sought to be achieved. (See: State of West Bengal Vs.
Anwar Ali Sarkar6 and John Vallamattom & Anr. Vs.
Union of India7).”

32. He further relied on a decision reported in STATE OF
[13]
MADHYA PRADESH V RAKESH KOHLI AND ANOTHER , wherein
it was held thus:

“THE High Court has not given any reason as to why the
provision contained in clause (d) was arbitrary,
unreasonable or irrational. The basis of such conclusion
is not discernible from the judgment. The High Court has
not held that the provision was discriminatory. When the
provision enacted by the State Legislature has not been
found to be discriminatory, we are afraid that such
enactment could not have been struck down on the
ground that it was arbitrary or irrational. ”

33. He further relied on a decision reported in THE
STATE OF WEST BENGAL V ANWAR ALI SARKAR AND
[14]
ANOTHER , wherein it was held thus:

“It was suggested that good faith and knowledge of
existing conditions on the part of a legislature has to be
presumed. That is so; yet to carry that presumption to the
extent of always holding that there must be some
undisclosed intention or reason for subjecting certain
individuals to a hostile and discriminatory legislation is to
make the protection clause of Art. 14, in the words of an
American decision a mere rope of sand, in no manner
restraining State action. The protection afforded by the
article is not a mere eye wash but it is a real one and
unless a just cause for discrimination on the basis of a
reasonable classification is put forth as a defence, the
statute has to be declared unconstitutional. No just cause
has been shown in the present instance. The result is that
the appeals fail and are dismissed.”

34. He further relied on a decision reported in
B.MANMAD REDDY AND OTHERS V CHANDRA PRAKASH
[15]
REDDY AND OTHERS , wherein it was held thus:

“That leaves us with the question whether any imbalance
among those eligible for appointment against class II
category 1 posts coming from different sources and
categories would itself justify a classification like the one
made in Note 6. Our answer is in the negative. There is no
gainsaying that classification must rest on a reasonable
and intelligible basis and the same must bear a nexus to
the object sought to be achieved by the statute. By its very
nature classification can and is often fraught with the
danger of resulting in artificial inequalities which make it
necessary to subject the power to classify to restraints lest
the guarantee of equality becomes illusory on account of
classifications being fanciful instead of fair, intelligible or
reasonable. We may gainfully extract the note of caution
sounded by Krishna Iyer J. in his Lordship’s separate but
concurring judgment in Triloki Nath’s case (supra):

“……..The dilemma of democracy is as to how to avoid
validating the abolition of the difference between the good
and the bad in the name of equality and putting to sleep
the constitutional command for expanding the areas of
equal treatment for the weaker ones with the dope of
“special qualifications” measured by expensive and exotic
degrees. These are perhaps meta-judicial matters left to
the other branches of Government, but the Court must
hold the Executive within the leading strings of egalitarian
constitutionalism and correct, by judicial review, episodes
of subtle and shady classification grossly violative of
equal justice. That is the heart of the matter. That is the
note that rings through the first three fundamental rights
the people have given to themselves.”

Even from the above decisions, reasonable classification is
permissible and what is prohibited is arbitrary selections or
discrimination within the class. If the power was exercised
according to one’s pleasure or will, it can said to be arbitrary. In
other words, it is unfair exercise of right and without reasons.

35. The Tribunal placed reliance on Roshanlal’s case (10
supra), Trilokinath’s case (9 supra) and Manmad Reddy’s case
(15 supra). In Roshanlal’s case, it is held by the Supreme Court
that direct recruits and promotees lose their birth-marks on fusion
into a common stream of service and they cannot thereafter be
treated differently by reference to the consideration that they
were recruited from different sources. Roshanlal’s case was
explained in Trilokinath’s case and it is held that Roshanlal’s case
is no authority for the proposition that if direct recruits and
promotees are integrated into one class, they cannot be classified
for purposes of promotion on a basis other than the one that they
were drawn from different sources. So, from the above decisions,
it is clear that the classification of direct recruits and the
promotees for further promotion as C.Is should not rest on unreal
or unreasonable basis. Article 14 of the Constitution of India
permits classification among one class, provided the twin test as
enunciated in Boodhan Chowdary‘s case (1 supra) is fulfilled or
satisfied. The contention of the learned counsel for the unofficial
respondents that there cannot be further classification once the
direct recruits and promotees/converted category of persons
grouped to a common category cannot be accepted. Differential
treatment does not per se constitute violation of Article 14 of
Constitution. It denies equal protection when there is no
reasonable basis for the differentiation. The expression
‘reasonable’ means ‘rational according to the dictates of reason
and not excessive or immoderate’. An act is reasonable when it is
conformable or agreeable to reason, having regard to the facts of
the particular controversy.

36. There cannot be any dispute that right of promotion to
higher post is not a fundamental right, but right to be considered
for promotion is a fundamental right. The amendments to rules
impugned in O.As were made in pursuance of the proviso to
Article 309 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, both the
amendments are legislative in character. There cannot be any
dispute that a legislation can be struck down only on two grounds
viz., (1) legislative competence and 2) violation of fundamental
rights or any other constitutional provision. This has been stated
by three Judge bench of the Supreme Court in STATE OF A.P. V
[16]
MC.DOWELL AND COMPANHY LTD. , wherein it was held thus:

“A law made by the Parliament or the Legislature can be
struck down by the Courts on two grounds alone (i) Lack
of legislative competence (ii) Violation of any of the
fundamental rights guaranteed in part III of the
Constitution of India or of any other constitutional
provisions. There is no third ground.”

For the proposition that the amendment to challenge rules or
amendment made under proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution
of India, which are in the nature of legislature, it is relevant to
refer to a decision reported in RAJ KUMAR V UNION OF INDIA AND
[17]
OTHERS , wherein it was held thus:

“There is no doubt that this rule is valid rule because it is
now well established that rules made under the
provisions to Article 309 of the Constitution are
legislative in nature and, therefore, can be given effect to
retrospectively.”

37. Now it has to be seen whether further classification
among direct recruited S.Is/Constables and converted
R.S.Is/converted reserve constables when they formed into one
class is fair, reasonable and justifiable.?

38. One of the grounds taken is that the proposed
amendments are discrimination, arbitrary and illegal among S.Is
and R.S.Is and also Constables and Armed Reserve Constables.
The word ‘discrimination’ connotes differential treatment especially
a failure to treat all persons equally when no reasonable distinction
can be found between those favoured and those not favoured. In
other words the effect of rule of law confers privileges on certain
class or that denies privileges to a certain class because of the
nature of duties. The word ‘arbitrary’ is founded on preference
rather than on reason or fact. In other words, it depends upon the
individual discretion. The word ‘illegality’ means an act that is not
authorized by law or a state or condition of being unlawful. The
case on hand does not fall under the category of illegality or
arbitrariness. Whether it amounts to discrimination or not has to
be seen.

39. The only ground taken in the O.As. is that the direct
recruits were ripe for promotion by virtue of their seniority and
eligibility criteria and by reducing minimum service of 6 years to
four years/five years to three years by virtue of the amendments,
their chances of promotion are hampered and reduced. Promotion
in the context of the law relating to service, means advancing or
raising an employee to a higher rank or office or post than the one
the employee was holding or to a higher scale of pay than the
one the employee was enjoying immediately before such
promotion. Although an employee has no right to be promoted, he
has a right to be considered for promotion. This right to be
considered for promotion is one of the ‘matters relating to
employment or appointment’ within the meaning of Article 16 (1) of
the Constitution. Consideration for promotion is directly related to
the concept of opportunity in Article 16 and the constitutional
requirement of equality with regard to such opportunity necessarily
means exclusion of arbitrariness in the course of consideration for
promotion. It is not a case where the direct recruits would be left
with no avenues of promotion. The power of judicial review does
not stretch to interfere with a policy providing for avenues of
promotion unless there is manifest arbitrariness or resultant
discrimination. By virtue of these amendments, right of the
applicants to be considered for promotion from the category of S.I.
to Inspector of Police or Police Constable to Head Constable, is
not taken away. At best by virtue of the said amendments, the
right to promotion to the higher category may be reduced to a
small extent because the direct recruits have to wait for some
time for promotion. Under no stretch of imagination it can be said
that by virtue of these amendments, the right of the applicants to
be considered for the promotion to the higher post has been taken
away. When the right to be considered for promotion to the higher
post of the applicants has not been taken away by virtue of the
amendments, it cannot be said that it violates Article 16 of the
Constitution of India. What the Courts have to do is whether a
classification is legal, valid and reasonable and whether the
amendments challenged in the O.As fulfill two tests.

40. Learned senior counsel for the petitioners placed
reliance on the decision of Trilokinath’s case (9 supra). The issue
fell for consideration in that case was if the persons drawn from
different sources are integrated into one class , can they be
classified for the purpose of promotion on the basis of their
educational qualifications. Referring to the various decisions,
Constitution Bench held that though persons appointed directly
and by promotion were integrated into a common class of
Assistant Engineers, they could, for the purpose of promotion to
the cadre of Executive Engineers, be classified on the basis of
educational qualification. The rule provides that the graduates shall
be eligible for such promotion to the exclusion of diploma holders
and it does not violate Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and
must be upheld. From the above decisions, it is clear that when
the persons appointed directly by promotion are integrated into a
common class, there can be further classification for getting
promotion on the basis of educational qualification.

41. The counsel for unofficial respondents placed reliance
on Roshanlal’s case (10 supra). But in Trilokinath’s case (9 supra)
it is held that the ratio in Roshanlal’s case is not authority for the
proposition that if the direct recruits are integrated into one class,
they cannot be classified for the purpose of promotion. Therefore,
it is held that the discrimination is not in relation to the source of
recruitment as in Roshanlal’s case. In Siva Guru’s case the issue
fell for consideration was whether the executive instructions
cannot supplant statutory rules and whether the academic
qualification prescribed cannot be relaxed. By applying the
principles relying upon in Manmadha Reddy’s case (15 supra) and
Roshanlal’s case (10 supra), the classification based on birth-
mark stood obliterated. So from the authoritative
pronouncements, it is clear that the classification is made on
educational qualifications for the purpose of promotion or if the
classification is made on the ground that the persons are similarly
circumstanced with regard to their entering into employment such
classification can be justified. Classification between direct
recruits and the promotees for the purpose of promotion has been
held to be reasonable.

42. Learned senior counsel for the petitioners relied on the
decision of the Manmadha Reddy’s case (15 supra), but that
judgment is solely based upon the judgment in Roshanlal’s case
(10 supra) and Trilokinath’s case (9 supra). Therefore, there
cannot be any dispute that the ratio laid down in any decision has
to be understood in the factual back ground of the case. In
Thomas case (7 supra) also, it is pointed out by the Supreme
Court that equality of principle need not be confused with absolute
equality, Article 16 (1) of the Constitution does not prohibit
reasonable rules for selection to any employment or appointment
to any office. It is also further held that rule of parity is the equal
treatment of class in equal circumstances.

43. Now it has to be seen whether the classification is
founded on intelligible differentia which distinguished persons that
are grouped together from others left out of the group. By virtue of
G.O.Ms.No.98, Home (Legal II) Department, dated 01-05-2006 the
Government issued amendment orders fixing 5% quota for
appointment by transfer from R.S.I to S.I. (Civil). It is not as if all
the R.S.Is are eligible for conversion for appointment by transfer to
the cadre of S.I. Only 5% of the vacancies in the category of S.Is
are earmarked for conversion from Reserve S.Is. Therefore, the
promotion avenues or prospects of remaining 95% of the cadre of
S.Is would not be affected in any manner. Before conversion to
the cadre of S.Is, the R.S.Is. have to put up minimum service of 5
years as R.S.I. in that cadre and thereafter they are eligible to be
converted that too if they come within 5% of quota. This is only
eligibility criteria for conversion from R.S.Is to S.Is. It does not
mean that after completion of 5 years of service as R.S.I., they
would be converted as S.Is. Some times R.S.Is have to wait for
more than 10 years because 5% conversion quota has to be
available in the cadre of S.Is. As per the rules regular direct recruit
S.I. is eligible for promotion after completion of 6 years of service
after recruitment, whereas the persons appointed in the same
recruitment as R.S.I. would be eligible for promotion as Inspector
of Police only after completion of 9 years of service (i.e., 5 years
as R.S.I. and then he became eligible within 5% quota for
conversion as S.I. and thereafter 4 more years of service in the
category of S.Is). In view of the fact that the recruitment is one
and the same, it cannot be presumed that the persons who were
selected for R.S.I. are less meritorious persons who were
selected as S.Is. Selection of R.S.Is is based upon order of merit.
Depending upon the number of vacancies notified for S.Is, the
required candidates as notified in the order of merit will be given
appointment in the first instance and thereafter in the same merit
list, the remaining candidates will be appointed as R.S.Is as per
vacancies notified. The difference of merit between the last
candidate selected in the S.I. category and the first candidate
selected in the R.S.I. category may be negligible with reference to
the marks secured by them. It may also be possible that the last
candidate of S.Is and first candidate R.S.Is may get equal marks.
Depending upon age criteria though both the candidates secured
equal marks, the aged person would be selected for regular S.Is.
Therefore, there cannot be any vast difference of marks secured
by the persons appointed to the post of S.Is. and the persons
appointed to the post of R.S.Is. Under no stretch of imagination it
can be said that the persons selected for R.S.Is are less
meritorious persons. Considering this aspect of the case, there
must be a dissatisfaction with regard to promotion among the
converted S.Is. Prior to the impugned amendment a coverteee S.I
has to put up 11 years of service to secure eligibility for promotion
to the post of Inspector of Police, whereas a direct recruit S.I. is
eligible only after 6 years of entering into service. Further all
converted S.Is become juniors to the direct recruit S.Is because
they have to put up minimum period of 5 years of the service in
the category of S.I. Therefore it is a rational classification. There
is intelligible differentia between two classes or category of
persons. It is not in dispute before this Court that the past service
i.e., minimum 5 years of service rendered by R.S.I. was taken into
account for the purpose of seniority upon conversion. When R.S.Is
were converted into regular S.Is., the seniority of converted R.S.I
is of no avail because in the category of R.S.I. they have to put up
minimum of 6 years of service earlier. Now it has been reduced to
4 years. Minimum service of 4 years after conversion is
mandatory to become eligible for the next promotion. It is also not
in dispute that the pay scales of both regular S.Is and R.S.Is and
reserved constables and constables are one and the same, when
they were initially recruited by a common notification. By reducing
the eligibility criteria, R.S.Is or Reserve Constables would not be
converted immediately as S.Is or Constables because conversion
is limited to 5% and 10% respectively.

44. It is argued that the nature of duties of both the
categories i.e., S.Is and R.S.Is, and also Civil Constables and
Armed Reserve Constables are entirely different and distinct, and
that after conversion, the convertees have to undergo training
required. On the aspect of nature of performance of the duties,
the pleadings are not exhaustive. As seen from the pleadings, it is
clear that the Armed Reserve have to do more arduous nature of
work and sometimes, they would help the Civil Police to maintain
law and order and in order to improve physical efficiency of the
police in the first instance, the Government introduced 5% quota to
fill up the posts of S.Is by conversion from the R.S.Is namely
Armed Reserve and A.P. Special Police, In respect of direct
recruits, applicants were appointed as S.Is. in the year 2008
whereas unofficial respondents in the O.A. were appointed in the
year 1996-98 and 2002 respectively. Thereafter, they were
converted into Civil Police in the year 2009. So, having put up
more than 10 years of service before they were converted to Civil
Police, putting minimum period of 6 years again in that category
would be unreasonable. Therefore, the Government rightly
reduced it into 4 years, which is the only eligibility criteria.

45. The applicants who were appointed in the year 2008
as S.Is have to put up not less than 6 years of service and they
are eligible to be considered for promotion in the panel year 2015-

16. Now at this point of time, they cannot contend that their
promotion prospects have been hampered with. As on the date of
filing of O.A., the right to be considered for promotion of all the
applicants would not in any manner affect or hampered because
as on that date, they are not eligible to be considered for
promotion to the posts of Inspector of Police. Therefore, filing of
Original Application itself is pre-mature. The amendment, will not
have any effect over the right of the petitioners to be considered
for promotion to the higher post. Therefore, there is no violation of
Article 16 of the Constitution of India. The object sought to be
achieved may be to improve the physical efficiency of the police
by converting 5% and 10% in respect of reserve S.I., and reserve
constables respectively to the category of regular S.Is and Head
Constables. After conversion, the R.S.I or the Reserve Constable
would be given training on law and order and forensic subjects and
after completion of their successful training, their respective
postings would be given. So without adverting to anyone of the
aforesaid aspects, the Tribunal simply held that there cannot be
any further classification among one class. This finding is totally
incorrect. The decisions relied upon by the Tribunal and the
counsel for unofficial respondents herein do not lay down any
ratio decidendi in terms of Article 141 of Constitution to the effect
that when two groups or classes formed into one group or class,
there cannot be any further classification and therefore, it violates
Article 16 of the Constitution of India. As the Constitution permits
reasonable classification, burden is on the applicants to establish
as to how that classification is arbitrary or discriminatory. The
grounds raised before the Tribunal by the applicants do not show
that amendments to the rule contravene Article 14 of the
Constitution of India. The pleadings in O.As are silent with regard
to the violation of any constitutional provisions.

46. The complexities of situations and the involvement of
a large number of persons has compelled the Courts to evolve a
balance and pragmatic approach in deciding the constitutional
validity of service rules. There cannot be any dispute that in
service jurisprudence there cannot be any rule which would satisfy
each and every employee. The rules may be amended to do
justice to the majority or minority of the employees. By virtue of
the amendment fortune of some of the Reserve S.Is or Reserve
Constable is not the touch stone. The validity of the amendment
with regard to the Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India
has to be judged whether it is fair and reasonable. In testing the
amendment impugned in the O.As as to arbitrariness unjust
discrimination or unreasonable restrictions on the service
conditions of the regular S.Is, the important consideration is
whether the amended Rule sub-serves the concept of integrity and
efficiency in public service. If there is any nexus between
amended rule and the object of achieving integrity and efficiency,
then ordinarily the Courts would not interfere. The word ‘right to
promotion’ is used in the sense that an employee can, as a matter
of right, claim that he must be promoted when the promotional
opportunity arises to the higher post. Non consideration of case of
a person for promotion will amount to infringement of Article 16 of
the Constitution of India. Any alteration in the service conditions
would be subject to constitutional limitations. It is well settled that
although a right to be considered for promotion is a condition of
service, a mere chance of promotion is not a constitutional right.
In all the O.As, there is no pleading that as to how many
sanctioned posts are available in the category of Inspector of
Police as well as in the category of Head Constables. In case of
regular S.Is who are directly recruited they have not even
completed 6 years of qualifying service to be considered for
promotion. Immediately thereafter their promotion has to be
considered depending upon the vacancies available in the next
higher category of Inspector of Police. The pleadings are very
clear that their chances or avenues of promotion are reduced to a
small extent by virtue of the amendments which were challenged
before the Tribunal. As already pointed out that mere chances of
promotion are not condition of service and thereby it cannot be
said that it violates Article 16 of the Constitution of India.

47. The Tribunal without assigning any reasons set aside
the G.Os impugned before the Tribunal. Therefore, the writ
petitions are liable to be allowed.

48. Accordingly, the writ petitions are allowed setting
aside the impugned orders of the Tribunal. No order as to costs.
Miscellaneous petitions, if any pending in these writ petitions shall
stand closed.

———————–

K.C.BHANU, J
`

—————–

ANIS, J
DATED: 22ND DAY OF JANUARY, 2015
Hsd

[1]
AIR 1955 SC 191

[2]
(2006) 8 SCC 399
[3]
(2008) 7 SCC 231
[4]
(2008) 10 SCC 139
[5]
(2013) 2 SCC 772
[6]
1989 SUPP (1) SCC 116
[7]
(1976) 2 SCC 310
[8]
AIR 1951 SC 41
[9]
(1974) 1 SCC 19
[10]
AIR 1967 SC 1889
[11]
(1975) 3 SCC 76
[12]
(2012) 2 SCC 307
[13]
(2012) 6 SCC 312
[14]
AIR 1952 SC 75
[15]
AIR 2010 SC 1001
[16]
(1996) 3 SCALE 146
[17]
(1975) 4 SCC 13