Delhi District Court
Dr. Deepanjali vs State And Ors on 11 March, 2025
IN THE COURT OF SH. ABHISHEK GOYAL, ADDITIONAL
SESSIONS JUDGE-03, CENTRAL DISTRICT, TIS HAZARI
COURTS, DELHI
CNR No.: DLCT01-014786-2023
CRIMINAL REVISION No.: 561/2023
SHRI. SHAILENDER AGGARWAL,
S/o. Shri. Moolchand Aggarwal,
R/o 10-11/9, Old Nursing Hostel,
Nurses Flats, Hindu Rao Hospital,
Delhi. ... PETITIONER
VERSUS
STATE (GNCT of DELHI) ... RESPONDENT
Date of Institution : 18.10.2023
Date when judgment was reserved : 21.12.2024
Date when judgment is pronounced : 11.03.2025
AND,
CNR No.: DLCT01-015843-2023
CRIMINAL REVISION No.: 593/2023
DR. 'D1',
W/o. Shri. 'A',
R/o. 'XYZ'. ... PETITIONER
VERSUS
1. STATE,
Through Public Prosecutor, GNCTD,
Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi-110054
2. SHRI. SHAILENDER AGGARWAL,
S/o. Shri. Moolchand Aggarwal,
R/o 10-11/9, Old Nursing Hostel,
Nurses Flats, Hindu Rao Hospital,
Malka Ganj, New Delhi-110007. ... RESPONDENTS
Date of Institution : 03.11.2023
Date when judgment was reserved : 21.12.2024
Date when judgment is pronounced : 11.03.2025
1
Identities of the prosecutrix and her other particulars have been deliberately withheld in view of the decisions
in; Birbal Kumar Nishad v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 3464; X v. State of Maharashtra,
2023 SCC OnLine SC 279; and Saleem v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 3 HCC (Del) 365: 2023 SCC OnLine
Del 2190.
CR No. 561/2023 Shailender Aggarwal v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
CR No. 593/2023 Dr. D v. State & Anr. Page No. 1 of 49
Digitally signed
by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
Date:
GOYAL 2025.03.11
16:09:26
+0530
JUDGMENT
1. The present common judgment shall determine the
aforenoted criminal revision petitions, preferred in terms of the
provisions under Section(s) 397/399/401 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Cr.P.C./Code’),
bearing; Crl. Rev. No. 561/2023 and Crl. Rev. No. 593/2023.
Pertinent to outrightly observe that Crl. Rev. No. 561/2023 has
been preferred by Sh. Shailender Aggarwal (hereinafter referred to
as the ‘accused’, as before the Ld. Trial Court), whereas Crl. Rev.
No. 593/2023 has been preferred by Dr. ‘D’ (hereinafter referred
to as the ‘complainant’, as before the Ld. Trial Court ). Notably,
both the said criminal revision petitions impugn/challenge the
order dated 14.09.2023 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘impugned
order’), passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate-03/Ld.
MM-03, Central, (Mahila Court), Central, Tis Hazari Courts,
Delhi (hereafter referred to as the ‘Ld. Trial Court/Ld. MM’), in
Cr. Case No. 8738/2017, titled as; ‘State v. Shailendra Aggarwal‘,
arising out of FIR No. 280/2016, PS. Subzi Mandi, under Sections
354/354A/506/323/452/509 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
(hereinafter referred to as ‘IPC‘). Pertinently, by virtue of the
impugned order, Ld. Trial Court, while dismissing the applications
filed by/on behalf of the accused under Sections 239 and 173(8)
Cr.P.C., directed the framing of charges against the accused under
Sections 354/354A/354D/451/506/323 IPC. Strikingly, while the
accused under his petition has entreated for setting aside of the
order of framing of charge and correspondingly, prayed for
discharge from the instant proceedings, in contrast, the
complainant has impugned the said order/order dated 14.09.2023
of the Ld. Trial Court on the ground that the Ld. Trial Court, while
CR No. 561/2023 Shailender Aggarwal v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
CR No. 593/2023 Dr. D v. State & Anr. Page No. 2 of 49
Digitally signed
by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.03.11
16:09:32 +0530
passing the said order, erroneously failed to consider that in the
instant case, provisions of Section 376/Section 376/511 IPC ought
to have been attracted against the accused and matter deserved
committal before the Ld. Sessions Judge.
2. Succinctly, the case of the prosecution is that on
17.09.2017, SI Saris Khan was present at PS Subzi Mandi, when a
written complaint was received by her from the complainant, Dr.
‘D’. Notably, in her complaint, the complainant inter alia asserted
that the accused, namely, Shailender was her distant relative, and
that the accused’s wife was also employed as staff nurse at
Surgical Emergency, Bara Hindu Rao Hospital. As per the
complainant, since the accused was her/complainant’s distant
relative and residing nearby, they/accused and his family used to
visit the complainant’s house. However, it was proclaimed by the
complainant that after some time, the accused started misbehaving
with the complainant, besides commenced passing lewd
comments and gestures. Correspondingly, as per the complainant,
the accused used to also make unwanted physical contact and
advances, unwelcome explicit sexual overtures, as well as even
used to explicitly touch the complainant’s private parts without her
consent. It was further avowed by the complainant that as and
when, she objected to the illegal/unwelcome acts of the accused,
the accused used to intimidate her/the complainant of dire
consequences, besides used to threaten to defame the complainant
in the society. Concomitantly, as per the complainant, the accused
used to demand and request for sexual favors, without her consent
and even tried to pounce on her. On 14.09.2016, as per the
complainant, the accused forcibly entered into the complainant’s
house, assaulted her, as well as pushed her/complainant’s breasts,
CR No. 561/2023 Shailender Aggarwal v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
CR No. 593/2023 Dr. D v. State & Anr. Page No. 3 of 49
Digitally signed
ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.03.11
16:09:37 +0530
besides tried to open the knot of complainant’s salwar and tried to
rape her. It was further proclaimed by the complainant that when
she objected to the same and shouted, the accused left her house
with a threat that in case, she disclosed the said facts to anyone,
he/the accused would defame the complainant. The complainant
further asserted that she fathomed courage to informed about the
incident to her husband and thereafter, fathomed courage to report
the incident to the police. Markedly, on the basis of the
complainant’s complaint, the instant FIR came to be registered,
and investigation ensued.
2.1. Noticeably, during the course of investigation MLC
No. 3347/16 of the complainant was got conduced on 17.09.2016,
wherein it was inter alia recorded, “…No opinion can be given as
the patient refused for her internal examination. Original MLC
done by Dr. Shilpa…”. Correspondingly, the accused was
interrogated pursuant to direction of Ld. ASJ in accused’s
anticipatory bail application as well as the statement of the
complainant under Section 164 Cr.P.C. was recorded before the
Ld. MM on 17.09.2016, relevant extracts of which are reproduced
as under;
“…मैं उपरोक्त पते पर रहती हूँ, पिछले साल मेरी Sister की
Engagement 11/02/15 को Shailender के साले Ankit के
साथ हु ई थी, तो Shailender मेरे घर आने जाने लगा । धीरे धीरे
Shailender दोस्ती बढ़ाने लगा, Compliments देता, Guitar
offer करता, AC वालो को Service के लिए ले आता, Whatsapp
Message करता। दिनांक 17/05/15 को जब मेरे पति और मेरे बच्चे
घर पर नहीं थे , Shailender घर मे घुस गया और मुझे Hug और
Kiss किया और अपना Private Part निकालकर Touch किया, मैनें
धक्का देकर उसको हटा दिया, फिर उसने कहा कि किसी को मत बताना,
reputation और family destroy हो जायेगी, वचन दिया कि मेरी
मर्जीके बिना मुझे कभी Touch नहीं करे गा। 18/05/15 को मैं नें अपने
पति को बता दिया, वो Upset हो गये और Shailender को फोन
करके कहा कि यह क्या किया, अपनी पत्नी को Divorce दे देगा, तो
उसने कहा दे दूंगा। 21/05/15 को Shailender ने मेरे पति से माफी
मांगी। दिनांक 12/06/15 को Hospital जाते वक्त Shailender
मुझे फिर मिल गया और बात करने के लिए Insist करने लगा। July
CR No. 561/2023 Shailender Aggarwal v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
CR No. 593/2023 Dr. D v. State & Anr. Page No. 4 of 49
Digitally signed
by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.03.11
16:09:40 +0530
में मैं Pregnant हो गयी और हमारा मिलना जुलना बन्द हो गया। 15-
20 दिन में वो फोन करता और बात होती। 16/04/16 को मुझे
Daughter हो गयी। फिर 15-16/05/16 को Shailender मुझे
फिर मिल गया और कहने लगा मैं आपको बहु त सुख दूंगा। फिर
02/08/16 को मैं बहु त रो रही थी और तब मैं नें पति को सब बताया और
उन्होनें Shailender को फोन करके बुलाया तो वो Wife Namarta
को लेकर आ गया और मैनें Shailender को slap किया। दिनांक
14/09/16 को बच्चे नीचे खेल रहे थे , Mother-in-law छत पर थी
तब Again Shailender entered my house and touched
my boobs tried to open knot of Salwar and tried to
rape me. I shouted and he left my place. फिर मैं नें पुलिस
Complaint की और Police कार्यवाही हु ई।…”
(Emphasis supplied)
2.2. Congruently, during the investigation, the IO
recorded statements of various witnesses and upon conclusion of
investigation, chargesheet was filed upon which, the Ld. Trial
Court took cognizance of the offence on 25.07.2017. Strikingly,
the IO also filed a supplementary chargesheet before the Ld. Trial
Court inter alia containing the FSL report dated 25.04.2019.
Pertinently, during the course of proceedings, the accused moved
an application under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. inter alia seeking
directions to the IO to submit the transcript of the audio recording,
present in the memory card, mobile phone, etc., of the
complainant’s mobile phone. Concomitantly, application under
Section 239 Cr.P.C., seeking discharge was moved on behalf of the
accused before the Ld. Trial Court. Markedly, arguments on the
said applications as well as on the aspect of charge was addressed
by/on behalf of the accused, complainant and the State. Further, as
aforementioned, the said applications were dismissed, besides
charges under Sections 354/354A/354D/451/506/323 IPC were
directed to be framed by the Ld. Trial Court vide order dated
14.09.2023/impugned order. Relevant extracts from the impugned
order are reproduced as under;
“…In view of the aforementioned observations
laid down in judicial dicta, the court undoubtedly has
CR No. 561/2023 Shailender Aggarwal v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
CR No. 593/2023 Dr. D v. State & Anr. Page No. 5 of 49
Digitally signed
by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
Date:
GOYAL 2025.03.11
16:09:44
+0530
power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited
purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie
case against the accused is made out and this Court is
of the considered opinion that there exists prima facie
case against the accused person. The law is well
settled regarding the expert opinion to its nature being
corroborative piece of evidence as expert witness is
not a witness of fact and the opinion is to be analyzed
objectively by the Court during the course of trial.
Furthermore, in the present matter, the prosecution
had tried to procure the CDRs of the complainant and
accused but failed to procure the same as they were
not found preserved as per TRAI Guidelines for which
the documents have been placed on record to discard
the allegations of complainant. Moreover the IO has
already seized the case property which will be brought
during the trial and is for the accused to prove his
defence during trial, therefore, no ground exists for
taking the transcript on record at this stage, or to direct
IO to file the same on record. Already the
supplementary chargesheet under Section 173(8)
Cr.P.C had been filed by the IO. No case is made out
to enter into a detailed appreciation of the evidence
intended to be led by the prosecution.
As there are allegations of advancing physical
contact by the accused against the complainant of
explicit sexual overtures despite her clear disinterest
by entering into her house forcefully, assaulted her,
pushed her breast, tried to open the knot of her salwar,
threatening her with dire consequences, to defame her
in case she discloses anything to anyone, touching the
private part of the complainant without her consent
using criminal force with an intention to outrage the
modesty of the complainant by pouncing upon her and
contacted her to foster personal interaction repeatedly
despite a clear indication of disinterest by her over
phone, whatsapp on various occasions i.e.,
17.05.2015, 14.09.2016 & 15.05.2016. Charge is
accordingly framed against the accused u/s 354/354-
A/354-D/451/506/323 IPC and read over to the
accused in Hindi to which he pleaded not guilty and
claimed trial and no ground exists for directing IO to
place on record the transcript as the electronic
evidence has already been procured by prosecution
agency. As there is no allegations against the accused
qua the offence of Section 509 IPC therefore, accused
is hereby discharged of offence u/s 509 IPC.
Accordingly, both the applications stands
disposed of…”
(Emphasis supplied)
CR No. 561/2023 Shailender Aggarwal v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
CR No. 593/2023 Dr. D v. State & Anr. Page No. 6 of 49
Digitally signed
by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
Date:
GOYAL 2025.03.11
16:09:48
+0530
3. Learned Counsel for the accused/revisionist,
Shailender outrightly submitted that the complainant initiated
several false cases/complaints/FIRs against the accused, including
the present FIR, wherein the accused endeavored to raise a defence
of alibi (of his absence at the alleged place of occurrence) before
the Ld. Trial Court as well as handed over one DVR of his CCTV
footage, mobile phone as well as memory card and a pen-drive to
the investigating officer/IO of the present case during the course of
investigation of the present case. Correspondingly, as per the Ld.
Counsel, the accused had also obtained a copy of FSL report along
with the CD and other documents, exhibiting that no tampering,
alteration or addition has been done in the said mobile phone
recording(s), memory card data and DVR of his CCTV footage.
However, despite the same, Ld. Counsel asserted that the Ld. Trial
Court failed to consider the relevant material brought on record of
the Ld. Trial Court, while erroneously framing charges against the
accused. In this regard, Ld. Counsel fervently asserted that had the
Ld. Trial Court duly considered the material placed on record by
the accused, it would be quite lucid the complainant and her
husband along with other persons, namely, Ashish and Shyam
Gupta, hatched a conspiracy against the accused as well as his
family members, to wrongly implicate them in false case. Ld.
Counsel further submitted that the Ld. Trial Court failed to
appreciate the fact that the IO has not filed the transcript of the
aforesaid recordings before the Ld. Trial Court, for which, the
accused entreated for further investigation so that material
evidence may be brought on record of the Ld. Trial Court, despite
which, the Ld. Trial Court mistakenly dismissed the application of
the accused, filed under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. and failed to
CR No. 561/2023 Shailender Aggarwal v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
CR No. 593/2023 Dr. D v. State & Anr. Page No. 7 of 49
Digitally signed
by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
Date:
GOYAL 2025.03.11
16:09:51
+0530
consider the true and correct facts of the present case. Even
otherwise, it was further submitted by the Ld. Counsel that despite
repeated requests of the accused, Ld. Trial Court failed to hear the
audio recordings, which is part of the chargesheet, exhibiting
malicious implication of the accused in the present case.
Correspondingly, as per Ld. Counsel, Ld. Trial Court failed to
appreciate the fact that the alleged incident is asserted to have
transpired at around 07.00 p.m. on 14.09.2016, however, the
relevant CCTV footage, which was perused by the Ld. Trial Court
on 26.07.2022, duly proves that the accused had entered into his
house at about 18:05:54 hours and left his house at about 20:29:24
hours on the said day, establishing that the accused was present at
his house at the alleged time of incident on 14.09.2016. However,
despite the same, Ld. Counsel asserted that the Ld. Trial Court
passed the impugned order on mere conjunctures, surmises and in
contravention of the settled cannons of law, besides being
oblivious of the relevant material and facts, deserving the same to
be set aside at the outset, as suffering with gross illegality.
3.1. Learned Counsel for revisionist Shailender/accused
further contended that the impugned order was passed by the Ld.
Trial Court on mere assumptions and that no sound and/or cogent
reasons have been delineated thereunder. It was further submitted
that while passing the impugned order, the Ld. Trial Court further
failed to appreciate that from the material placed on record, even
the basic ingredients of the provisions/offence under Section
354/354A/354D/451/506/323 IPC are not even prima facie
established against the accused in the instant case. Further, as per
the Ld. Counsel, the Ld. Trial Court, while passing the impugned
order, did not even consider that there is no evidence or material on
CR No. 561/2023 Shailender Aggarwal v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
CR No. 593/2023 Dr. D v. State & Anr. Page No. 8 of 49
Digitally
signed by
ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.03.11
16:09:54
+0530
record against the accused to proceed with the framing of charges
under the said provisions/Sections, besides strenuously reiterated
that even the basic ingredients of the said provisions/charges are
not attracted against the accused in the instant case. It was further
submitted that the Ld. Trial Court failed to give any sufficient
cause/reason, while passing the impugned order, being non-
speaking as well as passed by the Ld. Trial Court in an extremely
casual and cavalier manner. Further, as per the Ld. Counsel, the
Ld. Trial Court also failed to give any sound, cogent or justified
reasons for passing the impugned order, which adversely affects
the rights of the accused. Consequently, the Ld. Counsel prayed
that the impugned order, being passed in gross violation of law and
settled judicial precedents, deserves to be set aside, outrightly. In
support of the said contentions, reliance was placed upon the
decisions in; State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi, (2005) 1
SCC 568; Sh. Satish Mehra v. Delhi Administration, 1996 (9)
SCC 766; and Sunil Kumar v. State & Anr., CRMC No. 512/2017,
dated 14.12.2018 (J&K High Court).
4. Per contra, Ld. Counsel for the revisionist, namely,
Dr. ‘D’/complainant submitted that the Ld. Trial Court passed the
impugned order, oblivious of the relevant material/documents
placed on record, besides failing to consider the consistent
statements/assertion of the complainant before the police officials
as well as the Ld. MM in her statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C.
and Section 164 Cr.P.C., respectively. In this regard, it was further
vehemently argued by the Ld. Counsel that the Ld. Trial Court did
not consider the statement of the complainant, recorded under
Section 164 Cr.P.C., wherein she explicitly inter alia avowed that
on the date of incident, the accused forcibly entered her house,
CR No. 561/2023 Shailender Aggarwal v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
CR No. 593/2023 Dr. D v. State & Anr. Page No. 9 of 49
Digitally signed
by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
Date:
GOYAL 2025.03.11
16:09:58
+0530
assaulted her, pushed her breast, tried to open the knot of her
salwar as well as tried/attempted to rape her. However, despite the
same, as per the Ld. Counsel, charges under Section 376/Section
376/511 IPC were not framed against the accused by the Ld. Trial
Court. It was further submitted by the Ld. Counsel that the Ld.
Trial Court did not record the contentions raised by/on behalf of
the complainant during the course of arguments/proceedings
before the Ld. Trial Court, and reiterated that the charges were
framed against the accused, without considering the police report
and documents sent with it under Section 173 Cr.P.C. and the
argument advanced on behalf of victim/complainant. Even
otherwise, as per the Ld. Counsel, the framing of charges is not in
accordance with the procedure prescribed by the law, besides have
been framed in violation of the provisions under Articles 14, 19
and 21 of the Constitution of India. In this regard, Ld. Counsel
further asserted that the procedure prescribed under the
Code/Cr.P.C. is the ‘procedure prescribed by law’ within the
meaning of the expression under the Constitution, which was not
duly complied with/considered by the Ld. Trial Court for the
reason that material documents/facts/statements of witnesses were
negated by the Ld. Trial Court, while passing the impugned order.
It was further submitted that order of framing of charges by Ld.
Trial Court/impugned order does not only explicates utter non
application of mind by the Ld. Trial Court, rather, also indicates
gross violation of law by the Ld. Trial Court. Further, as per Ld.
Counsel, Ld. Trial Court wrongly proceeded only under Sections
354/354A/354D/451/506/323 IPC against the accused as
ingredients of the Section 376 IPC and/or Section 376 IPC read
with Section 511 IPC was sufficiently present in the instant case.
CR No. 561/2023 Shailender Aggarwal v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
CR No. 593/2023 Dr. D v. State & Anr. Page No. 10 of 49
Digitally signed
by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
ABHISHEK
Date:
GOYAL 2025.03.11
16:10:03
+0530
4.1. Learned Counsel for the complainant/revisionist Dr.
‘D’ further ardently reiterated that there was sufficient material to
proceed with the framing of charges against the accused for the
offence under Section 376 IPC/Sections 376/511 IPC on the basis
of the complainant’s statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. Further,
as per the Ld. Counsel, it is not within the domain of the courts to
overzealously analyze the material/evidence placed on record in
detail at the stage of charge and conclude the entire case even
before it begins, to the prejudice the case of the complainant or an
accused. Even otherwise, as per the Ld. Counsel, the investigation
in the instant case is grossly tainted with malafide, one sided and
tilts in favour of the accused, as the investigating agency has not
properly followed the correct procedure for the investigation of the
case, as per as Punjab Police Rules, 1934 as well as Circular
No.444/2016, Standing Instructions/ Circular No. 17 of 2013 &
Circular No. 15 of 2015, issued by the Delhi Police. Ld. Counsel
for the complainant further submitted that the complainant would
suffer irreparably, in case the Ld. Trial Court proceeds with the
trial of the said case under wrong legal provisions/sections and it
would be great injustice not only with the complainant but also to
the criminal justice delivery system. Lastly, it was submitted by
the Ld. Counsel that the trial proceedings in the instant case have
been grossly delayed to the prejudice of the complainant, by
repeated adjournments by the Ld. Trial Court. Accordingly, Ld.
Counsel entreated that the impugned order/order dated
14.09.2023, passed by the Ld. Trial Court is liable to be set-aside
and the matter may be directed to be committed to Ld. Sessions
Court, besides charges under Section 376 IPC and Section 376 IPC
read with 511 IPC be added/framed against the accused. In support
CR No. 561/2023 Shailender Aggarwal v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
CR No. 593/2023 Dr. D v. State & Anr. Page No. 11 of 49
Digitally signed
ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.03.11
16:10:07 +0530
of the said contentions, reliance was placed upon the decisions in;
Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency Pvt. Ltd. v. Central Bureau of
Investigation, AIR 2018 SC 2039; Aparna Bhatt & Ors. v. State of
MP, Crl. Appeal No. 329/2021, dated 18.03.2021 (SC); State of
Rajasthan v. Ashok Kumar Kashyap, MANU/SC/0275/2021;
Pappu Tiwary v. State of Jharkhand, MANU/SC/0115/2022;
Chaitu Lal v. State of Uttarakhand, Crl. Appeal No. 2127/2009,
dated 20.11.2019 (SC); Madan Lal v. State of J&K, 11998 Crl.LJ
667; Dr. Atul Krishna v. State of Uttarakhand & Ors., SLP (Crl.)
No. 2493/2021, dated 15.09.2021 (SC); Rajinder @ Raju v. State
& Anr., Crl. Rev. Pet. 801/2019, dated 27.05.2020 (DHC); Central
Bureau of Investigation v. Prem Bhutani & Anr., Crl. Rev. Pet.
No. 406/2019, dated 04.04.2022 (DHC); State v. Mohd. Javed
Nasir & Ors., Crl. Rev. Pet. 268/2018, dated 23.11.2022 (DHC);
Sanikommmu Vijaya Bhaskar Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh,
Crl. Rev. Pet. No. 148/2022, dated 06.04.2022 (AP High Court);
and Pushpendra Kumar Singh @ Puspendra v. State of Jharkhand,
Crl.MP 2632/2021, dated 29.08.2024 (Jharkhand HC).
5. Ld. Addl. PP for the State submitted that the
impugned order was passed by the Ld. Trial Court after due
appreciation of the facts and circumstances of the present case and,
as such, deserves no interference by this Court. It was further
submitted that all the relevant facts and circumstances were duly
considered by the Ld. Trial Court, besides the impugned order was
passed by the Ld. Trial Court, wary of the settled judicial
precedents and the material brought forth. Ld. Addl. PP for the
State further submitted that no illegality/infirmity can be attributed
to the impugned order, so as to subject the same to any interference
by this Court under this Court’s exercise of its revisional
CR No. 561/2023 Shailender Aggarwal v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
CR No. 593/2023 Dr. D v. State & Anr. Page No. 12 of 49
Digitally signed
ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.03.11
16:10:10 +0530
jurisdiction.
6. The arguments of Ld. Counsel for the
accused/revisionist Shailender, Ld. Counsel for the complainant/
revisionist Dr. ‘D’ as well as that of Ld. Addl. PP for the State have
been heard as well as the records, including the Ld. Trial Court
record and the judgments cited by/on behalf of the parties have
been thoroughly perused.
7. Before proceeding with the determination of the
merits of the case/issues posed before this Court, it would be
apposite to outrightly make a reference to the relevant provisions
under law, in particular, the provisions under law/Section 397
Cr.P.C.2, as under;
“397. Calling for records to exercise of powers of
revision – (1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge
may call for and examine the record of any proceeding
before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or
his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying
itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or
propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded
or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings
of such inferior Court, and may, when calling for such
record, direct that the execution of any sentence or
order be suspended, and if the accused is in
confinement, that he be released on bail or on his own
bond pending the examination of the record.
Explanation – All Magistrates, whether Executive
or Judicial, and whether exercising original or
appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to
the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this sub-section
and of Section 398.
(2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-
section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any
2
Pari materia to Section 438 BNSS, which provides; “438. Calling for records to exercise powers of revision-
(1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any
inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself
as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the
regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling, for such record, direct that the
execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement that he be released on
his own bond or bail bond pending the examination of the record.***Explanation–All Magistrates, whether
Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior
to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this sub-section and of Section 439.***(2) The powers of revision
conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal,
inquiry, trial or other proceeding….” (Emphasis supplied).
CR No. 561/2023 Shailender Aggarwal v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
CR No. 593/2023 Dr. D v. State & Anr. Page No. 13 of 49
Digitally signed
by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.03.11
16:10:14 +0530
interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial
or other proceeding…”
(Emphasis supplied)
8. Pertinently, from a perusal of the aforesaid, it is quite
evident that the revisional jurisdiction of this Court can be agitated
either suo motu or an application of parties, solely in the cases
where there is a palpable error, non-compliance of the provision of
law, decision of Trial Court being completely erroneous or where
the judicial decision is exercised arbitrarily. In this regard, reliance
is placed upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Amit
Kumar v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 , wherein the
Hon’ble Court while explicating the various contours of the
provision under Section 397 Cr.P.C. observed as under:
“12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with
the power to call for and examine the records of an
inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to
the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order
made in a case. The object of this provision is to set
right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law.
There has to be a well-founded error and it may not be
appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders,
which upon the face of it bears a token of careful
consideration and appear to be in accordance with
law. If one looks into the various judgments of this
Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can
be invoked where the decisions under challenge are
grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the
provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no
evidence, material evidence is ignored or judicial
discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These
are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative.
Each case would have to be determined on its own
merits.
13. Another well-accepted norm is that the
revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very
limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine
manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should
not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The
Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of
revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to
injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the
question as to whether the charge has been framed
CR No. 561/2023 Shailender Aggarwal v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
CR No. 593/2023 Dr. D v. State & Anr. Page No. 14 of 49
Digitally signed
by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
Date:
GOYAL 2025.03.11
16:10:17
+0530
properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it
may be reluctant to interfere in exercise of its
revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially
falls within the categories aforestated. Even framing
of charge is a much advanced stage in the proceedings
under the CrPC.”
(Emphasis supplied)
9. Similarly, the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in V.K.
Verma v. CBI, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 1192, in a similar context
noted as under;
“67. The revisional jurisdiction is not meant to test
the waters of what might happen in the trial. The
Revisional Court has to consider the correctness,
legality or propriety of any finding inter se an order
and as to the regularity of the proceedings of the court
below. While doing so, the Revisional Court does not
dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the
case, rather it considers the material only to satisfy
itself about the legality and propriety of the findings,
sentence and order and refrains from substituting its
own conclusion on an elaborate consideration of
evidence. In the instant case, the Petitioner has failed
to make out a case for exercise of the revisional
jurisdiction since there is no patent error in the
impugned order on the face of record.”
(Emphasis supplied)
10. Quite evidently, it may be noted from above that the
revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is quite limited and
cannot be exercised in a routine manner. In fact, as aforenoted, the
revisional Court can interfere only in the instances where an order
of trial court was passed, unjustly and unfairly. Further, it is a
settled law3 that trite law that in a case where the order of
subordinate Court does not suffer from any illegality, “merely
because of equitable considerations, the revisional Court has no
jurisdiction to re-consider the matter and pass a different order in a
routine manner.” Reference in this regard is made to the decision
3
Juned v. State of M.P., 2023 SCC OnLine MP 4458; and Dilip Damor v. State of M.P., 2024 SCC OnLine
MP 958.
CR No. 561/2023 Shailender Aggarwal v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
CR No. 593/2023 Dr. D v. State & Anr. Page No. 15 of 49
Digitally signed
by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
ABHISHEK
Date:
GOYAL 2025.03.11
16:10:25
+0530
in Taron Mohan v. State, 2021 SCC OnLine Del 312, wherein the
Hon’ble High Court of Delhi expounded as under;
“9. The scope of interference in a revision petition
is extremely narrow. It is well settled that Section 397
CrPC gives the High Courts or the Sessions Courts
jurisdiction to consider the correctness, legality or
propriety of any finding inter se an order and as to the
regularity of the proceedings of any inferior court. It is
also well settled that while considering the legality,
propriety or correctness of a finding or a conclusion,
normally the revising court does not dwell at length
upon the facts and evidence of the case. A court in
revision considers the material only to satisfy itself
about the legality and propriety of the findings,
sentence and order and refrains from substituting its
own conclusion on an elaborate consideration of
evidence.”
(Emphasis supplied)
11. Notably in the context of the foregoing, it is further
apposite to observe here that it is no longer res integra that the
orders framing charges or refusing discharge are neither
interlocutory nor final in nature, rather, intermediate in nature 4,
and are, therefore, not affected by the bar of Section 397(2) Cr.P.C.
However, the scope of interference under Section 397 Cr.P.C. at a
stage, when charge had been framed, is also equally settled5. In this
regard, it is pertinent to make a reference to the decision of the
Hon’ble Apex Court in Manendra Prasad Tiwari v. Amit Kumar
Tiwari, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1057, wherein the Hon’ble Court
enunciated the law in regard the foregoing as under;
“22. The scope of interference and exercise of
jurisdiction under Section 397 of CrPC has been time
and again explained by this Court. Further, the scope
of interference under Section 397 CrPC at a stage,
when charge had been framed, is also well settled. At
the stage of framing of a charge, the court is concerned
not with the proof of the allegation rather it has to
focus on the material and form an opinion whether4
Sanjay Kumar Rai v. State of U.P., (2022) 15 SCC 720.
5
State of Rajasthan v. Fatehkaran Mehdu, (2017) 3 SCC 198.
CR No. 561/2023 Shailender Aggarwal v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
CR No. 593/2023 Dr. D v. State & Anr. Page No. 16 of 49
Digitally signed
ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.03.11
16:10:29 +0530
there is strong suspicion that the accused has
committed an offence, which if put to trial, could
prove his guilt. The framing of charge is not a stage, at
which stage the final test of guilt is to be applied.
Thus, to hold that at the stage of framing the charge,
the court should form an opinion that the accused is
certainly guilty of committing an offence, is to hold
something which is neither permissible nor is in
consonance with the scheme of Code of Criminal
Procedure.
23. Section 397 CrPC vests the court with the
power to call for and examine the records of an
inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to
the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order
made in a case. The object of this provision is to set
right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law
or the perversity which has crept in the proceeding.”
(Emphasis supplied)
12. Germane for the purpose(s) of present discourse to
now consider the principles governing framing of charges. In this
regard, it is relevant to outrightly note the settled law 6 that at the
stage of framing of charges, neither can the truth, veracity and
effect of the prosecution case be meticulously7 judged, nor can any
weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. On
the contrary, at such a stage, only the sufficiency of ground for
proceeding against the accused, on a general consideration of
materials placed before the Court by the investigating police
officer is relevant. Further, though, sifting of evidence is
permissible8, however, scanning of evidence in detail is not. Quite
understandably, the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in Reena v. State
(NCT of Delhi), 2020 SCC OnLine Del 630 , iterated the said
principles in unequivocal terms as under;
“12. Thus it is settled position of law that at the
time of framing of charge, the Court is not supposed to
look into the evidence of the case in detail and is only
to consider whether there is a strong suspicion against
6
State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh, AIR 1977 SC 2018
7
Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460.
8
State of Maharashta v. Priya Sharan Maharaj & Ors., (1997) 4 SCC 393.
CR No. 561/2023 Shailender Aggarwal v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
CR No. 593/2023 Dr. D v. State & Anr. Page No. 17 of 49
Digitally
signed by
ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.03.11
16:10:33
+0530
the accused on the basis of the material that comes
before it. The court has the power to sift the evidence
for the limited purpose of finding out, whether or not a
prima facie case is made out against the accused.
However, the Court is not supposed to delve deeply
into the merits of the matter and start a roving
expedition into the evidence that is brought forth it, as
if conducting a trial. Further there is no one fixed
definition that may be ascribed to the term prima
facie’ nor can the term strong suspicion have a
singular meaning. While coming to the conclusion of
a strong prima facie case or strong suspicion, the
Court shall have to decide each case on the basis of its
own independent facts and circumstances.”
(Emphasis supplied)
13. Concurrently, it is settled law9 that the inconsistency
in the material produced by the prosecution or the defects in
investigation10, cannot be looked into for discharge of an accused,
in the absence of full-fledged trial. In fact, the probative value11 of
the material on record cannot be gone into, and the material placed
on record by the prosecution has to be accepted as true at that
stage. Reference in this regard is made to the decision of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in State through Deputy Superintendent
of Police v. R. Soundirarasu and Ors., MANU/SC/1103/2022 ,
wherein the Hon’ble Court remarked as under;
“58. Reiterating a similar view in Sheoraj Singh
Ahlawat and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr.,
MANU/SC/1011/2012: (2013) 11 SCC 476, it was
observed by this Court that while framing charges the
court is required to evaluate the materials and
documents on record to decide whether the facts
emerging therefrom taken at their face value would
disclose existence of ingredients constituting the
alleged offence. At this stage, the court is not required
to go deep into the probative value of the materials on
record. It needs to evaluate whether there is a ground
for presuming that the Accused had committed the
offence and it is not required to evaluate sufficiency of
evidence to convict the Accused. It was held that the9
Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat v. State of U.P., (2013) 11 SCC 476.
10
State of Tamil Nadu by Inspector of Police v. N. Suresh Ranjan & Ors., (2014) 11 SCC 709.
11
Soma Chakravarty v. State, (2007) 5 SCC 403.
CR No. 561/2023 Shailender Aggarwal v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
CR No. 593/2023 Dr. D v. State & Anr. Page No. 18 of 49
Digitally signed
by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
Date:
GOYAL 2025.03.11
16:10:37
+0530
Court at this stage cannot speculate into the
truthfulness or falsity of the allegations and
contradictions & inconsistencies in the statement of
witnesses cannot be looked into at the stage of
discharge.”
(Emphasis supplied)
14. Relevant to further note that it is trite law 12, at the
stage of framing of charge, only the police report is required to be
considered and the defence of the accused13 cannot be looked into.
Needless to mention that the superior courts 14 have persistently
deprecated the practice of holding a mini trial at the time of
framing of charge. Relevantly, in this regard, reference is made to
the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bharat Parikh v.
CBI, (2008) 10 SCC 109, wherein the Hon’ble Court enunciated
the judicial principle(s), as under;
“19. As observed in Debendra Nath Padhi case
[(2005) 1 SCC 568: 2005 SCC (Cri) 415] at the stage
of framing charge roving and fishing inquiry is
impermissible and a mini trial cannot be conducted at
such stage. At the stage of framing of charge the
submissions on behalf of the accused have to be
confined to the material produced by the investigating
agency. The accused will get an opportunity to prove
the documents subsequently produced by the
prosecution on the order of the Court, but the same
cannot be relied upon to reopen the proceedings once
charge has been framed or for invocation of the High
Court’s powers under Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure.”
(Emphasis supplied)
15. Apposite to further emphasize15 that at the stage of
charge, court(s) is/are not even required to record detailed reasons
for framing charge, rather16, a very strong suspicion founded upon
12
State Anti-Corruption Bureau, Hyderabad & Anr. v. P. Suryaprakasam, (1999) SCC (Crl.) 373 and State of
Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi, 2005 (1) SCC 568.
13
State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294.
14
Indu Jain v. State of M.P., (2008) 15 SCC 341.
15
Bhawna Bai v. Dhanshyam & Ors., (2020) 2 SCC 217
16
Supdt. and Remembrance of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Anil Kumar Bhunja, AIR 1980 SC 52 and Sajjan
Kumar v. CBI, (2010) 9 SCC 368
CR No. 561/2023 Shailender Aggarwal v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
CR No. 593/2023 Dr. D v. State & Anr. Page No. 19 of 49
Digitally signed
by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.03.11
16:10:41 +0530
materials placed before it, which leads the court to form a
presumptive opinion as to the existence of factual ingredients
constituting the offence alleged, may justify the framing of
charges. In fact17, it is only when no case is made out even after
presuming entire prosecution evidence, can an accused be
discharged. Needless to accentuate18, “at the stage of framing of
charge, the sufficiency of materials for the purpose of conviction is
not the requirement and a prayer for discharge can be allowed only
if the court finds that the materials are wholly insufficient for the
purpose of trial.” Notably, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Stree
Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia, (1989) 1
SCC 715, while inter alia illuminating the principles as well as the
scope of enquiry for the purpose of charge/discharging an accused,
observed as under;
“14. …In fact, Section 227 itself contains enough
guidelines as to the scope of enquiry for the purpose of
discharging an accused. It provides that “the Judge
shall discharge when he considers that there is no
sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused”.
The “ground” in the context is not a ground for
conviction, but a ground for putting the accused on
trial. It is in the trial, the guilt or the innocence of the
accused will be determined and not at the time of
framing of charge. The court, therefore, need not
undertake an elaborate enquiry in sifting and
weighing the material. Nor is it necessary to delve
deep into various aspects. All that the court has to
consider is whether the evidentiary material on record
if generally accepted, would reasonably connect the
accused with the crime. No more need be enquired
into.”
(Emphasis supplied)
16. Ergo, being mindful of the principles hereinunder
noted, this Court would now proceed with the determination of the
arguments raised by Ld. Counsel for the accused, Ld. Counsel for
17
Manjit Singh Virdi v. Hussain Mohammed Shattaf, (2023) 7 SCC 633
18
Sonu Gupta Vs. Deepak Gupta & Ors., (2015) 3 SCC 424
CR No. 561/2023 Shailender Aggarwal v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
CR No. 593/2023 Dr. D v. State & Anr. Page No. 20 of 49
Digitally signed
ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.03.11
16:10:44 +0530
the complainant as well as by Ld. Addl. PP for the State. Markedly,
one of the primary contentions of the Ld. Counsel for the accused
is that even from the material placed on record, ingredients of
offence/allegations levelled/charges framed against the accused
are not even prima facie made out. In contrast, as aforenoted, Ld.
Counsel for the complainant has asserted that provisions under
Section 376IPC/Section 376/511 IPC are also attracted against the
accused in the instant case. However, in order to appreciate the
said contention, this Court deems it pertinent to reproduce the
relevant provisions under law/IPC as under;
“319. Hurt-Whoever causes bodily pain, disease
or infirmity to any person is said to cause hurt.
*** *** ***
321. Voluntarily causing hurt-Whoever does any
act with the intention of thereby causing hurt to any
person, or with the knowledge that he is likely thereby
to cause hurt to any person, and does thereby cause
hurt to any person, is said “voluntarily to cause hurt”.
323. Punishment for voluntarily causing hurt-
Whoever, except in the case provided for by section
334, voluntarily causes hurt, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to one year, or with fine which may
extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.
*** *** ***
354. Assault or criminal force to woman with
intent to outrage her modesty-Whoever assaults or
uses criminal force to any woman, intending to
outrage or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby
outrage her modesty, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which
shall not be less than one year but which may extend
to five years, and shall also be liable to fine.
354A. Sexual harassment and punishment for
sexual harassment-(1) A man committing any of the
following acts-
(i) physical contact and advances involving
unwelcome and explicit sexual overtures; or
(ii) a demand or request for sexual favours; or
(iii) showing pornography against the will of a
woman; orCR No. 561/2023 Shailender Aggarwal v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
CR No. 593/2023 Dr. D v. State & Anr. Page No. 21 of 49
Digitally signed
by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.03.11
16:10:47 +0530
(iv) making sexually coloured remarks, shall be
guilty of the offence of sexual harassment.
(2) Any man who commits the offence specified in
clause (i) or clause (ii) or clause (iii) of sub-section (1)
shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a
term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or
with both.
(3) Any man who commits the offence specified in
clause (iv) of sub-section (1) shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both.
*** *** ***
354D. Stalking-(1) Any man who–
(i) follows a woman and contacts, or attempts to
contact such woman to foster personal interaction
repeatedly despite a clear indication of disinterest by
such woman; or
(ii) monitors the use by a woman of the internet,
email or any other form of electronic communication,
commits the offence of stalking:
Provided that such conduct shall not amount to
stalking if the man who pursued it proves that–
(i) it was pursued for the purpose of preventing or
detecting crime and the man accused of stalking had
been entrusted with the responsibility of prevention
and detection of crime by the State; or
(ii) it was pursued under any law or to comply with
any condition or requirement imposed by any person
under any law; or
(iii) in the particular circumstances such conduct
was reasonable and justified.
(2) Whoever commits the offence of stalking shall
be punished on first conviction with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to
three years, and shall also be liable to fine; and be
punished on a second or subsequent conviction, with
imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to five years, and shall also be liable to
fine.
*** *** ***
375. Rape-A man is said to commit “rape” if he-
(a) penetrates his penis, to any extent, into the
vagina, mouth, urethra or anus of a woman or makes
her to do so with him or any other person; or
(b) inserts, to any extent, any object or a part of the
body, not being the penis, into the vagina, the urethraCR No. 561/2023 Shailender Aggarwal v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
CR No. 593/2023 Dr. D v. State & Anr. Page No. 22 of 49Digitally signed
by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
Date:
GOYAL 2025.03.11
16:10:52
+0530
or anus of a woman or makes her to do so with him or
any other person; or
(c) manipulates any part of the body of a woman so
as to cause penetration into the vagina, urethra, anus
or any part of body of such woman or makes her to do
so with him or any other person; or
(d) applies his mouth to the vagina, anus, urethra
of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any
other person,
under the circumstances falling under any of the
following seven descriptions:–
First-Against her will.
Secondly-Without her consent.
Thirdly-With her consent, when her consent has
been obtained by putting her or any person in whom
she is interested, in fear of death or of hurt,
Fourthly-With her consent, when the man knows
that he is not her husband and that her consent is given
because she believes that he is another man to whom
she is or believes herself to be lawfully married.
Fifthly-With her consent when, at the time of
giving such consent, by reason of unsoundness of
mind or intoxication or the administration by him
personally or through another of any stupefying or
unwholesome substance, she is unable to understand
the nature and consequences of that to which she gives
consent.
Sixthly-With or without her consent, when she is
under eighteen years of age.
Seventhly-When she is unable to communicate
consent.
Explanation 1-For the purposes of this section,
“vagina” shall also include labia majora.
Explanation 2-Consent means an unequivocal
voluntary agreement when the woman by words,
gestures or any form of verbal or non-verbal
communication, communicates willingness to
participate in the specific sexual act:
Provided that a woman who does not physically
resist to the act of penetration shall not by the reason
only of that fact, be regarded as consenting to the
sexual activity…
*** *** ***
441. Criminal trespass-Whoever enters into or
upon property in the possession of another with intent
to commit an offence or to intimidate, insult or annoy
any person in possession of such property,CR No. 561/2023 Shailender Aggarwal v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
CR No. 593/2023 Dr. D v. State & Anr. Page No. 23 of 49
Digitally signed
by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.03.11
16:10:57 +0530
or having lawfully entered into or upon such
property, unlawfully remains there with intent thereby
to intimidate, insult or annoy any such person, or with
intent to commit an offence,
is said to commit “criminal trespass”.
442. House-trespass-Whoever commits criminal
trespass by entering into or remaining in any building,
tent or vessel used as a human dwelling or any
building used as a place for worship, or as a place for
the custody of property, is said to commit “house-
trespass”.
Explanation-The introduction of any part of the
criminal trespasser’s body is entering sufficient to
constitute house-trespass.
*** *** ***
451. House-trespass in order to commit offence
punishable with imprisonment-Whoever commits
house-trespass in order to the committing of any
offence punishable with imprisonment, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for
a term which may extend to two years, and shall also
be liable to fine; and if the offence intended to be
committed is theft, the term of the imprisonment may
be extended to seven years.
*** *** ***
506. Punishment for criminal intimidation-
Whoever commits, the offence of criminal
intimidation shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to two
years, or with fine, or with both.
If threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc.–
and if the threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, or
to cause the destruction of any property by fire, or to
cause an offence punishable with death or
imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment for a
term which may extend to seven years, or to impute,
unchastity to a woman, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to seven years, or with line, or with both
*** *** ***
511. Punishment for attempting to commit
offences punishable with imprisonment for life or
other imprisonment-Whoever attempts to commit an
offence punishable by this Code with imprisonment
for life or imprisonment, or to cause such an offence to
be committed, and in such attempt does any act
towards the commission of the offence, shall, where
no express provision is made by this Code for the
punishment of such attempt, be punished with
CR No. 561/2023 Shailender Aggarwal v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
CR No. 593/2023 Dr. D v. State & Anr. Page No. 24 of 49
Digitally signed
by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.03.11
16:11:01 +0530
imprisonment of any description provided for the
offence, for a term which may extend to one-half of
the imprisonment for life or, as the case may be, one-
half of the longest term of imprisonment provided for
that offence, or with such fine as is provided for the
offence, or with both.”
(Emphasis supplied)
17. Notably, it is observed from a perusal of Section 323
IPC that the essence of the said offence lies in the accused’s
causing hurt to the victim, voluntarily , i.e., intentionally or with
knowledge that in the process, hurt would be caused. Significantly,
the term, hurt, in turn, is defined under Section 319 IPC as
causation of any bodily pain, disease or infirmity to a victim. Quite
evidently, disease or infirmity may have external manifestation,
however, bodily pain may not be easily perceivable from any
medical report. Ergo, it is quite understandable that the superior
courts have persistently avowed that in order for conviction under
Section 323 IPC to stand, it is not essential for production of an
injury/medical report. Reference in this regard is made to the
decision in Lakshman Singh v. State of Bihar, (2021) 9 SCC 191 ,
wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court in unambiguous terms noted
as under;
“11. Now so far as the submission on behalf of the
appellant-accused that all the appellants were alleged
to have been armed with lathis and so far as PW 8 is
concerned, no injury report is forthcoming and/or
brought on record and therefore they cannot be
convicted for the offence under Section 323 IPC is
concerned, at the outset, it is required to be noted that
PW 8 in his examination-in-chief/deposition has
specifically stated that after he sustained injuries,
treatment was provided at Government Hospital,
Paatan. He has further stated in the cross-examination
on behalf of all the accused persons except accused
Dinanath Singh that he sustained 2-3 blows of
truncheons. He has also stated that he does not exactly
remember that how many blows he suffered.
According to him, he first went to Police Station,CR No. 561/2023 Shailender Aggarwal v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
CR No. 593/2023 Dr. D v. State & Anr. Page No. 25 of 49
Digitally signed
by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.03.11
16:11:04 +0530
Paatan along with the SHO of Police Station, Paatan,
where his statement was recorded and thereafter the
SHO sent him to Paatan Hospital for treatment. Thus,
he was attacked by the accused persons by
lathis/sticks and he sustained injuries and was treated
at Government Hospital, Paatan has been established
and proved. It may be that there might not be any
serious injuries and/or visible injuries, the hospital
might not have issued the injury report. However,
production of an injury report for the offence under
Section 323 IPC is not a sine qua non for establishing
the case for the offence under Section 323 IPC.
Section 323 IPC is a punishable section for voluntarily
causing hurt. “Hurt” is defined under Section 319 IPC.
As per Section 319 IPC, whoever causes bodily pain,
disease or infirmity to any person is said to cause
“hurt”. Therefore, even causing bodily pain can be
said to be causing “hurt”. Therefore, in the facts and
circumstances of the case, no error has been
committed by the courts below for convicting the
accused under Section 323 IPC…”
(Emphasis supplied)
18. In so far as the provision under Section 354 IPC is
concerned, in order to attract the said provision, it is required from
the prosecution to prove; (i) commission of criminal assault or use
of criminal force on a person, who is a woman; (ii) use of criminal
force on such victim by the aggressor/accused; and (iii) use of
criminal force upon such a woman with a mens rea (intention or
knowledge) to ‘outrage her modesty’. In this regard, this Court
deems is further apposite to refer to the decision in Vidyadharan v.
State of Kerala, (2004) 1 SCC 215, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme
Court19, while explicating the basic ingredients of Section 354 IPC,
noted as under;
“9. In order to constitute the offence under Section
354 mere knowledge that the modesty of a woman is
likely to be outraged is sufficient without any
deliberate intention of having such outrage alone for
its object. There is no abstract conception of modesty
that can apply to all cases. (See State of Punjab v.
Major Singh [AIR 1967 SC 63 : 1967 Cri LJ 1] .) A
19
Premiya v. State of Rajasthan, (2008) 10 SCC 81.
CR No. 561/2023 Shailender Aggarwal v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
CR No. 593/2023 Dr. D v. State & Anr. Page No.Digitally
26 ofsigned
49
ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.03.11
16:11:08 +0530
careful approach has to be adopted by the court while
dealing with a case alleging outrage of modesty. The
essential ingredients of the offence under Section 354
IPC are as under:
(i) that the person assaulted must be a woman;
(ii) that the accused must have used criminal force
on her; and
(iii) that the criminal force must have been used on
the woman intending thereby to outrage her modesty.
10. Intention is not the sole criterion of the offence
punishable under Section 354 IPC, and it can be
committed by a person assaulting or using criminal
force to any woman, if he knows that by such act the
modesty of the woman is likely to be affected.
Knowledge and intention are essentially things of the
mind and cannot be demonstrated like physical
objects. The existence of intention or knowledge has
to be culled out from various circumstances in which
and upon whom the alleged offence is alleged to have
been committed…”
(Emphasis supplied)
19. Analogously, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Raju
Pandurang Mahale v. State of Maharashtra & Ors.,
MANU/SC/0116/2004, cogitating on the ingredients of the
offence under Section 354 IPC and the meaning of the term,
‘modesty’, remarked as under;
“11. Coming to the question as to whether Section
354 of the Act has any application, it is to be noted that
the provision makes penal the assault or use of
criminal force to a woman to outrage her modesty.
The essential ingredients of offence under Section 354
IPC are:
(a) That the assault must be on a woman.
(b) That the accused must have used criminal force
on her.
(c) That the criminal force must have been used on
the woman intending thereby to outrage her modesty.
12. What constitutes an outrage to female modesty
is nowhere defined. The essence of a woman’s
modesty is her sex. The culpable intention of the
accused is the crux of the matter. The reaction of the
woman is very relevant, but its absence is not always
decisive. Modesty in this Section is an attribute
associated with female human beings as a class. It is a
CR No. 561/2023 Shailender Aggarwal v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
CR No. 593/2023 Dr. D v. State & Anr. Page No. 27 of 49
Digitally signed
by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
ABHISHEK
Date:
GOYAL 2025.03.11
16:11:12
+0530
virtue which attaches to a female owing to her sex.
The act of pulling a woman, removing her saree,
coupled with a request for sexual intercourse, is such
as would be an outrage to the modesty of a woman;
and knowledge, that modesty is likely to be outraged,
is sufficient to constitute the offence without any
deliberate intention having such outrage alone for its
object. As indicated above, the word ‘modesty’ is not
defined in IPC. The Shorter Oxford Dictionary (Third
Edn.) defines the word ‘modesty’ in relation to woman
as follows:
“Decorous in manner and conduct; not forward or
lowe; Shame-fast, Scrupulously chast.”
*** *** ***
14. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary
of the English Language defines modesty as “freedom
from coarseness, indelicacy or indecency; a regard for
propriety in dress, speech or conduct”. In the Oxford
English Dictionary (1933 Edn.), the meaning of the
word ‘modesty’ is given as “womanly propriety of
behavior; scrupulous chastity of thought, speech and
conduct (in man or woman); reverse or sense of shame
proceeding from instinctive aversion to impure or
coarse suggestions”…”
(Emphasis supplied)
20. Pertinent, for the purpose(s) of the present discourse
to also make a reference to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in State of Punjab v. Major Singh, 1966 SCC OnLine SC 51,
wherein the Hon’ble Court, while confronted with the issue
whether a female child of seven-and-a-half months could be said to
be possessed of ‘modesty’ which could be outraged, remarked as
under;
“15. I think that the essence of a woman’s modesty
is her sex. The modesty of an adult female is writ large
on her body. Young or old, intelligent or imbecile,
awake or sleeping, the woman possesses a modesty
capable of being outraged. Whoever uses criminal
force to her with intent to outrage her modesty
commits an offence punishable under Section 354.
The culpable intention of the accused is the crux of the
matter. The reaction of the woman is very relevant,
but its absence is not always decisive, as for example,
when the accused with a corrupt mind stealthily
touches the flesh of a sleeping woman. She may be an
CR No. 561/2023 Shailender Aggarwal v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
CR No. 593/2023 Dr. D v. State & Anr. Page No. 28 of 49
Digitally
signed by
ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.03.11
16:11:15
+0530
idiot, she may be under the spell of anaesthesia, she
may be sleeping, she may be unable to appreciate the
significance of the act; nevertheless, the offender is
punishable under the section.”
(Emphasis supplied)
21. Remarkably, in the aforesaid dictate, the Hon’ble
Apex Court unambiguously explicated that the sense of modesty in
all women is not the same for all and that the same may vary from
woman to woman. Nonetheless, considering that the essence of a
woman’s modesty is her sex, touching of the victim’s body, i.e.,
breasts, mouth any other body parts, etc., by an accused, without
the consent of the complainant/victim, would indubitably and
plainly fall within the four corners of the provisions under Section
354 IPC. Similarly, Section 354A IPC provides for criminality
against any man who engages in unwelcome physical contact and
advances explicit sexual behavior, demands sexual favors, shows
pornography against a woman’s will, or makes sexually colored
remarks. Correspondingly, from a perusal of the provisions under
Section 354D IPC, it is observed that in order to attract culpability
under the said provision, the prosecution is inter alia required to
establish20 that a man followed a woman and contacted or
attempted to contact her to foster personal interaction, repeatedly,
despite a clear indication of disinterest by such woman. In this
regard is made to the decision of the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court
in Satyabrata Barik v. State of W.B., 2024 SCC OnLine Cal 6948,
wherein the Hon’ble Court, while explicating the ingredients of the
provisions under Section 354D IPC, remarked as under;
“23. At the same time, the offence of stalking
under Section 354D of the IPC involves a man as the
perpetrator and a woman as victim. To constitute any20
Jayaprakash P.P. v. Sheeba Revi, 2023 SCC OnLine Ker 4904.
CR No. 561/2023 Shailender Aggarwal v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
CR No. 593/2023 Dr. D v. State & Anr. Page No. 29 of 49
Digitally signed
by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.03.11
16:11:20 +0530
offence under this Section the man must try to contact
a woman against her interest.
24. The essentials of the offence of stalking under
Section 354D of the IPC require specific elements to
be established for a violation to occur. These elements
of Section 354D of the IPC include:-
• Perpetrator’s Gender: Stalking must be
committed by any man. The offence is gender-
specific, meaning it involves a man as the perpetrator
and a woman as the victim.
• Unwanted Contact: The man must try to contact
or contact a woman against her interest . This element
involves any form of communication, be it in person
or through electronic means, where the woman has
expressed disinterest and the man persists in trying to
establish contact.
• Repetition: The act of stalking must exhibit a
certain degree of repeatedness. It’s not a one-time
occurrence but rather involves a pattern of persistent
and unwanted attention or contact. This pattern is
essential to distinguish stalking from isolated or
accidental interactions.
• Absence of Interest: There should be a clear
indication of disinterest on the part of the woman.
This element is crucial to ensure that the woman’s lack
of consent or interest is evident and that the man is
persisting despite her objections.”
(Emphasis supplied)
22. Correspondingly, the Hon’ble High Court of Kerala
in Abdul Razak v. State of Kerala, 2019 SCC OnLine Ker 5334 ,
while delving into the provisions under Section 354D IPC, inter
alia observed as under;
“10. A mere reading of the provision contained in
Sec.354D of the IPC would make it clear that one of
the prime ingredients to be satisfied is that, the
accused man should have followed the woman and
should have contacted or attempted to contact the
woman to foster personal interaction repeatedly
despite a clear indication of disinterest by such
woman or monitors the use by a woman of the
internet, email or any other form of electronic
communication, etc. In the instant case the lady
defacto complainant does not have a case that the
petitioner has monitored her use of internet, email or
any other form of electronic communication. Further
that, her admitted allegation is only that the petitioner
CR No. 561/2023 Shailender Aggarwal v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
CR No. 593/2023 Dr. D v. State & Anr. Page No. 30 of 49
Digitally signed by
ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.03.11
16:11:24 +0530
had taken her photograph in one occasion, without her
permission. Thus it can be seen that a solitary instance
as in the instant one cannot be remotely contemplated
as stalking as understood in Sec.354D of the IPC.
Hence the petitioner is right in contending that the
vital ingredients of offence of stalking as per
Sec.354D of the IPC are not made out even going
through the admitted prosecution allegations.”
(Emphasis supplied)
23. In as much as the applicability/culpability under
Section 506 IPC is concerned, law is trite that in order to attract the
said provision, the prosecution is required to prove that the; (i)
accused threatened some person; (ii) such threat must extend to
causing any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the
person, reputation or property of someone in whom he was
interested; and (iii) the accused did so with intent to cause alarm to
that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he was not
legally bound to do or omit to do an act which he is legally entitled
to do as a means of avoiding the execution of such threat.
Pertinently, the Hon’ble High Court of Orissa in Amulya Kumar
Behera v. Nabaghana Behera, 1995 SCC Online Ori 317, while
explicating the meaning of the word, ‘alarm’ used under Section
503/506 IPC, noted as under;
“…The threat must be intended to cause alarm
from which it follows that, ordinarily, it would be
sufficient for that purpose. The degree of such alarm
may vary in different cases, but the essential matter is
that it is of a nature and extent to unsettle the mind of
the person on whom it operates and take away from
his acts that element of free voluntary action which
alone constitutes consent. The case where the threat
produces an alarm is comparatively a simple one, for
all that has then to be proved is that threat was given
and that the alarm was due to the threat: but where the
threat has not that effect, it involves a question
whether it was sufficient to overcome a man of
ordinary nerves. The Court may hold it to be an empty
boast, too insignificant to call for penal visitation of
Section 506. “Intimidate” according to Webstar’s
CR No. 561/2023 Shailender Aggarwal v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
CR No. 593/2023 Dr. D v. State & Anr. Page No. 31 of 49Digitally signed
ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.03.11
16:11:27 +0530
Dictionary means” (1) to make timid, make afraid,
overawe; (2) force or deter with threats or violence,
cow”. Threat referred to in the Section must be a threat
communicated or uttered with intention of its being
communicated to the person threatened for the
purpose of influencing his mind. Question whether
threat amounts to a criminal intimidation or not does
not depend on norms of individual threatened if it is
such a threat as may overcome ordinary free will of a
man of common firmness. “Threat” is derived from
Anglo-sexam word “threotou to life”, (harass). It is
the dicleration of an intention to inflict punishment,
loss or pain on another. “Injury” is defined in Section
44. It involves doing of an illegal act. If it is made with
intention mentioned in the section, it is an offence.
Whether threat was given with intention to cause
alarm to the person threatened has to be established by
evidence to be brought on record…”
(Emphasis supplied)
24. Significantly, in the aforenoted dictate, the Hon’ble
Court explicitly observed that the mens rea/ intention envisaged
under Section 503/506 IPC must be to cause alarm to the victim
and whether or not such a victim is alarmed, is not of any
consequence. Apropos the present discourse, reference is further
made to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Manik
Taneja v. State of Karnataka, (2015) 7 SCC 423 , wherein the
Hon’ble Court, while dealing with the ingredients of offence under
Section(s) 503/506 IPC, inter alia, observed as under;
“11. Section 506 IPC prescribes punishment for
the offence of criminal intimidation. “Criminal
intimidation” as defined in Section 503 IPC is as
under:
“503. Criminal intimidation.–Whoever threatens
another with any injury to his person, reputation or
property, or to the person or reputation of any one in
whom that person is interested, with intent to cause
alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any
act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to
do any act which that person is legally entitled to do,
as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat,
commits criminal intimidation.
CR No. 561/2023 Shailender Aggarwal v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
CR No. 593/2023 Dr. D v. State & Anr. Page No. 32 of 49
Digitally signed
ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.03.11
16:11:31 +0530
Explanation- A threat to injure the reputation of
any deceased person in whom the person threatened is
interested, is within this section.”
A reading of the definition of “criminal
intimidation” would indicate that there must be an act
of threatening to another person, of causing an injury
to the person, reputation, or property of the person
threatened, or to the person in whom the threatened
person is interested and the threat must be with the
intent to cause alarm to the person threatened or it
must be to do any act which he is not legally bound to
do or omit to do an act which he is legally entitled to
do.”
(Emphasis supplied)
25. Apposite for the purpose of present discourse to
further refer to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Aman Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2004) 4 SCC 379, while
cogitating on the provisions under Section 511 IPC, noted as
under;
“9. …Attempt to commit an offence can be said to
begin when the preparations are complete and the
culprit commences to do something with the intention
of committing the offence and which is a step towards
the commission of the offence. The moment he
commences to do an act with the necessary intention,
he commences his attempt to commit the offence. The
word “attempt” is not itself defined, and must,
therefore, be taken in its ordinary meaning. This is
exactly what the provisions of Section 511 require. An
attempt to commit a crime is to be distinguished from
an intention to commit it; and from preparation made
for its commission. Mere intention to commit an
offence, not followed by any act, cannot constitute an
offence. The will is not to be taken for the deed unless
there be some external act which shows that progress
has been made in the direction of it, or towards
maturing and effecting it. Intention is the direction of
conduct towards the object chosen upon considering
the motives which suggest the choice. Preparation
consists in devising or arranging the means or
measures necessary for the commission of the
offence. It differs widely from attempt which is the
direct movement towards the commission after
preparations are made. Preparation to commit an
offence is punishable only when the preparation is to
commit offences under Section 122 (waging war
CR No. 561/2023 Shailender Aggarwal v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
CR No. 593/2023 Dr. D v. State & Anr. Page No. 33 of 49
Digitally signed
by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
Date:
GOYAL 2025.03.11
16:11:39
+0530
against the Government of India) and Section 399
(preparation to commit dacoity). The dividing line
between a mere preparation and an attempt is
sometimes thin and has to be decided on the facts of
each case. There is a greater degree of determination
in attempt as compared with preparation.
10. An attempt to commit an offence is an act, or a
series of acts, which leads inevitably to the
commission of the offence, unless something, which
the doer of the act neither foresaw nor intended,
happens to prevent this. An attempt may be described
to be an act done in part-execution of a criminal
design, amounting to more than mere preparation, but
falling short of actual consummation, and, possessing,
except for failure to consummate, all the elements of
the substantive crime. In other words, an attempt
consists in it the intent to commit a crime, falling short
of, its actual commission. It may consequently be
defined as that which if not prevented would have
resulted in the full consummation of the act attempted.
The illustrations given in Section 511 clearly show the
legislative intention to make a difference between the
cases of a mere preparation and an attempt.”
(Emphasis supplied)
26. Similarly, the Hon’ble High Court of Punjab and
Haryana in Mohindar Singh v. State, 1959 SCC OnLine Punj 260,
while deliberating on the provisions under Section 511 IPC,
remarked as under;
“28. An attempt is an intended but unfinished
crime, tending but failing to effect its commission. I
Specific intention to commit the crime of murder is a
necessary pre-requisite. In so far as the offence relates
to an attempt, the overt act must necessarily be left
unaccomplished, for otherwise the prosecution would
be for the completed crime. Apart from the necessary
mens rea, the actus reus must be more than a
preliminary preparation.
*** *** ***
30. The means must be apparently, though not
really, suitable, so that they can be adapted to the
designed purpose. Well-laid plans after careful
preparation are sometimes unexpectedly foiled-and
rendered ineffectual. The best fire-arms loaded,
capped, primed and well-aimed may misfire. It may
even be, that the party shot at was wearing a jacket of
impervious mail, or that the shot that a bullet proof
CR No. 561/2023 Shailender Aggarwal v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
CR No. 593/2023 Dr. D v. State & Anr. Page No. 34 of 49Digitally signed
by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.03.11
16:11:43 +0530
object inside a pocket, e.g., metal clasp of a pocket
book or of a purse, or a cigarette case.
31. In all such cases the accused is guilty of the
offence of attempt to commit murder. But if the means
adopted are such, as are apparently and also
absolutely, inadequate to accomplish the designed
purpose then the case for attempted murder cannot be
made out. This is illustrated when a man threatens the
life of another, with a child’s popgun using a cork or
similar innocuous thing as a projectile.
32. Thus the essentials for criminal attempt are:
(i) an existence of an intent on the part of the
accused to commit a particular offence;
(ii) some step taken towards it after completion of
preparation.
(iii) The step must be apparently though not
necessarily adapted to the purpose designed;
(iv) it must come dangerously near to success;
(v) it must fall short of completion of the ultimate
design.”‘
(Emphasis supplied)
27. Clearly, it is noted from the above that ‘attempt’
denotes an inchoate offence when an accused takes a significant
step towards the commission of a targeted offense, however,
ultimately fails to achieve the desired object due to intervening
circumstances. Needless to further mention here that besides the
aforenoted ingredients, for culpability for attempt/S. 511 IPC to
arise the steps/device/means adopted must be apparently though
not necessarily adapted for the purpose, designed. As a corollary,
where the means adopted are such, as are apparently and also
absolutely, inadequate to accomplish the designed purpose then,
criminality would not arise. Lastly, this Court further deems it
pertinent to refer here the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in Koppula Venkat Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh,
MANU/SC/0204/2004, wherein the Hon’ble Court, while
expounding the ingredients of offence of rape and attempt to rape,
besides distinguishing between the same, remarked as under;
CR No. 561/2023 Shailender Aggarwal v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
CR No. 593/2023 Dr. D v. State & Anr. Page No. 35 of 49
Digitally signed
by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
ABHISHEK
Date:
GOYAL 2025.03.11
16:11:46
+0530
“9. A culprit first intends to commit the offence,
then makes preparation for committing it and
thereafter attempts to commit the offence. If the
attempt succeeds, he has committed the offence; if it
fails due to reasons beyond his control, he is said to
have attempted to commit the offence. Attempt to
commit an offence can be said to begin when the
preparations are complete and the culprit commences
to do something with the intention of committing the
offence and which is a step towards the commission of
the offence. The moment he commences to do an act
with the necessary Intention, he commences his
attempt to commit the offence. The word “attempt” is
not itself defined, and must, therefore, be taken in its
ordinary meaning. This is exactly what the provisions
of Section 511 require. An attempt to commit a crime
is to be distinguished from an intention to commit it:
and from preparation made for its commission. Mere
intention to commit an offence, not followed by any
act, cannot constitute an offence. The will is not be
taken for the deed unless there be some external act
which shows that progress, has been made in the
direction of it, or towards maturing and effecting it.
Intention is the direction of conduct towards the object
chosen upon considering the motives which suggest
the choice. Preparation consists in devising or
arranging the means or measures necessary for the
commission of the offence. It differs widely from
attempt which is the direct movement towards the
commission after preparations are made. Preparation
to commit an offence is punishable only when the
preparation is to commit offences under Section 122
(waging war against the Government of India) and
Section 399 (preparation to commit dacoity). The
dividing, line between a mere preparation and an
attempt is sometimes thin and has to be decided on the
facts of each case. There is a greater degree of
determination in attempt as compared with
preparation.
10. An attempt to commit an offence is an act, or a
series of acts, which leads inevitably to the
commission of the offence, unless something, which
the doer of the act neither foresaw nor intended,
happens to prevent this. An attempt may be described
to be an act done in part execution of a criminal
design, amounting to more than mere preparation, but
falling short of actual consummation, and, possessing,
except for failure to consummate, all the elements of
the substantive crime. In other words, an attempt
consists in it the intent to commit a crime, falling short
CR No. 561/2023 Shailender Aggarwal v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
CR No. 593/2023 Dr. D v. State & Anr. Page No. 36 of 49
Digitally signed
by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.03.11
16:11:50 +0530
of, its actual commission or
consummation/completion. It may consequently be
defined as that which if not prevented would have
resulted in the full consummation of the act attempted.
The illustrations given in Section 511 clearly show the
legislative intention to make a difference between the
cases of a mere preparation and an attempt.
11. In order to find an accused guilty of an attempt
with intent to commit a rape, Court has to be satisfied
that the accused, when he laid hold of the prosecutrix,
not only desired to gratify his passions upon her
person, but that he intended to do so at all events, and
notwithstanding any resistance on her part. Indecent
assaults are often magnified into attempts at rape. In
order to come to a conclusion that the conduct of the
accused was indicative of a determination to gratify
his passion at all events, and in spite of all resistance,
materials must exist. Surrounding circumstances
many times throw beacon light on that aspect.
12. The sine qua non of the offence of rape is
penetration, and not ejaculation. Ejaculation without
penetration constitutes an attempt to commit rape and
not actual rape. Definition of “rape” as contained in
Section 375 IPC refers to “sexual intercourse” and the
Explanation appended to the Section provides that
penetration is sufficient to constitute the sexual
intercourse necessary to the offence of rape.
Intercourse means sexual connection. In the instant
case that connection has not been established. Courts
below were not correct in their view.”
(Emphasis supplied)
28. Consequently, being wary of principles/judicial
dictates hereinunder noted and the arguments addressed, this Court
would now proceed with the appreciation of the material placed on
record. In this regard, this Court deems it pertinent to outrightly
deal with the contention of Ld. Counsel for the accused that the Ld.
Trial Court failed to appreciate the CCTV footage placed on record
of the Ld. Trial Court, which proves the plea of alibi of the
accused. As aforenoted, Ld. Counsel for the accused vehemently
asserted that as per the prosecution the alleged incident occurred at
07.00 p.m. on 14.09.2016, however, the relevant CCTV footage,
CR No. 561/2023 Shailender Aggarwal v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
CR No. 593/2023 Dr. D v. State & Anr. Page No. 37 of 49
Digitally signed
by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
Date:
GOYAL 2025.03.11
16:11:55
+0530
placed on record of the Ld. Trial Court, duly proves that the
accused had entered into his house at about 18:05:54 hours and left
his house at about 20:29:24 hours on the said day, establishing that
the accused was present at his house at the alleged time of incident
on 14.09.2016. Accordingly, Ld. Counsel has asserted that the
charges ought not to have been framed against the accused as the
said footage clearly demonstrates the presence of the accused
elsewhere (at his house). Correspondingly, Ld. Counsel for the
accused vehemently relied on the FSL report dated 25.04.2019 in
this regard, wherein it has been noted as under;
“…RESULTS OF EXAMINATION/OPNION:
The laboratory examination of CCTV Footage in
Video file in “Exhibit-1”, it was observed that Video
files are continuous footage of CCTV Recordings.
There is no indication of alteration in continuous
footage of CCTV recording on the basis of frame by
frame analysis using Video Analyst System.
The Auditory analysis by critical listening,
subsequent waveform and spectrographic analysis of
acoustic signals of each audio file in “Exhibit-1″ it
was revealed that the signal are continuous form of
audio recording and there is no indication of alteration
by using CSL (computerized Speech Lab.)…”
(Emphasis supplied)
29. However, when the material placed on record is
conscientiously analyzed, the aforesaid contention of the Ld.
Counsel for the accused fails to impress this Court. In this regard,
this Court outrightly observes that even conceding/yielding that
the FSL report correctly records that there is no indication of
alteration in the continuous footage of CCTV recording, same, in
the considered opinion of this Court, cannot be read to reach at an
unwavering conclusion that the time noted on such CCTV footage
aligned with the actual time of the said day or that the same
coincided with the time of occurrence, bereft of a proper trial and
CR No. 561/2023 Shailender Aggarwal v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
CR No. 593/2023 Dr. D v. State & Anr. Page No. 38 of 49
Digitally signed
by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.03.11
16:11:58 +0530
evidence being led in this regard. In other words, presuming for the
sake of argument, the instant FLS report is unblemished, it would
not be safe to reach at a conclusion that the CCTV footage was in
fact recording the timing of the fateful day in its exactitude,
especially when the proceedings are still at a nascent stage and the
evidence is yet to be led/adduced. Correspondingly, this Court is
also in concurrence with the finding of the Ld. Trial Court that
opinion of an expert, by its very nature, is only a corroborative
piece of evidence as an expert witness is not a witness of fact.
Clearly, such an opinion can only be put to test and objectively
analyzed only during the course of trial. As a corollary, bereft of
necessary evidence/material being put forth to the complainant
and other witnesses, including the expert, in the considered
opinion of this Court, it would not be safe to simply rely on the said
CCTV footage to reach a conclusion that the accused was not
present at the spot or that he had no occasion to commit the
offence, especially when the complainant has consistently asserted
regarding the same in her statement recorded before the police
officials as well as before the Ld. MM, in terms of the provisions
under Section 164 Cr.P.C. Needless to note here that the superior
courts21 have persistently declared that a plea of ‘ alibi’ is a
question of fact which is required to be proved by an accused at the
stage of trial to show by adducing appropriate evidence that he/she
was elsewhere and was falsely implicated in a case. Reference in
this regard is further made to the decision in Neetesh Sharma v.
The State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors., MANU/MP/4449/2024,
wherein the Hon’ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh, while
scrupulously delving into the said issue, explicated the law as21
Satish v. State of U.P. & Ors., MANU/UP/3612/2024.
CR No. 561/2023 Shailender Aggarwal v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
CR No. 593/2023 Dr. D v. State & Anr. Page No. 39 of 49Digitally
signed by
ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.03.11
16:12:03
+0530
under;
“5. The moot question for consideration is
whether this Court can discharge the petitioner by
accepting his defence of plea of alibi or not?
6. The Supreme Court in the case of Vijay Pal v.
State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), reported in
MANU/SC/0230/2015: 2015:INSC:194: (2015) 4
SCC 749 has held as under:
*** *** ***
The said principle has been reiterated in Gurpreet
Singh v. State of Haryana, Sk. Sattar v. State of
Maharashtra and Jitender Kumar v. State of Haryana.
7. The Supreme Court in the case of S.K.Sattar v.
State of Maharashtra, reported in
MANU/SC/0649/2010: 2010:INSC:546: (2010) 8
SCC 430 has held as under :
*** *** ***
8. The Supreme Court in the case of Binay Kumar
Singh v. State of Bihar, reported in
MANU/SC/0088/1997: 1996:INSC:1260: (1997) 1
SCC 283 has held as under:
*** *** ***
Thus, it is clear that so far as defence of plea of
alibi is concerned, it is required to be proved by
leading cogent evidence and it cannot be proved by
preponderance of probabilities. It is a disputed
question of fact that cannot be adjudicated by the
Court while exercising power under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India…”
(Emphasis supplied)
30. Reverting now to the contention of the Ld. Counsel
for the accused that the Ld. Trial Court did not consider the
transcript placed on record by the accused of the memory
card/recording on the mobile phones of the complainant, accused
and other persons demonstrating that the complainant and such
other persons engaged in criminal conspiracy to falsely implicate
the accused in the present case, this Court outrightly observes that
the said contention too falls flat before this Court. In this regard, it
is reiterated that the Ld. Counsel for the accused vehemently
asserted that the Ld. Trial Court wrongly dismissed the accused’s
CR No. 561/2023 Shailender Aggarwal v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
CR No. 593/2023 Dr. D v. State & Anr. Page No. 40 of 49
Digitally signed
by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
Date:
GOYAL 2025.03.11
16:12:07
+0530
application under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. inter alia seeking
directions to the IO to submit the transcript of the audio recording,
present in the memory card, mobile phone, etc., of the
complainant’s mobile phone, besides the Ld. Trial Court did not
consider the transcript of the said recording placed on record by
the Ld. Trial Court. However, as aforenoted, when the said
contentions of the Ld. Counsel for the accused when judiciously
probed, in light of the material placed on record, this Court finds
itself difficult to concede that the Ld. Trial Court committed any
irregularity, impropriety or palpable error in dismissing the
accused’s application under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. or failed to
consider the material placed on record while framing charges, as
otherwise contended by the Ld. Counsel. On the contrary, even if
the argument of Ld. Counsel for the accused in this regard is
conceded and the transcript placed on record by the accused is read
at the present of charge, the veracity, context as well as the
relevance of such transcript/conversation of alleged conspiracy
between the complainant and others to falsely implicate the
accused in the present case can be examined, evaluated and
determined only once evidence is led before the Ld. Trial Court.
Clearly, bereft of such evidence placed on record, it would not be
in consonance with the repeated declarations of the superior
courts, as hereinunder noted, to reach a conclusion that the accused
was falsely implicated in the present case in furtherance of such
alleged conspiracy. Needless to reiterate that at the stage of charge,
only the contents of the chargesheet and the material placed
therewith can be considered by court to reach a conclusion of
prima facie case and strong suspicion of commission of offence by
an accused and that the defence of an accused cannot be
CR No. 561/2023 Shailender Aggarwal v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
CR No. 593/2023 Dr. D v. State & Anr. Page No. 41 of 49
Digitally signed
by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.03.11
16:12:22 +0530
considered at such a stage. Clearly, seen in such perspective, this
Court is further in concurrence with the determination of the Ld.
Trial Court that the accused can prove his defence that the instant
case was initiated by the complainant in furtherance of conspiracy
between her/the complainant and others, only during the trial and
that since the IO has already seized the case property, which would
be adduced during the trial proceedings, no ground for taking the
transcript on record or to direct the IO to file the same on record are
made out in the instant case. On the contrary, from a thorough
review of the material placed on record of the Ld. Trial Court,
including the contents of the chargesheet/supplementary
chargesheet, complaint and statement of the victim/complainant
and other witnesses; MLC of the victim; statement of the
complainant recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. as well as the
recovery and seizure memo(s) placed on record, this Court is in
complete alliance/consonance with the determination of the Ld.
Trial Court that a prima facie case under Sections
354/354A/354D/451/506/323 IPC stands established against the
accused/revisionist, namely, Shailender in the present case.
Further, from the perusal of case record, it is revealed that there is
strong suspicion and sufficient material/ground(s) to proceed
against the said accused, besides there are witnesses who can
depose against him. Needless to accentuate that when the
complaint/statements of the complainant recorded under Section
161/164 Cr.P.C. are read in conjunction with each other there are
specific allegations of accused persistently and repeatedly trying
to contact of contacting the accused against her interest and despite
the complainant’s clear indication of disinterest. As aforenoted,
the complainant, explicated under her statement, recorded in termsCR No. 561/2023 Shailender Aggarwal v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
CR No. 593/2023 Dr. D v. State & Anr. Page No. 42 of 49Digitally signed
by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.03.11
16:12:27 +0530
of the provisions under Section 164 Cr.P.C., that the accused
continued to follow and/or contacted/attempted to contact her/the
complainant on 17.05.2015, 12.06.2016, 15/16.05.2016 and
14.09.2016 in order to foster personal interaction with the
complainant, repeatedly, despite a clear indication of disinterest on
her part, prima facie, establishing a case under Section 354D IPC
against the accused. Correspondingly, the complainant, explicated
under her complaint/various statements that on 14.09.2016, the
accused forcibly entered her house, assaulted her, pushed her
breast, tried to open the knot of her salwar, besides threatened
her/the complainant of dire consequences of defaming the
complainant, in case she disclosed anything about the incident to
anyone. Quite evidently, the complainant consistently proclaimed
of the accused’s touching her private part(s)/pushing her breast,
without her consent, by using criminal force with an intention to
outrage her modesty. As aforenoted, considering that the superior
courts have tirelessly declared that the essence of a woman’s
modesty is her sex and that touching of the victim’s body, i.e.,
breasts, mouth any other body parts, etc., by an accused, without
the consent of the complainant/victim, would indubitably and
plainly fall within the four corners of the provisions under Section
354/354A IPC, in the instant case, from the material placed on
record, provisions of Sections 323/354/354A IPC are prima facie
established against the accused. Needless to reiterate the
complainant averred that the accused threatened her of dire
consequences of defaming her on the said date, post commission
of the incident, besides the complainant avowed of the accused’s
forcibly entering her dwelling/house with an intention to commit
offence, in the considered opinion of this Court, sufficient to makeCR No. 561/2023 Shailender Aggarwal v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
CR No. 593/2023 Dr. D v. State & Anr. Page No. 43 of 49
Digitally signed
ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.03.11
16:12:30 +0530
out strong suspicion and prima facie case under Sections 451/506
IPC against the accused, in the instant case.
31. However, now coming to contention of the Ld.
Counsel for the complainant that the charges under Sections 376
IPC/Section 376 IPC read with Section 511 IPC ought to have
been framed against the accused in the instant case, this Court
outrightly notes that nowhere under the complaint or any of the
statements of the complainant is there any allegation of
commission of rape in the instant case. On the contrary, under the
said statements/complaint, the complainant persistently asserted
that the accused tried to rape her and that there is no assertion of
any penetration or even slightest degree of penetration, digital or
otherwise is forthcoming under any of the statements/complaint of
the complainant so as to be sufficient to charge the accused of the
offence under Section(s) 375/376 IPC in the instant case. Needless
to mention that the complainant is educated, admittedly being a
Doctor by profession. Ergo, under such circumstances, bereft of
clear indication/allegation of rape, in the considered opinion of this
Court, no infirmity can be attributed to the impugned order in so
far as the Ld. Trial Court does not direct framing of charges under
the said provision.
32. In so far as the contention of Ld. Counsel for the
complainant pertaining to non-framing of charges under Section
376 read with Section 511 IPC is concerned, it is reiterated that
nowhere under any of her statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. or
her complaint or the statement recorded in terms of the provision
under Section 164 Cr.P.C., the complainant gave any indication of
the acts constituting attempt to rape in the instant case. As
aforenoted, the complainant despite being educated and Doctor by
CR No. 561/2023 Shailender Aggarwal v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
CR No. 593/2023 Dr. D v. State & Anr. Page No. 44 of 49
Digitally signed
by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
Date:
GOYAL 2025.03.11
16:12:34
+0530
profession merely asserted that the complainant attempted to rape
her. However, such bald allegation, in the considered opinion of
this Court, does not make out even a prima facie case for the
offence(s) under Section 376 IPC read with Section 511 IPC.
Needless to mention that there is no allegation of
performing/doing a specific act towards the commission of
offence of rape by the accused, which could not be completed, but
for the timely of intervention in such act. Clearly, mere vague
allegation that accused tried to commit rape upon the complainant,
does not ipso facto attract penal provision of offence under Section
376 IPC read with Section 511 IPC. In fact, the law is trite22 that for
an offence of attempt to rape, the the accused must have so
advanced in his actions that it would have resulted into rape had
some extraneous factors not intervened. In other words, there must
be specific allegation and evidence on record to prima facie
establish that accused has done an act towards commission of
offence of rape as defined in section 375 IPC, but for intervention
in that act. However, as aforenoted, in the instant case, no such
assertion(s) is/are forthcoming under any of the
statements/complaint of the complainant, even indicating to the
slightest or making out even a prima facie case/strong suspicion to
reach a conclusion that provisions under Section 376/511 IPC are
attracted in the present case. Here, this Court deems it further
apposite to observe that the contention of Ld. Counsel for the
complainant that the complainant asserted in her complainant that
the accused tried to pounce on her is sufficient to attract provisions
under Section 376/511 IPC in the instant case, does not find favour
with this Court. Pertinent to note in this regard that the said
22
State v. Sachin Singh & Ors., Crl. Rev. Pet. 315/2019, dated 08.02.2023 (DHC).
CR No. 561/2023 Shailender Aggarwal v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
CR No. 593/2023 Dr. D v. State & Anr. Page No. 45 of 49
Digitally signed
ABHISHEK by ABHISHEK
GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.03.11
16:12:37 +0530
assertion/allegation is not related to the incident of 14.09.2016,
when the complainant alleged that the accused “tried to rape me”.
On the contrary, from a meticulous review of the said complaint it
is noted that the said assertion is also general in nature, with no
indication of any date, time and place of such occurrence, so as to
convince of a prima facie case for framing said charges against the
accused in the instant case. Reference in respect of the foregoing is
further made to the decision of the Hon’ble High Court of Madhya
Pradesh in Premnarayan v. State of M.P., MANU/MP/0215/1988,
wherein the Hon’ble Court noted in an akin situation as under;
“Every criminal act of rape or an attempt thereof
does involve an indecent assault. In order to amount to
an attempt to commit an offence, the act of the
accused must have proceeded beyond the stage of
‘preparation’. If the act of the accused does not
constitute anything beyond preparation and falls short
of an attempt, he may escape the liability under
Sections 376/511, I.P.C, and may he liable to be
convicted only for an offence amounting to an
indecent assault. Their Lordships of the Supreme
Court observed in Abhayanand Mishra v. State of
Bihar MANU/SC/0124/1961: 1961CriLJ822 :
There is a thin line between the preparation for and
an attempt to commit an offence. Undoubtedly, a
culprit first intends to commit the offence, then
makes preparation for committing it and thereafter
attempts to commit the offence. If the attempt
succeeds, he has committed the offence, if it fails
due to reasons beyond his control, he is said to
have attempted to commit the offence. Attempt to
commit an offence, therefore, can be said to begin
when the preparations are complete and the culprit
commences to do something with the intention of
committing the offence and which is a step
towards the commission of the offence. The
moment tie commences to do an act with the
necessary intention, he commences his attempt to
commit the offence. A person commits the offence
of “attempt to commit a particular offence,” when
(i) he intends to commit that particular offence;
and (ii) he, having made preparations and with the
intention to commit the offence, does an act
towards its commission, such an act need not be
CR No. 561/2023 Shailender Aggarwal v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
CR No. 593/2023 Dr. D v. State & Anr. Page No. 46 of 49
Digitally signed by
ABHISHEK ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date: 2025.03.11
16:12:40 +0530
the penultimate act towards the commission of that
offence but must be an act during the course of
committing that offence…”
(Emphasis supplied)
33. Consequently, in conspectus of above, further being
wary of the aforenoted judicial principles, in light of the arguments
addressed by the Ld. Counsel for the accused, Ld. Counsel for the
complainant as well as by Ld. Addl. PP for the State, this Court
reiterates that from the facts and circumstances of the case,
material and the documents placed on record of the Ld. Trial
Court, including inter alia the contents of the
chargesheet/supplementary chargesheet, complaint and statement
of the victim/complainant and other witnesses; MLC of the victim;
statement of the complainant recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C.
as well as the recovery and seizure memo(s) placed on record, this
Court is in concurrence with the determination of the Ld. Trial
Court that a prima facie case under Sections
354/354A/354D/451/506/323 IPC stands established against the
accused/revisionist, namely, Shailender. It is reiterated that the
complainant expounded under her statement, recorded in terms of
the provisions under Section 164 Cr.P.C., that the accused
continued to follow and/or contacted/attempted to contact her/the
complainant on 17.05.2015, 12.06.2016, 15.05.2016 and
14.09.2016 in order to foster personal interaction with the
complainant, repeatedly, despite a clear indication of disinterest on
her part, prima facie, establishing a case under Section 354D IPC
against the accused. Correspondingly, the complainant, explicated
under her complaint/various statements that on 14.09.2016, the
accused forcibly entered her house, assaulted her, pushed her
breast, tried to open the knot of her salwar, besides threatened
CR No. 561/2023 Shailender Aggarwal v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
CR No. 593/2023 Dr. D v. State & Anr. Page No. 47 of 49
Digitally signed
by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
Date:
GOYAL 2025.03.11
16:12:43
+0530
her/the complainant of dire consequences of defaming the
complainant, in case she disclosed anything about the incident to
anyone. Quite evidently, the complainant consistently proclaimed
of the accused’s touching her private part(s)/pushing her breast,
without her consent, by using criminal force with an intention to
outrage her modesty, prima facie attracting the provisions under
Sections 323/354/354A IPC against the accused. Needless to
reiterate the complainant averred that the accused threatened her of
dire consequences of defaming her on the said date, post
commission of the incident, besides the complainant avowed of
the accused’s forcibly entering her dwelling/house with an
intention to commit offence, in the considered opinion of this
Court, sufficient to make out strong suspicion and prima facie case
under Sections 451/506 IPC against the accused, in the instant
case.
34. Accordingly, in light of the aforesaid discussion, this
Court unwaveringly records and reiterates that no irregularity,
impropriety palpable error or non-compliance of the provision of
law is demonstrable under the impugned order/order dated
14.09.2023, passed by Ld. MM-03, Central, (Mahila Court),
Central, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi in Cr. Case No. 8738/2017, titled
as; ‘State v. Shailendra Aggarwal‘, arising out of FIR No.
280/2016, PS. Subzi Mandi, under Sections
354/354A/506/323/452/509 IPC, directing framing of charges
under Sections 354/354A/354D/451/506/323 IPC against the
accused and dismissing the accused’s applications under Sections
239/173(8) Cr.P.C. Needless to mention that though it holds
highest regard for the decisions relied, however, the same would
not come to the parties, in the manner as proposed, as the facts and
CR No. 561/2023 Shailender Aggarwal v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
CR No. 593/2023 Dr. D v. State & Anr. Page No. 48 of 49
Digitally signed
by ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.03.11
16:12:47 +0530
circumstances of the present case are clearly distinguishable.
35. Conclusively, in light of the above, this Court
unambiguously observes that instant revision petitions, i.e., Crl.
Rev. No. 561/2023, preferred by Sh. Shailender Aggarwal,
seeking discharge of the accused from the allegations/charges
framed against him; and Crl. Rev. No. 593/2023, preferred by Dr.
‘D’, seeking directions for committal of the present before the Ld.
Sessions Judge, both, deserve to be dismissed for the reasons as
aforenoted, and are hereby, accordingly, dismissed. Trial Court
Record along with a copy of this judgment be sent to the Ld. Trial
Court concerned for information and compliance. As a corollary,
impugned order dated 14.09.2023, passed by the Ld. Trial Court is
hereby, upheld.
36. Revision files be consigned to record room after due
compliance. Digitally
signed by
ABHISHEK
ABHISHEK GOYAL
GOYAL Date:
2025.03.11
16:12:53
+0530Announced in the open Court (Abhishek Goyal)
on 11.03.2025. ASJ-03, Central District,
Tis Hazari Courts, DelhiCR No. 561/2023 Shailender Aggarwal v. State (GNCT of Delhi)
CR No. 593/2023 Dr. D v. State & Anr. Page No. 49 of 49
