Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 07.03.2025 vs Himachal Road Transport Corp. & Ors on 11 March, 2025
Bench: Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Sushil Kukreja
2025:HHC:5615-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA.
CWP No. 3744 of 2019
Reserved on: 07.03.2025
Date of decision: 11.03.2025
Jai Kumar & Ors. ...Petitioners
Versus
Himachal Road Transport Corp. & Ors.
...Respondents
Coram
The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge.
The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sushil Kukreja, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting? No.
For the Petitioners: Mr. Parveen Kumar Thakur, Advocate.
For the Respondents: Ms. Shubh Mahajan, Advocate, for
respondent No. 1.
Respondent No. 2 in person.
Mr. Dilip Sharma, Sr. Advocate with Mr.
Manish Sharma, Advocate, for
respondents No. 3 to 5.
Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge
The petitioners have filed the instant petition
assailing the selection that was made way back in the year,
2004, as would be evident from the relief claimed in this petition
which reads as under:-
(i) That the selection and appointment of the ineligible
candidates as per the Inquiry Report, who were wrongly
and illegally selected to the post of Transport Multi-
Purpose Assistants (Conductors) made in the year 2004
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by the respondents, may kindly be quashed and set
aside and the respondents No. 1 & 2 may kindly be
directed to give appointment to the petitioners to the
post of Transport Multi Purpose Assistant (Conductor)
from the due date with all consequential benefits.
or
In the alternative, the respondents No. 1 & 2 may kindly
be directed to give appointment to the petitioners on
priority basis against the vacancies of Conductors to be
published by the respondents in near future without
subjecting the petitioner to face the interview and
written examination by granting special relaxation in
the age limit, because the petitioners had already
qualified the written examination in the year 2003-2004
and thereafter, they were interviewed by the
respondent-Corporation, but in order to give the benefit
to their near and dear and by adopting the policy of pick
& choose, their merit and candidature has been ignored
and they were deprived from the appointment.
2. The instant petition has been filed on 26.08.2019,
meaning thereby, after an inordinate delay of 15 years.
3. It is more than settled that if a person wants to
invoke jurisdiction of a writ court, he should come to the court at
the earliest reasonable possible opportunity. An inordinate delay
in making the motion for a writ would indeed be a good ground
for refusing to exercise such discretionary jurisdiction. The
underlying object of this principle is not to encourage agitation of
stale claim and exhume matters which have already been
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disposed of or settled or where the rights of a third party have
accrued in the meantime.
4. On the aspect of delay and laches and they reflect on
writ proceedings, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in its recent
decision in Mrinmoy Matty vs. Chhanda Koley and others,
AIR 2024 SC 2717, reiterated the legal position thus:-
9. Having heard rival contentions raised and on perusal of
the facts obtained in the present case, we are of the
considered view that writ petitioner ought to have been
non-suited or in other words writ petition ought to have
been dismissed on the ground of delay and laches itself.
An applicant who approaches the court belatedly or in
other words sleeps over his rights for a considerable
period of time, wakes up from his deep slumber ought not
to be granted the extraordinary relief by the writ courts.
This Court time and again has held that delay defeats
equity. Delay or laches is one of the factors which should
be born in mind by the High Court while exercising
discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India. In a given case, the High Court may refuse to
invoke its extraordinary powers if laxity on the part of the
applicant to assert his right has allowed the cause of
action to drift away and attempts are made subsequently
to rekindle the lapsed cause of action.
10. The discretion to be exercised would be with care and
caution. If the delay which has occasioned in approaching
the writ court is explained which would appeal to the
conscience of the court, in such circumstances it cannot
be gainsaid by the contesting party that for all times to
come the delay is not to be condoned. There may be
myriad circumstances which gives rise to the invoking of
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the extraordinary jurisdiction and it all depends on facts
and circumstances of each case, same cannot be
described in a straight jacket formula with mathematical
precision. The ultimate discretion to be exercised by the
writ court depends upon the facts that it has to travel or
the terrain in which the facts have travelled.
11. For filing of a writ petition, there is no doubt that no
fixed period of limitation is prescribed. However, when the
extraordinary jurisdiction of the writ court is invoked, it
has to be seen as to whether within a reasonable time
same has been invoked and even submitting of memorials
would not revive the dead cause of action or resurrect the
cause of action which has had a natural death. In such
circumstances on the ground of delay and laches alone,
the appeal ought to be dismissed or the applicant ought
to be non-suited. If it is found that the writ petitioner is
guilty of delay and laches, the High Court ought to dismiss
the petition on that sole ground itself, in as much as the
writ courts are not to indulge in permitting such indolent
litigant to take advantage of his own wrong. It is true that
there cannot be any waiver of fundamental right but while
exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226, the
High Court will have to necessarily take into consideration
the delay and laches on the part of the applicant in
approaching a writ court. This Court in the case of Tridip
Kumar Dingal and others v. State of W.B and
others., (2009) 1 SCC 768 has held to the following
effect:
“56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is no
doubt true that there can be no waiver of
fundamental right. But while exercising discretionary
jurisdiction under Articles 32, 226, 227 or 136 of the
Constitution, this Court takes into account certain
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2025:HHC:5615-DBfactors and one of such considerations is delay and
laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a
writ court. It is well settled that power to issue a writ
is discretionary. One of the grounds for refusing
reliefs under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution is
that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches.
57. If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a
writ court, he should come to the Court at the
earliest reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate
delay in making the motion for a writ will indeed be a
good ground for refusing to exercise such
discretionary jurisdiction. The underlying object of
this principle is not to encourage agitation of stale
claims and exhume matters which have already been
disposed of or settled or where the rights of third
parties have accrued in the meantime (vide State of
M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai [AIR 1964 SC 1006 : (1964)
6 SCR 261], Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Court
[AIR 1967 SC 1450] and Bhoop Singh v. Union
of India [(1992) 3 SCC 136 : (1992) 21 ATC
675 : (1992) 2 SCR 969] ). This principle applies
even in case of an infringement of fundamental right
(vide Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi
[(1969) 1 SCC 110] , Durga Prashad v. Chief
Controller of Imports & Exports [(1969) 1 SCC
185] and Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India
[(1970) 1 SCC 84] ).
58. There is no upper limit and there is no lower limit
as to when a person can approach a court. The
question is one of discretion and has to be decided
on the basis of facts before the court depending on
and varying from case to case. It will depend upon
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remedy claimed are and when and how the delay
arose.”
12. It is apposite to take note of the dicta laid down by
this Court in Karnataka Power Corportion Ltd. and
another v. K. Thangappan and another, (2006) 4
SCC 322 whereunder it has been held that the High Court
may refuse to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction if there is
negligence or omissions on the part of the applicant to
assert his right. It has been further held thereunder:
“6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to
be borne in mind by the High Court when they
exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226
of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High
Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers
if there is such negligence or omission on the part of
the applicant to assert his right as taken in
conjunction with the lapse of time and other
circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite
party. Even where fundamental right is involved the
matter is still within the discretion of the Court as
pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller
of Imports and Exports [(1969) 1 SCC 185 : AIR
1970 SC 769] . Of course, the discretion has to be
exercised judicially and reasonably.
7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes
Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper
Armstrong Hurd [(1874) 5 PC 221 : 22 WR 492]
(PC at p. 239) was approved by this Court in Moon
Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher [AIR 1967 SC 1450] and
Maharashtra SRTC v. Shri Balwant Regular
7
2025:HHC:5615-DBMotor Service [(1969) 1 SCR 808 : AIR 1969 SC
329] .
Sir Barnes had stated:
“Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not
an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would
be practically unjust to give a remedy either because
the party has, by his conduct done that which might
fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or
where by his conduct and neglect he has though
perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other
party in a situation in which it would not be
reasonable to place him if the remedy were
afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases,
lapse of time and delay are most material. But in
every case, if an argument against relief, which
otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay,
that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any
statute of limitation, the validity of that defence
must be tried upon principles substantially equitable.
Two circumstances always important in such cases
are, the length of the delay and the nature of the
acts done during the interval which might affect
either party and cause a balance of justice or
injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far
as it relates to the remedy.”
8. It would be appropriate to note certain decisions
of this Court in which this aspect has been dealt with
in relation to Article 32 of the Constitution. It is
apparent that what has been stated as regards that
article would apply, a fortiori, to Article 226. It was
observed in Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India
[(1970) 1 SCC 84 : AIR 1970 SC 470] that no
relief can be given to the petitioner who without any
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reasonable explanation approaches this Court under
Article 32 after inordinate delay. It was stated that
though Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right, it does
not follow from this that it was the intention of the
Constitution-makers that this Court should disregard
all principles and grant relief in petitions filed after
inordinate delay.
9. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal
[(1986) 4 SCC 566 : AIR 1987 SC 251] that the
High Court in exercise of its discretion does not
ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the
acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate
delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is
not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may
decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its
writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is
premised on a number of factors. The High Court
does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the
extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause
confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in its
train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is
exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the
effect of inflicting not only hardship and
inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It
was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is
invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation
of third-party rights in the meantime is an important
factor which also weighs with the High Court in
deciding whether or not to exercise such
jurisdiction.”
13. Reiterating the aspect of delay and laches would
disentitle the discretionary relief being granted, this Court
in the case of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply &
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Sewerage Board and others v. T.T. Murali Babu,
(2014) 4 SCC 108 has held:
“16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should
not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required
to weigh the explanation offered and the
acceptability of the same. The court should bear in
mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and
equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has
a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but
simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary
principle that when an aggrieved person, without
adequate reason, approaches the court at his own
leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal
obligation to scrutinise whether the lis at a belated
stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay
comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances
delay and laches may not be fatal but in most
circumstances inordinate delay would only invite
disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of
the court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on
the part of a litigant — a litigant who has forgotten
the basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the
greatest thief of time” and second, law does not
permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay
does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis.”
5. Having regard to the settled principle of law
enunciated here-in-above, when we turn our attention to the
facts on hand, it would no longer detain us for too long for
coming to the conclusion that the petition is barred by delay and
laches, as the petitioners have approached this Court after an
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inordinate delay of 15 years, that too, without there being any
explanation whatsoever for such delay.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioners would argue that
since the petitioners were unaware of certain proceedings that
had been initiated by the Vigilance Department against
respondent No. 2 and upon learning of the same, they had
promptly filed this petition, which only came to their notice in the
year, 2019, therefore, there is no delay whatsoever.
7. However, we are not impressed by such arguments,
firstly for the reasons that if at all the petitioners felt that there
was malpractice or irregularity in the selection process, they
ought not have waited for other people or authority to take
action against such illegality, but ought to have moved the Court
/ Tribunal themselves, knowing fully well that someone else was
not going to fight their battle, given the fact that in those
proceedings, the authority or court could at best have held the
selection process to be vitiated, but what the petitioners are
seeking is their appointments, which relief could not have been
granted in those proceedings.
8. That apart, the petitioners are otherwise guilty of
suppressio veri and suppressio falsi, as they have on affidavit
categorically stated in para 23 as under:-
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“23. That the petitioners have not filed any other petition
on the same and similar grounds in any other Court of law
including the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India.”
9. This averment is false to the very knowledge of the
petitioners because alongwith the petition they themselves
annexed a copy of the complaint filed by them against the
official-respondents under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. wherein
verbatim allegations have been set out against the official
respondents.
10. Interestingly, this complaint is dated 24.01.2017 and
cognizance thereof stands taken by the Court on 03.02.2017.
This goes to indicate that:
(i) the averment that the petitioners had not filed the
same or similar petition is false;
(ii) the arguments that the petitioners had acquired
knowledge about the so called irregularity in the
year, 2019 and thereafter promptly filed the petition
is also a blatant lie.
11. It is more than settled that one must approach the
Court with clean hand, clean mind, clean heart and a clean
objective.
12. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed on the
ground of unexplained delay and laches, without examining the
merits of the case.
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Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
(Tarlok Singh Chauhan)
Judge
(Sushil Kukreja)
11th March, 2025 Judge
(sanjeev)
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