Karnataka High Court
Smt. Geetha W/O Rangappa Walikar vs The Assistant Commissioner on 21 February, 2025
Author: Suraj Govindaraj
Bench: Suraj Govindaraj
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®
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA,
DHARWAD BENCH
DATED THIS THE 21ST DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURAJ GOVINDARAJ
WRIT PETITION NO. 101344 OF 2025 (LB-RES)
BETWEEN:
1. SMT. GEETHA
W/O RANGAPPA WALIKAR
AGE 46 YEARS
OCC: PRESIDENT
HIREGONNAGAR GRAM PANCHAYAT
TQ KUSHTAGI
DIST KOPPAL PIN 583277
2. SRI BASANAGOUDA
S/O GIREGOUDA MASAKATTI
AGE47 YEARS
OCC: VICE PRESIDENT
HIREGONNAGAR GRAM PANCHAYAT
TQ KUSHTAGI
DIST KOPPAL PIN 583277
Digitally signed
by SHWETHA ...PETITIONERS
RAGHAVENDRA (BY SRI. ANAND R KOLLI,ADVOCATE)
Location: HIGH
COURT OF
KARNATAKA AND:
1. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER
KOPPAL DISTRICT
KOPPAL PIN 583239
2. THE PANCHAYAT DEVELOPMENT OFFICE
HIREGONNAGAR GRAM PANCHAYAT
TQ KUSHTAGI
DIST KOPPAL PIN 583277
3. SRI SANGAPPA
S/O YELLAPPA KUMBAR
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AGE 45 YEARS
OCC MEMBER
HIREGONNAGAR GRAM PANCHAYAT
R/O HIEGONNAGAR
TQ KUSHTAGI
DIST KOPPAL PIN 583 277
4. SMT GANGAVVA
W/O HANAMAPPA HARIJAN
AGE 38 YEARS
OCC MEMBER
HIREGONNAGAR GRAM PANCHAYAT
R/O HIREGONNAGAR
TQ KUSHTAGI
DIST KOPPAL
PIN 583 277
5. SMT RENUKA
W/O HANAMAPPA MENASGERI
AGE 35 YEARS
OCC MEMBER
HIREGONNAGAR GRAM PANCHAYAT
R/O HIREGONNAGAR
TQ KUSHTAGI
DIST KOPPAL
PIN 583 277
6. SMT MASAMMA
W/O SHARANAPPA MENASGERI
AGE 40 YEARS
OCC MEMBER
HIREGONNAGAR GRAM PANCHAYAT
R/O HIREGONNAGAR
TQ KUSHTAGI
DIST KOPPAL
PIN 583 277
7. SMT MALLAVVA HANAMAPPA KADAD
AGE 44 YEARS
OCC MEMBER
HIREGONNAGAR GRAM PANCHAYAT
R/O NARASAPUR
TQ KUSHTAGI
DIST KOPPAL
PIN 583 277
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8. SRI KALAKAPPA YELLAPPA KADAD
AGE: 45 YEARS
OCC MEMBER
HIREGONNAGAR GRAM PANCHAYAT
R/O NARASAPURA
TQ KUSHTAGI
DIST KOPPAL
PIN 583 277
9. SMT PARVATI NAGAPPA ANGADI
AGE 34 YEARS
OCC MEMBER
HIREGONNAGAR GRAM PANCHAYAT
R/O MOOGANUR
TQ KUSHTAGI
DIST KOPPAL
PIN 583 277
10. SRI DASTAGIRSAB HUSENSAB JULKATTI
AGE 48 YEARS
OCC MEMBER
HIREGONNAGAR GRAM PANCHAYAT
R/O MOOGANUR
TQ KUSHTAGI
DIST KOPPAL
PIN 583277
11. KALAKAPPA BHEEMAPPA ADAPATTI
AGE 34 YEARS
OC MEMBER
HIREGONNAGAR GRAM PANCHAYT
R/O MOOGANUR
TQ KUSHTAGI
DIST KOPPAL
PIN 583277
12. SMT RAJEYABEGAM LATIFSAB JULKATTI
AGE 44 YEARS
OCC MEMBER
HIREGONNAGAR GRAM PANCHAYAT
R/O MOOGANUR
TQ KUSHTAGI
DIST KOPPAL
PIN 583277
13. SRI MAHANTESH YAMANAPPA GUDADAR
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AGE 45 YEARS
OCC MEMBER
HIREGONNAGAR GRAM PANCHAYAT
R/O WARIKAL
TQ KUSHTAGI
DIST KOPPAL
PIN 583277
14. SMT SHARANAVVA NINGAPPA MAYGERI
AGE 48 YEARS
OC MEMBER
HIREGONNAGAR GRAM PANCHAYAT
R/O CHICKGONNAGAR
TQ KUSHTAGI
DIST KOPPAL
PIN 583 277
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. M.M. KHANNUR., AGA FOR R1;
SRI. ABHISHEK L KALLAD., ADVOCATE FOR R3-14;
SRI. VIJAYKUMAR. B., ADVOCATE FOR R2)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO ISSUE A WRIT OF
NATURE OF CERTIORARI QUASHING THE IMPUGNED NOTICE DATED
14.02.2025 BEARING NO. KANDAYA/ CHUNAVANE/ AA. GO/06/2024-
25 ISSUED BY THE RESPONDENT NO.1 AUTHORITY MARKED AS
ANNEXURE-C IN RESPECT OF ADHYAKSHA (PETITIONER NO.1) IN
THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY AND ETC.
THIS WRIT PETITION, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY
HEARING, THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:
CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SURAJ GOVINDARAJ
ORAL ORDER
(PER: THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SURAJ GOVINDARAJ)
1. The petitioners are before this Court seeking for the
following reliefs:
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WP No. 101344 of 2025i. Issue writ in the nature of certiorari to quashing
the impugned notice dated 14.02.2025 bearing No.
Kandaya/ Chunavane/ AA. GO/06/2024-25 issued
by the R1 authority marked as Annexure-C in
respect of Adhyaksha (Petitioner No.1) in the
interest of justice and equity.
ii. Issue a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the
impugned notice dated 14.02.2025 bearing No.
Kandaya/ Chunavane/ AA. GO/06/2024-25 issued
by the R1 authority marked as Annexure-D in
respect of Upadhyaksha (Petitioner No.2) in the
interest of justice and equity.
iii. Issue a writ in the nature of Certiorari thereby
quashing the impugned representation/Form No.1
dated 03.02.2025 as submitted by the respondents
No. 3 to 14 vide Annexure-B in the interest of
justice and equity.
iv. Such other writ or order or direction as this Hon’ble
Court deems fits on the facts and circumstances of
the case in the interest of justice and equity.
2. The petitioner No.1-Adhyaksha and the petitioner
No.2-Upadhyaksha are before this Court aggrieved
by the notices dated 14.2.2025 issued by respondent
No.1 fixing the date for consideration of the no
confidence motion as 3.3.2025 at 11.00 a.m. in the
office of grama panchayath, Hiregowdnagar, Kustagi
Taluk, Koppal District.
3. Sri.Anand R.Kolli., learned counsel for the petitioner
submits;
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3.1. Firstly, the requisition notice issued under Form
No.1 in pursuance of Sub-rule (1) of Rule 3 is a
joint requisition notice which has been issued
as regards both the Adhyaksha and
Upadhyaksha and as such the requisition notice
itself is not in accordance with the applicable
law, in as much as the words used in the
statute are Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha and as
such single requisition notice could not have
been issued in respect of both the Adhyaksha
and Upadhyaksha.
3.2. The second submission is that in order to
consider both the notice of motions, the
respondent No.1-Assistant Commissioner has
fixed the same date, time and venue, as if both
the resolutions would be considered at the
same time which could not be so done, there
being separate resolutions required to be
passed.
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3.3. Lastly, he submits that in terms of Sub-rule (5)
of Rule 3 of the Karnataka Gram Swaraj and
Gram Panchayat (Motion of No Confidence
against Adhyakahs and Upadhayaksha of Gram
Panchayat) Rules 1994 (for short hereinafter
referred to as “Rules of 1994”), if there is no
quorum within one hour after the time
appointed for the meeting, the meeting shall
stand dissolved and notice given under Sub-
rule (1) shall lapse. In this regard he submits
that, if the meeting were convened and the first
motion were to be taken up insofar as the
Adhyaksha is concerned and if the same were
to go on for more than one hour, then the
second notice would have automatically lapsed.
3.4. Thus, his submission is that the intention of
legislature is not to have a joint or a common
meeting but to have separate meetings under
separate notices. In this regard, he refers to
Section 49 of the Karnataka Panchayat Raj Act,
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1993 (for short hereinafter referred to as ‘Act of
1993’) and submits that the usage of the words
Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha wherever found, is
with a disjunctive in between of the word “or”
i.e., say Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha, at no
place in Section 49 is a conjunctive “and” used,
viz., Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha. Therefore,
there being a disjunctive “or” in between the
words Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha, there
should have been separate notices of
requisition under Form No.1, separate notices
calling for the meeting under Form No.2 and
there should be separate meetings held at
different times in terms of Sub-rule (2) of Rule
3 of the Rules of 1994.
3.5. In this regard, he places reliance on the
definition of the word “or” in the Law Lexicon
by P. Ramnath Iyer, 2nd edition reprint
2010, more particularly at page 1369,
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which is reproduced hereunder for easy
reference;
Or. The word “or” is a disjunctive particle that
marks an alternative, generally corresponding to
“either.” as. “either this or that,” a connective that
marks an alternative, as “you may read or may
write that is, you may do one of the things at your
pleasure, but not both.” A conjunction marking
distribution or an alternative. (See 5 SLR 259=15
IC 830.) “Or” prima facie has only an alternative
significance. (Litt s. 732; per PARKE. В., Elliott v.
Turner, 15 LJCP 49; 2 C. 446), but sometimes used
as interpretative, or expository, of the former
word. (Dwar. 689 Vf. Hills v. London Gas Co., 5 H.
& Ν. 312.) The word ‘or’ is an alternative word. It
is, however, not always disjunctive and is
sometimes interpretative or expository of the
preceding word. But no instances can be found
where the term ‘or’ is used neither as alternative
nor as synonymous. [75 IC 105=37 CLJ 478=AIR
1923 Cal 682. See also LBR (1893-1900), 348.]
In a legacy to “A, or his issue.” “A, or his legal
repre-sentatives,” “or his personal representatives,
“or his heirs,” “or” denotes substitution.
In a direction that income “be applied by the
proper authorities for the purchase of books for the
Young Men’s Institute, or any public Library which
satisfies certain conditions, or a power to sell “all or
any” portion of a stock, etc., “or” implies discretion
or choice.
The word “or” is often used to express an
alternative of terms, definitions or explanations of
the same thing in different words, as, wilful or
malicious prosecution. “Or” is sometimes used as
an explanation of the preceding term, as,
intoxicating or malt liquors, in which case, it has
been held equivalent to “to-wit”; or such other like
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expression as “that is to say”; “other-wise called”;
“being.”
“It is normally disjunctive, but sometimes it is read
as conjunctive to give effect to the manifest
intention of the legislature as disclosed from the
context”. Municipal Council v. Bishandas Nathumal,
AIR 1969 amply chaine or del PO Reno8 T 50P 147
at 149. [Civil Procedure Code (1908) Preamble)Contrat car requently be performed in of wd the
athablis 2025.03.03 17:05 as to be read to mean
‘and’. State of Bihar one of the ways that he likes
when there | v. S.R. Roy, AIR 1966 SC 1995, 1997.
[Coal MinesProvident Fund and Bonus Schemes Act (46 of
1948), S. 2(b)The use of the word or after ‘shall pronounce the
judg-ment against shows that the Court has
discretion to pronounce udement against the
defendant on mere non-filing of the written
statement or to make such other onder in the suit
as it thinks fit. The expression ‘or’ is a disjunctive.
It indicates that two powers contained in the rule
before and after the word ‘or’ were meant to lay
down two distinct powers relating to the discretion
of the court and it could adopt either depending
upon the peculiar facts of the case. Abdul Gani Mir
v. Sakina Bano, AIR 1991 J & K 11, 13. [J & K Civil
Procedure Code (1977 Svt.), O. 8. R. 10]
Conjunction ‘or’ means alternatively and it is not
con-verted into and Rajkumar v. The State of
Tripura, AIR 1967 Tri 13. 15. [Motor Vehicles Act
(1939), S.130(1)(a))
The word ‘or must be read as ‘and”. Devidayal
Nanak-chand. State of Industrial Court, AIR 1959
Bom 65, 67. (Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, S.
16(2)]
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The use of the expression ‘or’ is not disjunctive.
Depend-ing on the context, ‘or’ may be read as
‘and’ but the court would not do it unless it is
obliged because ‘or’ does not generally mean ‘and’
and ‘and does not generally mean ‘or. R.S. Nayak
v. A.R. Autulay, AIR 1984 SC 684, 708. [Penal
Code (45 of 1860), S. 21(12)(a))
The schemes of the Punjab Pre emptive Act, 1913
does not enjoin that the word ‘or’ used in S. 15
should be read as ‘and’. Inder Singh v. Gulzara
Singh, AIR 1969 Del 154 at 156. [Punjab Pre-
emption Act (1 of 1913), S. 15(1)(b))
The word ‘or’ in CL. (g) must mean ‘and’, for the
context regarding the qualification to be a member
of the Board indicates that the members should be
not only Hindus but also being to the denomination
of Pushti-Margiya Vaishnavas. Govindalalji Maharaj
v. State of Rajas than, AIR 1963 SC 1638, 1652.
[Rajasthan Nathdwara Temple Act (13 of 1959), S.
5(2)(g))
The word ‘or’ in the proviso has the effect of ‘and’.
When there is a bar imposed in one circumstances
or another, it means that the act barred cannot be
done if either circumstances exists. Raja Syed
Mohammad Saadat Ali Khan v. Wealth Tax Officer,
AIR 1963 All 488, 493. [Wealth Tax Act, 1957. S.
25 proviso(a)]
In respect of discharge of oil from ship into the
prohibited area in the sea, the offence is said to be
committed by the owner or master of the ship.
Here the word ‘or’ is used conjunctively and not in
an alternative and ex-clusionary sene. Federal
Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Department of Trade
and Industry, (1974) 2 All ER 97 (HL). [Oil in
Navigable Rivers Act, 1955, S. 1(1)] ”
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WP No. 101344 of 2025OR” IS SOMETIMES USED OR CONSTRUED AS
“AND.” In some statutes the word “or” is often
used, and has been often construed, as if it were
“and.” It has been so used also in some rules of
Court. It is likewise often so construed in different
kinds of private writings, most frequently in wills,
and also with considerably less frequency in others,
such as deeds, bonds, leases or a company’s by-
laws. (29 Ame Cyc. 1505.)“Or” construed as “and”. 1946 ITR 548.
Interpretation of statutes. It is legitimate to read
the con-junctive and disjunctive words ‘and’ and
‘or’ one for the other, where the literal
interpretation would defeat the intention of the
legislature of the object of the Act Samapada v.
Assistant Registrar Co-operative AIR 1964 Cal 190,
193.
The expression or used in Section 183 between a
contract and the expression execution of any work
is to be read as any contract for execution of any
work supply of materials or goods. k. Dasharatha.
Mysore City Municipal Corporation, AIR 1995 Kant
157.165 Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act (14
of 1977). S. 183]Or is. “Often construed as ‘and, and and, construed
in or, to further the intent of the parties in acts,
legacies, devices, deeds, bonds and writings.
(Bouvier.) “Or used for “and,” See (31LW
754=1930 M. 510-58MLJ 622:91 IC 539-27 Cr LJ
107=1926 All 263.)It is sometimes necessary to read the conjunctions
or and and one for the other. (87 IC 229=AIR 1925
Cal 1967.)
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WP No. 101344 of 2025‘Produced or given in evidence. Here “or” has the
force of “and.” (113 IC 712=1929 Pat 60.)The word “or” in S. 82(2) of the Assam Land and
Revenue Regulation must be regarded as having
been used in the sense of “and.” (43 CWN 1359-
AIR 1936 Cal 715.)The word “and” is sometimes construed as “or.”
See ILR 1937 Nag 13-AIR 1937 Nag 310.)
“Or’ has been construed to mean ‘and’ and vice
versa. And the power of the courts to do this in a
proper case has never been questioned. But a
proper case can arise only when from a reading of
the act as a whole it becomes apparent that the
word used was mistakenly used.” [Carter v. Mc
Clellan, 132 lowa 502 (505).) Strictly the word “or”
in itself, has no such meaning as “and”; the true
rule is that only when “or” is used by mistake,
instead of “and,” the latter may be substituted, But
the substitution of “and” for “or” is, however, never
judicially authorized, except where it is needed to
conform to the clear intent of the legislative body
or individual, using the word.
“The word ‘or’ may be taken to signify “and,” when
it appears to be consistent with the meaning
implied by the context and in order to carry out the
manifest intent of the contracting parties,” but not
where such inter-pretation “would be inconsistent
with any intent which can reasonably be gathered
from the connection in which the word is used,
from the whole contest, or from the light of the
surrounding circumstances.”
“You will find it said in some cases that ‘or’ means
‘and’; but ‘or’ never does mean ‘and’; unless there
is a context which shows it is used for “and” by
mistake. Suppose a testator said, “I give the black
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WP No. 101344 of 2025cow on which I usually ride to A.B.,’ and he usually
rode on a black horse; of course the horse would
pass. But I do not think that any annotator of cases
would put in the marginal note that ‘cow’ means
“horse.” (See Morgan v. Thomas, 9 LT Rep NS 281,
31 Wkly. Rep 106.)STRICT CONSTRUCTION OF “OR” IN PENAL
STATUTES, In penal statutes “or” cannot be
interpreted “and” when the effect would be to
aggregate the punishment; but this rule does not
extend to the admission of the con junctive
construction where the word is used between the
descriptions of different offences. (Ame Cyc.)CLERICAL ERRORS. Other substitutions have been
ma for “or” where it has been found erroneously
used “on,” or for “to.” (29 Ате Сус. 1507.)“Or”: “Nor.” In a negative statement, “or” may be
taken as equivalent to “nor”: following a negative,
it has the same effect as “nor.”
Or, nor. Full effect can be given by reading ‘nor’ for
or-Interpretation of Statutes. C.P. and Berar Relief
of Indebtedness Act (14 of 1931), S. 13(3),
Bedprasad v. Bhagirath, AIR 1953 Nag 218, 219.
Or at any time afterwards. The words ‘or at any
time afterwards’ in S. 164 Cr PC obviously denote
that if the confession was not made in the course
of the investigation, then it must be made at any
time afterwards but before the enquiry or trial
commenced. If there has been no investigation at
all, then the question ‘or at any time afterwards’
does not arise. Rishi v. State of Bihar, AIR 1955 Pat
425.
Or is otherwise invalid. The expression ‘or is
otherwise invalid in S. 30(c) Arbitration Act, 1940
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covers all objections to an award on the ground of
invalidity from any cause whatsoever and does not
refer to the in-validity of the kind referred to in the
preceding clauses of the section. Ismail v. Hansraj,
AIR 1955 Raj 153.
Or for any other purpose’. Even where the duty has
been fully paid and only the signature of Excise
Inspec-tor to the pro-forma and signature on gate
passed to speed the movements of goods, bribes
are paid not only to get unlawful things done but to
get lawful things done promptly connotes ‘for any
other purpose. Som Prakash v. State of Delhi. AIR
1974 SC 989. [Evidence Act (1972), Sec. 161]
“Or in future.” See 27 Mad 348.
“Or other proceeding.” See 9 C. 397; 53 PR 1883.
“Or otherwise.” The words “or otherwise” in Article
111 of the China and Corea Order in Council, 1904,
must at least include the operation of other
Statutes, Imperial or Indian, applicable to the
person in question. [(1914) 1 LW 989 (994)=18
CWN 705-23 IC 678=15 Cr LJ 326-(194) AC 599-4
Cr. LR 275-3 Con. LR 187.
“OR OTHERWISE”. The expression “or otherwise” in
S. 22 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885 (VIII of
1885) means “or in a similar way”, 2 CLJ 570;
must be construed ejusdem generis. See 8 CLJ
324-13 CWN 32-1 Ind Cas 155: See also 10 Bom
LR 92-7 Cr LJ 118.
The word “or” in “or otherwise” is a disjunctive that
marks an alternative which generally corresponds
to the word “either”. An interpretation of the
general words “or otherwise” limiting them to the
matters and things of the some kind as the
previous words would make the general words “or
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otherwise” following the preceding specific words,
redundant. These words “or otherwise are not
words of limitation, but of extension so as to cover
all possible ways in which title may vest in the land
in the unauthorised occupation of the person con-
cerned. Chotanagpur Banking Association Ltd. v.
Government of India, AIR 1957 Pat 666, 669, 670,
671. [Bihar Land Encroachment Act. 31 of 1958, S.
2(ii)(e)]
The Legislature, when it used the words ‘or
otherwise’. apparently intended to cover other
cases which may not come within the meaning of
the preuding clauses. The rule of ejusdem generis
is intended to be applied where general words have
been used following particular and specific words of
the same nature. Lila Vati Bai v. State of Bombay
AIR 1957 SC 521.528.529.[Bombay Land
Requisition Act 33 of 1948, S. 6 Expl. (a))
Expression covers all the other Directors who for
one bhaja reason or the other cease to hold office
and are imme diately thereafter re-appointed as
directors, Lali C. Kapadia v, Laliji B. Desai, AIR
1972 Bem 276,294 Companies Act. Sec. 264(1)]
“Or the like” The words “or the like” in S. 23(4)
Bengal Tenancy Act (X of 1859), must be taken es
dem generis with the rights spoken of previously,
(28 C. 485-5 CWN 840.)
‘Or the survivors”. The effect of the words “or the
survivors or survivor of them” (in a will) was, in the
circumstances of the case, held to take the case
out of the ordinary rule that a legacy lapses where
the legatee dies during the lifetime of the testator
(26 M. 433)
Or within the State. The words or within that State
in Art. 304 elucidate the words ‘throughout the
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territory of India” in Art. 301 meaning that the
freedom of trade. declared in Art. 301 is the
freedom not only between one State and another,
but also between different parts of the same state.
State v. Philipose Philip. AT R 1954 TC 257.
[Constitution of India, Arts. 301 and 304)
3.6. By referring to the said definition, he submits
that when the word “or” is used, the same is a
disjunctive and is referred to in the alternative
and as such he submits that the Adhyaksha and
Upadhyaksha cannot be read together but
would have to be read separately in the
alternative to each other. His submission is
also that, if the said definition as contending in
the law lexicon is applied then separate
notices have to be issued to the Adhyaksha or
Upadhyaksha as contended earlier.
3.7. He relies on contemporary English grammar by
Jayanthi Dakshinamurthy, more particularly
Chapter 26 thereof, relating to conjunction and
submits that there are four different types of
conjunctions viz., correlative conjunctions,
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compound conjunctions, coordinating
conjunction and subordinating conjunction.
3.8. Insofar as the usage under Section 49 of the
Act of 1993 and the various Rules contained in
Rules of 1994, the word “and” has not been
used and it only if the word “and” had been
used, then a single requisition notice could
have been issued under Form No.1. Since the
word “and” has not been used i.e., a
conjunctive word has not been used, there
being an alternative disjunctive in terms of the
word “or” used, Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha
have to be read separately and he once again
reiterates that all the actions would have to be
taken separately.
3.9. On that basis, he submits that the requisition
notice being required to be quashed, all other
further actions taken in pursuance thereof
would also have to be quashed.
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4. Sri.Abhishek L. Kallad., learned counsel who has filed
caveat for respondent No.3 and has accepted notice
for respondents No.4 to 14 submits that;
4.1. The petitioners are only seeking to prolong their
stay at the office of the Adhyaksha and
Upadhyaksha.
4.2. Requisition notice which had been moved once
earlier was quashed by this Court on account of
the said notice containing an endorsement and
signature of the PDO, the same being contrary
to the decision of a
Co-ordinate bench of this Court in Sanganna
Biradar’s case.
4.3. This is the second time a notice of requisition
has been moved and once again a pedantic
argument is sought to be advanced, trying to
give an interpretation of the word “or” which is
not the correct interpretation.
4.4. His submission is that this Court would have to
apply the Rule of Mischief in order to interpret
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the provision. Section 49 having been
introduced in order to provide a right to the
members of the Gram Panchayat to move a
notice for No Confidence. The said right being a
democratic right, this court ought to give
meaning and purport to said Rule and not
interpret it in a pedantic manner to take away
the rights vested with the other members of the
Gram Panchayat.
4.5. In this regard, he relies upon the decision of
Seven Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court
in Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage
Board v. A. Rajappa1, more particularly Para
17 thereof, which is reproduced hereunder for
reference;
17. Lord Denning has stated the Judge’s task in
reading the meaning of enactments:
“The English language is not an instrument of
mathematical precision. Our literature would be
much poorer if it were…. He must set to work in the
constructive task of finding the intention of1 (1978) 2 SCC 213
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WP No. 101344 of 2025Parliament, and he must do this not only from the
language of the statute, but also from a
consideration of the social conditions which gave rise
to it and of the mischief which it was passed to
remedy, and then he must supplement the written
word so as to give ‘force and life’ to the intention of
the legislature…. A Judge should ask himself the
question, how, if the makers of the Act had
themselves come across this rock in the texture of it,
they would have straightened it out? He must then
do as they would have done. A Judge must not alter
the material of which the Act is woven, but he can
and should iron out the creases.”
The duty of the Court is to interpret the words that
the Legislature has used; those words may be
ambiguous, but, even if they are, the power and
duty of the Court to travel outside them on a voyage
of discovery are strictly limited.”
4.6. His submission is that this Court ought to
interpret the words that the legislature has
used in a manner to give meaning to the said
words by taking into account the social
conditions which gave rise to it and the mischief
which it was to remedy.
4.7. His submission is further that this Court is
required to give force and life to the intention of
the legislature while interpreting the aforesaid
provisions. He also relies upon the decision of
the Hon’ble Apex Court in British Airways Plc.
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v. Union of India2, more particularly Para 8
thereof, which is reproduced hereunder for easy
reference;
8. While interpreting a statute the court should try
to sustain its validity and give such meaning to the
provisions which advance the object sought to be
achieved by the enactment. The court cannot
approach the enactment with a view to pick holes or
to search for defects of drafting which make its
working impossible. It is a cardinal principle of
construction of a statute that effort should be made
in construing the different provisions so that each
provision will have its play and in the event of any
conflict a harmonious construction should be given.
The well-known principle of harmonious construction
is that effect shall be given to all the provisions and
for that any provision of the statute should be
construed with reference to the other provisions so
as to make it workable. A particular provision
cannot be picked up and interpreted to defeat
another provision made in that behalf under the
statute. It is the duty of the court to make such
construction of a statute which shall suppress the
mischief and advance the remedy. While
interpreting a statute the courts are required to
keep in mind the consequences which are likely to
flow upon the intended interpretation.
4.8. By relying on British Airways case is that this
Court should try to sustain the validity and give
meaning to the provision of the Act, so as to
advance the objects ought to be achieved by
2 (2002) 2 SCC 95
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the enactment rather than to pick holes or to
search for defects, making the working of the
statute impossible. In that background, he
submits that the usage of the word “or” cannot
be interpreted in such a manner that it requires
two separate notices, when the intention of the
members of the Gram Panchayat is common in
respect of both Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha to
move a notice of No Confidence against both of
them.
4.9. On the other basis, he submits that the petition
is required to be dismissed and a meeting
permitted to go on.
5. Heard Sri.Anand R.Kolli., learned counsel appearing
for the petitioner, Sri.M.M.Khannur., learned AGA for
respondent No.1 and Sri.Vijaykumar Balagerimath.,
learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2 and
Sri.Abhishek L.Kallad., learned counsel appearing for
respondents No.3 to 14. Perused papers.
6. The points that would arise for consideration are;
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1. Whether the usage of the word “or” in
Section 49 of the Act of 1993 and the
Rules of 1994 is disjunctive in such a
manner as requiring a notice in Form No.1
to be issued to the Adhyaksha and
Upadhyaksha separately and thereafter
notice in Form No.2 to be issued to the
Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha separately,
as also for a separate meeting to be
conducted for considering the motion for
No Confidence separately in respect of the
Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha?
2. Whether the actions taken by the
members of the Gram Panchayat and that
of the Assistant Commissioner suffer any
legal infirmity requiring intervention at the
hands of this Court?
3. What order?
7. I answer the above points as under:
8. Answer to point No.1: Whether the usage of
the word “or” in Section 49 of the Act of 1993
and the Rules of 1994 is disjunctive in such a
manner as requiring a notice in Form No.1 to be
issued to the Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha
separately and thereafter notice in Form No.2
to be issued to the Adhyaksha and
Upadhyaksha separately, as also for a separate
meeting to be conducted for considering the
motion for No Confidence separately in respect
of the Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha?
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8.1. The vehement submission of Sri. Anand
R.Kolli., learned counsel for the petitioner is
that the word “or” has to be given its true
grammatical meaning and when such a
meaning is given, it would require two separate
requisition notices under Form No.1, two
separate notices of meeting under Form No.2
and two separate meetings in terms of Sub-rule
(2) of Rule 3 as also Sub-rule (6) of Rule 3.
8.2. Section 49 is reproduced here under for easy
reference;
49. Motion of no-confidence against
Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha of Grama
Panchayat.
– Every Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha of Grama
Panchayat shall forthwith be deemed to have
vacated his office if a resolution expressing want of
confidence in him is passed by a majority of not
less than two thirds of the total number of
members of the Grama Panchayat at a meeting
specially convened for the purpose in accordance
with the procedure as may be prescribed:
Provided that no such resolution shall be
moved unless notice of the resolution is signed by
not less than one-third of the total number of
members and at least ten days notice has been
given of the intention to move the resolution:
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WP No. 101344 of 2025Provided further that no resolution expressing
want of confidence against an Adhyaksha or
Upadhyaksha, shall be moved within one year from
the date of his election:
Provided also that where a resolution
expressing want of confidence in any Adhyaksha or
Upadhyaksha has been considered and negatived
by a Grama Panchayat a similar resolution in
respect of the same Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha
shall not be given notice of, or moved, within one
year from the date of the decision of the Grama
Panchayat.
8.3. The heading of Section 49 would indicate that
the section relates to a motion of No Confidence
against Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha of Grama
Panchayat, it is stated that every Adhyaksha or
Upadhyaksha of the Gram Panchayat shall
forthwith be deemed to have vacated his office
if a resolution expressing want of confidence is
passed.
8.4. The second provisio to Sub-section (1) would
indicate that no resolution expressing want of
confidence against an Adhyaksha or
Upadhyaksha shall be moved within the first 15
months.
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8.5. Third provisio indicates that resolution
expressing want of confidence in any
Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha, if has been
considered and negatived by the Gram
Panchayat, a similar resolution in respect of the
same Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha shall not be
moved for another six months from the date of
the decision of the Gram Panchayat.
8.6. It is because of the usage of the word “or”
between the word Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha
that Sri. Anand R.Kolli., learned counsel for the
petitioner has contended that it is disjunctive
and separate actions have to be taken.
8.7. Though references have been made to the
definition of “or” in the law lexicon, those are
relating to completely different and alternative
items.
8.8. In the present case, there is an Adhyaksha and
Upadhyaksha for every Gram Panchayat, that is
to say that the Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha
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are not in the alternative, but both the posts
are available in any Gram Panchayat. It is for
that reason that Section 49 provides for a
motion of no-confidence to be moved against
either the Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha. It does
not however restrict a notice of no-confidence
to be moved against both the Adhyaksha or
Upadhyaksha.
8.9. The right being vested with the Gram
Panchayat members to move a motion of no-
confidence against the Adhyaksha or
Upadhyaksha would also include a right to
move a motion of no-confidence against both
the Adhyaksha and the Upadhyaksha. The
permutation and combination in which the
members of the Gram Panchayat may act
would vary in terms of the members of the
Gram Panchayat and against whom they want
to move a no-confidence motion. Whether it is
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only against the Adhyaksha or only against the
Upadhyaksha or as regards both of them.
8.10. If the argument of Sri.Anand R.Kolli., learned
counsel were to be tested by using a
conjunctive word “and” Section 49 would read
as under, with emphasis supplied for the
substituted word “and”.
49. Motion of no-confidence against
Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha of Grama
Panchayat.
– Every Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha of Grama
Panchayat shall forthwith be deemed to have
vacated his office if a resolution expressing want of
confidence in him is passed by a majority of not less
than two thirds of the total number of members of
the Grama Panchayat at a meeting specially
convened for the purpose in accordance with the
procedure as may be prescribed:
Provided that no such resolution shall be
moved unless notice of the resolution is signed by
not less than one-third of the total number of
members and at least ten days notice has been
given of the intention to move the resolution:
Provided further that no resolution expressing want
of confidence against an Adhyaksha and
Upadhyaksha, shall be moved within one year from
the date of his election:
Provided also that where a resolution expressing
want of confidence in any Adhyaksha and
Upadhyaksha has been considered and negatived by
a Grama Panchayat a similar resolution in respect of
the same Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha shall not be
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WP No. 101344 of 2025given notice of, or moved, within one year from the
date of the decision of the Grama Panchayat.8.11. Now, if Section 49 were to be read with he
word “or” being replaced by the word “and”,
then a resolution will be required to be moved
against both the Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha
jointly. That is to say, that a resolution cannot
be moved against the Adhyaksha or
Upadhyaksha separately, but the members of
the Gram Panchayat would be perforce
constrained to move a common motion as
against both the Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha,
whether they want to move such a motion
against both of them or not.
8.12. In my considered opinion that is not the purport
of Section 49 of the Act of 1993. The Act
provides the option to the members of the
Gram Panchayat to move a motion of no-
confidence as observed earlier against either
the Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha or against both
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of them. Merely because the disjunctive word
“or” is used would not mean that a common
motion cannot be moved against both the
Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha. If the conjunctive
word is replaced as contended by Mr Kolli, the
same would militate against the very object of
the said provision, making the whole object
redundant and negate the object.
8.13. Rule 3 of the Karnataka Panchayat Raj (Motion
Of No-Confidence Against Adhyaksha And
Upadhyaksha Of Grama Panchayat) Rules,
1994, is reproduced hereunder for easy
reference
3. Motion of No-confidence :- (1) A written notice of
intention to make the motion under the proviso to
S.49 OF THE Karnataka Panchayat Raj Act,1993 shall
be in Form I signed by not less than one-third of the
total number of members together with a copy of the
proposed motion shall be delivered in person by any
two of the members signing the notice to the
Assistant Commissioner.
(2) The Assistant Commissioner shall thereafter convene
a meeting for the consideration of the said motion at
the office of the Grama Panchayat on the date
appointed by him which shall not be later than thirty
days from the date on which the notice under sub-
rule (1) was delivered to him. He shall give to the
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members a notice of not less than fifteen clear days
of such meeting in Form II: Provided that where the
holding of such meeting is stayed by an order of a
Court, the Assistant Commissioner shall adjourn the
said meeting and shall hold the adjourned meeting
on a date not later than thirty days from the date on
which he receives the intimation about the vacation
of stay, after giving to the members, after giving to
the members a notice of not less than fifteen clear
days of such adjourned meeting.
(3) A notice is Form II shall be given to every member
including the Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha.
(a) by delivering or tendering the said notice to such
member; or
(b) if such member is not found, by leaving such
notice at his last known place of residence or
business within the Grama Panchayat or by giving or
tendering the same to some adult member or
servant of his family; or
(c) by registered posts; or
(d) if none of the means aforesaid be available, by
affixing such notice on some conspicuous part of the
house, if any, in which the member is known to have
last resided or carried on business within the Grama
panchayat.
(4) The quorum for such meeting shall be two thirds of
the total number of members of the Grama
Panchayat. The Assistant Commissioner shall preside
at such meeting.
Explanation. For determination of two third of total
number of members under this sub-rule any fraction
arrived at shall be construed as one.
(5) Save as otherwise provided in the Act or these rules,
a meeting convened for the purpose of considering a
motion under sub-rule (2) shall not for any reason be
adjourned.
(6) If there is no quorum, within one hour after the time
appointed for the meeting, the meeting shall stand
dissolved and the notice given under sub-rule (1)
shall lapse.
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(7) As soon as the meeting convened and sub-rule (2)
commences the Assistant Commissioner shall read to
the members of the Grama Panchayat, the motion
for the consideration of which the meeting has been
convened and shall put it to vote without any debate.
(8) The Assistant Commissioner shall not speak on the
merits of the motion and he shall not be entitled to
vote thereon.
(9) If the motion is carried by a majority of not less than
two thirds of the total number of members of the
Grama Panchayat, the Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha,
as the case may be, shall forthwith cease to function
as such and the Assistant Commissioner shall, as
soon as may be, notify such cessation on the notice
board of the office of the Grama Panchayat and also
inform the Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha, as the case
may be, regarding such cessation, if he is not
present at the meeting.
(10) After the cessation is notified under sub-rule (9)
the Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha as the case may be
shall, immediately hand over all documents, moneys
or other properties of the Grama Panchayat in his
custody to the Secretary of the Grama Panchayat.
(11) The election to the office of Adhyaksha or
Upadhyaksha shall not be held until the notification
under sub-rule (9) removing the Adhyaksha or
Upadhyaksha, as the case may be, is published.
8.14. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 3 only speaks of a written
notice of intention to make a motion in terms of
the proviso to Section 49 in Form No.1, there is
neither the word Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha
used in the said Rule. Similar is the case with
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Sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 which enables the
Assistant Commissioner to convene a meeting
for consideration of the motion at the office of
the Gram Panchayat.
8.15. Sub-rule (3) of Rule 3 requires a notice in Form
No.2 to be given to every member including the
Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha. The usage of the
word “and” in Sub-rule (3) of Rule 3 would
indicate that if a notice convening a meeting to
consider a notice of no-confidence is to be
issued in Form No.2, then the said notice shall
be on every member including the Adhyaksha
and Upadhyaksha and not only as regard the
person against whom it is being moved i.e., the
Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha. The legislature has
therefore consciously used the word “and” in
Sub-rule (3) of Rule 3, similarly the legislature
has consciously used the word “or” in Section
49 as aforesaid.
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8.16. Sub-rule (5) does not make any usage of the
word Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha but only
provides for a meeting to be convened for the
purpose of consideration of motion shall not be
adjourned.
8.17. Sub-rule (6) provides that if there is no quorum
within one hour from the time appointed for the
meeting, the meeting shall stand dissolved, and
notice given under Sub-rule (1) shall lapse.
Again, in either both Sub-rule (5) and Sub-rule
(6) the word Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha are
not used but only reference is made to the
notice.
8.18. Sub-rule (9) of Rule 3 provides for a motion to
be carried by a majority of not less than 2/3rd
of the total number of the members of Gram
Panchayat, then the Adhyaksha or
Upadhyaksha as the case may be shall
forthwith cease to function as such and further
provides for the Assistant Commissioner to
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inform the Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha as the
case may be regarding such resolution.
8.18.1. Meaning can be gathered from Sub-rule
(9) to indicate that a motion for no
confidence if moved against the
Adhyaksha only and be carried by a
majority of not less than 2/3rd of the total
number of the members of Gram
Panchayat, then he shall cease to function
as Adhyaksha and further provides for the
Assistant Commissioner to inform the
Adhyaksha regarding such resolution if
the Adhyaksha was not present at the
meeting.
8.18.2. If a motion for no confidence is moved
against the Upadhyaksha only and be
carried by a majority of not less than 2/3rd
of the total number of the members of
Gram Panchayat, then the Upadhyaksha
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shall cease to function as the
Upadhyaksha and further provides for the
Assistant Commissioner to inform the
Upadhyaksha regarding such resolution if
the upadhyaksha was not present at the
meeting.
8.18.3. There is no embargo under Sub-rule (9) of
Rule 3 that a motion for no confidence
cannot be moved against both Adhyaksha
or Upadhyaksha, If a motion for no
confidence is moved against both the
Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha and be
carried by a majority of not less than 2/3rd
of the total number of the members of
Gram Panchayat, then the Adhyaksha and
Upadhyaksha shall cease to function as
the Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha
respectively and both of them would have
to be informed by the Assistant
Commissioner of the same to the
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Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha who were not
present at the meeting.
8.19. In that view of the matter, it is clear that
Section 49 providing a valuable democratic
right to the members of Gram Panchayat to
move a notice for no-confidence in form 1
against either the Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha,
it is at the discretion of the Gram Panchayat
members to move the said motion against
either the Adhyaksha or Upadhyaksha or both
of them.
8.20. Coming to the second argument of Sri. Anand
R.Kolli., learned counsel for the petitioner that
in terms of Sub-rule (6) of Rule 3, if there is no
quorum within one hour after the time
appointed for the meeting, the meeting shall
stand dissolved and the notice given under
Sub-rule (1) shall lapse, meaning thereby to
indicate that if at the beginning of the meeting
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the motion for no-confidence against the
Adhyaksha is taken up and the discussion were
to last for more than one hour, then the second
notice would automatically lapse is again a
pedantic argument which has been advanced.
8.21. The Sub-rule (6) of Rule 3 only provides for
quorum not to be present within one hour and
does not provide for a meeting not being
conducted within one hour. Both the meetings
scheduled at 11.00 a.m. notices having been
issued, if it is only if there is no quorum as
required, then Sub-rule (6) of Rule 3 would be
applicable. If the quorum is there for
consideration of the motion of no confidence
against one of the office bearers, the said
quorum would continue for the next meeting.
8.22. If at all there is no quorum this aspect would
continue for the next meeting since both the
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meetings are proposed to be held at the same
time at the same venue. Thus, what Sub-rule
(6) of Rule 3 deals with is not the time taken
for conduct of the meeting but the presence of
the quorum at the beginning of the meeting, as
rightly contended by Sri.Abhishek L. Kalled.,
learned counsel for respondents No.3 to 14 this
argument is a premature argument since the
meeting is proposed to be held on 3.3.2025, it
is the outcome of the said meeting and the
quorum present at the said meeting which
would have to be considered for appreciating
the argument under Sub-rule (6) of Rule 3.
8.23. Be that as it may, what this Court would have
to opine at present is that Sub-rule (6) of Rule
3 would relate to the quorum at the beginning
of the meeting and not the time at which the
notice of no confidence is taken up.
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8.24. What would have to be looked at are sub-rules
(7) and (8) of Rule 3, Sub rule (7) provides for
as soon as the meeting convened under sub-
rule (2) commences the Assistant
Commissioner shall read to the members of the
Grama Panchayat, the motion for the
consideration of which the meeting has been
convened and shall put it to vote without any
debate, thus it is only the motion which is to be
read and there shall be no debate on the same,
hence the contention of Shri Anand R Kolli that
a debate on the motion would take time is not
countenanced by sub-Rule (7) to Rule 3, there
being no debate which is permissible.
8.25. Sub Rule (8) provides that even the Assistant
Commissioner shall not speak on the merits of
the motion and he shall not be entitled to vote
thereon, thus the Assistant commissioner is
only to read the motion and not to speak on it,
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which would also indicate that there would be
no further time spent on this.
8.26. Coming back to the facts of the matter, a
common notice has been issued under Form
No.1 by more than one-half of the members as
required under the first proviso to Sub-section
(1) of Section 49. Thus, it satisfies the
requirement thereof, merely because a
common requisition has been made for both the
Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha, the same does
not fall foul of Sub-section (1) of Section 49 of
the Act of 1993 or the Rules of 1994.
8.27. The notice issued in Form No.2 by the Assistant
Commissioner is not a common notice but is a
separate notice. The one at Annexure-C is in
respect of the Adhyaksha. The one at
Annexure-D is in respect of Upadhyaksha. The
Assistant Commissioner, in my considerable
opinion, could have issued a common notice
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convening the meeting on the basis of a
common requisition notice. The issuance of
separate notice or common notice would not
make any difference in so far as Form No.2 in
that regard is concerned.
8.28. In that view of the matter, I am of the
considered opinion that the members of the
Grama Panchayat together moving a motion for
no-confidence against both the Adhyaksha and
Upadhyaksha cannot be said to be contrary to
the applicable law.
8.29. In that view of the matter I Answer point
No.1 by holding that the usage of the word
“or” in Section 49 of the Act of 1993 and
the Rules of 1994 is not disjunctive in such
a manner as requiring a notice in Form
No.1 to be issued to the Adhyaksha and
Upadhyaksha separately and thereafter
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notice in Form No.2 to be issued to the
Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha separately,
as also for a separate meeting to be
conducted for considering the motion for
No Confidence separately in respect of the
Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha.
8.30. It is for the members of the Grama
Panchayat to move motion of no
confidence against the Adhyaksha or
Upadhyaksha individually, separately or
together/jointly.
8.31. Such a motion for no confidence can be
moved under a single Form No.1 in so far
as Adhyaksha is concerned if moved
against the Adhyaksha alone. Similarly, a
motion for no confidence can be moved
under a single Form No.1 in so far as
Upadhyaksha is concerned if moved
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against the Upadhyaksha alone. If such a
motion for no confidence is moved against
both Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha, the
same can be under a single Form No.1 or
at the discretion of the members of the
Grama panchayat by two separate Form
No.1’s one each for the Adhyaksha and
Upadhyaksha.
8.32. The Assistant Commissioner can on the
basis of the motion for no confidence
moved, can either issue a single notice in
Form No.2 to the Adhyaksha or
Upadhyaksha if such notice of no
confidence is moved against either of them
or issue a single notice under Form No.2
as against both of them if a common
motion for no confidence is moved. Even if
a common motion for no confidence is
moved against both Adhyaksha and
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:3625
WP No. 101344 of 2025
Upadhyaksha in Form No.1 the Assistant
Commissioner can issue a single notice
under Form No.2 as against both of them
or issue separate notices in From No.2 as
regards the Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha
separately. Needless to say, such notice in
Form No.2 would also have to be served on
all other members of the Grama
Panchayat.
9. Answer to point No.2: Whether the actions
taken by the members of the Gram Panchayat
and that of the Assistant Commissioner suffer
any legal infirmity requiring intervention at the
hands of this Court?
9.1. In view of my finding on Point No.1, a common
notice issued by the members of the Grama
Panchayat in Form No.1 as regards both
Adhyaksha and Upadhyaksha is proper and
correct.
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:3625
WP No. 101344 of 2025
9.2. Separate notices issued by the Assistant
Commission in From No.2 in Annexure- C and D
which are impugned in these proceedings are
also proper and in accordance with law.
9.3. In view thereof there would be no requirement
for this Court to intercede as regards such
proper actions.
10. Answer to point No.3: What order?
The petition making out no grounds stands
dismissed.
Sd/-
(SURAJ GOVINDARAJ)
JUDGE
SR
List No.: 1 Sl No.: 41
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