Page No.# 1/18 vs The State Of Assam And Anr on 24 March, 2025

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Gauhati High Court

Page No.# 1/18 vs The State Of Assam And Anr on 24 March, 2025

                                                                  Page No.# 1/18

GAHC010143162022




                                                            2025:GAU-AS:3260

                       THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
  (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)

                         Case No. : Crl.Pet./706/2022

         HAZARAT ALI AND 7 ORS
         SON OF LATE ABDUL PARAMANIK,
         R/O VILL- SONAMUKHI, P.S. CHAPAR, IN THE DISTRICT OF DHUBRI,
         ASSAM

         2: KAJIMUDDIN
          SON OF LATE KAAMAL PARAMANIK
         R/O VILL- RAMHARRIR CHAR
          P.O JOYPUR BAZAR
          P.S. PANCHARATNA RIVER P.S.
          IN THE DIST. OF GOALPARA
         ASSAM

         3: ROFIQUL ISLAM
          SON OF KAZIMUDDIN
         R/O VILL- RAMHARRIR CHAR
          P.O JOYPUR BAZAR
          P.S. PANCHARATNA RIVER P.S.
          IN THE DIST. OF GOALPARA
         ASSAM

         4: MOFIDUL ISLAM
          S/O KAZIMUDDIN
         R/O VILL- RAMHARRIR CHAR
          P.O JOYPUR BAZAR
          P.S. PANCHARATNA RIVER P.S.
          IN THE DIST. OF GOALPARA
         ASSAM

         5: JAHIRUL ISLAM
          S/O LATE MAZIBAR RAHMAN
         R/O VILL- RAMHARRIR CHAR
          P.O JOYPUR BAZAR
          P.S. PANCHARATNA RIVER P.S.
                                                                Page No.# 2/18

        IN THE DIST. OF GOALPARA
        ASSAM

        6: AAZIDA KHATUN
        W/O ROFIQUL ISLAM
        R/O VILL- RAMHARRIR CHAR
         P.O JOYPUR BAZAR
         P.S. PANCHARATNA RIVER P.S.
         IN THE DIST. OF GOALPARA
        ASSAM

        7: KARIMA KHATUN
        W/O JAHRUL ISLAM
        R/O VILL- RAMHARRIR CHAR
         P.O JOYPUR BAZAR
         P.S. PANCHARATNA RIVER P.S.
         IN THE DIST. OF GOALPARA
        ASSAM

        8: AASIYA KHATUN
        W/O KAJIMUDDIN
        R/O VILL- RAMHARRIR CHAR
         P.O JOYPUR BAZAR
         P.S. PANCHARATNA RIVER P.S.
         IN THE DIST. OF GOALPARA
        ASSA

        VERSUS

        THE STATE OF ASSAM AND ANR
        REP. BY THE PP, ASSAM

        2:MOSLEMA KHATUN
         D/O MOKTEL HUSSAIN

        W/O MOFIDUL ISLAM

        R/O VILL- RAMHARRIR CHAR PART-3
        P.O. JOYPUR BAZAR
        P.S. PANCHARATNA RIVER P.S.
        IN THE DIST. OF GOALPARA
        ASSAM

Advocate for the appellant             :-   Mr. H. Das.
Advocate for the respondent No. 1      :-   Mr. P.S. Lahkar.
Advocate for the respondent No. 2      :-   Mr. D. Das.
                                                                        Page No.# 3/18

     Date of Hearing                       :-    18.03.2025.

     Date of Judgment & Order              :-    24.03.2025.




                                    BEFORE
                       HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ROBIN PHUKAN

                           JUDGEMENT & ORDER (CAV)




        Heard Mr. H. Das, learned counsel for the petitioners; Mr. P.S. Lahkar,
learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State, respondent No. 1; and Mr. D.
Das, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2.

2.       In this petition, under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
(Cr.P.C.), eight petitioners have prayed for quashing the proceeding of C.R. Case
No. 32/2021, under Sections 147/149/448/294/ 324/326/354/307/34 of the
Indian Penal Code (IPC) pending before the learned Additional Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Goalpara (trail court) and also the order dated 04.12.2021, passed
by the learned trial court by which cognizance of the offence under the
aforementioned sections were taken against the petitioners.

Background Facts:-

3. The background facts, leading to filing of the present petition, are
adumbrated herein below:-

“On 05.02.2021, one Moslema Khatun, the respondent No. 2 lodged one
complaint case before the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Goalpara alleging inter-alia amongst others that on 28.12.2020, at about
Page No.# 4/18

12 noon, she went to her land along with Momtaz Begum situated at
Ramhrrir Char Part – 3 and then, on the behest of petitioner No. 1,
Hazrat Ali, the other petitioners in a pre-planned manner, being armed
with dao, lathi, dagger and other sharp objects confronted them and
started scolding them with slang languages.

Thereafter, when the complainant raised objection, the petitioner No.
2, Kajiumuddin assaulted over her head and as a result she fell down
and became unconscious and then, Momtaz Begum raised hue and cry
and then, Moktel Hussain; Emran Hussain; Surman Ali; and Nur Islam,
arrived at there and then, petitioner No. 3, Rofiqul Islam attacked on the
head of Moktel Hussain by means of a dao and as a result he sustained
injuries over two places of his head and became unconscious and Hazrat
Ali assaulted Emran Hussain by means of one bamboo lathi and Mofidul
Islam tried to outrage the modesty of Momtaz Begum. Thereafter, the
petitioner No. 5 Jahirul Islam attempted to assault on the head of
Surman Ali by means of a dao, but somehow the blow missed the head
and hit on the left leg.

Thereafter, the nearby people along with Nur Islam got them
admitted at Goalpara Civil Hospital and due to serious injuries, Moktel
was admitted at Solace Nursing Home, Goalpara.

Thereafter, in connection with the aforementioned case, one ejahar
was filed with the Pancharatna River Police Station, but no action has
been taken upon the same.

Thereafter, upon the said complaint, the learned Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Goalpara has registered a case, being C.R. Case No.
Page No.# 5/18

32/2021 and transferred the same to the learned Additional Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Goalpara and thereafter, the learned trail court
examined the complainant and four other prosecution witnesses and
took cognizance of the offence vide order dated 04.12.2021, under
Sections 147/ 149/ 448/ 294/ 324/ 326/ 354/ 307/ 34 of the IPC and
issued process to the accused persons to appear before the court to
stand trial.”

Being aggrieved, the petitioners have approached this court by filing the present
petition with the aforementioned prayer.

Submissions:-

4. Mr. H. Das, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the petitioner
No. 1 is a Headmaster and on the relevant date he was working at
Mashaneralga High School of Dhubri and in respect of the said contention, Mr.
Das has referred to the Identity Card of petitioner No.1, enclosed with the
petition as Annexure – 10, at page No. 47; the Certificate issued by the
Inspector of Schools of Dhubri district as Annexure – 11, at page No. 48; the
attendance sheet of Teachers as Annexure – 12, at page No. 49; the visiting
report at page No. 50; and Teachers’ daily attendance sheet of the said school
at page Nos. 51, 52 & 53 and therefore, Mr. Das submits that he was absent on
that day at the place of occurrence.

4.1. Mr. Das further submits that while the occurrence took place on
28.12.2020, the FIR was lodged on 05.02.2021, about 2 months after the
occurrence and no plausible explanation is forthcoming from the respondent’s
side for the inordinate delay. Mr. Das further submits that though one
statement is made in the complaint petition that one FIR was filed with the
Page No.# 6/18

Pancharatna River Police Station, yet, to substantiate the same the copy of the
aforesaid FIR has not been enclosed with the petition. Mr. Das further submits
that there is land dispute between the parties, and title suit, being Title Suit
No. 96/2021 is also pending before the Court of learned Munsiff No. 1,
Goalpara. Mr. Das further submits that one Kamal Paramanik also lodged one
complaint case, being C.R. Case No. 01/2022 against the respondents herein.

4.2. Mr. Das also submits that in the impugned order of taking cognizance
dated 04.12.2021, the learned trial court has not recorded his satisfaction and
there is nothing in the said order to show that the learned Magistrate has
applied his mind to the facts of the case and law applicable there to and that
the Magistrate has only mentioned the sections, under which the offence
appears to be made out and thereafter, issued the process and that the same is
not in accordance with mandate of Section 204 of the Cr.P.C.

4.3. Mr. H. Das has referred following case laws in support of his submission :-

(i) Pepsi Foods Limited and Another vs. Special Judicial
Magistrate and Others
, reported in (1998) 5 SCC 749 and

(ii) Mehmood Ul Rehman vs. Khazir Mohammad Tunda and Others,
reported in (2015) 12 SCC 420.

5. Per contra, Mr. D. Das, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 submits
that in a petition for quashing the proceeding the court is not supposed to
consider the defence case of the petitioners. Referring to the plea of alibi, so
taken by the petitioner No. 1 is defence plea and shall be taken into account at
the end of trial by the trial court. Mr. Das further submits that in view of the
decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bhushan Kumar and
Another vs. State (NCT) and Another
, reported in (2012) 2 SCC 699,
the Section 204 of the Cr.P.C. does not mandate the Magistrate to explicitly
Page No.# 7/18

state the reasons for issuance of summons. The section clearly states that if, in
the opinion of a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence, there is sufficient
ground for proceeding, then the summons may be issued. This section only
mandates the Magistrate to form an opinion as to whether there exists a
sufficient ground for issuing summon, but nowhere it has been mentioned in
the said section explicit narration of the same is mandatory, meaning thereby
that it is not a pre-requisite for deciding the validity of the summons issued. Mr.
Das further submits that the title suit pending between the parties is an
afterthought and lodged after lodging of the complaint.

5.1. Mr. Das also submits that from a perusal of the complaint petition, prima
faice offences appears to be made out against the petitioners and that the
same is sufficient to issue summon to the petitioners. Mr. Das also submits that
having satisfied with existence of a prima-facie case, the learned trial court has
issued the process vide impugned order, dated 04.12.2021, and the same
warrants no interference of this court. Therefore, Mr. Das has contended to
dismiss the petition.

5.2. Mr. D. Das has referred another case law in support of his submission :-

(i) Mahmood Ali and Others vs. State of U.P. and Others,
reported in (2023) 0 Supreme SC 691.

Discussion :-

6. Having heard the submissions of learned counsel for both the parties, I
have carefully gone through the petition as well as the documents placed on
record and also gone through the impugned order dated 04.12.2021, and also
gone through the case laws referred by learned counsel for both the parties.

7. The law regarding quashing of the FIR/complaint is well settled by Hon’ble
Page No.# 8/18

Supreme Court in catena of decisions and a reference can be made to a
decision in Neeharika Infrastructure Private Limited vs. State of
Maharashtra and Others
, reported in (2021) 19 SCC 401. Wherein it is
held as under:-

“33. In view of the above and for the reasons stated
above, our final conclusions on the principal/core
issue, whether the High Court would be justified
in passing an interim order of stay of
investigation and/or “no coercive steps to be
adopted”, during the pendency of the quashing
petition under Section 482CrPC and/or under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India and in
what circumstances and whether the High Court
would be justified in passing the order of not to
arrest the accused or “no coercive steps to be
adopted” during the investigation or till the
final report/charge-sheet is filed under Section
173CrPC, while dismissing/disposing of/not
entertaining/not quashing the criminal
proceedings/ complaint/FIR in exercise of powers
under Section 482 CrPC and/or under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India, our final conclusions
are as under:

33.1. Police has the statutory right and duty under the
relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal
Procedure
contained in Chapter XIV of the Code to
investigate into a cognizable offence.

33.2. Courts would not thwart any investigation into the
cognizable offences.

33.3. It is only in cases where no cognizable offence or
offence of any kind is disclosed in the first
information report that the Court will not permit
Page No.# 9/18

an investigation to go on.

33.4. The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly
with circumspection, as it has been observed, in
the “rarest of rare cases” (not to be confused
with the formation in the context of death
penalty).

33.5. While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which
is sought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry
as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise
of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint.

33.6. Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the
initial stage.

33.7. Quashing of a complaint/FIR should be an exception
rather than an ordinary rule.

33.8. Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the
jurisdiction of the police, since the two organs
of the State operate in two specific spheres of
activities and one ought not to tread over the
other sphere.

33.9. The functions of the judiciary and the police are
complementary, not overlapping.

33.10. Save in exceptional cases where non-interference
would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court
and the judicial process should not interfere at
the stage of investigation of offences.

33.11. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do
not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court
to act according to its whims or caprice.

33.12. The first information report is not an
encyclopaedia which must disclose all facts and
details relating to the offence reported.

Page No.# 10/18

Therefore, when the investigation by the police is
in progress, the court should not go into the
merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must
be permitted to complete the investigation. It
would be premature to pronounce the conclusion
based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR does
not deserve to be investigated or that it amounts
to abuse of process of law. After investigation,
if the investigating officer finds that there is
no substance in the application made by the
complainant, the investigating officer may file an
appropriate report/summary before the learned
Magistrate which may be considered by the learned
Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure.

33.13. The power under Section 482CrPC is very wide, but
conferment of wide power requires the court to be
more cautious. It casts an onerous and more
diligent duty on the court.

33.14. However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks
fit, regard being had to the parameters of
quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law,
more particularly the parameters laid down by this
Court in R.P. Kapur [R.P. Kapur v. State of
Punjab
, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 21 : AIR 1960 SC 866]
and Bhajan Lal [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal
,
1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426], has
the jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint.

33.15. When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the
alleged accused and the court when it exercises
the power under Section 482CrPC, only has to
consider whether the allegations in the FIR
disclose commission of a cognizable offence or
not. The court is not required to consider on
merits whether or not the merits of the
allegations make out a cognizable offence and the
Page No.# 11/18

court has to permit the investigating
agency/police to investigate the allegations in
the FIR.

33.16. The aforesaid parameters would be applicable and/or
the aforesaid aspects are required to be
considered by the High Court while passing an
interim order in a quashing petition in exercise
of powers under Section 482CrPC and/or under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However,
an interim order of stay of investigation during
the pendency of the quashing petition can be
passed with circumspection. Such an interim order
should not require to be passed routinely,
casually and/or mechanically. Normally, when the
investigation is in progress and the facts are
hazy and the entire evidence/material is not
before the High Court, the High Court should
restrain itself from passing the interim order of
not to arrest or “no coercive steps to be adopted”

and the accused should be relegated to apply for
anticipatory bail under Section 438CrPC before the
competent court. The High Court shall not and as
such is not justified in passing the order of not
to arrest and/or “no coercive steps” either during
the investigation or till the investigation is
completed and/or till the final report/charge-
sheet is filed under Section 173CrPC, while
dismissing/disposing of the quashing petition
under Section 482CrPC and/or under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India.

33.17. Even in a case where the High Court is prima facie
of the opinion that an exceptional case is made
out for grant of interim stay of further
investigation, after considering the broad
parameters while exercising the powers under
Page No.# 12/18

Section 482CrPC and/or under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India referred to hereinabove, the
High Court has to give brief reasons why such an
interim order is warranted and/or is required to
be passed so that it can demonstrate the
application of mind by the Court and the higher
forum can consider what was weighed with the High
Court while passing such an interim order.

33.18. Whenever an interim order is passed by the High
Court of “no coercive steps to be adopted” within
the aforesaid parameters, the High Court must
clarify what does it mean by “no coercive steps to
be adopted” as the term “no coercive steps to be
adopted” can be said to be too vague and/or broad
which can be misunderstood and/or misapplied.”

8. In the instant case, a careful perusal of the complaint petition, which is
being sought to be quashed in the present petition, indicates following facts and
circumstances:-

(i) On 28.12.2020, at about 12 noon, Moslem Khatun along
with Momtaz Begum went to Ramhrrirchar Part – 3;

(ii) Then, as per order of petitioner No. 1, Hazrat Ali,
the other petitioners in a pre-planned manner
restrained and scolded them with abusive languages;

(iii) While the complainant raised objection, the petitioner
No. 2, Kajiumuddin, had assaulted over her head and as
a result she became unconscious;

(iv) It further appears that, thereafter, Momtaz Begum
raised hue and cry and then, Moktel Hussain; Emran
Hussain; Surman Ali; and Nur Islam arrived at there;

(v) Then, petitioner No. 3, Rofiqul Islam attacked on the
head of Moktel Hussain by means of a dao and as a
result he sustained two injuries over his head and
Page No.# 13/18

became unconscious;

(vi) Then, Hazrat Ali assaulted Emran Hussain by means of
one bamboo lathy;

(vii) Then, Mofidul Islam tried to outrage the modesty of
Momtaz Begum.

(viii) Thereafter, the petitioner No. 5 Jahirul Islam
attempted to assault Surman Ali by means of a dao and
the same hit over his left leg and thereafter, he
fell down on the ground.

(ix) Thereafter, the nearby people, along with Nur
Islam, arrived at there and got them admitted at
Goalpara Civil Hospital and Moktel was admitted at
Solace Nursing Home, Goalpara.

9. The aforementioned allegations, so made in the complaint petition, if
taken at their face value, it cannot be said that no cognizable offence, are not
made out against the petitioners herein. The factual foundation of the offences,
under which cognizance was taken, appears to be clearly laid in the complaint,
and whether said factual foundation would be sufficient to disclose the
ingredients of the offences against petitioners, has to be considered at the stage
of trial. Such an enquiry cannot be embarked on at this stage.

10. It appears that some of the allegations are serious in nature and if proved
the same may entail punishment that may extend to life imprisonment also. At
this stage, the facts are hazy and as such, it would be premature to arrive at the
conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint does not deserve to be
investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process of law. Since at this stage,
the court has only to consider whether the allegations in the FIR discloses
commission of a cognizable offence or not, it is not required to consider on
Page No.# 14/18

merits whether or not the merits of the allegations make out a cognizable
offence, as held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Neeharika
Infrastructure
(Supra).

11. Though, the petitioner No.1 has taken a plea that there is considerable
delay in lodging the complaint, yet the same appears to be a matter of trial.
Further, it appears that the plea of alibi is a defence plea and at this stage, this
court is also not entitled to appreciate the defence case of the petitioner.
Reference in this context can be made to a decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court
in Mohd. Akram Siddiqui v. State of Bihar, reported in (2019) 13 SCC
350, wherein it has been held as under:-

“5. Ordinarily and in the normal course, the High Court
when approached for quashing of a criminal proceeding
will not appreciate the defence of the accused; neither
would it consider the veracity of the document(s) on
which the accused relies. However an exception has been
carved out by this Court in Yin Cheng Hsiung v. Essem
Chemical Industries (2011) 15 SCC 207; State of
Haryana v. Bhajan Lal
; 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335:

and Harshendra Kumar D. v. Rebatilata Koley (2011) 3
SCC 351, to the effect that in an appropriate case
where the document relied upon is a public document or
where veracity thereof is not disputed by the
complainant, the same can be considered.

12. In the case of CBI v. Arvind Khanna, reported in (2019) 10 SCC 686,
Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:-

“17. After perusing the impugned order and on hearing
the submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel on
both sides, we are of the view that the impugned order
[Arvind Khanna v. CBI, 2015 SCC OnLine Del 13651,
Page No.# 15/18

passed by the High Court is not sustainable. In a
petition filed under Section 482 CrPC, the High Court
has recorded findings on several disputed facts and
allowed the petition. Defence of the accused is to be
tested after appreciating the evidence during trial.
The very fact that the High Court, in this case, went
into the most minute details, on the allegations made
by the appellant CBI, and the defence put forth by the
respondent, led us to a conclusion that the High Court
has exceeded its power, while exercising its inherent
jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

18. In our view, the assessment made by the High Court
at this stage, when the matter has been taken
cognizance of by the competent court, is completely
incorrect and uncalled for.”

13. Moreover, the petitioner could not make out very exceptional
circumstances to interfere with the case at the very threshold, as held in the
case of State of Haryana and Ors. Vs. Bhajan Lal and Ors., reported
in AIR 1992 SC 604 and M/s Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd.
(Supra).

14. But, it appears that while taking cognizance of the offence vide order
dated 04.12.2021, the learned trial court has not recorded its satisfaction that
there exist sufficient ground for proceeding against the petitioners. Mr. H. Das,
learned counsel for the petitioners has rightly pointed out this at the time of
hearing and the decision, i.e. Pepsi Foods (Supra), referred by him also
strengthened his submission. Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with this
issue has held as under:-

“28. Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a
serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion
Page No.# 16/18

as a matter of course. It is not that the complainant
has to bring only two witnesses to support his
allegations in the complaint to have the criminal law
set into motion. The order of the Magistrate summoning
the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind
to the facts of the case and the law applicable
thereto. He has to examine the nature of allegations
made in the complaint and the evidence both oral and
documentary in support thereof and would that be
sufficient for the complainant to succeed in bringing
charge home to the accused. It is not that the
Magistrate is a silent spectator at the time of
recording of preliminary evidence before summoning of
the accused. The Magistrate has to carefully scrutinize
the evidence brought on record and may even himself put
questions to the complainant and his witnesses to
elicit answers to find out the truthfulness of the
allegations or otherwise and then examine if any
offence is prima facie committed by all or any of the
accused.”

15. It is to be noted here that in the case of Mehmood (Supra), Hon’ble
Supreme Court has held as under:-

“22. The steps taken by the Magistrate under Section
190(1)(a)
CrPC followed by Section 204 CrPC should
reflect that the Magistrate has applied his mind to the
facts and the statements and he is satisfied that there
is ground for proceeding further in the matter by
asking the person against whom the violation of law is
alleged, to appear before the court. The satisfaction
on the ground for proceeding would mean that the facts
alleged in the complaint would constitute an offence,
and when considered along with the statements recorded,
c would, prima facie, make the accused answerable
before the court. No doubt. no formal order or a
Page No.# 17/18

speaking order is required to be passed at that stage.
The Code of Criminal Procedure requires speaking order
to be passed under Section 203 CrPC when the complaint
is dismissed and that too the reasons need to be stated
only briefly. In other words, the Magistrate is not to
act as a post office in taking cognizance of each and
every complaint filed before him d and issue process as
a matter of course. There must be sufficient indication
in the order passed by the Magistrate that he is
satisfied that the allegations in the complaint
constitute an offence and when considered along with
the statements recorded and the result of inquiry or
report of investigation under Section 202 CrPC, if any,
the accused is answerable before the criminal court,
there is ground for proceeding against the accused
under Section 204 CrPC, by e issuing process for
appearance. The application of mind is best
demonstrated by disclosure of mind on the satisfaction.
If there is no such indication in a case where the
Magistrate proceeds under Sections 190/204 CrPC, the
High Court under Section 482 CrPC is bound to involve
its inherent power in order to prevent abuse of the
power of the criminal court. To be called to appear
before the criminal court as an accused is serious
matter affecting one’s dignity, self-f respect and
image in society. Hence, the process of criminal court
shall not be made a weapon of harassment.”

16. Though Mr. D. Das, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2, referring to
the decision of Bhushan Kumar (Supra) submits that there is no such
requirement of recording satisfaction.
However, it appears that the decision
referred by Mr. H. Das, learned counsel for the petitioners in Pepsi Foods
(Supra), was taken note of by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, however, in a
Page No.# 18/18

different context, i.e. in respect of maintainability of petition under Section 482
of the Cr.P.C., not on the point of exercising the jurisdiction under Section 204 of
the Cr.P.C.

17. Thus, having tested the impugned order in the light of the decision of
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Pepsi Foods (supra) and also in the
case of Bhushan Kumar (supra) and in the case of Neeharika
Infrastructure
(supra) and in the case of Mohd. Akram Siddiqui
(supra) and in Arvind Khanna (supra) and in Bhajan Lal and Ors.
(supra), and also in the in the light of the submission of learned counsel for
both the parties, this court is unable to derive satisfaction that very exceptional
circumstances are made out to interfere with the case at this stage.

18. In the result, I find no merit in the present Criminal Petition, and
accordingly, the same stands dismissed. Stay, if any, granted earlier, stands
vacated. The parties have to bear their own costs.

JUDGE

Comparing Assistant

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