Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On : 17.3.2025 vs Golf Link Finance Resorts Pvt. Ltd. & Anr on 28 March, 2025
Author: Virender Singh
Bench: Virender Singh
12025:HHC:8373
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA
Cr. MMO No. 990 of 2024
Reserved on : 17.3.2025
Decided on : 28.3.2025
Rekha
...Petitioner
Versus
Golf Link Finance Resorts Pvt. Ltd. & anr.
...Respondents
___________________________________________
Coram
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge
Whether approved for reporting? yes
________________________________________________
For the Petitioner : Mr. Mohar Singh, Advocate.
For the Respondents :Ms. Seema K. Guleria and
Ms. Kusum, Advocates, for
respondent No. 1.
Mr. H.S. Rawat, Addl. A.G.,
for respondent No. 2.
Virender Singh, Judge (oral)
The petitioner has filed the present petition, under
Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita,
2023, (hereinafter referred to as ‘the B.N.S.S.) read with
Section 147 of Negotiable Instruments Act (hereinafter
referred to as ‘the NI Act‘), for compounding the offence,
committed by the petitioner, under Section 138 of N.I. Act.
22025:HHC:8373
2. It is the case of the petitioner that respondent No.
1-Golf Link Finance and Resorts Pvt. Ltd. had filed
complaint, under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, against him,
before the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Shimla, (hereinafter referred to as ‘the trial Court’), in
which, the petitioner has been convicted by the learned
trial Court, vide judgment of conviction, dated 9.12.2022.
Vide order of sentence, dated 19.12.2022, the petitioner
has been sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment, for
six months, and to pay compensation of Rs. 6,00,000/-.
3. Against the said judgment of conviction and order
of sentence, Cr. Appeal No. 18-S/10 of 2023, titled as,
‘Rekha vs. Golf Link Finance & Resorts Pvt. Ltd.‘ was
preferred before the Court of learned Additional Sessions
Judge-1, Shimla, Himachal Pradesh (Appellate Court).
However, the said appeal has also been dismissed, vide
order dated 23.6.2023.
4. Thereafter, the petitioner had preferred the
Criminal Revision Petition No. 462 of 2023, before this
Court, which was dismissed by this Court, vide judgment
dated 17.9.2024.
32025:HHC:8373
5. Now, the petitioner is before this Court on the
ground that the matter has now been settled between the
parties, and the entire amount has been paid to the
complainant. Alongwith the petition, copy of draft has also
been annexed.
6. In the petition, guidelines, as formulated by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Damodar S. Prabhu vs. Sayed
Babalal, reported in 2010 (2) SCC (Cri) 1328, have also
been reproduced.
7. On the basis of above, a prayer has been made to
allow the present petition, by permitting the parties to
compound the offence.
8. It is not in dispute that after dismissal of the
Criminal Revision petition, before this Court, no appeal
has been preferred, by the petitioner, before the Hon’ble
Supreme Court. In such situation, the material question,
which arises for determination, before this Court, is as to
whether the bar, as, contained, under Section 362 Cr. P.C.
(now 403 of the BNSS), can be ignored, by exercising the
powers under Section 482 Cr. P.C. (Section 528 BNSS).
9. In case, the present petition is accepted, as prayed
for, it would be nothing, but, reviewing the judgment,
42025:HHC:8373
passed by this Court, on 17.9.2024, by virtue of which,
Criminal Revision No. 462 of 2023, was dismissed, copy of
which, has been annexed with the petition, as Annexure P-
3.
10. The acceptance of the prayer, so made, in the
present petition, would be nothing, but reviewing the
judgment passed by this Court earlier, which is not
permissible, under the law, especially in view of the bar
created by Section 362 Cr. P.C.
11. Admittedly, at present, no proceedings are
pending between the parties before this Court, or before
the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Although, compounding can
be done, at any stage, but, for invoking the said provisions,
i.e. Section 147 of the N.I. Act, some proceedings must be
pending before any Court.
14. It is trite law that pendency of the proceedings,
before any Court, is sine qua non, for exercising the powers
under Section 482 Cr.PC., as, held by a three Judges Bench
of the Hon’ble Apex Court, in Ramawatar versus State of
Madhya Pradesh, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 966. Relevant
paragraph 13 of the judgment, is reproduced as under:-
52025:HHC:8373
“13. We, however, put a further caveat that the
powers under Article 142 or under Section 482
Cr.P.C., are exercisable in post-conviction matters
only where an appeal is pending before one or
the other Judicial forum. This is on the premise
that an order of conviction does not attain finality
till the accused has exhausted his/her legal
remedies and the finality is sub-judice before an
appellate court. The pendency of legal
proceedings, be that may before the final Court,
is sine-qua-non to involve the superior court’s
plenary powers to do complete justice.
Conversely, where a settlement has ensued post
the attainment of all legal remedies, the
annulment of proceedings on the basis of a
compromise would be impermissible. Such an
embargo is necessitated to prevent the accused
from gaining an indefinite leverage, for such a
settlement/compromise will always be loaded
with lurking suspicion about its bona fide. We
have already clarified that the purpose of these
extra-ordinary powers is not to incentivise any
hollow-hearted agreements between the accused
and the victim but to do complete justice by
effecting genuine settlement(s).”
(Self emphasis supplied)
15. Moreover, the powers, under Section 482 Cr.PC.
(Section 528 BNSS), are not to be used, in contravention to
the specific provisions of the Act. While holding so, the view
of this Court is being guided, by the decision of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, in State of Punjab versus Devinder Pal
Singh Bhullar and others, (2011) 14 Supreme Court
Cases 770. Relevant paragraphs 44 to 64 of the said
judgment, are reproduced, as under:
“44. There is no power of review with the
Criminal Court after judgment has been rendered.
62025:HHC:8373
The High Court can alter or review its judgment
before it is signed. When an order is passed, it
cannot be reviewed. Section 362 Cr.P.C. is based
on an acknowledged principle of law that once a
matter is finally disposed of by a Court, the said
Court in the absence of a specific statutory
provision becomes functus officio and is
disentitled to entertain a fresh prayer for any
relief unless the former order of final disposal is
set aside by a Court of competent jurisdiction in a
manner prescribed by law. The Court becomes
functus officio the moment the order for disposing
of a case is signed. Such an order cannot be
altered except to the extent of correcting a clerical or
arithmetical error. There is also no provision for
modification of the judgment. (See: Hari Singh Mann v.
Harbhajan Singh Bajwa & Ors., AIR 2001 SC 43;
and Chhanni v. State of U.P., )
45. Moreover, the prohibition contained in Section
362 Cr.P.C. is absolute; after the judgment is signed,
even the High Court in exercise of its inherent power
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has no authority or
jurisdiction to alter/review the same. (See: Moti Lal v.
State of M.P., AIR 1994 SC 1544; Hari Singh Mann
(supra); and State of Kerala vs. M.M. Manikantan
Nair).
46. If a judgment has been pronounced without
jurisdiction or in violation of principles of natural
justice or where the order has been pronounced
without giving an opportunity of being heard to a
party affected by it or where an order was obtained
by abuse of the process of court which would really
amount to its being without jurisdiction, inherent
powers can be exercised to recall such order for the
reason that in such an eventuality the order becomes
a nullity and the provisions of Section 362 Cr.P.C.
would not operate. In such eventuality, the judgment
is manifestly contrary to the audi alteram partem rule
of natural justice. The power of recall is different from
the power of altering/reviewing the judgment.
However, the party seeking recall/alteration has to
establish that it was not at fault. (Vide: Chitawan &
Ors. v. Mahboob Ilahi, Deepak Thanwardas Balwani
v. State of Maharashtra & Anr. Swarth Mahto & Anr.
v. Dharmdeo Narain Singh, Makkapati Nagaswara
Sastri v. S.S. Satyanarayan, Asit Kumar Kar v. State
of West Bengal & Ors., Vishnu Agarwal v. State of
U.P. & Anr.
72025:HHC:8373
47. This Court by virtue of Article 137of the
Constitution has been invested with an express power
to review any judgment in Criminal Law and while no
such power has been conferred on the High Court,
inherent power of the court cannot be exercised for
doing that which is specifically prohibited by the
Code itself. (Vide: State Represented by D.S.P.,
S.B.C.I.D., Chennai v. K.V. Rajendran & Ors.
48. In Smt. Sooraj Devi v. Pyare Lal & Anr., AIR 1981
SC 736, this Court held that the prohibition in Section
362 Cr.P.C. against the Court altering or reviewing its
judgment, is subject to what is “otherwise provided by
this Code or by any other law for the time being in
force”. Those words, however, refer to those provisions
only where the Court has been expressly authorised
by the Code or other law to alter or review its
judgment. The inherent power of the Court is not
contemplated by the saving provision contained
in Section 362 Cr.P.C and, therefore, the attempt to
invoke that power can be of no avail.
49. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to
the effect that the criminal justice delivery system
does not clothe the court to add or delete any words,
except to correct the clerical or arithmetical error as
specifically been provided under the statute itself
after pronouncement of the judgment as the Judge
becomes functus officio. Any mistake or glaring
omission is left to be corrected only by the appropriate
forum in accordance with law.
IV. INHERENT POWERS UNDER SECTION 482 Cr.P.C. 50. "3......The inherent power under Section
482 Cr.P.C. is intended to prevent the abuse of the
process of the Court and to secure the ends of justice.
Such power cannot be exercised to do something
which is expressly barred under the Cr.P.C. If any
consideration of the facts by way of review is not
permissible under the Cr.P.C. and is expressly barred,
it is not for the Court to exercise its inherent power to
reconsider the matter and record a conflicting
decision. If there had been change in the
circumstances of the case, it would be in order for the
High Court to exercise its inherent powers in the
prevailing circumstances and pass appropriate orders
to secure the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of
the process of the Court. Where there are no such
changed circumstances and the decision has to be
arrived at on the facts that existed as on the date of
the earlier order, the exercise of the power to
82025:HHC:8373
reconsider the same materials to arrive at different
conclusion is in effect a review, which is expressly
barred under Section 362 Cr.P.C.
(emphasis supplied)
51. The inherent power of the court under Section
482 Cr.P.C. is saved only where an order has been
passed by the criminal court which is required to be
set aside to secure the ends of justice or where the
proceeding pending before a court, amounts to abuse
of the process of court. Therefore, such powers can be
exercised by the High Court in relation to a matter
pending before a criminal court or where a power is
exercised by the court under the Cr.P.C. Inherent
powers cannot be exercised assuming that the statute
conferred an unfettered and arbitrary jurisdiction, nor
can the High Court act at its whim or caprice. The
statutory power has to be exercised sparingly with
circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases. (Vide:
Kurukshetra University & Anr. v. State of Haryana &
Anr., AIR 1977 SC 2229; and State of W.B. & Ors. v.
Sujit Kumar Rana, (2004) 4 SCC 129).
52. The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. cannot be
resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Cr.P.C.
for the redressal of the grievance of the aggrieved
party or where alternative remedy is available. Such
powers cannot be exercised as against the express
bar of the law and engrafted in any other provision of
the Cr.P.C. Such powers can be exercised to secure
the ends of justice and to prevent the abuse of the
process of court. However, such expressions do not
confer unlimited/unfettered jurisdiction on the High
Court as the “ends of justice” and “abuse of the
process of the court” have to be dealt with in
accordance with law including the procedural law and
not otherwise. Such powers can be exercised ex debito
justitiae to do real and substantial justice as the
courts have been conferred such inherent jurisdiction,
in absence of any express provision, as inherent in
their constitution, or such powers as are necessary to
do the right and to undo a wrong in course of
administration of justice as provided in the legal
maxim “quando lex aliquid alique, concedit, conceditur
et id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest”. However, the
High Court has not been given nor does it possess any
inherent power to make any order, which in the
opinion of the court, could be in the interest of justice
as the statutory provision is not intended to by-pass
the procedure prescribed. (Vide: Lalit Mohan Mondal
& Ors. v. Benoyendra Nath Chatterjee, AIR 1982 SC
785; Rameshchandra Nandlal Parikh v. State of
92025:HHC:8373
Gujarat & Anr., AIR 2006 SC 915; Central Bureau of
Investigation v. Ravi Shankar Srivastava, IAS & Anr.,
AIR 2006 SC 2872; Inder Mohan Goswami & Anr. v.
State of Uttaranchal & Ors., AIR 2008 SC 251;
and Pankaj Kumar v. State of Maharashtra & Ors.,
AIR 2008 SC 3077).
53. The High Court can always issue appropriate
direction in exercise of its power under Article 226 of
the Constitution at the behest of an aggrieved person,
if the court is convinced that the power of investigation
has been exercised by an Investigating Officer
malafide or the matter is not investigated at all. Even
in such a case, the High Court cannot direct the police
as to how the investigation is to be conducted but can
insist only for the observance of process as provided
for in the Cr.P.C. Another remedy available to such an
aggrieved person may be to file a complaint
under Section 200 Cr.P.C. and the court concerned
will proceed as provided in Chapter XV of the Cr.P.C.
(See: Gangadhar Janardan Mhatre v. State of
Maharashtra & Ors., (2004) 7 SCC 768; and Divine
Retreat Centre v. State of Kerala & Ors., AIR 2008 SC
1614).
54. The provisions of Section 482 Cr.P.C. closely
resemble Section 151 of Code of Civil Procedure,
1908, (hereinafter called the ‘CPC‘), and, therefore, the
restrictions which are there to use the inherent powers
under Section 151 CPC are applicable in exercise of
powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and one such
restriction is that there exists no other provision of law
by which the party aggrieved could have sought relief.
(Vide: The Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary & Ors., AIR
1993 SC 892).
55. In Divisional Forest Officer & Anr. v. G.V.
Sudhakar Rao & Ors., AIR 1986 SC 328, this Court
held that High Court was not competent under Section
482 Cr.P.C. to stay the operation of an order of
confiscation under Section 44(IIA) of the Andhra
Pradesh Forest Act as it is distinct from a trial before
a court for the commission of an offence.
56. In Popular Muthiah v. State represented by
Inspector of Police, (2006) 7 SCC 296, explaining the
scope of Section 482 Cr.P.C., this Court held :
” 48…The High Court cannot issue directions to
investigate the case from a particular angle or by a
particular agency.” (emphasis added)
Thus, in case, the High Court in exercise of its
inherent powers, issues directions contravening the
102025:HHC:8373statutory provisions laying down the procedure of
investigation, it would be unwarranted in law.
57. In Rajan Kumar Machananda v. State of
Karnataka, 1990 (supp.) SCC 132, this Court
examined a case as to whether the bar under Section
397(3) Cr.P.C. can be circumvented by invoking
inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. by the
High Court. The Court came to the conclusion that if
such a course was permissible it would be possible
that every application facing the bar of Section
397(3) Cr.P.C. would be labelled as one under Section
482 Cr.P.C. Thus, the statutory bar cannot be
circumvented.
58. This Court has consistently emphasised that
judges must enforce laws whatever they may be and
decide the cases strictly in accordance with the law.
“The laws are not always just and the lights are not
always luminous. Nor, again, are judicial methods
always adequate to secure justice”. But the courts
“are bound by the Penal Code and Criminal Procedure
Code” by the very `oath’ of the office. (See: Joseph
Peter v. State of Goa, Daman and Diu, AIR 1977 SC
1812).
59. It is evident from the above that inherent
powers can be exercised only to prevent the abuse of
the process of the court and to secure the ends of
justice. However, powers can be used provided there
is no prohibition for passing such an order under the
provisions of Cr.P.C. and there is no provision under
which the party can seek redressal of its grievance.
Under the garb of exercising inherent powers, the
Criminal Court cannot review its judgment. Such
powers are analogous to the provisions of Section 151
CPC and can be exercised only to do real and
substantial justice. (self emphasis supplied).
60. The rule of inherent powers has its source in
the maxim “Quadolex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere
videtur id sine quo ipsa, ess uon potest” which means
that when the law gives anything to anyone, it gives
also all those things without which the thing itself
could not exist. The order cannot be passed by-
passing the procedure prescribed by law. The court in
exercise of its power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. cannot
direct a particular agency to investigate the matter or
to investigate a case from a particular angle or by a
procedure not prescribed in Cr.P.C. Such powers
should be exercised very sparingly to prevent abuse of
process of any court. Courts must be careful to see
112025:HHC:8373
that its decision in exercise of this power is based on
sound principles.
61. To inhere means that it forms a necessary part
and belongs as an attribute in the nature of things.
The High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is crowned
with a statutory power to exercise control over the
administration of justice in criminal proceedings
within its territorial jurisdiction. This is to ensure that
proceedings undertaken under the Cr.P.C. are
executed to secure the ends of justice. For this, the
Legislature has empowered the High Court with an
inherent authority which is repository under the
Statute. The Legislature therefore clearly intended the
existence of such power in the High Court to control
proceedings initiated under the Cr.P.C. Conferment of
such inherent power might be necessary to prevent
the miscarriage of justice and to prevent any form of
injustice. However, it is to be understood that it is
neither divine nor limitless. It is not to generate
unnecessary indulgence. The power is to protect the
system of justice from being polluted during the
administration of justice under the Code.
62. The High Court can intervene where it finds the
abuse of the process of any court which means, that
wherever an attempt to secure something by abusing
the process is located, the same can be rectified by
invoking such power. There has to be a nexus and a
direct co-relation to any existing proceeding, not
foreclosed by any other form under the Code, to the
subject matter for which such power is to be
exercised.
63. Application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. lies before
the High Court against an order passed by the court
subordinate to it in a pending case/proceedings.
Generally, such powers are used for quashing
criminal proceedings in appropriate cases. Such an
application does not lie to initiate criminal proceedings
or set the criminal law in motion. Inherent jurisdiction
can be exercised if the order of the Subordinate Court
results in the abuse of the “process” of the court
and/or calls for interference to secure the ends of
justice. The use of word `process’ implies that the
proceedings are pending before the Subordinate
Court. When reference is made to the phrase “to
secure the ends of justice”, it is in fact in relation to
the order passed by the Subordinate Court and it
cannot be understood in a general connotation of the
phrase. More so, while entertaining such application
the proceedings should be pending in the Subordinate
Court. In case it attained finality, the inherent powers
122025:HHC:8373
cannot be exercised. Party aggrieved may approach
the appellate/revisional forum. Inherent jurisdiction
can be exercised if injustice done to a party, e.g., a
clear mandatory provision of law is overlooked or
where different accused in the same case are being
treated differently by the Subordinate Court.
64. An inherent power is not an omnibus for
opening a pandorabox, that too for issues that are
foreign to the main context. The invoking of the power
has to be for a purpose that is connected to a
proceeding and not for sprouting an altogether new
issue. A power cannot exceed its own authority
beyond its own creation. It is not that a person is
remediless. On the contrary, the constitutional remedy
of writs are available. Here, the High Court enjoys
wide powers of prerogative writs as compared to that
under Section 482 Cr.P.C. To secure the corpus of an
individual, remedy by way of habeas corpus is
available. For that the High Court should not resort to
inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. as the
Legislature has conferred separate powers for the
same. Needless to mention that Section 97 Cr.P.C.
empowers Magistrates to order the search of a person
wrongfully confined. It is something different that the
same court exercising authority can, in relation to the
same subject matter, invoke its writ jurisdiction as
well. Nevertheless, the inherent powers are not to
provide universal remedies. The power cannot be and
should not be used to belittle its own existence. One
cannot concede anarchy to an inherent power for that
was never the wisdom of the Legislature. To confer
un-briddled inherent power would itself be trenching
upon the authority of the Legislature.”
(Self emphasis supplied)
16. This matter can be seen from another angle.
Hon’ble Supreme Court in Damodar S. Prabhu versus
Sayed BabaLal, 2015 (5) SCC 663, has elaborately
discussed the provisions of Sections 138 and 147 of the
N.I. Act and laid down certain guidelines. Relevant para-
21 of the judgment, is reproduced, as under:
132025:HHC:8373
” With regard to the progression of litigation in
cheque bouncing cases, the learned Attorney
General has urged this Court to frame guidelines
for a graded scheme of imposing costs on parties
who unduly delay compounding of the offence. It
was submitted that the requirement of deposit of
the costs will act as a deterrent for delayed
composition, since at present, free and easy
compounding of offences at any stage, however
belated, gives an incentive to the drawer of the
cheque to delay settling the cases for years. An
application for compounding made after several
years not only results in the system being
burdened but the complainant is also deprived of
effective justice. In view of this submission, we
direct that the following guidelines be followed:-
THE GUIDELINES
(i) In the circumstances, it is proposed as follows:
(a) That directions can be given that the Writ of
Summons be suitably modified making it clear to
the accused that he could make an application for
compounding of the offences at the first or second
hearing of the case and that if such an application
is made, compounding may be allowed by the
court without imposing any costs on the accused.
(b) If the accused does not make an application for
compounding as aforesaid, then if an application
for compounding is made before the Magistrate at
a subsequent stage, compounding can be allowed
subject to the condition that the accused will be
required to pay 10% of the cheque amount to be
deposited as a condition for compounding with the
Legal Services Authority, or such authority as the
Court deems fit.
(c) Similarly, if the application for compounding is
made before the Sessions Court or a High Court in
revision or appeal, such compounding may be
allowed on the condition that the accused pays
15% of the cheque amount by way of costs.
(d) Finally, if the application for compounding is
made before the Supreme Court, the figure would
increase to 20% of the cheque amount.”
(Self emphasis supplied)
142025:HHC:8373
17. There is nothing on record to demonstrate that
any effort has been made by the petitioner to settle the
matter with the complainant, when the lis was pending,
before the learned trial Court, as well as, before this
Court, by way of Criminal Revision Petition.
18. As discussed above, the provisions of Section 482
Cr. P.C., cannot be used in contravention to the statutory
provisions, of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Bharatiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita), in the shape of Section 362
Cr. P.C.
19. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, while issuing
directions in Damodar S. Prabhu‘s (supra) has
categorically fixed the amount of compounding fee at
different levels. Before the learned trial Court, there is no
requirement of paying the compounding fee, if the
compounding is done at first or second hearing of the
case, whereas, 10% of the cheque amount is held to be
payable, as compounding fee, where, the compounding is
done, at the subsequent stage. If the proceedings are
pending before the Court of Sessions or before the High
Court, the compounding fee is held to be 15%. If the
152025:HHC:8373
proceedings are pending before the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has increased the
figure, as, 20% of the cheque amount.
20. Merely, on the basis of the said guidelines, the
arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner qua
the fact that compounding can be done, at any stage, do
not hold water.
21. Even, as per the guidelines, in Damodar S
Prabhu‘s case (supra), an inference can be drawn that
sine qua non, for moving the application, for
compounding, is pendency of proceedings. Non-filing of
the appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court against the
dismissal of the revision petition, by this Court, resulted
into finality of the judgment of conviction.
22. If the present petition is allowed, it would amount
to re-opening the matter, which is not permissible under
the provisions of Section 482 Cr.PC.
23. Even otherwise, if the prayer is accepted, it would
amount to give premium to the accused, for her act of
omission, in not preferring the appeal before the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, against the dismissal of the revision
162025:HHC:8373
Petition, by this Court, on 4.11.2024, whereas, the
present petition has been filed on 3.12.2024.
24. Considering the fact that no appeal has been
preferred against the dismissal of the revision petition, by
this Court, this Court is of the view that the petitioner
could not bring her case within the purview of the
exceptions, as, carved out, by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in para 46 of the judgment in Devinder Pal Singh
Bhullar‘s case (supra).
25. In view of the directions, issued, by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court, in Damodar S. Prabhu‘s case (supra),
compounding is permissible, at any stage of the
proceedings, but, pendency of the proceedings, is sine qua
non, whereas, in this case, no proceedings, in any Court,
are pending, as such, a line has to be drawn, where, the
compounding of the offence, could be permitted.
26. If the prayer, at this stage, is accepted, then, there
would be no end to the litigation, as, after challenging the
judgment of conviction and order of sentence
unsuccessfully, which has attained finality, by way of all
the legal remedies, available, thereafter, the person, like
the petitioner, would approach this Court, under Section
172025:HHC:8373
482 Cr.PC. (Section 528 BNSS), to get rid of the judgment
of conviction and order of sentence, under the garb of
compromise.
27. Considering all these facts, the present petition is
not maintainable and the same is accordingly dismissed.
The pending application(s), if any, are also disposed of.
(Virender Singh)
Judge
March 28, 2025
Kalpana
[ad_1]
Source link