Bangalore District Court
Satarasi Mallikarjuna Choudary vs Aravind T M on 28 March, 2025
IN THE COURT OF THE XXVII ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL
AND SESSIONS JUDGE (CCH-9) AT BENGALURU.
Dated this the 28th day of March, 2025.
PRESENT:
Sri HAREESHA A., B.A., LL.B.,
XXVII Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge,
Bengaluru.
A.A. No.06/2025
PETITIONER : Satarasi Mallikarjuna
Choudary,
Aged about 59 years,
S/o. Jagannadham Naidu Satarasi,
Residing at No.301. Sai
Sadan, Balkampet Main
Road, S.R. Nagar,
Hyderabad - 500038.
(By Sri V.H., Advocate)
-VERSUS-
RESPONDENTS : 1. Aravind T.M,
Aged about 49 years,
S/o. T. Muniraju, Residing
at No.1004, Gowri
Apartments, New BEL
Road, Near Ramaiah
Hospital, Devasandra
MSRIT, Bengaluru -
560054.
2. Shricharan,
Aged about 44 years,
S/o. Late. Narayanareddy,
Residing at No.37, RSSBN
Road, Singanayakanahalli
Village, Yelahanka Hobli,
Bengaluru North Taluk,
Bengalore - 560064.
(By Sri A.A., Advocate)
Cont'd..
-2- A.A. No.06/2025
ORDER
The petitioner has preferred the present
application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996, seeking an interim order
restraining the respondents, their agents, employees,
workmen, assigns, legal heirs, successors, or any
person acting through or under them from alienating,
encumbering, or creating any third-party rights or
interests in respect of the application schedule property,
pending adjudication of the dispute before the learned
arbitrator.
2. The petitioner entered into an Assignment Agreement
with the respondents on 12.12.2022 concerning an
agricultural land bearing Survey No. 62, measuring 31
acres 27 guntas, along with 17 guntas of karab land,
situated at Madappanahalli Village, Hesaraghatta Hobli,
Yelahanka, Bengaluru North Taluk, as more fully
described in the schedule annexed to the petition
(hereinafter referred to as the “Application Schedule
Property”).
Cont’d..
-3- A.A. No.06/2025
3. The Application Schedule Property originally belonged
to one Sri Narasimhaiah and his family members, from
whom respondent Nos. 1 and 2 had entered into a
registered Sale Agreement dated 08.10.2015, upon
payment of the entire sale consideration of
₹7,91,87,500/- (Rupees Seven Crores Ninety-One
Lakhs Eighty-Seven Thousand Five Hundred Only). It is
further contended that, at the time of execution of the
Sale Agreement, the vendors of the respondents
executed an irrevocable General Power of Attorney,
dated 08.10.2015, authorizing the respondents to deal
with and dispose of the Application Schedule Property
in accordance with law. Subsequently, the respondents
entered into an Assignment Agreement with the
petitioner, under which the respondents were required
to satisfy certain conditions precedent before
completing the transaction and executing the Sale
Deed. The said conditions precedent included:
a. making out clear and marketable title of the
schedule property.
b. satisfying the petitioner as to the area, boundaries
and other details of the schedule property by
conducting a spot survey.
Cont’d..
-4- A.A. No.06/2025
c. securing khata/ mutation of the schedule property
in the name of the vendors,d. completion of survey of the schedule property with
hudbust and making the boundaries of the schedule
property and fence the schedule property with barbed
wire; andc. paying property tax up to date.
4. The total sale consideration agreed to was
Rs.98,19,25,000/- payable in the following manner:
a. Rs. 2,50,00,000/- (Rupees Two Crores Fifty Lakha
Only) in favour of respondent No.1 by way of cheques:
i. bearing No.08419 for a sum of Rs.5,00,000/-
drawn on State Bank of India, Balkampet
Branch, Hyderabad.
ii. bearing No.003943 for a sum of Rs.99,00,000/-
drawn on ICICI Bank, Malleshwaram Branch,
Bengalore.
iii. bearing No.003944 for a sum of Rs.99,00,000/-
drawn on ICICI Bank, Malleshwaram Branch,
Bengaluru, andiv. bearing No.003945 for a sum of Rs.47,00,000/-
drawn on ICICI Bank, Malleshwaram Branch,
Bengalore.
b. Rs. 2,50,00,000/- (Rupees Two Crores Fifty Lakha
Only) in favour of respondent No.2 by way of cheques:
Cont’d..
-5- A.A. No.06/2025
i. bearing No.108420 for a sum of Rs.5,00,000/-
drawn on State Bank of India, Balkampet
Branch, Hyderabad.
ii. bearing No.003946 for a sum of Rs.99,00,000/-
drawn on ICICI Bank, Malleshwaram Branch,
Bengalore.
iii. bearing No.003947 for a sum of Rs.99,00,000/-
drawn on ICICI Bank, Malleshwaram Branch,
Bengaluru, andiv. bearing No.003948 for a sum of Rs.47,00,000/-
drawn on ICICI Bank, Malleshwaram Branch,
Bengalore.
c. Rs. 93,19,25,000/- (Rupees Ninety Three Crores
Ninteen Lakha Twenty Five Thousand Only) being the
balance of the consideration amount payable by the
petitioner to the respondents, subject to the
respondents complying with all their obligations and
the Conditions Precedent under the Assignment
Agreement.
5. Upon service of notice, the respondents entered
appearance through their counsel and filed objections
both to the interim application as well as the main
petition. In their objections, the respondents admitted
the existence of the Sale Agreement dated 08.10.2015
Cont’d..
-6- A.A. No.06/2025
and the irrevocable General Power of Attorney dated
08.10.2015, executed by the original landowners,
namely Sri Narasimhaiah and his family members, after
receiving the entire sale consideration. The respondents
further admitted the execution of the Assignment
Agreement dated 17.12.2022 in favour of the petitioner,
under which they had agreed to execute a registered
Sale Deed in respect of the Application Schedule
Property for a total consideration of ₹98,19,25,000/-
(Rupees Ninety-Eight Crores Nineteen Lakhs Twenty-
Five Thousand Only). The respondents also conceded
that, under the said Assignment Agreement, the
petitioner was required to pay an advance sum of
₹5,00,00,000/- (Rupees Five Crores Only), and that it
was the respondents’ obligation to establish a good and
marketable title to the Application Schedule Property.
Additionally, the respondents admitted their duty to
secure the khata/mutation of the Application Schedule
Property in the name of the vendors, conduct a survey
of the land, and ensure that the area, boundaries, and
other particulars of the property were consistent with
the description provided under the Assignment
Cont’d..
-7- A.A. No.06/2025
Agreement. However, the respondents have contended
that the Assignment Agreement imposed a condition
precedent requiring both parties to contribute equally
and work towards ensuring the transfer of title in the
name of the petitioner, and they allege that the
petitioner failed to fulfill this obligation.
6. It is further contended that, in Writ Appeal Nos.
1756/2016 and 1289/2023, vide orders dated
30.09.2015 and 25.07.2022, respectively, the Hon’ble
High Court of Karnataka, while affirming the order
passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No.
50129/2012, directed the revenue authorities to restore
the names of the original landowners of the petition
schedule property in the revenue records. However, the
authorities have failed to comply with the said direction,
and consequently, a contempt petition is pending before
the Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka in CCC No.
418/2023. The respondents have further alleged that
the petitioner failed to adhere to the key terms of the
agreement, particularly in making the full payment of
the advance consideration amount of ₹5,00,00,000/-
Cont’d..
-8- A.A. No.06/2025
(Rupees Five Crores Only). It is specifically contended
that a cheque for ₹47,00,000/- (Rupees Forty-Seven
Lakhs Only) was not presented for encashment as the
petitioner approached the respondents and requested
its return to arrange necessary funds. Additionally, the
respondents have contended that the petitioner is
employed with Hindustan Petroleum Corporation
Limited (HPCL) and, being a public servant, is ineligible
to enter into an agreement of this nature. Further, it is
alleged that the petitioner had made a promise to pay
an additional sum of ₹30,00,00,000/- (Rupees Thirty
Crores Only), but the said assurance never
materialized. The respondents assert that, without
obtaining the necessary permission from his employer,
the petitioner could not have lawfully entered into a sale
transaction with them. In view of the foregoing, the
respondents contend that the petitioner is not entitled
to any interim relief as sought in the present petition
and have prayed for its dismissal with costs.
7. This Court, upon consideration of the interim
application, granted an ex parte interim order vide its
Cont’d..
-9- A.A. No.06/2025
order dated 19.02.2025, restraining the respondents
from alienating the suit schedule property until the
service of notice upon them.
8. I have heard the arguments advanced by the respective
parties and have perused the grounds urged in the
petition, the documents filed in support thereof, as well
as the statement of objections and the accompanying
documents. The points that arise for consideration are
as follows:
1. Whether the petitioner made out
any grounds to grant interim order
under Section 9 of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996, as
sought for in the petition?
2. What order?
9. My findings on the Point No.1 in the affirmative for the
following;
REASONS
10. POINT No.1 : It is an admitted fact that respondents
No.1 and 2 entered into an Agreement of Sale dated
08.10.2015 with the original owners of the suit schedule
property and paid the entire sale consideration amount
Cont’d..
- 10 A.A. No.06/2025
-
of ₹7,91,87,500/- (Rupees Seven Crores Ninety-One
Lakhs Eighty-Seven Thousand Five Hundred Only). On
the same day, the landowners executed a registered
irrevocable General Power of Attorney in favor of the
respondents, thereby authorizing them to dispose of the
suit schedule property and execute a Sale Deed in their
favor. It is further an undisputed fact that respondents
No.1 and 2 subsequently entered into an Assignment
Agreement with the petitioner on 17.12.2022 for the
sale of the petition schedule property for a total
consideration of ₹98,19,25,000/- (Rupees Ninety-Eight
Crores Nineteen Lakhs Twenty-Five Thousand Only) and
received a cheque for ₹25,00,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty-
Five Crores Only) as an advance amount. However, one
cheque issued for ₹47,00,000/- (Rupees Forty-Seven
Lakhs Only) was not presented for encashment.
11. In the Assignment Agreement, in Clause 2 the
respondent expressly acknowledged the receipt of a
cheque for ₹5,00,00,000/- (Rupees Five Crores Only),
which remains undisputed. As per the terms of the
Assignment Agreement, the balance sale consideration
Cont’d..
- 11 A.A. No.06/2025
-
was payable only upon the fulfillment of certain
conditions precedent by the respondents, to the
satisfaction of the petitioner, as stipulated in Clause
2(iii) read with Clause 4 of the Assignment Agreement.
The petitioner has produced certified copies of the
registered Agreement of Sale, the Assignment
Agreement, and the registered General Power of
Attorney executed by the original landowners in favor of
the respondents. As per the conditions stipulated in the
Assignment Agreement, it was a mandatory obligation of
the assignor to establish a good and marketable title to
the petition schedule property to the satisfaction of the
assignee/attorney. In furtherance of this obligation, the
assignor was required to provide the necessary
documents to the assignee. Additionally, the
Assignment Agreement placed an obligation upon the
assignee to conduct a survey of the petition schedule
property to verify and identify its area, boundaries, and
other particulars, ensuring consistency with the
description provided in the agreement. Admittedly, the
Assignment Agreement also contains an arbitration
Cont’d..
- 12 A.A. No.06/2025
-
clause, specifying Bengaluru as the designated venue
for arbitration.
[
12. It is pertinent to note that the respondents issued a
notice dated 16.01.2025, terminating and revoking the
Assignment Agreement dated 19.12.2022. Upon service
of the said notice, the petitioner responded by letter
dated 17.02.2025. In accordance with the arbitration
clause in the Assignment Agreement, the petitioner
nominated a former Judge of the Hon’ble High Court of
Karnataka as the sole arbitrator to adjudicate the
dispute, in terms of Section 21 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996. Subsequently, apprehending
that the respondents might alienate the petition
schedule property to third parties, the petitioner
approached this Court seeking interim relief. This
apprehension is primarily based on the existence of an
irrevocable registered General Power of Attorney
executed in favor of the respondents.
13. The learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently
contended that all other contentious issues are required
to be adjudicated by the sole arbitrator in accordance
Cont’d..
- 13 A.A. No.06/2025
-
with the terms of the Assignment Agreement. However,
in order to preserve the subject matter of the dispute
and protect the property from alienation until the
adjudication of the parties’ rights, it is just and
necessary to grant an interim order under Section 9 of
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The learned
counsel for the petitioner has contended that the
contract could not be completed due to the respondents’
failure to satisfy the petitioner regarding the marketable
title of the vendor. Additionally, the khata has not been
transferred in the name of the landowners, thereby
rendering them incapable of executing valid Sale Deeds.
The petitioner has produced the orders passed by the
Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka in Writ Petition No.
50129/2012, Writ Appeal No. 1756/2016, and Writ
Appeal No. 1289/2023, as well as CCC No. 418/2023.
14. Further, the conditions stipulated in the Assignment
Agreement make it abundantly clear that it was the
duty of the assignor to furnish documentary evidence
establishing a marketable title in the name of the
assignors’ vendor. The documents produced by the
Cont’d..
- 14 A.A. No.06/2025
-
petitioner indicate that, prior to the Deputy
Commissioner’s order, the entire petition schedule
property stood recorded in the name of the assignors’
vendor, but despite the fact that the Deputy
Commissioner’s order had been set aside with a specific
direction to restore their names, the khata and revenue
records are yet to be restored in the name of the original
landowners.
=
15. The learned counsel for the petitioner, relying on the
judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Gujarat
Bottling Co. Ltd. & Others v. Coca Cola Co. &
Others, reported in (1995) 5 SCC 545, has contended
that an interim order of injunction must be granted to
mitigate the risk of injustice to the plaintiff during the
period of uncertainty preceding the final resolution of
the dispute. The Hon’ble Apex Court, in the aforesaid
decision, has held as follows:
“The decision whether or not to grant an
interlocutory injunction has to be taken at a
time when the existence of the leagal right
assailed by the plaintiff and its alleged
Cont’d..
- 15 A.A. No.06/2025
-
violation are both contested and uncertain
and its alleged violation are both contested
and uncertain and remain uncertain till they
are established at the trial on evidence. Relief
by way of interlocutory injuction is granted to
mitigate the risk of injustice to the plaintiff
during the period before that uncertainty
could be resolved.”
16. The learned counsel for petitioner also placed reliance
on the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of
Arcelor Mittal Nippon Steel Indian Limited Vs. Essar
Bulk Terminal Limited reported in (2022) 1 SCC 712
wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held that, the
applications for interim relief inherently demand swift
resolution. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the said decision
as held thus;
“88. Applications for interim relief are
inherently applications which are required to
be disposed of urgently. Interim relief is
granted in aid of final relief. The object is to
ensure protection of the property being the
Cont’d..
- 16 A.A. No.06/2025
-
subject matter of Arbitration and/or otherwise
ensure that the arbitration proceedings do not
become infructuous and the Arbitral Award
does not become an award on paper, of no real
value.
89. The principles for grant of interim
relief are (i) good prima facie case, (ii) balance
of convenience in favour of grant of interim
relief and (iii) irreparable injury or loss to the
applicant for interim relief. Unless applications
for interim measures are decided
expeditiously, irreparable injury or prejudice
may be caused to the party seeking interim
relief.”
17. The learned counsel for the petitioner placing reliance
on the decision of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of
Essar House Private Limited Vs. Arcellor Mittal Nippon
Steel India Limited reported in 2022 SCC Online SC
1219 has contended that, technicality of CPC cannot
prevent the court from securing ends of justice. The
Hon’ble Apex Court has held thus;
Cont’d..
- 17 A.A. No.06/2025
-
“49. If a strong prima facie case is made out
and the balance of convenience is in favour of
interim relief being granted, the Court
exercising power under Section 9 of the
Arbitration Act should not withhold relief on
the mere technicality of absence of averments,
incorporating the grounds for attachment
before judgment under Order 38 Rule 5 of the
CPC.”
18. The learned counsel for the petitioner placing reliance
on the decision of Hon’ble High Court of Calcutta in the
case of Srei Infrastructure Finance Ltd Vs. Ravi Udyog
Pvt. Ltd and Another reported in 2008 SCC OnLine Cal
974 has contended that, an application under Section
9 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 for interim
relief is not to be judged as per the standards of a
plaint in a suit. If the relevant facts pleaded, read with
the documents annexed to the petition, warrant the
grant of interim relief, interim relief ought not to be
refused by recourse to technicalities.
Cont’d..
- 18 A.A. No.06/2025
-
19. It is a well-settled principle that while adjudicating an
application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996, the court must determine
whether the applicant has demonstrated a substantial
right in their favor, arising from the contract in
question. The primary duty of the court in such
proceedings is to assess whether there exists a valid
arbitration agreement between the parties and whether
the dispute presents a triable issue warranting
adjudication by the arbitral tribunal. If these conditions
are satisfied, the court is empowered to grant interim
measures to preserve the subject matter of arbitration
and prevent irreparable injury to the applicant. The
jurisprudence surrounding interim relief under Section
9 aligns with the principles governing the grant of
temporary injunctions under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of
CPC. The essential prerequisites for such relief include:
(i) the existence of a prima facie case in favor of the
applicant; (ii) the balance of convenience tilting in favor
of the grant of interim protection; and
(iii) the likelihood of irreparable injury being caused to
the applicant in the absence of such relief.
Cont’d..
- 19 A.A. No.06/2025
-
20. In the present case, the petitioner has entered into an
Assignment Agreement with the respondents, under
which a huge financial investment has been made. The
petitioner has also produced material documents
evidencing the existence of the arbitration clause within
the said agreement, thereby establishing a binding
obligation on the parties to refer the disputes to
arbitration. Moreover, the respondents’ issuance of a
termination notice, coupled with the petitioner’s
apprehension regarding alienation of the suit schedule
property, substantiates the prima facie necessity for
interim relief. The failure of the respondents to
establish a clear and marketable title in favor of their
vendors, as required under the terms of the
Assignment Agreement, further lends credence to the
petitioner’s claim that the contract could not be
completed due to the respondents’ default. The purpose
of an interlocutory injunction is to preserve the status
quo, so that the rights of the parties are safeguarded
until the dispute is finally resolved. The courts must
exercise caution and ensure that interim measures are
granted only where the balance of convenience and the
Cont’d..
- 20 A.A. No.06/2025
-
likelihood of irreparable harm weigh in favor of the
applicant.
[
21. The learned counsel for the respondent has vehemently
contended that, the stamp duty paid on Assignment
Agreement is insufficient, hence interim relief on such
documents can not be granted. The Constitution Bench
of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Interplay Between
Arbitration Agreements Under Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 & Stamp Act, 1899, In Re,
reported in (2024) 6 SCC 1, has comprehensively
analyzed the interplay between arbitration agreements
under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and
the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. The petitioner’s counsel
has placed strong reliance on this decision, wherein the
Apex Court has unequivocally held that:
“Issues concerning the payment of stamp duty
fall within the remit of the Arbitral Tribunal.
The discussion in the preceding segments also
makes it evident that courts are not required
to deal with the issue of stamping at the stage
Cont’d..
- 21 A.A. No.06/2025
-
of granting interim measures under Section 9
of the Act.”
[
22. In light of this authoritative pronouncement, any
contention regarding the sufficiency of stamp duty paid
by the parties does not pose an impediment to the
grant of interim relief under Section 9 of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996. The issue of stamp duty, if
any, is a matter for the Arbitral Tribunal to adjudicate
and does not warrant judicial interference at the stage
of interim measures.
23. The learned counsel for the respondents, despite
admitting the material facts presented by the
petitioner, has strenuously argued that the Assignment
Agreement is, by its very nature, determinable and,
therefore, no relief can be granted in light of Section
14(1)(d) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The
respondent’s contention is premised on Clause 11 of
the Assignment Agreement, which provides for
termination in the following terms:
“11) Termination – If any of the Conditions
Precedent are not completed to the satisfaction
Cont’d..
- 22 A.A. No.06/2025
-
of the Assignee, the Assignee may at its
discretion, without prejudice to his other rights
under this Agreement or law including with
respect to seeking Specific Performance of the
Agreement, issue a notice to the Assignors to
terminate the Agreement. The Assignors shall,
within 10 (ten) days of receipt of such notice,
repay all amounts paid by the Assignee
pursuant to his Agreement. If there is any delay
in the repayment of the aforementioned
amounts, the Assignors shall repay the same
along with interest at the rate of 12% (twelve
percent) per annum from the date of
termination till the date of repayment. The
Agreement shall terminate only upon such
repayment being made.”
24. A meticulous reading of Clause 11 of the Assignment
Agreement unequivocally establishes that the right to
terminate the agreement is exclusively vested in the
Assignee (the petitioner) and may be exercised at its
discretion if the conditions precedent enumerated in
Cont’d..
- 23 A.A. No.06/2025
-
Clause 4 are not fulfilled to its satisfaction.
Furthermore, the clause explicitly provides that such
termination is without prejudice to the petitioner’s right
to seek specific performance of the agreement.
25. In my considered opinion, when the parties have
contractually agreed to resolve any disputes arising
from the agreement through arbitration, the
determination of whether the contract is determinable
under law falls within the exclusive domain of the
Arbitral Tribunal. The court, while adjudicating an
application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996, cannot express any opinion on
the legal nature of the agreement, including whether it
is determinable, nor can it assess the applicant’s
entitlement to the substantive relief that may be sought
before the Arbitral Tribunal. The scope of judicial
intervention at this stage is confined to examining
whether a prima facie case exists, whether the balance
of convenience favors granting interim relief, and
whether irreparable harm would be caused to the
applicant in the absence of such relief. Any
Cont’d..
- 24 A.A. No.06/2025
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determination on the merits of the dispute, including
the enforceability or specific performance of the
agreement, falls exclusively within the jurisdiction of the
arbitrator.
26. The learned counsel for the respondents has placed
reliance on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
in I.S. Sikhandar v. K. Subramani, (2013) 15 SCC 27, to
contend that time was of the essence in the agreement,
and consequently, upon issuance of the notice of
termination, the applicant is not entitled to interim
relief unless a declaratory relief is sought to establish
that such termination was legally untenable. However,
the factual matrix of the present case is materially
distinguishable from the aforesaid case as that matter
involved a suit for specific performance, where the Apex
Court held that without seeking a declaration, the relief
of specific performance could not be granted. In
contrast, the present dispute is governed by an
arbitration clause, and all substantive legal contentions,
including the validity of termination, must be
adjudicated by the learned arbitrator.
Cont’d..
- 25 A.A. No.06/2025
-
27. Further, reliance has been placed by the respondents on
U.N. Krishnamurthy v. A.M. Krishnamurthy, (2023) 11
SCC 775, wherein the Supreme Court reiterated that
the plaintiff seeking specific performance must establish
continuous readiness and willingness to perform the
contract, particularly in relation to payment of
consideration. However, this issue pertains to the final
adjudication of rights and obligations under the
agreement and falls exclusively within the jurisdiction of
the arbitrator, rather than being a determinative factor
at the stage of interim relief under Section 9 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
28. The counsel for respondents also relied on the decision
of the Bombay High Court in Chetan Iron LLP v. NRC
Limited, AIR 2022 Bom 104, to argue that in light of the
alleged determinable nature of the agreement, no
interim relief can be granted under Section 9 of the
Arbitration Act, applying the principles embodied in
Section 14(1)(d) read with Section 41(e) of the Specific
Relief Act, 1963. However, Clause 11 of the Assignment
Agreement unequivocally stipulates that the right of
Cont’d..
- 26 A.A. No.06/2025
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termination is vested solely with the Assignee (the
petitioner), without prejudice to his right to seek specific
performance of the agreement. The clause further
provides that such termination is contingent upon the
non-fulfillment of the Conditions Precedent imposed
upon the respondents, thereby casting an obligation
upon them to comply. It is, therefore, evident that the
right of termination is neither absolute nor unilateral
but conditional and dependent on the performance of
contractual obligations by the respondents. The
contention that the agreement is determinable in
nature, and thus precludes interim relief, is untenable
in the present case, as the termination right is
exercisable at the discretion of the applicant and not at
the behest of the respondents.
29. In the instant case, the respondents have expressly
admitted to issuing a legal notice purporting to
terminate the Assignment Agreement. However, in light
of the contractual terms and the settled legal position,
such unilateral termination appears to be prima facie
unsustainable, as the agreement does not reserve any
Cont’d..
- 27 A.A. No.06/2025
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right of termination in favor of the respondents. Upon
consideration of the material placed on record by both
parties, this Court is of the considered view that the
applicant has established a valid ground for the grant of
interim relief as sought in the petition. Accordingly,
point for consideration is answered in the Affirmative.
30. POINT No.2 : For the aforesaid reasons and discussion I
proceed to pass the following:
ORDER
The application filed under Section 9 of
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
hereby allowed.
The respondents, their agents,
employees, workman, assignee, heirs,
successor or any one claiming through or
under them are hereby restrained from
alienating, encumbering or creating any
third party rights, claims or interest over the
application schedule property till the dispute
is adjudicated by the Arbitral Tribunal.
However, in the event that arbitration
proceedings are not initiated within 90 days
from the date of this order, due to theCont’d..
- 28 A.A. No.06/2025
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applicants’ default, this interim order shall
stand vacated automatically.
No order as to cost.
(Dictated to Stenographer, transcribed by her, revised by
me and after corrections, pronounced in open Court on this the
28th day of March, 2025.)(HAREESHA A.)
XXVII Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge,
Bengaluru.
Cont’d..
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