Manipur High Court
Mrs. Jubilee Moi vs The State Of Manipur Represented By The … on 2 April, 2025
Author: A. Guneshwar Sharma
Bench: A. Guneshwar Sharma
SHAMURAILATPAM Digitally signed by
SHAMURAILATPAM SUSHIL SHARMA
SUSHIL SHARMA Date: 2025.04.02 17:02:40 +05'30'
REPORTABLE
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MANIPUR
AT IMPHAL
WA No. 75 of 2016
Ref:- WP(C) No. 369 of 2009
Mrs. Jubilee Moi, aged about 55 years, D/o (Late)
Tongjapao Zou, Acting Chief of Behiang village of
Singhat Division, District-Churachandpur, Manipur.
...Appellant
-Versus-
1. The State of Manipur represented by the Principal
Secretary (Hills), Government of Manipur.
2. The Deputy Commissioner, Churachandpur District,
Government of Manipur.
3. Shri Paodamang Ngaihte, aged about 60 years, S/o
(Late) Chingkam, Self Style Chief of Behiang
(Tuanthong) village, P.O. & P.S. Singhat,
Churachandpur District, Manipur (at present New
Lamka, P.O. & P.S. Churachandpur, Manipur.
.... Respondents
HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. D. KRISHNAKUMAR
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE A. GUNESHWAR SHARMA
For the Appellant :: Mr. Ng. Jagatchandra, Advocate.
For the Respondents :: Mr. S. Nepolean, Sr. GA
Mr. Robert, Dy. GA
Mr. D. Julius Riamei, Advocate
Date of Hearing and
reserving Judgment & Order :: 11.02.2025
Date of Judgment & Order :: 02.04.2025.
WA No. 75 of 2016 (Ref:- WP(C) No. 369 of 2009) Page 1 of 24
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
(CAV)
(D. Krishnakumar, C.J) :
Heard Mr. Ng. Jagatchandra, learned counsel for the
appellant; Mr. D. Julius Riamei, learned counsel and Mr. S. Nepolean,
learned senior Government Advocate assisted by Mr. Robert, learned
Deputy Government Advocate, appearing for the respondents.
2. The appellant herein has filed the intra court appeal
before this Court as against the dismissal order passed in the writ
petition.
3. The brief facts of the case is as follows.
4. The appellant submits that the appellant and the private
respondents had their disputes over the Chiefship or ownership of a
place called Behiang in Churachandpur district, Manipur. According to
the appellant, Shri Langjachin established the Behiang village as its
founder and Chief and allowed Shri Tuanthong who hailed from
erstwhile Burma (now Myanmar) to stay and live in the Behiang village
as permissive possessor and licensee along with some of his followers
and he also agrees that the Government had recognized 2 (two)
villages namely, Behiang Langjachin under the Chiefship of
Jamkhongin who was the ancestor of the appellant and another
Behiang (Tuanthong) who was the ancestor of the private respondent
in the area of Behiang range, by including both villages in the schedule
WA No. 75 of 2016 (Ref:- WP(C) No. 369 of 2009) Page 2 of 24
of Manipur State Hill Peoples (Administration) Regulation, 1947.
Therefore, both the parties have been recognized as Chief of their
respective Behiang villages in the Behiang Range.
5. In course of time, the government officials and the private
respondents had started to claim to be the Chief of Behiang village
without using the suffixed name after their ancestor. By taking
advantage of using the name by the private respondents, there arose
a confusion that he is claiming the Chief of Behiang village instead of
Chief of Behiang (Tuanthong) village for administrative purpose.
6. According to the appellant, Behiang Range is a vast area
where no concrete boundary between the two parties is humanly
possible and that often leads to confusion of village boundary between
the two parties. Therefore, the private respondents cannot have the
legal right to claim as a Chief of Behiang village. Further, the appellant
has submitted that the Deputy Commissioner, Manipur South
District/Churachandpur had passed five different orders thereby
allowing to bifurcate five villages namely a) Suangphu, b) Maukot, c)
Mualzin, d) Tuimanjang and e) Sialish from the Behiang village
(Langjachin) after duly informing and recognizing the father of the
appellant namely Shri Tongzapao as the main Village Chief of those
four bifurcating sub/machet villages. From the perusal of the order, it
can also be seen that appellant’s father namely Shri Tongzapao was
WA No. 75 of 2016 (Ref:- WP(C) No. 369 of 2009) Page 3 of 24
the one who even objected the bifurcation and the same is also
reflected in the order of then DC, Churachandpur. It is also further
submitted that the aforesaid orders nowhere mention the name of the
respondent or ancestors. That being the position, after a period of 20
years, a representation was made by the private respondents to the
respondent authority to cancel the abovementioned bifurcation orders
of the then DC, Churachandpur by claiming him to be the owner of
abovementioned machet villages. Based on the representation of the
aforesaid private respondents, the Government has passed the order
on 12.02.2004 by recognizing the private respondent as a Chief of
Behiang village and at the same time restoring the abovementioned
villages to main village, Behiang, instead of Behiang village
(Langjachin). The said order was passed without verifying the
documents and the said order is illegal and the same is unsustainable
without considering the factual position as well as the relevant
documents.
7. According to the appellant, the documents which are
relied upon by the appellant clearly shows that they ought to have
restored the said villages to Behiang (Langjachin) and not “Behiang”
so as avoid any confusion between the two parties. But, by order dated
12.02.2004 it is mentioned that only Behiang Langjachin under the
Chiefship of Jamkhojin and Behiang Village under the Chiefship of
WA No. 75 of 2016 (Ref:- WP(C) No. 369 of 2009) Page 4 of 24
Tuanthong were given statutory recognition and all the machet villages
in the area and within the Behiang range should be a part of the
“Behiang Village”. Further, the said order dated 12.02.2004 was
passed for restoration of the two villages namely, Behiang and
Behiang Langjachin in the area of Behiang range and cancellation of
those Machet Village as Hill Revenue Villages independent from main
village, Behiang. Therefore, according to them, he made the
representation on 10.05.2004 to the Commissioner (Hills),
Government of Manipur, alleging inter alia that the order dated
12.02.2004 is illegal on the ground amongst others that the said
machet/sub villages belongs to the appellant’s father. The writ
petitioner also filed WP(C) No. 391 of 2005 and same was disposed
of on 24.07.2006 with a direction to the respondent to consider the
representation dated 10.05.2004.
8. The appellant Jubilee Moi approached the respondent
authority for the cancellation of the Government orders dated
12.02.2004 and 05.12.2006. Considering the representation of the
appellant, the Principal Secretary (Hills), Government of Manipur
passed an order to cancel the order dated 12.02.2004 and 05.12.2006
and ordered to maintain status quo of the order passed under Title
Suit No. 26 of 1965 passed on 21.07.1969 with immediate effect.
WA No. 75 of 2016 (Ref:- WP(C) No. 369 of 2009) Page 5 of 24
9. Subsequently, the Government passed the order on
05.10.2006 without considering the contention raised by the appellant.
Again, Shri Paodomang Ngaihte, Chief of Behiang Tuanthong village,
being aggrieved by the Government’s order dated 25.09.2008, filed a
representation dated 06.10.2008 requesting to restore the earlier
orders dated 12.02.2004 and 05.12.2006.
10. Thereafter, the Governor of Manipur was pleased to
restore the orders dated 12.02.2004 and 05.12.2006 and the order
dated 25.09.2008 was also revoked in the interest of the hill people
under law of the hills including the customs and practices. The
impugned order dated 25.09.2008 was challenged by filing the writ
petition in WP(C) No. 369 of 2009 and the same writ petition came to
be dismissed by this Court and impugned order under challenge in the
intra court Appeal by raising the submissions that without considering
submission made by the appellant, by addressing the history of the
aforesaid villages, by contending that the suit in Suit Title No. 26 of
1965 before the Second Sub-Judge Manipur and judgment was
delivered by the Sub-Judge which was decided in favour of the
appellant’s father namely Tongzapao, though other documents also
relied by the appellant by claiming the right over the aforesaid villages
and seek to interfere the order under impugned in challenge as well
as the order of the writ court. Further, learned counsel appearing for
WA No. 75 of 2016 (Ref:- WP(C) No. 369 of 2009) Page 6 of 24
the appellant has contended that already the Civil Court rendered
judgment in favour of the appellant’s father regarding the title suit and
the respondent authority has not recognized Tongzapao Zou as the
son of ex-chief of Behiang (Langjachin) and the reasons as stated in
the order for bifurcation of two villages and recognizing the two villages
namely, Behiang (Langjachin) and Behiang (Tuanthong). But the
present case has been filed by only as a brother of late Jamkhongin
and not as a son in T.S. No. 26 of 1965. Further, learned counsel
appearing for the petitioner contended that the respondent
Government has not providing an opportunity to the petitioner, before
passing order on 29th May, 2009.
11. The learned Single Judge has not appreciated the factum
of case in proper perspective and wrongly appreciated the contention
of the private respondents, that judgment passed in the Title Suit No.
26 of 1965 which is not binding on the official respondents. Therefore,
the judgment and order passed by the Single Judge that the aforesaid
judgment dated 21st July, 1969 in T.S. No. 26 of 1965 in favour of Shri
Tongzapao, the writ petitioner’s father (is nothing to do with the subject
matter in issuing a government order) is totally unsustainable and
further stated that under Section 3 of the Manipur (Village Authorities
in Hill Areas) Act, 1956 the said provision will not consider recognizing
of the village and therefore, on the aforesaid grounds, the learned
WA No. 75 of 2016 (Ref:- WP(C) No. 369 of 2009) Page 7 of 24
counsel appearing for the appellant has argued that the order of the
writ court is liable to be set aside.
12. On the other hand, learned senior Government Advocate
appearing for the respondents has objected that the writ court had
considered the submissions of the appellant and after elaborate
discussion, the contention of the appellant was considered in detail.
Further, he also submits that the Manipur State Hill Peoples
(Administration) Regulations, 1947. Under the provisions of the said
Act, the list of villages in new Churachandpur Circle was published.
The said copy of the list of villages also enclosed in the paperbooks
where it is recorded that at Sl. No. 109 – Beheng Langjachin with
Jamkhojin as Headman or Khulakpa and Sl. No. 110- Beheng with
Tenthong as Headman or Khulakpa. Therefore, the said village was
already been included in list of Schedules under the Act.
13. Mr. S. Nepolean, the learned senior GA appearing for the
State submitted that the order has been passed on 12th February,
2004 based on the representation of one Paudoumang Ngaihte, Chief
of Behiang (Tuanthong) village sought for cancellation of various
orders of the Deputy Commissioner, Churachandpur and the Sub-
Divisional Officer, Singhat Sub-Division recognizing the following
Machet Villages belonging to Behiang (T) Village :
WA No. 75 of 2016 (Ref:- WP(C) No. 369 of 2009) Page 8 of 24
1. Behiang (V)
2. Suangphu
3. Maukot
4. Mualzin
5. Tuimanjang
6. Sialsih
14. Considering the said representation of Paudoumang
Ngaihte, Chief of Behiang (Tuanthong) village, the Commissioner
(Hills), Government of Manipur has observed that the earlier order
passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Churachandpur and the S.D.O.,
Singhat Sub-Division recognizing the above Machet Villages shall be
deemed cancelled as no approval of the Govt. was obtained to the
recognition of those Machet Villages during the relevant time under
Section 3 of the Manipur (Village Authorities in Hill Areas) Act, 1956
and further in the said order says that State should restore the two
villages, namely, Behiang and Behiang Langjachin in the area of
Behiang range and cancellation of those Machet Villages as Hill
Revenue Villages independent from main Village, Behiang.
15. Thereafter, again the representation filed by the
appellant on 10th May 2004 to the Commissioner (Hills), Government
of Manipur was considered and detail order was passed by the
Principal Secretary (Hills), Government of Manipur and review
application submitted by the appellant was rejected and subsequently,
another order is passed on 25.09.2008 thereby cancelling the order
WA No. 75 of 2016 (Ref:- WP(C) No. 369 of 2009) Page 9 of 24
dated 12.02.2004 and 05.12.2006 and further according to the learned
senior Government Advocate the said order has not been challenged.
The only order dated 29.05.2008 was challenged before this Court in
the instant writ petition. Hence, according to them, seeks dismissal of
the writ petition.
16. He further states that the learned Single Judge has
considered the entire history of the said lands, under the village and
rejected the claim of the appellant and therefore, seeks for dismissal
of the writ petition.
17. The counsel appearing for the private respondent would
submit that he made a representation to the respondents government
and by order dated 12.02.2009 stating that no approval of the
Government was obtained to the recognition of other machet villages
during the relevant time under Section 3 of the Manipur (Village
Authorities in Hill Areas) Act, 1956.
18. In view of above, the earlier order passed by the Deputy
Commissioner and the Sub-Divisional Officer was cancelled and
therefore, the appellant cannot have any right to rely upon the order
and claiming the right in the aforesaid villages. Further, also reiterated
that the submission made by learned senior Government Advocate
that the respondent has not challenged the Notification of bifurcation
of the villages under the list of schedules which is annexed along with
WA No. 75 of 2016 (Ref:- WP(C) No. 369 of 2009) Page 10 of 24
the Manipur (Village Authorities in Hill Areas) Act, 1956 and therefore,
he seeks for dismissal of the said appeal.
19. Heard the parties and perused the materials on the
record.
20. The points for consideration in the instant writ appeal are
as follows :
1) Whether the appellant is claiming the right as per
judgment and decree passed in Title Suit No. 6/1965
dated 21.07.1969?
2) Whether in the absence of any approval for the earlier
proceedings passed by the Deputy Commissioner/
SDO of Churachandpur is valid in law?
3) Whether the writ petition filed by the appellant for the
prayer is maintainable without challenging the
Notification as well as all the Government orders?
Issue No. 1
The contention of the appellant is that the appellant has
filed a Title Suit No. 26 of 1965 before the Second Subordinate Judge,
Manipur which was decided ex-parte vide its judgment 21.07.1969
granted the declaration in favour of Mrs. Jubilee Moi’s deceased father
late Tongzapao Zou and 34 others. The aforesaid appeal went to the
Supreme Court in CA No. 54 of 1969 and the same was dismissed
WA No. 75 of 2016 (Ref:- WP(C) No. 369 of 2009) Page 11 of 24
and become final. So according to the appellant, the judgment and
decree passed by the Civil Court is binding on the authority and
therefore, the claim of the petitioner/appellant that the aforesaid five
villages as mentioned in the earlier paragraph belongs to the appellant
village. According to the appellant, the Civil Court decided the disputed
facts in the matter of suit land between the two villages which has been
decided in favour of the appellant Tongzapao Zou and therefore, the
respondent authority has no jurisdiction in passing impugned order by
restoring the orders dated 12.02.2004 and 05.12.2006 and revocation
of the order passed on 25.09.2008 is illegal and discriminatory and
therefore, the impugned order is liable to be set aside. The writ court
has not appreciated the case of the appellant. The official
respondents has contended that the decision rendered in the civil suit
is not binding on the authority concerned for the reasons that the
respondent department Government is not a party in the aforesaid
suit. They are also relying upon the Manipur Hills People
(Administration) Regulation, 1947. In the aforesaid Regulation,
villages were given recognition by including in the Schedule in the Act,
unless and until the said Regulation is amended by another Statute to
alter the identity of the extent of the said village. Therefore, the said
suit filed by the appellant is not binding on the official respondent
which is clearly stated in the order passed by the respondent.
WA No. 75 of 2016 (Ref:- WP(C) No. 369 of 2009) Page 12 of 24
It is useful to rely upon the decision of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court reported in (2010) 4 SCC 393 in the case of Manish
Goel -Versus- Rohini Goel wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court held
as follows :-
“14. Generally, no Court has competence to issue a
direction contrary to law nor the Court can direct an
authority to act in contravention of the statutory provisions.
The courts are meant to enforce the rule of law and not to
pass the orders or directions which are contrary to what has
been injected by law. (Vide State of Punjab & Ors. v.
Renuka Singla & Ors (1994) 1 SCC 175; State of U.P. &
Ors. v. Harish Chandra & Ors. AIR 1996 SC 2173; Union of
India & Anr. v. Kirloskar Pneumatic Co. Ltd. AIR 1996 SC
3285; Vice Chancellor, University of Allahabad & Ors. v.
Dr. Anand Prakash Mishra & Ors. (1997) 10 SCC 264;
and Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation v.
Ashrafulla Khan & Ors. AIR 2002 SC 629).
15. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Prem Chand
Garg & Anr. v. Excise Commissioner, U.P. & Ors. AIR
1963 SC 996 held as under:
“12. … An order which this Court can make in
order to do complete justice between the parties, must
not only be consistent with the fundamental rights
guaranteed by the Constitution, but it cannot even be
inconsistent with the substantive provisions of the
relevant statutory laws.”
(emphasis supplied)
The Constitution Benches of this Court in Supreme
Court Bar Association v. Union of India & Anr. AIR 1998
SC 1895; and E.S.P. Rajaram & Ors. v. Union of India &
Ors. AIR 2001 SC 581 held that under Article 142 of the
Constitution, this Court cannot altogether ignore the
substantive provisions of a statute and pass orders
concerning an issue which can be settled only through a
mechanism prescribed in another statute. It is not to be
WA No. 75 of 2016 (Ref:- WP(C) No. 369 of 2009) Page 13 of 24
exercised in a case where there is no basis in law which can
form an edifice for building up a superstructure.
16. Similar view has been reiterated in A.R. Antulay v.
R.S. Nayak & Anr. (1988) 2 SCC 602; Bonkya alias Bharat
Shivaji Mane & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra (1995) 6 SCC
447; Common Cause, a Registered Society v. Union of India
& Ors. AIR 1999 SC 2979; M.S. Ahlawat v. State of
Haryana AIR 2000 SC 168; M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath &
Ors. AIR 2000 SC 1997; State of Punjab & Anr. v. Rajesh
Syal (2002) 8 SCC 158; Government of West Bengal v.
Tarun K. Roy & Ors. (2004) 1 SCC 347; Textile Labour
Association v. Official Liquidator AIR 2004 SC 2336; State
of Karnataka & Ors. v. Ameerbi & Ors. (2007) 11 SCC
681; Union of India & Anr. v. Shardindu AIR 2007 SC 2204;
and Bharat Sewa Sansthan v. U.P. Electronic Corporation
Ltd. AIR 2007 SC 2961.
17. In Teri Oat Estates (P) Ltd. v. UT.
Chandigarh (2004) 2 SCC 130, this Court held as under:
(SCC p. 144, para 36)
“36. ….. sympathy or sentiment by itself cannot be a
ground for passing an order in relation whereto the
appellants miserably fail to establish a legal right. …
despite an extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction
contained in Article 142 of the Constitution of India,
this Court ordinarily would not pass an order which
would be in contravention of a statutory provision.”
18. In Laxmidas Morarji v. Behrose Darab
Madan (2009) 10 SCC 425, while dealing with the
provisions of Article 142 of the Constitution, this Court has
held as under:
” 25. ….The power under Article 142 of the
Constitution is a constitutional power and hence, not
restricted by statutory enactments. Though the
Supreme Court would not pass any order
under Article 142 of the Constitution which would
amount to supplanting substantive law applicable or
ignoring express statutory provisions dealing with the
subject, at the same time these constitutional powers
cannot in any way, be controlled by any statutoryWA No. 75 of 2016 (Ref:- WP(C) No. 369 of 2009) Page 14 of 24
provisions. However, it is to be made clear that this
power cannot be used to supplant the law applicable
to the case. This means that acting under Article 142,
the Supreme Court cannot pass an order or grant
relief which is totally inconsistent or goes against the
substantive or statutory enactments pertaining to the
case. The power is to be used sparingly in cases
which cannot be effectively and appropriately tackled
by the existing provisions of law or when the existing
provisions of law cannot bring about complete justice
between the parties.”
(Emphasis added)
19. Therefore, the law in this regard can be summarised
to the effect that in exercise of the power under Article
142 of the Constitution, this Court generally does not pass
an order in contravention of or ignoring the statutory
provisions nor the power is exercised merely on sympathy.”
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sneha Lata
Goel Vs. Pushplata and Others reported in (2019) 3 SCC 594 :
MANU/SC/0048/2019 mentioned as follows :-
“13. In Harshad Chiman Lal Modi v DLF Universal
Ltd. MANU/SC/0710/2005: (2005) 7 SCC 791, this Court
held that an objection to territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction
has to be taken at the earliest possible opportunity. If it is not
raised at the earliest, it cannot be allowed to be taken at a
subsequent stage. This Court held thus:
“30. The jurisdiction of a court may be classified into
several categories. The important categories are (i)
territorial or local jurisdiction; (ii) pecuniary
jurisdiction; and (iii) jurisdiction over the subject-
matter. So far as territorial and pecuniary
jurisdictions are concerned, objection to suchWA No. 75 of 2016 (Ref:- WP(C) No. 369 of 2009) Page 15 of 24
jurisdiction has to be taken at the earliest possible
opportunity and in any case at or before settlement of
issues. The law is well settled on the point that if such
objection is not taken at the earliest, it cannot be
allowed to be taken at a subsequent stage.
Jurisdiction as to subject-matter, however, is totally
distinct and stands on a different footing. Where a
court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of
the suit by reason of any limitation imposed by
statute, charter or commission, it cannot take up the
cause or matter. An order passed by a court having no
jurisdiction is a nullity.”
In Hasham Abbas Sayyad v Usman Abbas Sayyad
MANU/SC/5541/2006: (2007) 2 SCC 355, a two judge
Bench of this Court held thus:
“24. We may, however, hasten to add that a
distinction must be made between a decree passed by
a court which has no territorial or pecuniary
jurisdiction in the light of Section 21 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, and a decree passed by a court
having no jurisdiction in regard to the subject-matter
of the suit. Whereas in the former case, the appellate
court may not interfere with the decree unless
prejudice is shown, ordinarily the second category of
the cases would be interfered with.”
Similarly, in Mantoo Sarkar v. Oriental Insurance Co.
Ltd. MANU/SC/8464/2008: (2009) 2 SCC 244, a two judge Bench of this
Court held thus:
WA No. 75 of 2016 (Ref:- WP(C) No. 369 of 2009) Page 16 of 24
“20. A distinction, however, must be made between a jurisdiction
with regard to the subject-matter of the suit and that of territorial
and pecuniary jurisdiction. Whereas in the case falling within the
former category the judgment would be a nullity, in the latter it
would not be. It is not a case where the Tribunal had no
jurisdiction in relation to the subject-matter of claim…in our
opinion, the court should not have, in the absence of any finding
of sufferance of any prejudice on the part of the first respondent,
entertained the appeal.”
On carefully analyzing the aforesaid decision of the
judgments cited (supra), the contention of the appellant that the judgment
passed by the Civil Court in the suit is binding on the respondent cannot
be accepted and the said contention is liable to be rejected.
21. On perusal of the impugned order passed by the
respondent authority, it clearly states that provision of the Manipur
Hills People (Administration) Regulation, 1947 which is come into
force and the villages were given recognition by including the schedule
of the Act, in the list of villages which were seen in Sl. No. 109 which
says that Behiang Langching is the name of the village and Jamkhojin
is the headman or khullakpa of that village and Sl. No. 110 is the
village name Behiang and Tenthong is the headman and khulakpa.
Both villages have a separate identity in the aforesaid list of schedules.
Considering the decisions cited above, the said finding in the judgment
and decree passed by the civil court will not be binding on the
respondent authority. Therefore, accepting the said submission of the
respondent, the said contention of the appellant is liable to be rejected
and issue No. 1 is answered against the appellant.
WA No. 75 of 2016 (Ref:- WP(C) No. 369 of 2009) Page 17 of 24
Issue No. 2
22. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant relying upon
the various orders of the Deputy Commissioner dated 23.03.1983,
01.05.1985 and 25.11.1982 and also submitted that the various orders
passed by the D.C., Churachandpur and SDO recognized the above
machet villages which belong to the appellant village under the
chiefship of Jamkhongin.
23. Heavily relying upon the documents in support of his
contention by stating that the subsequent orders passed by the
respondent Government is without any authority, and he relied upon
the earlier order of the Deputy Commissioner, Churachandpur and the
other documents in support of his submission. Therefore, the said
impugned order dated 29.05.2009 is liable to be set aside and also the
order of the writ court is liable to be set aside.
24. The Respondent has contended that aforesaid
documents which has been considered by the respondent
Government, at the time of considering the representations, submitted
by the private respondents Shri Paodomang Ngaihte, Chief of Behiang
Tuanthong village where it is called Behiang (T) village. Based on his
representation and considering the records they have stated that the
two villages namely, Behiang Langjachin under the Chiefship of
Jamkhojin and Behiang Village under the Chiefship of Tuanthong
WA No. 75 of 2016 (Ref:- WP(C) No. 369 of 2009) Page 18 of 24
were given such recognition and all the machet villages in the area
and within the Behiang range should be a part of the Behiang village.
There is no separate identity and they cannot be given status of village
for any purpose. They are only two legal recognition village in the
areas namely, 1) Behiang and 2) Behiang (Lianching). Further, stated
the earlier orders passed by the Deputy Commissioner,
Churachandpur and SDO recognizing the above said machet villages
shall be deemed cancelled and reason that there is no approval of the
Government was obtained to the recognition of these machet villages
during the relevant time under Section 3 of the Manipur (Village
Authorities in Hill Areas) Act, 1956 and therefore, restoring the two
villages namely, Behiang and Behiang (Lianching) in the area of
Behiang range and cancellation of those machet village independent
from main village Behiang.
25. We have gone through the said orders passed by the
respondent Government. The petitioner has made a specific ground
that the earlier order passed by the DC and SDO has not been
considered by the respondent at the time of passing the impugned
order. These orders are also considered by the respondents in the
order dated 12.02.2004 where it was stated that the above said orders
passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Churachandpur and SDO, no
approval granted by the Government under Section 3 of the Manipur
WA No. 75 of 2016 (Ref:- WP(C) No. 369 of 2009) Page 19 of 24
(Village Authorities in Hill Areas) Act, 1956. Therefore, considering the
said provisions under Section 3 of the Act, the said orders passed by
the DC, Churachandpur and consequently, passed by the SDO cannot
be given any weightage for accepting the contention of the appellant
for interfering the order passed by the Government. Therefore, there
is no valid ground to interfere with the contention raised by the
appellant on this issue. On this second issue, there is no valid ground
to interfere with the impugned order under challenge in the writ appeal.
Issue No. 3
26. The writ petitioner has challenged the impugned order
dated 29th May, 2009 on the ground that the respondent authority has
not chosen to consider the earlier orders has been passed by the
authorities and also judgment and decree passed by the Civil Court.
The order under challenge in the impugned is the order dated
29.05.2009. According to the appellant that the private respondents
herein made the representation to Paudoumang Ngaihte, Chief of
Behiang (Tuanthong) village to the Government to cancel the DC,
Churachandpur’s order and to seek further recognition of these two
villages, namely, Behiang Langjachin under the Chiefship of
Jamkhojin and Behiang Village under the Chiefship of Tuanthong
were already given statutory recognition. The representation was
considered by the respondent Commissioner (Hills), Government of
WA No. 75 of 2016 (Ref:- WP(C) No. 369 of 2009) Page 20 of 24
Manipur and by accepting the private respondents representation by
stating that in the earlier orders passed by the Deputy C and SDO
which has not been approved by the State Government and further it
states that under the provisions of the Schedule of the Act, to the
Manipur State Hill Peoples (Administration) Regulations, 1947
restored the two villages namely Behiang and Behiang village in the
area of Behiang range and cancellation of those machet villages
independent from main village Behiang. The said decision was taken
in the year 2004 and subsequently, the review application also filed by
the appellant and in the said review application a detail order has been
passed by the respondent Government and said review application
came to be rejected and subsequently, at the instance of the appellant
the respondent relying upon the judgment and decree passed in the
said suit and Government by order dated 25.09.2008 passed an order
to maintain status quo order, cancellation of the earlier order and pass
the status quo order. Subsequent to that the impugned judgment and
order has been passed by passing the detail discussions in the said
order it has been clearly stated that the aforesaid two villages being
found in the schedule of the Manipur State Hill Peoples
(Administration) Regulations, 1947 and Sl. No. 109 – Beheng
Langjachin with Jamkhojin as Chief and Sl. No. 110- Beheng with
Chief Tenthong as Chief in the said schedule. The said villages have
been statutorily recognization have been come to the aforesaid village
WA No. 75 of 2016 (Ref:- WP(C) No. 369 of 2009) Page 21 of 24
and therefore, it is also clearly rendered in its finding that unless and
until the aforesaid regulation is amended to another statute or alter the
identity of the extent of said villages, but on the aforesaid legal
submissions, the respondent has not been in a position to answer that
challenging villages in the aforesaid list of schedules in the Act.
Though it has been relying on the documents of Deputy Commissioner
and SDO, it has been stated by the Government’s order that the
aforesaid orders were not obtained any approval from the
Government. Therefore, these orders cannot be relied upon to
substantiate the claim of the appellant that the said villages come
under the appellant village, and hence it is clear that the appellant has
filed the writ petition challenging the aforesaid impugned order dated
25.09.2008 without questioning the various orders passed by the
Government by recognizing the said villages as Beheng Langjachin
with Jamkhojin as Chief and Sl. No. 110- Beheng with Tenthong as
Chief and also recognizing the aforesaid village in the schedule of the
said provisions of the Act. In these grounds, according to us, the
aforesaid prayer as made by the petitioner is not maintainable, without
challenging the aforesaid villages, included in the Schedule of the Act.
Therefore, the prayer as sought by the petitioner cannot be accepted
and same is liable to be rejected.
WA No. 75 of 2016 (Ref:- WP(C) No. 369 of 2009) Page 22 of 24
27. In the present context of the case, when there is
provision under the Act which clearly states that these two villages
were recognized under the schedule of the Act unless the same is
amended, it cannot be modified or altered, under the judicial review.
Further, the judgment and decree passed by the Civil Court is not
binding upon the respondent authority, since they are not party in the
aforesaid proceeding and the said judgment passed by the civil court
is nullity. Therefore, the said contention is liable to be rejected.
28. By way of executive order, the respondent cannot pass
an order by including the said village in favour of the appellant.
Therefore, the impugned order clearly states that unless and until the
said Regulation is amended.
29. The appellant is not entitled for inclusion of the villages
under Behiang appellant village. Therefore, the contention of the
appellant cannot be accepted and the same is liable to be rejected.
30. The learned Single Judge has considered elaborately on
the facts of the case and rejecting the claim of the appellant, therefore,
considering at any angle there is no merit in the appeal and the same
deserves to be dismissed.
31. However, learned counsel appearing for the appellant
states that the boundaries of the villages has not been demarcated. If
WA No. 75 of 2016 (Ref:- WP(C) No. 369 of 2009) Page 23 of 24
that being the case, it is for the appellant to approach the authority
concerned seeking for demarcating boundary in accordance with law.
32. With the above observation, the writ appeal stands
dismissed with no cost.
JUDGE CHIEF JUSTICE
Sushil
WA No. 75 of 2016 (Ref:- WP(C) No. 369 of 2009) Page 24 of 24
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