Bombay High Court
Rangrao Mahadu Pethkar vs Sadashiv Maruti Vibute And Ors on 2 April, 2025
2025:BHC-AS:15194
Neeta Sawant WP-1978-1998-JR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO.1978 OF 1998
WITH
INTERIM APPLICATION NO.1932 OF 2023
IN
WRIT PETITION NO.1978 OF 1998
Rangrao Mahadu Pethkar
(deceased, through Heir & LR)
Jaywant Rangrao Pethkar
Age 40 years Occ. Agri.
R/o Yedemachindra,
Tal. Walwa, Dist. Sangli. .... Petitioner/Applicant
-Versus-
1 Sadashiv Maruti Vibhute
(Since deceased through heirs and L.Rs.)
1A. Shivaji Sadashiv Vibhute,
Age: 40 years,
1B. Tanaji Sadashiv Vibhute,
Age: 37 years,
1C. Meena Murlidhar Phalle,
Age: 44 years,
1D. Ranjana Santram Shingare,
Age: 42 years,
1E. Sumati Sadashiv Vibhute,
Age: 62 years,
Nos. 1A to 1E - R/o. Yedemachhindra,
Tal. Walwa, Dist.Sangli.
2. Ramchandra Khandu Vibhute,
(Since deceased through heirs and L.Rs.)
2A. Hanmant Ramchandra Vibhute,
(Since deceased through heirs and L.Rs.)
__________________________________________________________________________
Page No.1 of 31
Wednesday, 2 April 2025
::: Uploaded on - 02/04/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 02/04/2025 22:39:48 :::
Neeta Sawant WP-1978-1998-JR
2A(i). Sarika Hanmant Vibhute,
Age: 26 years,
2A(ii). Ganesh Hanmant Vibhute,
Age: 2 years,
Since minor represented through
natural guardian mother- Resp. 2A(i)
Nos. 2A(i) to 2A(ii) residents of
A/p. Yedemachhindra,
Tal. Walwa, Dist.Sangli.
2B. Anjana Shivaji Kshirsagar,
Age: 37 years,
R/o Danole Tal. Shiro)
Dist. Kolhapur.
2C. Manisha Sambhaji Salunkhe,
Age: 32 years,
R/o. Narsinhpur,
Tal. Walwa, Dist. Sangli.
2D. Shalan Ramchandra Vibhute,
Age: 57 years,
R/o.Yedemachhindra,
Tal.Walwa, Dist.Sangli.
3. Vasant Khandu Vibhute,
(Since deceased through heirs and L.Rs.)
3A. Shivaji Vasant Vibhute,
(Since deceased through heirs and L.Rs.)
3A(i) Yogita Shivaji Vibhute,
Age: 31 years,
3A(ii) Yash Shivaji Vibhute,
Age: 5 years,
Since minor represented through
natural guardian mother- Resp. 3A(1)
3B. Yogesh Vasant Vibhute,
Age: 12 years,
__________________________________________________________________________
Page No.2 of 31
Wednesday, 2 April 2025
::: Uploaded on - 02/04/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 02/04/2025 22:39:48 :::
Neeta Sawant WP-1978-1998-JR
Since minor represented through
natural guardian mother- Resp. 3C
3C. Sunanda Vasant Vibhute,
Age: 51 years,
3D. Anita Jayvant Phalle,
Age: 31 years,
Nos. 3A(i). 3A(ii) and 3D
R/o.Yedemachhindra,
Tal. Walwa, Dist Sangli. ....Respondents
WITH
WRIT PETITION NO.1982 OF 1998
Rangrao Mahadu Pethkar
(deceased, through Heir & LR)
Jaywant Rangrao Pethkar
Age 40 years Occ. Agri.
R/o Yedemachindra,
Tal. Walwa, Dist. Sangli. ....Petitioner
-Versus-
1 Sadashiv Maruti Vibhute
(Since deceased through heirs and L.Rs.)
1A. Shivaji Sadashiv Vibhute,
Age: 40 years,
1B. Tanaji Sadashiv Vibhute,
Age: 37 years,
1C. Meena Murlidhar Phalle,
Age: 44 years,
1D. Ranjana Santram Shingare,
Age: 42 years,
1E. Sumati Sadashiv Vibhute,
Age: 62 years,
__________________________________________________________________________
Page No.3 of 31
Wednesday, 2 April 2025
::: Uploaded on - 02/04/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 02/04/2025 22:39:48 :::
Neeta Sawant WP-1978-1998-JR
Nos. 1A to 1E - R/o. Yedemachhindra,
Tal. Walwa, Dist.Sangli.
2. Ramchandra Khandu Vibhute,
(Since deceased through heirs and L.Rs.)
2A. Hanmant Ramchandra Vibhute,
(Since deceased through heirs and L.Rs.)
2A(i). Sarika Hanmant Vibhute,
Age: 26 years,
2A(ii). Ganesh Hanmant Vibhute,
Age: 2 years,
Since minor represented through
natural guardian mother- Resp. 2A(i)
Nos. 2A(i) to 2A(ii) residents of
A/p. Yedemachhindra,
Tal. Walwa, Dist.Sangli.
2B. Anjana Shivaji Kshirsagar,
Age: 37 years,
R/o Danole Tal. Shiro)
Dist. Kolhapur.
2C. Manisha Sambhaji Salunkhe,
Age: 32 years,
R/o. Narsinhpur,
Tal. Walwa, Dist. Sangli.
2D. Shalan Ramchandra Vibhute,
Age: 57 years,
R/o.Yedemachhindra,
Tal.Walwa, Dist.Sangli.
3. Vasant Khandu Vibhute,
(Since deceased through heirs and L.Rs.)
3A. Shivaji Vasant Vibhute,
(Since deceased through heirs and L.Rs.)
3A(i) Yogita Shivaji Vibhute,
Age: 31 years,
__________________________________________________________________________
Page No.4 of 31
Wednesday, 2 April 2025
::: Uploaded on - 02/04/2025 ::: Downloaded on - 02/04/2025 22:39:48 :::
Neeta Sawant WP-1978-1998-JR
3A(ii) Yash Shivaji Vibhute,
Age: 5 years,
Since minor represented through
natural guardian mother- Resp. 3A(1)
3B. Yogesh Vasant Vibhute,
Age: 12 years,
Since minor represented through
natural guardian mother- Resp. 3C
3C. Sunanda Vasant Vibhute,
Age: 51 years,
3D. Anita Jayvant Phalle,
Age: 31 years,
Nos. 3A(i). 3A(ii) and 3D
R/o.Yedemachhindra,
Tal. Walwa, Dist Sangli. ....Respondents
_______________________________________________________________
Mr. Pratap V. Patil, for the Petitioner/Applicant.
Mr. Mandar Goswami with Mr. Siddhant Choudhari, for Respondents.
_______________________________________________________________
CORAM: SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.
Judgment Reserved on : 21 March 2025.
Judgment Pronounced on : 2 April 2025.
JUDGMENT:
1) These petitions are filed by Petitioner challenging the order
dated 30 December 1997 passed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal,
Pune (MRT) in Revision Application Nos.43 of 1997 and 38 of 1997. The
MRT, by its order dated 30 December 1997, has allowed Revision
__________________________________________________________________________
Page No.5 of 31
Wednesday, 2 April 2025
::: Uploaded on – 02/04/2025 ::: Downloaded on – 02/04/2025 22:39:48 :::
Neeta Sawant WP-1978-1998-JR
Application No.38 of 1997 filed by Respondent Nos.1 to 3 and has
dismissed Revision Application No.43 of 1997 filed by the Petitioner
and has set aside the order passed by Sub Divisional Officer (SDO)
dated 21 March 1997 by which the SDO had remanded the proceedings
to Tahsildar for fresh enquiry. The MRT has allowed the application
filed by Respondent Nos.1 to 3 and has directed restoration of
possession of the land in their favour by taking it out from possession of
the Petitioner. In short, the impugned order passed by the MRT has
resulted in loss of possession of the tenanted land by the Petitioner and
restoration thereof in favour of Respondent Nos.1 to 3.
2) Agricultural land bearing Gat No.399 admeasuring 1 H 39
R situated at Village-Yedemachindra, Taluka-Walwa, District- Sangli is
the subject matter of the present Petition (agricultural land). The
predecessors of Respondent Nos.1 to 3 were the owners in respect of the
agricultural land and Petitioner’s father was a tenant therein. It appears
that the proceedings for fixation of purchase price of the agricultural
land have neither been initiated nor purchase of the land by the tenant
has taken place. This is on account of the land being given for
cultivation of sugarcane crop. However, there was litigation between the
landlord and the tenant over the issue of quantum of rent payable in
respect of the agricultural land. The initial rent of the land was
Rs.68.50/-. By way of order passed in Tenancy Case No.55 of 1968, the
rent was increased to Rs. 250/-. The landlord again filed Tenancy Case
No.709 of 1987 before the Agricultural Lands Tribunal, Walwa (ALT),
which was decided on 27 March 1990 and the rent was further
increased to Rs.500/-. The landlords filed Tenancy Appeal No.35 of
1990 before the SDO and by allowing the Appeal, the rent was increased
to Rs.1,500/-. The landlords filed Revision Application before the MRT
__________________________________________________________________________
Page No.6 of 31
Wednesday, 2 April 2025
::: Uploaded on – 02/04/2025 ::: Downloaded on – 02/04/2025 22:39:48 :::
Neeta Sawant WP-1978-1998-JR
for enhancement of the rent and the said proceedings were pending as
on the date of filing of the petition.
3) According to the Petitioner, on account of pendency of
dispute about quantum of rent, he could not pay rent for the years 1991-
92, 1992-93 and 1993-94. The Respondents sent three notices to the
Petitioner on 11 June 1992, 14 June 1993 and 10 June 1994 for alleged
non-payment of rent during the years 1991-92, 1992-93 and 1993-94
respectively. As the Petitioner did not pay the rent despite service of
notices, Respondents filed Tenancy Case No.217 of 1995 before the
Tenancy Avhal Karkun, Islampur, seeking restoration of possession of
the agricultural land on the ground of default in payment of rent. The
Tenancy Avhal Karkun allowed the said Application by his judgment
and order dated 30 March 1996 holding that the Petitioner had
committed default in payment of rent. Tenancy of the Petitioner was
accordingly terminated and direction was given for recovery of
possession of agricultural land from the Petitioner by handing it over to
the Respondent Nos.1 to 3.
4) Petitioner filed Tenancy Appeal No.12 of 1996 before the
SDO challenging the order of Tenancy Avhal Karkun. By judgment and
order dated 4 July 1997, the SDO allowed the Appeal partly by setting
aside the order passed by the Tenancy Avhal Karkun and remanded the
proceedings by directing Tahsildar, Walwa to make an enquiry into the
case as per provisions of Sections 14, 25 and 29 of the Maharashtra
Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (Tenancy Act).
5) The Tahsildar conducted a fresh enquiry in Tenancy Case
No.217 of 1995 and confirmed the tenancy rights of the Petitioner in
__________________________________________________________________________
Page No.7 of 31
Wednesday, 2 April 2025
::: Uploaded on – 02/04/2025 ::: Downloaded on – 02/04/2025 22:39:48 :::
Neeta Sawant WP-1978-1998-JR
respect of the agricultural land under provisions of Section 25 of the
Tenancy Act. The Tahsildar further directed Petitioner to pay rent at the
rate of Rs.1,500/- for the years 1991-92, 1992-93 and 1993-94 in addition
to expenses of Rs.200/- (Total Rs.4,700/-) within three months. The order
passed by the Tahsildar on 14 January 1997 was challenged by
Respondents before SDO by filing Tenancy Appeal No.3 of 1997. The
Appeal came to be partly allowed by SDO by setting aside Tahsildar’s
order dated 14 January 1997. The SDO remanded the proceedings for
fresh enquiry to Tahsildar.
6) Both Petitioner as well as Respondents felt aggrieved by
remand order made by SDO on 21 March 1997 and preferred cross
revisions before the MRT. Respondents preferred Revision Application
No.38 of 1997 challenging the order of remand and prayed for allowing
their application for restoration of land, whereas Petitioner filed
Revision Application No.43 of 1997 challenging the order of remand
and praying for confirmation of the order passed by the Tahsildar on
14 January 1997. By impugned order dated 30 December 1997, MRT has
allowed Revision Application No.38 of 1997 filed by the Respondents
and has dismissed the Revision Application No.43 of 1997 filed by the
Petitioner. The MRT has set aside the SDO’s order dated 21 March 1997.
The MRT has allowed the application preferred by the Respondents for
restoration of the agricultural land and has directed possession of the
land to be restored in favour of Respondents by taking it away from the
Petitioner. Petitioner is aggrieved by the order dated 30 December 1997
passed by the MRT and has accordingly filed these two Petitions. Writ
Petition No.1978 of 1998 is filed to the extent of dismissal of Petitioner’s
Revision Application No.43 of 1997 whereas Writ Petition No.1982 of
1998 is filed to the extent of allowing the Revision Application No.38 of
__________________________________________________________________________
Page No.8 of 31
Wednesday, 2 April 2025
::: Uploaded on – 02/04/2025 ::: Downloaded on – 02/04/2025 22:39:48 :::
Neeta Sawant WP-1978-1998-JR
1997 filed by Respondents. By order dated 23 April 1998 the petitions
came to be admitted by directing the Petitioner to deposit amount of
Rs.4,700/- for years 1991-92 till 1993-94 and costs of Rs.200/- as ordered
by Tahsildar. The Petitioner has further been directed to deposit rent at
the rate of Rs. 1500/- per year from 1994-95 till 1997-98 (Rs.6,000/-). The
Petitioner was also directed to deposit rent at the rate of Rs.1,500/- per
year during pendency of the Petition with corresponding liberty to the
Respondents to withdraw the same. By further order dated
4 August 1999, this Court directed investment of the deposited amount
in the event of non-withdrawal thereof by the Respondents. By order
dated 8 August 2008, the Respondents were permitted to withdraw the
deposited amount. The Petitions are called out for final hearing.
7) Mr. Pratap Patil, the learned counsel appearing for
Petitioner would submit that the MRT has grossly erred in allowing the
Revision filed by Respondents and in dismissing the Revision of the
Petitioner. He would submit that the deeming fiction of purchase of the
agricultural land under provisions of Section 32 of the Tenancy Act has
not taken place in the present case on account of the land being rented
out for cultivation of sugarcane. He would invite my attention to
provisions of Section 43A of the Tenancy Act, under which provisions
of Sections 32 to 32 R (both inclusive) of the Tenancy Act are excluded in
respect of leases of land for cultivation of sugarcane. He would also
invite my attention to sub-section (3) of Section 43A of the Tenancy Act,
under which the State Government is empowered to issue Notification
in the Official Gazette to issue directions in respect of lands covered by
sub-sections (1) and (2) in respect of duration of lease, improvement to
be made on land, payment of land revenue and any other matters. He
would submit that in exercise of power under sub-section (3) of Section
__________________________________________________________________________
Page No.9 of 31
Wednesday, 2 April 2025
::: Uploaded on – 02/04/2025 ::: Downloaded on – 02/04/2025 22:39:48 :::
Neeta Sawant WP-1978-1998-JR
43A of the Tenancy Act, the State Government has issued Notification
relating to land leased out for cultivation of sugarcane, under which
termination of lease can be made only by giving three months’ notice to
the tenant in writing and stating therein the reasons for such
termination.
8) Mr. Patil would also rely upon provisions of Section 14 of
the Tenancy Act under which also tenancy can be terminated on the
grounds of default of payment of rent only after giving three months’
notice in writing. He would submit that in the present case, no such
notice of termination of lease was ever served on the Petitioner. He
would submit that though termination notice was apparently prepared
by the Respondents on 20 February 1995, the same was not served on
the Petitioner and that the records indicate that a copy thereof was sent
to Additional Collector and Agricultural Lands Tribunal, Walwa under
certificate of posting (UCP).
9) Mr. Patil would then invite my attention to the provisions
of Section 25 of the Tenancy Act. He would submit there were three
intimations given to the Petitioner in respect of non-payment of rent
during three years. He would submit that the said intimations were
given under provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 25 of the Tenancy
Act and the said intimations cannot be construed as notice of
termination of tenancy. Mr. Patil would submit that the Tahsildar had
rightly appreciated this position and had held that the termination
notice was never served on the Petitioner. He would therefore submit
that in absence of valid service of notice of termination notice on the
Petitioner-tenant, MRT has erroneously allowed the revision
application. He would therefore submit that the order passed by the
__________________________________________________________________________
Page No.10 of 31
Wednesday, 2 April 2025
::: Uploaded on – 02/04/2025 ::: Downloaded on – 02/04/2025 22:39:48 :::
Neeta Sawant WP-1978-1998-JR
MRT is erroneous and liable to be set aside.
10) Mr. Goswami, the learned counsel appearing for
Respondents would submit that the MRT has properly applied its mind
to the entire records of the case while passing the impugned order. That
non-payment of rent for three consecutive years is an admitted position
in the present case. He would submit that right till filing of the present
Petitions and passing of the admission order on 23 April 1998,
Petitioner had not bothered to pay rent in respect of the land.
11) Mr. Goswami would further submit that in all the three
intimations, Petitioner was clearly informed about the default
committed by him in payment of rent. That additionally termination
notice dated 28 February 1995 was also issued to the Petitioner. That
commission of consistent defaults in payment of rent would necessarily
entail termination of tenancy of the Petitioner. He would submit that
land leased out for cultivation of sugarcane is something, which is
sought to be raised by the Petitioner for the first time before this Court
as such case was never pleaded or argued before the lower authorities.
He would submit that the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal has recorded
a finding of fact about commission of default in payment of rent and
termination of tenancy which does not warrant interference in exercise
of extraordinary jurisdiction by this Court under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India. That there is no perversity in the findings
recorded by the Tribunal and he would pray for dismissal of the
petition.
12) Rival contentions of the parties now fall for my
consideration.
__________________________________________________________________________
Page No.11 of 31
Wednesday, 2 April 2025
::: Uploaded on – 02/04/2025 ::: Downloaded on – 02/04/2025 22:39:48 :::
Neeta Sawant WP-1978-1998-JR
13) There is no dispute about the relationship of landlord and
tenant between the parties. Respondents do not really dispute that
Petitioner/his father was cultivating the land on the Tiller’s Day of 1
April 1957. Ordinarily therefore, there would have been deeming fiction
of purchase of the tenanted land under the provisions of Section 32 of
the Tenancy Act. Why such deeming fiction under Section 32 did not
kick in and why the tenant did not purchase the tenanted land by
getting the purchase price fixed under Section 32G of the Tenancy Act
has not really been borne out from the records of the case. The records
and proceedings of the case have been transmitted to this Court and I
have minutely gone through the same. Perusal of the application filed
by the Respondents (Tenancy Case No. 217/1995) before the Avhal
Karkoon, Walwa would indicate that the same does not clarify as to why
purchase of the tenanted land has not taken place in the present case
under the provisions of Section 32G of the Tenancy Act. The application
straightaway proceeded with a pleading that the Petitioner was a tenant
in respect of the land whose tenancy was terminated on 31 May 1995 on
account of non-payment of rent. However, during the course of his
submissions, Mr. Patil has clarified that the agricultural land was given
on tenancy basis for cultivation of sugarcane, on account of which,
provisions of Section 32 could not be invoked in the present case. It
would therefore be necessary to briefly take an overview of the
provisions of the Tenancy Act in this regard.
14) Ordinarily, Section 32 of the Tenancy Act creates a deeming
fiction of purchase of land cultivated by a tenant on Tiller’s Day of
1 April 1957. The tenant can then apply under the provisions of Section
32G of the Act for fixation of purchase price and after payment thereof,
Certificate of Purchase under Section 32-M is issued in the name of the
__________________________________________________________________________
Page No.12 of 31
Wednesday, 2 April 2025
::: Uploaded on – 02/04/2025 ::: Downloaded on – 02/04/2025 22:39:48 :::
Neeta Sawant WP-1978-1998-JR
tenant, who then acquires ownership in respect of the tenanted land.
However, Chapter-IIIA came to be inserted in the Tenancy Act by
Bombay Amendment Act, 13 of 1956 making special provisions in
respect of lands held on lease for certain purposes such as industrial or
commercial purpose or for cultivation of sugarcane and other notified
agricultural produce. Under Section 43A, various provisions of the
Tenancy Act are excluded from being applied to the lands enumerated
therein. Section 43A provides thus:
43-A. Some of the provisions not to apply to leases of land obtained by
industrial or commercial undertakings, certain co-operative societies or for
cultivation of sugarcane or fruits or flowers.
(1) The provisions of sections 4B, 8, 9, 9A, 9B, 9C, 10, 10A, 14, 16, 17, 17A, 17B,
18, 27, 31 to 31D (both inclusive), 32 to 32R, (both inclusive) [33A, 33B, 33C],
43, 63, 63A, 64 and 65, shall not apply to–
(a) [land leased to or held by] any industrial or commercial
undertaking (other than a Co-operative Society) which in the opinion
of the State Government bona fide carries on any industrial or
commercial operations and which is approved by the State
Government;
(b) leases of land granted to any bodies or persons other than
those mentioned in clause (a) for the cultivation of sugarcane or the
growing of fruits or flowers or for the breeding of livestock;
(c) to lands held or leased by such co-operative societies as are
approved, in the prescribed manner, by the State Government which
have for their objects the improvement of the economic and social
conditions of peasants or ensuring the full and efficient use of land for
agriculture and allied pursuits.
(2) The State Government may by notification in the Official Gazette, in this
behalf direct that the provisions of the said sections shall not apply to a lease
of land obtained by any person for growing any other class of agricultural
produce to which it is satisfied that it will not be expedient in the public
interest to apply the said provisions. Before the issue of such notification, the
State Government shall direct an inquiry to be made by an officer authorised
in this behalf by the State Government and shall give all persons who are
likely to be affected by such notification, an opportunity to submit their
objections.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections (1) and (2), it shall be
lawful for the State Government to direct, by notification in the Official Gazette,
that the leases [or lands, as the case may be,] to which the provisions of sub-
sections (1) and (2) apply, shall be subject to such conditions as may be
__________________________________________________________________________
Page No.13 of 31
Wednesday, 2 April 2025
::: Uploaded on – 02/04/2025 ::: Downloaded on – 02/04/2025 22:39:48 :::
Neeta Sawant WP-1978-1998-JR
specified in the notification, in respect of –
(a) the duration of the lease;
(b) the improvements to be made on the land and the formation of co-
operative farming societies for that purpose and financial assistance to
such societies;
(c) the payment of land revenue, irrigation cess, local-fund cess and
any other charges payable to the State Government or any local
authority; or
(d) any other matter referred to in sections mentioned in sub-section
(1).
15) Thus the lands, in respect of which lease is granted for
cultivation of sugarcane or growing of fruits or flowers or for breeding
of livestock, are included under Section 43A of the Tenancy Act and
provisions of Sections 32 to 32R (both inclusive) do not apply to such
land. This means that there is no deeming fiction of purchase under
Section 32 of the Tenancy Act in respect of the land granted for
cultivation of sugarcane. Sub-section (2) of Section 43A empowers the
State Government to notify lands for exclusion of applicability of
various provisions of the Act to lease of land for growing any other
class of agricultural produce. Under sub-section (3) of Section 43A, the
State Government is empowered to specify, by way of Notification in
Official Gazette, various conditions in respect of the lands included
under sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) of Section 43A in relation to
duration of lease, improvements made on the land, payment of land
revenue and other matter.
16) It appears that in exercise of power under sub-section (3) of
Section 43A, the State Government has issued Notification
No.T.N.C.5157/173483-M specifying the conditions relating to (i)
duration and termination of lease and (ii) purchase of land by lessee in
respect of the lands covered by Clause-(b) of sub-section (1) of Section
__________________________________________________________________________
Page No.14 of 31
Wednesday, 2 April 2025
::: Uploaded on – 02/04/2025 ::: Downloaded on – 02/04/2025 22:39:48 :::
Neeta Sawant WP-1978-1998-JR
43A i.e. lease granted for cultivation of sugarcane. In the Notification, it
is directed that no such lease shall be liable to be terminated on the
ground that the period fixed by agreement or usage for its duration has
expired. Para-2 of the Notification provides that if lessor bonafidely
requires any land so leased by him for cultivating it personally or for
any non-agricultural use, such lease can be terminated by lessor by
giving the lessee, one month’s notice in writing stating therein the
reasons for the termination of the lease. Para-3 of the Notification
provides that if a lessee commits any default mentioned in clause (a) of
sub-section (1) of Section 14 in relation to such lease of land, the lease
may be terminated by the lessor by giving the lessee three months’
notice in writing stating therein the reasons for such termination. The
relevant part of Notification reads thus:
Sec. 43A(3) of the B.T. & A.L. Act, 1948.- no. T.N.C. 5157/173483-M. in
exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (3) of sec. 43-A, of the Bombay
Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (Bom. LXVII of 1948), the
Government of Bombay hereby directs that the leases of land referred to in
clause (b) of sub-section (1) of the said sec. 43A and to which the provisions
of sub-section (1) of said sec. 43-A apply shall be subject to the following
conditions namely:
Conditions as to the duration and termination of lease —
1. No such lease of land shall be liable to be terminated on the ground that
the period fixed by agreement or usage for its duration has expired.
2. If a lessor bona fide requires any land so leased by him for cultivating it
personally or for any non-agricultural use, such lease may, subject to the
conditions mentioned in secs. 31-A, 31 B, 31-C and 31-D be terminated by the
lessor by giving the lessee [a month’s] notice in writing stating therein the
reasons for the termination of the lease:
[Provided that, if the holding of a lessor does not exceed one economic
holding and such lessor earns his livelihood principally by agriculture or by
agricultural labour, the conditions mentioned in sec. 31-A and 31-B shall not
apply but the lessor’s right to resume land shall be subject to the conditions
mentioned in clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (5) of sec. 33-B, with this
modification that clause (c) of the said sub-section (5) shall be read as if for
__________________________________________________________________________
Page No.15 of 31
Wednesday, 2 April 2025::: Uploaded on – 02/04/2025 ::: Downloaded on – 02/04/2025 22:39:48 :::
Neeta Sawant WP-1978-1998-JRthe words “the commencement date” appearing therein the words, letters,
figures and brackets “the date of Government Notification, Revenue and
Forests Department. No. TNC. 6769/9667-M. Spl. dated the 8th October, 1969”
were substituted.]
3. If a lessee commits any of the defaults mentioned in clause (a) of sub-
section (1) of sec. 14 in relation to such lease of land, the lease may be
terminated by the lessor by giving the lessee three months’ notice in writing
stating therein the reasons for such termination.
17) Since para-3 of the Notification refers to the provisions of
Section 14, it would be necessary to consider that provision as well.
Section 14 of the Tenancy Act deals with termination of tenancy for
default of tenant in payment of rent and provides thus :
14. Termination of tenancy for default of tenant.
(1) Notwithstanding any law, agreement or usage, or the decree or order of a
court, the tenancy of any land shall not be terminated-
(a) unless the tenant–
(i) has failed to pay the rent for any revenue year before the
31st day of May thereof;
(ii) has done any act which is destructive or permanently
injurious to the land;
(iii) has sub-divided, sub-let or assigned the land in
contravention of section 27;
(iv) has failed to cultivate it personally; or
(v) has used such land for a purpose other than agriculture or
allied pursuits; and
(b) unless the landlord has given three months’ notice in writing
informing the tenant of his decision to terminate the tenancy and the
ground for such termination, and within that period the tenant has
failed to remedy the breach for which the tenancy is liable to be
terminated.
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall apply to the tenancy of any land held by a
permanent tenant unless by the conditions of such tenancy the tenancy is
liable to be terminated on any of the grounds mentioned in the said sub-
section
18) Thus, under the provisions of Section 14, if tenant fails to
__________________________________________________________________________
Page No.16 of 31
Wednesday, 2 April 2025
::: Uploaded on – 02/04/2025 ::: Downloaded on – 02/04/2025 22:39:48 :::
Neeta Sawant WP-1978-1998-JR
pay the rent for any revenue year before 31st day of May thereof, the
landlord can serve three months’ notice in writing informing the tenant
of his decision about termination of tenancy and the ground for such
termination and if the tenant fails to remedy the breach within the
notice period, the tenancy becomes liable to be terminated.
19) Thus, upon conjoint reading of para-3 of the Notification
with provisions of Section 14 of the Tenancy Act, if a tenant to whom
agricultural land is leased out for growing sugarcane, commits default
in payment of rent for any revenue year before 31 st day of May thereof,
the landlord can terminate the tenancy by giving three months’ notice
in writing. Here again, there are twin protections provided to the tenant
possibly with the objective that mere failure to pay rent should
ordinarily not result in loss of tenancy. As observed above in para-1 of
the Notification, the tenancy continues notwithstanding expiry of
tenure thereof. The first protection to the tenant is to pay the rent within
a period of 3 months after receipt of notice and save the tenancy.
Section 25 of the Tenancy Act provides further protection to the tenant
to save the tenancy. Section 25 provides thus :
25. Relief against termination of tenancy for non-payment of rent.
(1) Where any tenancy of any land held by any tenant is terminated for
non-payment of rent and the landlord files any proceeding to eject the
tenant, the Mamlatdar shall call upon the tenant to tender to the
landlord the rent in arrears together with the cost of the proceeding,
within [three months] from the date of order, and if the tenant
complies with such order, the Mamlatdar shall, in lieu of making an
order for ejectment, pass an order directing that the tenancy had not
been terminated, and thereupon the tenant shall hold the land as if the
tenancy had not been terminated :
Provided that if the Mamlatdar is satisfied that in consequence of total
or partial failure of crops or similar calamity the tenant has been
unable to pay the rent due, the Mamlatdar may, for reasons to be
recorded in writing, direct that the arrears of rent together with costs
of the proceeding if awarded, shall be paid within one year from the
date of the order and that if before the expiry of the said period the
__________________________________________________________________________
Page No.17 of 31
Wednesday, 2 April 2025::: Uploaded on – 02/04/2025 ::: Downloaded on – 02/04/2025 22:39:48 :::
Neeta Sawant WP-1978-1998-JRtenant fails to pay the said arrears of rent and costs, the tenancy shall
be deemed to be terminated and the tenant shall be liable to be
evicted].
(2) Nothing in this section] shall apply to any tenant whose tenancy is
terminated for non-payment of rent if he has failed for any three years
to pay rent and the landlord has given intimation to the tenant to that
effect within a period of three months on each default.
20) Thus, when tenancy of any land is terminated for non-
payment of rent and the landlord files any proceedings for ejectment of
the tenant, the Tahsildar is required to first call upon them to tender to
the landlord the rent in arrears together with costs of the proceedings
within three months and if the tenant complies with the said order, the
tenancy gets protected. This is how twin opportunities are provided to
the tenants for saving their tenancies from being terminated on the
ground of default in payment of rent. Sub-section (2) of Section 25
however makes a special provision under which the second protection
made available to the tenant of making good the default upon filing of
proceedings gets denied. Under sub-section (2) of Section 25, if there is
a default in payment of rent for three years and if the landlord has given
intimations to the tenant to that effect for each such default, in that case,
the Tahsildar cannot grant second opportunity to the tenant to make
good the default in payment of rent after filing of the proceedings for
ejectment.
21) Thus, the broad statutory scheme is that there is no
deeming fiction of purchase by tenant under Section 32 of the Tenancy
Act when the land is leased out for growing of sugarcane. However,
though provisions of Section 32 to 32R are made inapplicable to land
leased out for cultivating sugarcane, the tenancy of the tenant is still
protected on account of issuance of Notification by the State
Government under the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 43A of
__________________________________________________________________________
Page No.18 of 31
Wednesday, 2 April 2025
::: Uploaded on – 02/04/2025 ::: Downloaded on – 02/04/2025 22:39:48 :::
Neeta Sawant WP-1978-1998-JR
the Tenancy Act and the same continues notwithstanding expiry of
tenure of lease. However, if the tenant commits default in payment of
rent, the tenancy can be terminated by the landlord by service of three
months’ notice in writing. If the tenant fails to make good the default
within the notice period of three months, the tenancy becomes liable to
be terminated and the landlord becomes entitled to file proceedings for
ejectment of the tenant. However, where the tenant has committed
default in payment of rent for three years, the landlord can give
intimations to the tenant informing him/her about the factum of non-
payment of rent within a period of 3 months of each default. Once such
three intimations are served and the tenancy is terminated under
Section 14, the Tahsildar cannot grant second opportunity of making
good the default under the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 25
and the ejectment in such case becomes eminent. This is the broad
statutory scheme of lands leased out for cultivation of sugarcane.
22) Turning to the facts of the present case, there is no denial to
the fact that there have been three consecutive defaults on the part of
the Petitioner in payment of rent for the years 1991-92, 1992-93 and
1993-94. It appears that the Respondent-landlords had filed proceedings
for enhancement of the rent from time to time. Initially, the rent was Rs.
68.50/- per year. In Tenancy Case No.55/1968, the rent was increased to
Rs.250/- per year. Thereafter, in Tenancy Appeal No.35/1990, the SDO
fixed the rent at Rs.1,500/- per year. The landlords were aggrieved by
fixation of rent at Rs.1,500/- and had filed Revision before the
Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal for further enhancement of the rent
which Revision was apparently pending as on the date of filing of
ejectment proceedings (Tenancy Case No.217/1995).
__________________________________________________________________________
Page No.19 of 31
Wednesday, 2 April 2025
::: Uploaded on – 02/04/2025 ::: Downloaded on – 02/04/2025 22:39:48 :::
Neeta Sawant WP-1978-1998-JR
23) As observed above, the Petitioner-tenant did not pay rent in
the year 1991-92, 1992-93 and 1993-94. The landlords decided to invoke
the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 25 and issued three separate
intimations to the Petitioner-tenant intimating him about non-payment
of rent for each of the three years of 1991-92, 1992-93 and 1993-94 on 11
June 1992, 14 June 1993 and 10 June 1994 respectively. The Petitioner-
tenant refused to accept the said notices nor paid the rent in respect of
the said three years. Thus, provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 25
were fully complied with by the Respondent-landlords and accordingly
the second opportunity of saving of tenancy from being terminated in
the form of order to be passed by the Tahsildar for payment of rent with
costs within three months got declined to the Petitioner-tenant under
the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 25.
24) Additionally, it appears that the Respondent-landlords had
prepared termination notice dated 20 February 1995 terminating the
tenancy stating therein that despite service of intimations for non-
payment of rent for 1991-92, 1992-93 and 1993-94, the Petitioner-tenant
had failed to pay the rent. Accordingly, the tenancy was terminated by
notice dated 20 February 1995 w.e.f. 31 May 1995. The notice dated 20
February 1995 was addressed to the Petitioner, copy thereof was also
shown to have been addressed to the Additional Tahsildar and
Agricultural Lands Tribunal, Taluka-Walwa, Islampur. Petitioner
contends that he was never served with the termination notice, whereas
it is the contention of Respondents that the notice was served on him.
25) The core issue that is involved in the present petition is
about the dispatch and service of Notice dated 20/23 February 1995 by
which tenancy of the Petitioner was terminated by the Respondents.
__________________________________________________________________________
Page No.20 of 31
Wednesday, 2 April 2025
::: Uploaded on – 02/04/2025 ::: Downloaded on – 02/04/2025 22:39:48 :::
Neeta Sawant WP-1978-1998-JR
According to the Petitioner, he was never served with the notice dated
20/23 February 1995. Mr. Patil has contended that perusal of records
and proceedings received from the office of Avhal Karkoon would
indicate that neither office copy of the said notice nor its
acknowledgement was ever produced by the Respondents before the
Avhal Karkoon.
26) Before proceeding further to examine the records and
proceedings, it would be first necessary to examine the pleadings of the
Petitioner in the present petition on the issue of non-receipt of
termination notice. Perusal of the pleadings in the Memo of the petition
would indicate that Petitioner has vaguely sought to contest finding of
the MRT about termination of tenancy by raising following pleadings :
vii) The Lnd. Member of M.R.T. erred in concluding that Respondents
herein rightly filed an application and have also rightly issued notices
and legally terminated the tenancy in the month of May 1995. In this
connection the Lnd. Member of M.R.T failed to see and consider that
though landlords have issued notices that itself cannot terminate the
tenancy unless there is such intimation of termination of tenancy
given to the tenant. In the present case no such intimation has been
given and hence there is no cause of action of termination of tenancy
for filing an application for restoration of land.
27) Except the above pleading, there is no specific averment
that the termination notice dated 20/23 February 1995 was never
dispatched or served on the Petitioner.
28) The original records and proceedings in Tenancy Case
No.217/1995 have been received. I have minutely gone through the
original records and proceedings. In application filed in Tenancy Case
No.217/1995, Respondents raised a specific pleading in para-5 thereof__________________________________________________________________________
Page No.21 of 31
Wednesday, 2 April 2025::: Uploaded on – 02/04/2025 ::: Downloaded on – 02/04/2025 22:39:48 :::
Neeta Sawant WP-1978-1998-JRthat they served notice dated 23 February 1995 by registered post to the
Respondent and terminated the tenancy w.e.f. 31 May 1995. On behalf of
the Respondents, examination-in-chief of Sadashiv Maruti Vibhute was
recorded on 4 January 1996. In his examination-in-chief, the witness
stated that on 23 February 1995, termination notice was dispatched by
Registered Post but the Petitioner did not accept the same. His cross-
examination was conducted on 8 February 1996 and in the entire cross-
examination there is no dispute created with regard to the dispatch and
service of termination notice to the Petitioner. Respondents filed list of
documents on 25 January 1996 and the document at serial no.5 in the
said list was as under :
अ. नं. तपशील तारीख शेरा
१) अर्जदार यांनी र्जबादार यांना पाठवि लेले ११/६/९२ मुळ
नोटीसची पोच - पा ती
२) अर्जदार यांनी र्जबादार यांना पाठवि लेले २१/६/९३ मुळ
नोटीसची स्थळ प्रत
३) अर्जदार यांनी र्जबादार यांना पाठवि लेले २१/३/९३ मुळ
नोटीसची पोच - पा ती
४) अर्जदार यांनी र्जबादार यांना पाठवि लेले ११/६/९४ मुळ
नोटीसची स्थळ प्रत (पोच - पा ती)
५) अर्जदार यांनी र्जाबदार यांना पाठवि लेले २३/२/१९९५ मुळ
नोटीसची स्थळ प्रत (पोच पा तीसह)
(emphasis added)
29) However, for some odd reason, the documents at Serial
Nos.1 to 4 are to be found in the records and proceedings, but the
document at Serial No. 5 is conspicuously missing. Thus, in the
documents appended to the list of documents dated 25 January 1996,
neither office copy of the notice dated 23 February 1995 nor its
acknowledgement is to be found. It becomes quite unbelievable that the
__________________________________________________________________________
Page No.22 of 31
Wednesday, 2 April 2025
::: Uploaded on – 02/04/2025 ::: Downloaded on – 02/04/2025 22:39:48 :::
Neeta Sawant WP-1978-1998-JR
other four original documents are available in the list of documents and
only the document at Serial No.5 (office copy of notice dated 23
February 1995 and its acknowledgement) are conveniently missing.
30) However, though the document at Serial No.5 at list of
documents dated 25 January 1996 is missing, it appears that the copy of
the notice dated 23 February 1995 was also sent to the Upper Tahsildar
and ALT. The original of the said notice as received by the office of the
Upper Tahsildar is however available in the records. It appears that the
said office copy was dispatched by UCP. The said notice bears the stamp
of the office of Tahsildar with inward number demonstrating receipt
thereof on 24 February 1995.
31) Thus, it is not that the claim of the Respondents about
dispatch of termination notice dated 20/23 February 1995 is entirely
false. The notice was dispatched to the Petitioner and copy thereof was
dispatched through UCP to Upper Tahsildar. The notice received by
Upper Tahsildar is available on record, but office copy of the said notice
together with acknowledgement receipt shown to have been filed before
the Avhal Karkoon vide list of documents dated 25 January 1996, has
curiously gone missing.
32) As observed above, the Respondents were emphatic in their
application filed before the Avhal Karkoon that termination notice was
dispatched to the Petitioner. This was reiterated in the examination-in-
chief. In the cross-examination, there is no contest about dispatch of the
termination notice and no attempt was ever made to question the
correctness of the statements made in the evidence of the witness that
the notice was actually dispatched to the Petitioner. What makes the
__________________________________________________________________________
Page No.23 of 31
Wednesday, 2 April 2025
::: Uploaded on – 02/04/2025 ::: Downloaded on – 02/04/2025 22:39:48 :::
Neeta Sawant WP-1978-1998-JR
case of the Petitioner worse is the evidence of witness-Jayvant Rangrao
Pethkar, Constituted Attorney of the Petitioner-Rangrao Mahadu
Petkar. His evidence was recorded on 7 March 1996. He did not state in
his examination-in-chief that termination notice dated 20/23 February
1995 was not received. On the contrary, in his cross-examination, he
made following admissions :
१४-०६-१९९३ चे नोटीसी हे माझे डि+लाना असे कळवि ली होती की माझे डि+ल हे
थकबाकीदार झाले त हे म्हणणे खरे नाही. विद. ११-६-१९९२ १४-०६-१९९३ चे
नोटीसाला अर्जदारला आम्ही उत्तर कांही विदले ले नाही हे म्हणणे खरे आहे. पुन्हा विद. १०-
०६-१९९४ ला अर्जदार नं. १ ते ३ यांनी आमचे डि+लाना रजिर्जः पोष्टाने नोटीस
पाठवि ली होती हे म्हणणे खरे आहे. या नोटीसीला सुध्दा आम्ही अर्जदाराला उत्तर विदले
नाही हे म्हणणे खरे आहे. पुन्हा विद. २३-०२-१९९५ ला अर्जदारा ही नोटीस पाठवि ली
होती हे म्हणणे खरे आहे. या नोटीसीला सुध्दा उत्तर विदले नाही. विद. २३-०२-१९९५ चे
नोटीसीचे अर्जदार यांनी आमचा कुळ हक्क नष्ट केला आहे हे म्हणणे खरे नाही. सन.
१९८४ नतंर खं+ाची काहीही रक्क्म अर्जदाराला विदले ली नाही हे म्हणणे खरे नाही
अर्जदाराचे नोटीसींना उत्तर का विदले नाही यांचे कारण मला सांगता येत नाही.
(emphasis added)
33) Thus, there is specific admission by the Petitioner’s witness
about receipt of termination notice dated 23 February 1995. What he
disputed is not the factum of receipt of notice, but he disputed that the
notice had the effect of termination of tenancy. Therefore, though the
office copy of the notice dated 20/23 February 1995 together with
acknowledgement receipt has gone curiously missing from the records
and proceedings, Petitioner never disputed dispatch and receipt of the
said notice before the Avhal Karkoon. In fact his constituted attorney
admitted its receipt in the cross examination. It is only after the
proceedings were remanded for fresh enquiry that the Petitioner took a
plea of non-service of termination notice in his written submissions.
34) Considering the above position, in my view, it becomes
__________________________________________________________________________
Page No.24 of 31
Wednesday, 2 April 2025::: Uploaded on – 02/04/2025 ::: Downloaded on – 02/04/2025 22:39:48 :::
Neeta Sawant WP-1978-1998-JRclear that the Petitioner had never disputed receipt of termination notice
dated 20/23 February 1995. Infact, his witness admitted receipt of the
said termination notice. The Petitioner therefore cannot be permitted to
take undue advantage of curious missing of office copy of the said
notice from the records and proceedings. It otherwise becomes
unbelievable that the Respondents, who were diligently serving three
intimations on the Petitioner and dispatched copy of the termination
notice to the Upper Tahsildar, would not dispatch the said termination
notice to the Petitioner.
35) In my view, therefore the termination notice has been duly
served under the provisions of Section 14 of the Tenancy Act as
required under the Notification issued by the State Government under
Section 43A(3) of the Tenancy Act.
36) Mr. Patil has not seriously disputed that the three
intimations as required under Section 25(2) of the Act in respect of non-
payment of rent for the years 1991-92, 1992-93 and 1993-94 was served
within the stipulated time limit on 11 June 1992, 14 June 1993 and 10
June 1994. On account of service of three intimations as aforestated, the
provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 25, under which the Petitioner
would have got a second opportunity of making good the default, was
not available to him. It is also an admitted position that even during
pendency of Tenancy Case No.217/1995, Petitioner did not bother to
clear the arrears of rent. Infact till 14 January 1997 when the Tahsildar
passed order in favour of the Petitioner in the remanded proceedings,
Petitioner had failed to make good the default in payment of rent for
those three years. In my view, therefore the tenancy of the Petitioner has
been validly terminated by the Respondents on account of non-payment
__________________________________________________________________________
Page No.25 of 31
Wednesday, 2 April 2025
::: Uploaded on – 02/04/2025 ::: Downloaded on – 02/04/2025 22:39:48 :::
Neeta Sawant WP-1978-1998-JR
of rent for over three years. The MRT has rightly appreciated this
position. The default in payment of rent is an admitted fact. However
minuscule it may be, the rent ultimately represents some form of return
for the landlord in respect of the leased land. A tenant who persistently
commits defaults in payment of rent and has absolutely no intention of
paying the rent needs to be evicted from the land by restoration thereof
to the landlords. In the present case, Petitioner has failed to avail the
opportunity of saving the tenancy by making good the default in
payment of rent despite receipt of three intimations and one
termination notice. It is only after the proceedings reached before this
Court that the Petitioner ultimately deposited the rent, that too because
this Court directed him to do so vide order dated 23 April 1998. Thus
the rent since 1991 was ultimately deposited by Petitioner 7 years later
in the year 1998 that too under the orders of this Court. After it is
proved that he is a consistent defaulter in payment of rent, all that the
Petitioner has attempted to do is to take disadvantage of the position of
missing office copy of termination notice and acknowledgement from
the records and proceedings by ignoring the position that his witness
had specifically admitted receipt of the said notice.
37) The conduct of the Petitioner in non-payment of rent
appears to be otherwise consistent. He admitted receipt of intimations
dated 11 June 1992, 14 June 1993 and 10 June 1994. However, he never
had the intention of payment of rent. Therefore, after receipt of the
termination notice dated 20/23 February 1995, Petitioner continued
with his consistent conduct and refused to pay the rent. The real case of
the Petitioner is not non-receipt of termination notice but (i) that he is a
deemed purchaser under Section 32 of the Tenancy Act and in the
alternative (ii) he was justified in not paying the rent. It would be
__________________________________________________________________________
Page No.26 of 31
Wednesday, 2 April 2025
::: Uploaded on – 02/04/2025 ::: Downloaded on – 02/04/2025 22:39:48 :::
Neeta Sawant WP-1978-1998-JR
apposite to reproduce the main case pleaded by the Petitioner in the
memo of the petition :
GROUNDS
i) That the impugned judgement and order is contrary to law, justice,
equity and principles of good conscience.
ii) That the Lnd. Member of M.R. T. has committed error apparent on
the face of record which has resulted in grave miscarriage of justice.
iii) That the Lnd. Member M.R.T. failed to see and consider that the
Petitioner being tenant on tiller’s day in the suit land has become
deemed purchaser on 1.4.57 and since that day the title in the suit land
which was previously vested in the Respondents has been passed to
Petitioner. Thus there is no more landlord tenant relationship between
the Respondents and Petitioner and Petitioner is no more tenant but
has become owner of the suit land. At the most what is remained is
fixation of purchase price of the suit land. As the Petitioner is not
tenant in the suit land after 1.4.57 the question of terminating tenancy
on any ground including ground of default does not arise at all. On
the contrary if the Petitioner has paid some amount to the
Respondents as rent after tiller’s day, the said amount deserves to be
deducted from purchase price of the suit land which will be fixed by
Agricultural Lande Tribunal in due course.
iv) It is pertinent to note that even Respondents also in their
application have pleaded that Petitioner was tenant in the suit land
not only on 1.4.57 but even prior to that. Further more it is not the case
of the Respondent that they belong to any of the categories specified in
Section 31(1) of the Tenancy Act or they are certificated landlords & to
them the certificate has been issued Under Section 88-C of the
Tenancy Act. In the circumstances the applications of Respondents for
obtaining possession of the suit land from Petitioner under Section 14
r/w. 29 of the Tenancy Act is not maintainable being made after 1.4.57.
v) Even if it is presumed for the sake of argument only and without
admitting that the Petitioner is tenant in the suit land even after tiller’s
day, still the Petitioner is not defaulter in payment of rent. In this
context it is pertinent to note that initially the amount of Rs.68.50 Ps.
was fixed as rent of the suit land. But right from 1968 till today the
Respondents have filed various litigations before various authorities
and consequently even today also the amount of rent is not fixed. The
Lnd.S.D.O. Walwa Division, Islampur by his order in Tenancy Appeal
No.35/90 has enhanced the rent of Rs. 1,500/-. The Respondents have
__________________________________________________________________________
Page No.27 of 31
Wednesday, 2 April 2025
::: Uploaded on – 02/04/2025 ::: Downloaded on – 02/04/2025 22:39:48 :::
Neeta Sawant WP-1978-1998-JR
challenged this order before M.R.T. Pune by way of Revision
Application No.MRT/SS/51/93 which is still pending. Thus even if
the Petitioner had paid rent to the Respondents for the years 1991-92,
1992-93 & 1993-94, it would be part payment of rent and still it would
be a ground for Respondents to contend that Petitioner is defaulter.
Thus only with the intention of obtaining possession of the suit land
from the Petitioner by hook or crook the Respondents on one hand
have kept the issue of fixation of rent pending before M.R.T. and on
other hand have filed application for obtaining possession of the suit
land from the Petitioner on the ground of default. It is pertinent to
note that entries in 7 X 12 extracts even today also show amount of
rent as 68.50 Ps. The Petitioner craves leave to refer to and rely upon
the relevant 7 x 12 extracts as and when found necessary. Thus in view
of pendency of issue regarding fixation of rent of the suit land and
entries in 7 X 12 extracts, in no circumstances the Petitioner can be
called as defaulter in payment of rent.
vi) As the Petitioner is not defaulter in paymet of rent in the eyes of
law, he is entitled to relief under Section 25 (1) of the Tenancy Act.
vii) The Lnd. Member of M.R.T. erred in concluding that Respondents
herein rightly filed an application and have also rightly issued notices
and legally terminated the tenancy in the month of May 1995. In this
connection the Lnd. Member of M.R.T failed to see and consider that
though landlords have issued notices that itself cannot terminate the
tenancy unless there is such intimation of termination of tenancy
given to the tenant. In the present case no such intimation has been
given and hence there is no cause of action of termination of tenancy
for filing an application for restoration of land.
viii) The Lnd.Member further erred in concluding that cause of action
was arised on the part of the landlords and they have rightly filed an
application for restoration of land under Section 29 of the Tenancy
Act.
ix) It ought to have been held thatas Petitioner had become deemed
purchaser on tiller’s day he is not defaulter and hence Respondents
are not entitled to obtain possession under Section 29 of the Tenancy
Act.
x) The Lnd. Judge failed on facts as well as on law.
xi) Neither the provisions of law nor the principles established in
settled case laws have been followed properly.
xii) The Lnd. Judge failed to exercise properly the jurisdiction vested
__________________________________________________________________________
Page No.28 of 31
Wednesday, 2 April 2025
::: Uploaded on – 02/04/2025 ::: Downloaded on – 02/04/2025 22:39:48 :::
Neeta Sawant WP-1978-1998-JR
in him by law.
xiii) The conclusion drawn are contrary to evidence on record. The
impugned judgement and order is perverse.
xiv) Even otherwise also the impugned Judgement and Order is bad in
law and deserves to be quashed and set aside.
38) Thus, the Petitioner always believed that he was a deemed
purchaser of the land and even if he continued to be a tenant, he had
valid justification for non-payment of rent. It is only after noticing that
the office copy of the termination notice had gone missing from the
records and proceedings that the Petitioner took a volte-face and started
contending in the remanded proceedings before the Tahsildar that the
tenancy was not terminated by issuance of notice. However, what is
conveniently ignored by the Petitioner is the fact that he never disputed
dispatch and service of the said termination notice and that his witness
in fact expressly admitted receipt of the notice.
39) Petitioner has invoked extraordinary jurisdiction of this
Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. This Court does
not appreciate the conduct of the Petitioner in arguing the case before
this Court contrary to the admissions given by his witness. Here, it
would be apposite to refer to the Division Bench judgment of this Court
in State of Bombay Versus. Morarji Kuwarjee 1 wherein Chief Justice
M. C. Chagla speaking for the Division Bench as held in paras-42 and 44
as under :
42. ……… This is, on the contrary, a case where the premises
requisitioned for a public purpose are occupied by a Government
servant and are sought to be taken possession of by the landlord by1
1958 Bom. Law Reporter Vol LXI 318
__________________________________________________________________________
Page No.29 of 31
Wednesday, 2 April 2025::: Uploaded on – 02/04/2025 ::: Downloaded on – 02/04/2025 22:39:48 :::
Neeta Sawant WP-1978-1998-JRasking the Court to throw the Government servant out and restore
possession to the landlord when that landlord has never shown his
need of those premises by occupying them himself. Therefore, this is
clearly a case where justice is not on the side of the petitioner, it is
on the side of the State, and we see no reason why we should grant
any relief to the petitioner.
xxx
44. With respect to the learned Judge, the matter is much more
serious than merely the question of this particular vacancy of 1956
not being relevant to the vacancy which is the subject matter of the
requisition order. On a writ petition, as we have already said, the
petitioner has not merely to show good faith, but he has not to
suppress any facts and has also to show that justice lies on his side.
If the learned Judge had taken these circumstances into consideration
and then had come to the conclusion that the discretion should be
exercised in favour of the landlord, then undoubtedly we would not
have interfered with the order passed by the learned Judge.
(emphasis added)
40) In M.P. Mittal Versus. State of Haryana and Ors. 2, the
Hon’ble Apex Court has held that discretionary jurisdiction of this
Court can be declined when the Petitioner seeks to secure dishonest
advantage to perpetuate the unjust claim. The Apex Court held in para-
5 as under :
5. Now there is no dispute that the appellant knowingly and
deliberately entered into the Guarantee agreement, and is liable as
Guarantor to make payment of the dividend due from Messrs Depro
Foods Limited. Nor is it disputed that the amount due, with interest,
stands at Rs 2,02,166 — in respect of the period ending with the year
1977. It was not contended that the appellant in fact does not possess
sufficient funds or cannot avail of sufficient personal property for the
purpose of discharging the liability. The record also shows that before
instituting coercive proceedings, the Assistant Collector provided the
appellant an opportunity to pay up the amount due from him, and
that the appellant made no attempt to discharge the liability. When
that is so, we are of opinion that he is not entitled to relief in these
proceedings. The appeal arises out of a writ petition, and it is well
settled that when a petitioner invokes the jurisdiction of the High
Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, it is open to the High
Court to consider whether, in the exercise of its undoubted2
(1984) 4 SCC 371
__________________________________________________________________________
Page No.30 of 31
Wednesday, 2 April 2025::: Uploaded on – 02/04/2025 ::: Downloaded on – 02/04/2025 22:39:48 :::
Neeta Sawant WP-1978-1998-JRdiscretionary jurisdiction, it should decline relief to such petitioner
if the grant of relief would defeat the interests of justice. The Court
always has power to refuse relief where the petitioner seeks to
invoke its writ jurisdiction in order to secure a dishonest advantage
or perpetuate an unjust gain. This is a case where the High Court
was fully justified in refusing relief. On that ground alone, the appeal
must fail.
(emphasis added)
41) I am therefore otherwise not inclined to exercise
jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to interfere
with the order passed by the MRT, which otherwise results in
restoration of the land in favour of the Respondent-landlords who have
diligently taken steps by issuing three intimations for non-payment of
rent for the years 1991-92, 1992-93 and 1993-94 as well as sending
termination notice dated 20/23 February 1995. The justice in the present
case appears to be clearly in favour of the Respondents and the
Petitioner is found to have taken undue advantage of curious missing of
office copy of notice and acknowledgement from the records and
proceedings by seeking to ignore admission given by its witness about
receipt of termination notice. Therefore, apart from the order passed by
the MRT being perfectly valid in law, the facts and circumstances of the
present case, do not warrant exercise of jurisdiction of this Court under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India in Petitioner’s favour to interfere
in the order passed by the Tribunal.
42) The Writ Petition is devoid of merits. It is accordingly
dismissed with no order as to costs. Rule is discharged.
43) In view of disposal of the Writ Petition, nothing survives in
Interim Application No. 1932 of 2023 and the same is accordingly
disposed of .
Digitally
signed by
NEETA
NEETA SHAILESH [SANDEEP V. MARNE, J.]
SHAILESH SAWANT
SAWANT Date:
2025.04.02
19:58:17
__________________________________________________________________________
+0530
Page No.31 of 31
Wednesday, 2 April 2025
::: Uploaded on – 02/04/2025 ::: Downloaded on – 02/04/2025 22:39:48 :::
[ad_1]
Source link