Jharkhand High Court
Anil Kumar Mehta vs The State Of Jharkhand on 2 April, 2025
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 1192 of 2024
With
I.A. No. 2197 of 2025
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Anil Kumar Mehta, aged about 31 years, son of Sri Jawahar Prasad
Mehta, Resident of Village-Asiya, P.O. + P.S.-Ichak, District-
Hazaribagh.
... ... Appellant
Versus
The State of Jharkhand ... ... Respondent
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CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP KUMAR SRIVASTAVA
———-
For the Appellant : Mr. P.P.N. Roy, Sr. Advocate
Mr. P.A.N. Roy, Advocate
Mrs. Pragati Prasad, Advocate
For the Respondent : Mr. Anup Pawan Topno, A.P.P.
For the Informant : Mr. Ashok Kumar Singh, Advocate
———–
nd
09/Dated: 02 April, 2025
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad J
I.A. No. 2197 of 2025:
1. The instant interlocutory application has been filed under Section
430(1) of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 on behalf of
appellant for suspension of sentence dated 31.07.2024 passed in S.T.
Case No. 45 of 2022 by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-I-
cum-FTC for Rape Cases, Hazaribagh in connection with Ichak P.S.
Case No. 76 of 2021, whereby and whereunder, the appellant has
been convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for
twelve years along with fine of Rs.30,000/- for the offence
punishable under Section 376(2)(n) of IPC and in default of payment
of fine, the appellant has further been directed to undergo
imprisonment for six months.
Factual Matrix:
2. The prosecution story, in brief, as per typed report of prosecutrix
dated 23.03.2021 is that she developed friendship with the appellant
Anil Kumar Mehta through Facebook in the year 2018. Thereafter
the appellant proposed her for marriage. It is alleged that during
‘Holi’ festival of the year 2018 the appellant took her to Hazaribagh1
Mourya colony and kept her in a house where he forcibly established
physical relation with her on promise of marriage.
3. It is further alleged that in the year 2019 the accused took her to
Ranchi police colony where he made physical relation with her. In
this way he made physical relation with her several times. When the
informant used to tell for solemnizing marriage, then he used to
differ the matter. It has further been alleged that ultimately the
appellant demanded Rs.10,00,000/- as dowry for solemnizing
marriage with the informant.
4. On the basis of typed report of prosecutrix dated 23.03.2021, FIR
was registered bearing Ichak PS Case No.76/2021 u/s 376 of I.P.C.
and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act.
5. After investigation, charge sheet was submitted and cognizance of
offences was taken u/s 376 of I.P.C the case was committed to the
Court of Sessions Hazaribagh.
6. On receipt of the case record by the Office of Ld. Sessions Judge,
Hazaribagh, the same was registered as Sessions Trial and the trial
proceeded in which the appellant has been convicted and sentenced
to undergo rigorous imprisonment for twelve years along with fine of
Rs.30,000/- for the offence punishable under Section 376(2)(n) of
IPC.
7. The instant interlocutory application has been preferred by the
applicant/appellant with the prayer for the suspension of sentence
during pendency of the instant appeal.
Argument on behalf of the appellant:
8. It has been contended on behalf of the appellant that the learned trial
court has failed to take into consideration that there is vital
contradiction in the statement of P.W.-6 with regard to the allegation
of commission of rape.
9. It has been contended that the learned trial court has also failed to
take into consideration that in the FIR, the Prosecutrix/victim has
stated that she was subjected to rape for the first time in the year
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2018 but in the statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C., she
has stated that the said incident happened in the year 2019 as also the
medical report does not support the case of rape.
10.Learned counsel for the appellant vehemently and fervently urged
that the entire case as set out in the FIR and the chargesheet is false
and cooked up. The victim/prosecutrix is a major educated girl, who
was fully conscious of the consequences of the intimate relationship
which flourished between her and the appellant for a period of more
than 03 years. The acts of repeated intimacy and sexual relations
were totally consensual in nature and were not established under any
false promise, threat, duress or coercion. The appellant all along
intended to marry the victim/prosecutrix. He thus, urged that the case
of a prolonged voluntary relationship/love affair between two
consenting adults has been given a colour of forcible sexual
intercourse with oblique purposes and motive.
11.It has further been contended that the learned trial court has failed to
take into consideration that the P.W.-4 and P.W.-5 have been
declared hostile, P.W.-1, P.W.-2 and P.W.-3 are hereby witnesses
and P.W.-6 is the prosecutrix herself, P.W.-7 is the doctor and P.W.-
8 is the investigation officer. P.W.-7, the doctor, has also not
supported the case of the prosecutrix and without any corroboration
of the evidence of the prosecutrix, there cannot be any conviction
under Section 376 of IPC.
12.It has further been contended that the appellant and the P.W.-6, the
prosecutrix, were in relationship for around 03 years, and all of a
sudden allegation has been made of commission of rape due to
disinclination to marry with the prosecutrix.
13.Learned counsel for the appellant, on the aforesaid premise, has
submitted that, therefore, it is a fit case where the sentence is to be
suspended so that the appellant be released on bail.
Argument on behalf of the respondent-State:
14. Per contra, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the
respondent-State has vehemently opposed the submissions advanced
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by the counsel for the appellant. He urged that the appellant won
over the confidence of the prosecutrix/victim by giving her false
assurances of marriage and based on such promise he sexually
exploited her, when in fact, he had no intentions to marry her and
after subjecting the victim/prosecutrix to forcible sexual intercourse
repeatedly over a period of almost 03 years, the appellant demanded
10,00000/- as dowry for solemnizing marriage with the victim.
15. It has been contended by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor
appearing for the respondent-State that the P.W.-6, the victim, her
parents P.W.-2 & P.W.-3 and her uncle P.W.-1 have supported the
case in all material particular relating to the occurrence. The
investigating officer has proved the places of occurrence. The initial
act of rape at Mourya Colony, Hazaribagh by use of force has been
substantiated by the prosecutrix and corroborated by other
prosecution witnesses.
16. It has also been contended that there is evidence that the said act was
committed by the appellant against the will of the prosecutrix and
later the appellant continued sexual relationship with the prosecutrix
on pretext of marriage. Hence, Section 376 IPC is applicable in the
given facts of the case.
17. It has also been contended that the accused, from the very inception,
did not want to marry the prosecutrix and demanded Rs.10,00,000/-
which has been established by the material witnesses i.e. P.W.-1,
P.W.-2, P.W.-3 & P.W.-6.
18. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor, on the aforesaid premise, has
submitted that, therefore, it is not a fit case where the appellant
deserves the privilege of bail by suspension of sentence.
Analysis:
19. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have given our
anxious consideration to the submissions advanced at the bar and
have carefully gone through the finding recorded by the learned trial
court in the impugned judgment as also the testimony of the
witnesses and the material placed on record.
4
20. It has been alleged in the written report that the victim developed
friendship with the appellant Anil Kumar Mehta through Facebook
in the year 2018 and during ‘Holi’ festival of the year 2018 the
appellant took her to Hazaribagh Mourya colony and kept her in a
house where he forcibly established physical relation with her on
promise of marriage.
21. It is further alleged that in the year 2019 the accused took her to
Ranchi police colony where he made physical relation with her. In
this way he made physical relation with her several times. When the
informant used to tell for solemnizing marriage, then he used to defer
the matter. It has further been alleged that ultimately the appellant
demanded Rs.10,00,000/- as dowry for solemnizing marriage with
the informant.
22. Therefore, we have to consider whether in the facts and
circumstances of the present case, the appellant who has been
prosecuted for committing rape upon the prosecutrix/victim by
giving her a false promise of marriage is able to make out a case for
suspension of his sentence during pendency of the instant appeal.
23. There is no dispute that the prosecutrix/victim, a qualified female,
was major at the time when her relationship with the appellant
sprouted. The first act of sexual intercourse between the appellant
and the prosecutrix/victim is alleged to have taken place in the year
2018. However, at that time, the prosecutrix/victim did not make any
complaint to anyone, including her own family members, that the
appellant had established sexual relations with her based on an
express promise to marry her in future.
24. At this juncture and in the backdrop of the aforesaid factual aspects it
needs to refer herein the core of Section 375 IPC which deals with
rape, punishable under Section 376 IPC. While the said Section 375
deals with various aspects of rape, in the present case, the allegation
against the appellant is that the appellant had forced himself on
victim/prosecutrix without her consent and engaged in sexual
5
intercourse. For ready reference Section 375 is being quoted as
under:
“375. Rape.–A man is said to commit “rape” if he–
(a) penetrates his penis, to any extent, into the vagina, mouth,
urethra or anus of a woman or makes her to do so with him or
any other person; or
(b) inserts, to any extent, any object or a part of the body, not
being the penis, into the vagina, the urethra or anus of a woman
or makes her to do so with him or any other person; or
(c) manipulates any part of the body of a woman so as to cause
penetration into the vagina, urethra, anus or any part of body of
such woman or makes her to do so with him or any other
person; or
(d) applies his mouth to the vagina, anus, urethra of a woman or
makes her to do so with him or any other person,
under the circumstances falling under any of the following seven
descriptions–
First.–Against her will.
Secondly.–Without her consent.
Thirdly.–With her consent, when her consent has been obtained
by putting her or any person in whom she is interested, in fear of
death or of hurt.
Fourthly.–With her consent, when the man knows that he is not
her husband and that her consent is given because she believes
that he is another man to whom she is or believes herself to be
lawfully married.
Fifthly.–With her consent when, at the time of giving such
consent, by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication or the
administration by him personally or through another of any
stupefying or unwholesome substance, she is unable to
understand the nature and consequences of that to which she
gives consent.
Sixthly.–With or without her consent, when she is under
eighteen years of age.
Seventhly.–When she is unable to communicate consent.”
25. In this regard it would also be profitable to refer to Section 90 of
the IPC which deals with consent given either under fear or
misconception. Section 90 provides that a consent is not a consent
under the IPC if such a consent is given by a person under fear of
injury, or under a misconception of fact, and if the person doing the
act knows, or has reason to believe, that the consent was given in
consequences of such fear or misconception. For ready reference the
same is being quoted as under:
“90. Consent known to be given under fear or
misconception.–
6
A consent is not such a consent as it intended by any section of
this Code, if the consent is given by a person under fear of
injury, or under a misconception of fact, and if the person doing
the act knows, or has reason to believe, that the consent was
given in consequence of such fear or misconception; or…”
26. Thus, Section 375 of the IPC clearly stipulates that a person is said to
have committed rape if he performs any of the sexual acts mentioned
under sub-clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d) without the consent of the
woman. As referred hereinabove, in terms of Section 90 of the IPC,
if the consent is given under a misconception of fact, such a consent
is no consent in the eyes of law and cannot be considered to be
willful and voluntary consent.
27. Taking into consideration the aforesaid aspect the Hon’ble Apex
Court has observed in the case of Shambhu Kharwar v. State of
Uttar Pradesh 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1032 as follows:
“11. In Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra (2019)
9 SCC 608, a two Judge Bench of this Court of which one of us
was a part (D.Y. Chandrachud J.), held in Sonu @ Subhash
Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2021) 18 SCC 517, observed
that:
“12. This Court has repeatedly held that consent with
respect to Section 375 of the IPC involves an active
understanding of the circumstances, actions and
consequences of the proposed act. An individual who
makes a reasoned choice to act after evaluating various
alternative actions (or inaction) as well as the various
possible consequences flowing from such action or
inaction, consents to such action…
14. […] Specifically in the context of a promise to marry,
this Court has observed that there is a distinction between
a false promise given on the understanding by the maker
that it will be broken, and the breach of a promise which
is made in good faith but subsequently not fulfilled…
16. Where the promise to marry is false and the intention
of the maker at the time of making the promise itself was
not to abide by it but to deceive the woman to convince her
to engage in sexual relations, there is a “misconception of
fact” that vitiates the woman’s “consent”. On the other
hand, a breach of a promise cannot be said to be a false
promise. To establish a false promise, the maker of the
promise should have had no intention of upholding his
word at the time of giving it. The “consent” of a woman
under Section 375 is vitiated on the ground of a
“misconception of fact” where such misconception was
the basis for her choosing to engage in the said act…
18. To summarise the legal position that emerges from the
above cases, the “consent” of a woman with respect to
Section 375 must involve an active and reasoned
deliberation towards the proposed act. To establish7
whether the “consent” was vitiated by a “misconception
of fact” arising out of a promise to marry, two
propositions must be established. The promise of marriage
must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and
with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was
given. The false promise itself must be of immediate
relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman’s decision
to engage in the sexual act.
28. Thus, it is evident that where the promise to marry is false and the
intention of the maker at the time of making the promise itself was
not to abide by it but to deceive the woman to convince her to
engage in sexual relations, there is a “misconception of fact” that
vitiates the woman’s “consent”. On the other hand, a breach of a
promise cannot be said to be a false promise. To establish a false
promise, the maker of the promise should have had no intention of
upholding his word at the time of giving it.
29. In the case of Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra 2024
SCC OnLine SC 3471 the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed that to
make a man, accused of having sexual relationship by making a false
promise of marriage, criminally liable, the physical relationship must
be traceable directly to the false promise made and it must not be
qualified by other circumstances or consideration. It has further been
observed that in a situation where the woman knowingly maintains
the physical relationship for a prolonged period, it cannot be said
with certainty that the said physical relationship was purely because
of alleged promise made by the accused to marry her.
30. In conclusion, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that unless it can be
shown that the physical relationship was purely because of the
promise of marriage and without being influenced by any other
consideration, it cannot be said that there was vitiation of consent
under misconception of fact. It was further held that even if it is
assumed that a false promise of marriage was made to the
complainant initially by the accused, the fact that the relationship
continued for a period of nine long years would render the plea of the
complainant that her consent for all these years was under
misconception of the fact that the accused would marry her
8
implausible, for ready reference the relevant paragraph of the
aforesaid judgment is being quoted as under:
” 22. In our view, if a man is accused of having sexual
relationship by making a false promise of marriage and if he
is to be held criminally liable, any such physical relationship
must be traceable directly to the false promise made and not
qualified by other circumstances or consideration. A woman
may have reasons to have physical relationship other than
the promise of marriage made by the man, such as personal
liking for the male partner without insisting upon formal
marital ties. Thus, in a situation where physical relationship
is maintained for a prolonged period knowingly by the
woman, it cannot be said with certainty that the said physical
relationship was purely because of the alleged promise made
by the appellant to marry her. Thus, unless it can be shown
that the physical relationship was purely because of the
promise of marriage, thereby having a direct nexus with the
physical relationship without being influenced by any other
consideration, it cannot be said that there was vitiation of
consent under misconception of fact.
27…… In our opinion, the longer the duration of the physical
relationship between the partners without protest and
insistence by the female partner for marriage would be
indicative of a consensual relationship rather than a
relationship based on false promise of marriage by the male
partner and thus, based on misconception of fact.”
28. Moreover, even if it is assumed that a false promise of
marriage was made to the complainant initially by the
appellant, even though no such cogent evidence has been
brought on record before us to that effect, the fact that the
relationship continued for nine long years, would render the
plea of the complainant that her consent for all these years
was under misconception of fact that the Appellant would
marry her implausible. Consequently, the criminal liability
attached to such false promise would be diluted after such a
long passage of time and in light of the fact that no protest
was registered by the complainant during all those years.
Such a prolonged continuation of physical relationship
without demurral or remonstration by the female partner, in
effect takes out the sting of criminal culpability and
neutralises it.
29. It will be very difficult to assume that the complainant
who is otherwise a mature person with two grown up
children, was unable to discover the deceitful behaviour of
the appellant who continued to have sexual relationship with
her for such a long period on the promise of marriage. Any
such mendacious act of the appellant would have been
exposed sooner without having to wait for nine years. The
inference one can draw under the circumstances is that there
was no such false promise made to the complainant by the
appellant of marriage by continuing to have physical
relationship so as to bring this act within the province of
Section 376 IPC and therefore, there was no vitiation of
consent under misconception of fact.
xxxx xxxx xxxx
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31. In our view if criminality is to be attached to such
prolonged physical relationship at a very belated stage, it
can lead to serious consequences. It will open the scope for
imputing criminality to such long term relationships after
turning sour, as such an allegation can be made even at a
belated stage to drag a person in the juggernaut of stringent
criminal process. There is always a danger of attributing
criminal intent to an otherwise disturbed civil relationship of
which the Court must also be mindful.
31. It is trite that there is a distinction between rape and consensual
intercourse. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Deepak Gulati v. State of
Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 675 differentiated between a mere breach of
promise and not fulfilling a false promise and held that an accused
will only be liable if the Courts concludes that his intentions
are mala fide and he has clandestine motives. The relevant extract is
reproduced hereinbelow:–
“21. Consent may be express or implied, coerced or misguided,
obtained willingly or through deceit. Consent is an act of
reason, accompanied by deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a
balance, the good and evil on each side. There is a clear
distinction between rape and consensual sex and in a case like
this, the court must very carefully examine whether the
accused had actually wanted to marry the victim, or had mala
fide motives, and had made a false promise to this effect only
to satisfy his lust, as the latter falls within the ambit of
cheating or deception. There is a distinction between the mere
breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus,
the court must examine whether there was made, at an early
stage a false promise of marriage by the accused; and whether
the consent involved was given after wholly understanding the
nature and consequences of sexual indulgence. There may be a
case where the prosecutrix agrees to have sexual intercourse
on account of her love and passion for the accused, and not
solely on account of misrepresentation made to her by the
accused, or where an accused on account of circumstances
which he could not have foreseen, or which were beyond his
control, was unable to marry her, despite having every
intention to do so. Such cases must be treated differently. An
accused can be convicted for rape only if the court reaches a
conclusion that the intention of the accused was mala fide, and
that he had clandestine motives.
24. Hence, it is evident that there must be adequate evidence to
show that at the relevant time i.e. at the initial stage itself, the
accused had no intention whatsoever, of keeping his promise
to marry the victim. There may, of course, be circumstances,
when a person having the best of intentions is unable to marry
the victim owing to various unavoidable circumstances. The
“failure to keep a promise made with respect to a future
uncertain date, due to reasons that are not very clear from the
evidence available, does not always amount to misconception of
fact. In order to come within the meaning of the term
“misconception of fact”, the fact must have an immediate
relevance”. Section 90 IPC cannot be called into aid in such a10
situation, to pardon the act of a girl in entirety, and fasten
criminal liability on the other, unless the court is assured of
the fact that from the very beginning, the accused had never
really intended to marry her.”
(emphasis supplied)
32.Similarly, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Naim
Ahmed v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2023 SCC OnLine SC 89 while
distinguishing false promise to marry from breach of promise by the
accused observed as under:
“21. The bone of contention raised on behalf of the respondents
is that the prosecutrix had given her consent for sexual
relationship under the misconception of fact, as the accused had
given a false promise to marry her and subsequently he did not
marry, and therefore such consent was no consent in the eye of
the law and the case fell under Clause Secondly of
Section 375 IPC. In this regard, it is pertinent to note that there
is a difference between giving a false promise and committing
breach of promise by the accused. In case of false promise, the
accused right from the beginning would not have any intention
to marry the prosecutrix and would have cheated or deceited
the prosecutrix by giving a false promise to marry her only
with a view to satisfy his lust, whereas in case of breach of
promise, one cannot deny a possibility that the accused might
have given a promise with all seriousness to marry her, and
subsequently might have encountered certain circumstances
unforeseen by him or the circumstances beyond his control,
which prevented him to fulfil his promise. So, it would be a
folly to treat each breach of promise to marry as a false promise
and to prosecute a person for the offence under Section 376. As
stated earlier, each case would depend upon its proved facts
before the court.”
33. Thus, there is a difference between giving a false promise and
committing breach of promise by the accused. In case of false
promise, the accused right from the beginning would not have any
intention to marry the prosecutrix and would have cheated or
deceived the prosecutrix by giving a false promise to marry her only
with a view to satisfy his lust, whereas in case of breach of promise,
one cannot deny a possibility that the accused might have given a
promise with all seriousness to marry her, and subsequently might
have encountered certain circumstances unforeseen by him or the
circumstances beyond his control, which prevented him to fulfil his
promise.
34. Thus, from the aforesaid settled position of law it is evident that the
accused is not liable for the offence of rape if the victim has willfully
11
agreed to maintain sexual relations. The Court has also recognized
that a prosecutrix can agree to have sexual intercourse on account of
her love and passion for the accused. Further it is not in doubt that a
man can be held liable if he engages into a physical relationship with
any woman on the false pretext of marriage. However, in order to
hold such man criminally accountable, it must be shown that such
physical relationship is a direct consequence of the false promise
made by the accused, and is not marred by any other consideration or
circumstance on the part of the woman.
35. For the aforesaid reason, in instances where the physical relationship
between the prosecutrix and the accused is continued for a long
period, it cannot be said with conviction that the same is only based
out of the alleged promise made by the accused. Further, there must
be adequate evidence to indicate that ab initio, the accused had no
intention whatsoever to keep his promise to marry the prosecutrix.
Consequently, unless it can be established that the physical
relationship was chiefly because of the alleged promise, and is not
influenced by any other consideration thereby being directly linked
to the alleged promise made by the accused, it cannot be said that the
consent of the woman was based on a misconception of fact.
36. Testing the facts of the case at hand, on the touchstone of the above
precedents, it is clear that the prosecutrix/victim being a qualified
major woman continued in a consensual intimate sexual relationship
with the appellant over a period of 03 years.
37. Therefore, in our opinion, even if the allegations made by the
victim/prosecutrix are accepted on their face value, it is evident that
the appellant and the victim were in a long-standing relationship. It
was noted that the medical examination of the prosecutrix did not
point towards any external injury mark on the person of the
prosecutrix. It was also noted that there existed no medical evidence
to support the version of the prosecutrix.
38. Further, from a perusal of the materials on record, and the statement
of the prosecutrix under Section 164 Cr.P.C., it transpires that the
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parties were acquainted with each other. It is the victim’s own case
that she had known the appellant/applicant since the year 2018. She
stated that she had entered into physical relations with the appellant
on several occasions. She further stated that the appellant refused to
solemnize marriage with the prosecutrix and instead stated that he
will solemnize marriage with the prosecutrix if the amount of
Rs.10,00000/- will be paid to him.
39. Upon a reading of the statement of the prosecutrix and the materials
on record, it is evident that the victim and applicant/appellant were
acquainted with each other and the prosecutrix was mature enough to
fully understand what was happening between them. For this reason,
prima facie, it cannot be said that the consent of the prosecutrix was
vitiated by virtue of Section 90 of the IPC.
40. Moreover, even if it is assumed that a false promise of marriage was
made to the victim/prosecutrix initially by the appellant, even though
no such cogent evidence has been brought on record before us to that
effect, the fact that the relationship continued over 03 years, would
render the plea of the victim/prosecutrix that her consent for all these
years was under misconception of fact that the appellant/applicant
would marry her implausible.
41. Consequently, as per the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court
in the case of Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra(supra),
the criminal liability attached to such false promise would be diluted
after such a long passage of time and in light of the fact that no
protest was registered by the victim/prosecutrix during all those
years. Such a prolonged continuation of physical relationship without
demurral or remonstration by the female partner, in effect takes out
the sting of criminal culpability and neutralises it.
42. In the instant case also, admittedly the prosecutrix/victim is an
educated woman and there was no pressure whatsoever upon her
which could have prevented her from filing a police complaint
against the accused if she felt that the sexual relations were under
duress or were being established under a false assurance of marriage.
13
43. Thus, the version that the victim allowed the accused/appellant to
establish sexual relations with her over a period of 03 years purely
under the misconception of marriage is not fully reliable. Therefore,
prima facie it is apparent that the relationship between the
prosecutrix/victim and appellant was consensual without the
existence of any element of deceit or misconception.
44. In the backdrop of the aforesaid settled position of law and admitted
factual aspect which has been referred in the preceding paragraphs
particularly paragraph 22 of this order, it is hard to believe that the
prosecutrix/victim, being a qualified and major woman, kept on
bending to the demands of the appellant for a period over 03 years
without raising any protest to any quarter that the appellant was
exploiting her sexually under the pretext of a false promise of
marriage. The prolonged period of 03 years during which the sexual
relations continued unabatedly between the parties, is prima facie
sufficient to indicate that there was absence of an element of
misconception in the relationship of the victim and the appellant.
45. We, however, make it clear that our decision in this case and
observations made are to be understood in the factual matrix before
this Court, reason being that every case must be decided on its own
facts and circumstances, for we are dealing with human relationships
and psychology which are dynamic and permeated with an array of
unpredictable human emotions and sensitivities and hence, every
decision relating to human relationships must be based on the
peculiar facts and circumstances obtaining in the particular case.
46. Thus, on the basis of discussion made hereinabove, this Court of the
considered view that the it is a fit case where the prayer for
suspension of sentence during pendency of the instant appeal may be
allowed.
47. Accordingly, the instant Interlocutory Application stands allowed.
48. In view thereof, the appellant, named above, is directed to be
released on bail on furnishing bail bond of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees Ten
Thousand only) with two sureties of the like amount each to the
14
satisfaction of learned Additional Sessions Judge-I-cum-FTC for
Rape Cases, Hazaribagh in S.T. Case No. 45 of 2022 arising out of
Ichak P.S. Case No. 76 of 2021.
49. It is made clear that any observation made hereinabove will not
prejudice the case of the parties on merit since the appeal is lying
pending for its consideration.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
(Pradeep Kumar Srivastava, J.)
Saurabh/-
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