Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Santosh Kumar vs Union Of India And Ors on 2 April, 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE
Present :-
The Hon'ble Justice PARTHA SARATHI SEN
WPA 8618 of 2012
Santosh Kumar
-Vs-
Union of India and Ors.
For the Petitioner: Mr. Achin Kumar Majumder, Adv.,
Ms. Ananya Adhikary, Adv.
For the respondents/UOI: Mr. D.N Ray, Adv.,
Mr. A.B Datta, Adv.,
Ms. Sabita Roy, Adv.
Hearing concluded on: 26.03.2025. Judgment on: 02.04.2025. PARTHA SARATHI SEN, J. : -
1. By filing the instant writ petition the writ petitioner has prayed for
issuance of appropriate writ/writs against the respondents/authorities for
quashing of the charge sheet dated 11.02.2010, the findings of the
enquiry officer dated 04.09.2010, the order of punishment dated
31.10.2010 as passed by the respondent no.6 and the order dated
06.09.2011 as passed by the appellate authority being respondent no.5
herein.
2. Admittedly the writ petitioner was appointed as a constable in RPF
by a recruitment process and in the said recruitment process a written
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test was conducted on 28.03.2007 at 16:00 hours at RPF/Ajni ground/
Nagpur. The respondents/authorities received a complaint against the
writ petitioner to the effect that some other person appeared on behalf of
the writ petitioner in the said written test by committing fraud upon the
respondents/authorities.
3. A preliminary enquiry reveals that the said complaint has
substance since on verification and examination of the application form
as filled up by the writ petitioner, the answers sheet and the specimen
writing of the writ petitioner by the Government Examiner of Questioned
Documents, Directorate of Forensic Science, Hyderabad reveals that the
differences as noticed in those documents are fundamental in nature and
beyond the scope of natural verification and leads to the opinion of
different authorship and thus it has been found by the said Government
Examiner that the aforementioned documents were written by different
persons.
4. The writ petitioner was thereafter placed on suspension on
29.01.2010. On 11.02.2010 the writ petitioner was served with a
memorandum of charge sheet containing the statement of articles of
charges and statement of imputations of misconduct and negligence of
duty in respect of articles of charges. A disciplinary proceeding was
initiated. On 04.09.2010 the enquiry officer by a reasoned order came to a
finding that the charges against the writ petitioner/delinquent have been
duly proved. On 07.10.2010 a memo was issued by the Adjutant
no.11BN/RPSF/GHZ enclosing therewith a copy of the report of the
3
enquiry officer asking the writ petitioner to submit his representation
against the finding of the enquiry authority. On 31.10.2010 the
respondent no.6 being the disciplinary authority passed the final order of
punishment whereby and whereunder the writ petitioner was removed
from his service. The writ petitioner thereafter approached the appellate
authority. However, such attempt was found to be unsuccessful and
hence the present writ petition.
5. In course of his submission Mr. Majumder, learned advocate
appearing on behalf of the writ petitioner contended the following:-
i. Drawing attention to page no.36 of the writ petition being a
copy of the letter dated 10.11.2009 it is submitted that from
the said letter it would reveal that the respondent no.3 being
the Chief Security Commissioner of RPF on perusal of the
alleged report of the Government Examiner of Questioned
Documents directed the disciplinary authority to take
appropriate action against the writ petitioner for dismissal
from service. It is thus submitted by Mr. Majumder that
issuance of the said memo dated 10.11.2009 clearly reflects
the bias mind of the respondent no.3 which had materially
influenced the mind of the disciplinary authority while passing
the order of punishment on 31.10.2010. It is further submitted
by Mr. Majumder that the order of suspension of the writ
petitioner dated 30.01.2010 also reflects the influence of the
respondent no.3.
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ii. While drawing attention to the memorandum of the charge
sheet dated 11.02.2010 it is argued by Mr. Majumdar that the
said charge sheet cannot be allowed to stand on the ground of
gross violation of principles of natural justice as well as on the
ground of violation of the rules governing the procedure for
initiation of a disciplinary proceeding in view of the fact that
prior to issuing charge sheet no opportunity was given to the
writ petitioner for furnishing his explanation with regard to the
alleged misconduct/fraud by the writ petitioner.
iii. It is further contended on behalf of the writ petitioner that from
the memorandum of the charge sheet containing the statement
of articles of charges and the statement of imputation of
misconduct and negligence, it would reveal that the said
charge sheet was issued by the Adjutant who is in the rank of
the Assistant Security Commissioner of RPF and therefore it is
clear that the said adjutant /Assistant Security Commissioner
of RPF acted as a disciplinary authority. Drawing attention to
the order of dismissal dated 31.10.2010 it is argued further
that from the said order it would reveal that the commandant
i.e. the respondent no.6 imposed punishment as a disciplinary
authority. It is thus contended that a serious procedural
irregularity occurred since both the Adjutant and the
commandant cannot act as a disciplinary authority at the
same time.
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iv. Drawing attention of this Court to page nos.41 and 42 of the
writ petition being copies of the statement of articles of charges
and the imputation of misconduct and negligence it is
submitted that from the list of witnesses it would reveal that
PW1 is the respondent no.3 i.e the Chief Security
Commissioner who is much higher in rank of the Adjutant as
well as enquiry officer and therefore it can be easily inferred
that the charges as framed against the writ petitioner and the
findings of the enquiry authority were influenced and are
suffering from biasness.
v. Drawing attention to Rule 153.3 of the Railway Protection
Force Rules, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as the said ‘Rules of
1987’ in short) it is submitted on behalf of the writ petitioner
that the said rules makes it obligatory on the part of the
disciplinary authority to come to a decision whether a case
comes under major or minor punishment. It is submitted that
even after receipt of the letter dated 10.11.2009 from the
respondent no.3 the disciplinary authority had not returned
any finding pursuant to the Rule 153.3 of the said Rules of
1987 and therefore the punishment as awarded to the writ
petitioner cannot be sustained in the eye of law.
vi. It is further argued that since the said Adjutant acted as
disciplinary authority, the said Adjutant ought to have made a
recommendation on the basis of the finding of the enquiry
6authority to the said commandant only after seeking an
explanation from the writ petitioner/delinquent and in not
doing so the writ petitioner was deprived of his right to submit
his reply before the Adjutant.
vii. Drawing attention to order of punishment it is submitted that
the said commandant mechanically imposed the punishment
of removal of service upon the writ petitioner without
expressing his independent view which clearly shows his non-
application of mind which is not permissible in the eye of law.
viii. Drawing attention to Rule 217.3 of the said Rules of 1987 it is
submitted that the appellate authority also did not apply its
independent mind as would reveal from the order of the said
appellate authority as passed on 06.09.2011.
6. Mr. Majumder thus submits that the instant writ petition may be
allowed and appropriate relief/reliefs may be granted to the writ petitioner
as per the prayers made in the writ petition.
7. In course of his submission Mr. Majumder places his reliance upon
the following reported decisions:-
i. Sanjoy Kumar Singh vs. Union of India and Ors. reported in
2002 (2) SLR 266;
ii. The judgement dated 07.05.2014 as passed in the case of Sri
Ambarish Prasad Singh vs. Union of India and Ors in WP
no.1237(W) of 2007 by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court;
7iii. The judgement dated 13.12.2022 as passed in the case of
Ramendra Kumar Pandey vs. Union of India & Ors. in
WPA 7899 of 2008 by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court;
iv. The judgement dated 04.04.2012 as passed in the case Utpal
Kumar Biswas Vs. Union of India and Ors in WP 6148 of
2012 by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court;
v. The judgement dated 10.11.2008 as passed in the case Union
of India and Ors. Vs. Utpal Kumar Biswas in MAT 907 of
2012 by a Division Bench of this Court;
reported in 1983 (1) CLJ 8;
reported in 1993 SCC (L&S) 109;
viii. Anil Kumar vs. Presiding Officer and Ors. reported in AIR
1985 SC 1121;
reported in 2009 (4) SLR 78;
x. Ram Chander vs. Union of India and Ors. reported in AIR
1986 SC 1173;
xi. R.P Bhatt vs. Union of India and Ors. reported in AIR 1986
SC 1040.
8. Per contra Mr. Ray, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of
the Union of India and its functionaries at the very outset draws attention
of this Court to affidavit-in-opposition as filed in connection with the
8
instant writ petition. It is submitted by Mr. Ray that in such affidavit-in-
opposition the respondents/authorities have raised the maintainability of
the instant writ petition on two fold grounds namely :-
i. That the writ petitioner was a resident of the State of Bihar and
the alleged misconduct and offence was committed by him in
the State of Maharashtra since the recruitment examination
where the writ petitioner allegedly participated was held in
Nagpur i.e. in the State of Maharashtra and thus no part of
causes of action arose in the State of West Bengal and
accordingly this High Court has got no territorial jurisdiction to
entertain the instant writ petition.
ii. The writ petitioner had not preferred any revision under Rule
219 of the said Rules of 1987 and thus did not avail the
statutory alternative efficacious remedy for which the writ
petitioner is not entitled to any relief as prayed for from this
Court.
9. In his next limb of submission Mr. Ray draws attention of this
Court to Rules 148,148.2,151,153,153.4 and 153.5 of the said Rules of
1987 read with Schedule III of thereof. It is submitted by Mr. Ray that in
the event Rule 151 is read with Schedule III of the said Rules of 1987 it
would reveal that the respondent no.6 being the disciplinary authority is
empowered to impose major punishment like removal from service. It is
further argued by Mr. Ray that Rule 153 of the said Rules of 1987 clearly
prescribes the procedure for imposing major punishment. It is further
9
submitted by Mr. Ray that from the materials as placed before this Court
it would reveal that the said Rule of 1987 has been duly followed by the
respondent/authorities and thus by no stretch of imagination it can be
said that submission of charge sheet, the enquiry proceeding as
conducted against the writ petitioner, the findings of the enquiry
authority and the findings of the disciplinary authority are violative of the
established procedure.
10. It is further submitted by Ray that no case has been made out on
behalf of the writ petitioner for violation of principle of natural justice
and/or non-consideration of materials which vitiated the decision making
process of the respondents/authorities. Mr. Ray thus submits that it is a
fit case for dismissal of the instant writ petition.
11. In his reply Mr. Majumder draws attention of this Court to page
no.3 of the affidavit-in-reply vis-à-vis page no.56 of the writ petition. It is
submitted by Mr. Majumder that the respondent no.6 while imposing
punishment under cover of its memo dated 31.10.2010 clearly indicated
that the appeal against his order has to be preferred before the
DIFRPSF/OPS II at Kolkata and therefore a part of cause of action arose
within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court and thus the instant writ
petition is maintainable.
12. For effective adjudication of the instant lis this Court at the very
outset proposes to look to some of the provisions of the said Rules of
1987.
“148. Description of punishments:
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148.1 Any of the following punishments may, for good and sufficient
reasons and as hereinafter provided, be imposed on an enrolled
member of the Force.
148.2 Major punishments :
(a) Dismissal from service (which shall ordinarily be a disqualification
for future employment under the Government).
(b) Removal from service (which shall not be a disqualification for
future employment under the Government).
(c) Compulsory retirement from service.
(d) Reduction in rank or grade.”
“151Disciplinary Authority :
151.1 The disciplinary authority in respect of any enrolled member of
the Force for the purpose of imposing any particular punishment or the
passing of any disciplinary order shall be the authority specified in
this behalf in Schedule III in whose administrative control the member
is serving and shall include any authority superior to such authority.
151.2 The disciplinary authority, in the case of an enrolled member of
the Force officiating in a higher rank, shall be determined with
reference to the officiating post held by him at the time of taking
action.”
“153.Procedure for imposing major punishments :
153.1Without prejudice to the provisions of the Public Servants
Inquires Act, 1850, no order of dismissal, removal, compulsory
retirement or reduction in rank shall be passed on any enrolled
member of the Force (save as mentioned in rule 161) without holding
an inquiry, as far as may be in the manner provided hereinafter, in
which he has been informed in writing of the grounds on which it is
proposed to take action, and has been afforded a reasonable
opportunity of defending himself.
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153.2.1 Whenever the disciplinary authority is of the opinion that there
are grounds for inquiring into the truth of any imputation of misconduct
or misbehaviour against an enrolled member of the Force, it may itself
inquire into, or appoint an Inquiry Officer higher in rank to the enrolled
member charged but not below the rank of Inspector, or institute a
Court of Inquiry to inquire into the truth thereof.
153.3 On receipt of complaint or otherwise, the disciplinary authority
on going through the facts alleged or brought out shall decide whether
it is a case for major or minor punishment. No attempt shall be made to
convert cases punishable under section 16 A or section 17 into
disciplinary cases nor divert cases in respect of which major
punishments are imposable to the category of cases where minor or
petty punishments are imposable.”
13. Since in course of his argument Mr. Ray strongly contended that
the instant writ petition is not maintainable this Court proposes to deal
with the point of maintainability at the first instance. It is an admitted
position that the recruitment examination through which the writ
petitioner was recruited in RPF in the post of constable was conducted in
Nagpur in the State of Maharashtra. It further reveals that the alleged
misconduct and/or fraud were conducted by the writ petitioner at Nagpur
in the State of Maharashtra. It further reveals that pursuant to an
adverse report as raised from Government Examiner of Questioned
Documents, Directorate of Forensic Science, Hyderabad charge sheet was
submitted against the writ petitioner at Baruni in the State of Bihar.
14. It thus appears to this Court that no part of the cause of action for
filing the writ petition occurred in the State of West Bengal i.e within the
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territorial jurisdiction of this Court. This Court finds no merit in the
submission of Mr. Majumder that since in the order of punishment the
disciplinary authority indicated to the writ petitioner that against the
order of punishment as imposed upon him the writ petitioner has to
prefer appeal before the appellate authority who sits at Kolkata a part of
the cause of action arose also in Kolkata. In this regard this Court
proposes to place its reliance upon the reported decision of Calcutta
Gujrati Education Society and Anr. vs. Regional Provident Fund
Commissioner and Ors. reported in (2020) 19 SCC 380 wherein the
Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with the territorial jurisdiction of a
High Court for entertaining a petitioner either under Article 226 (2) or
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India expressed the following
view:-
“7. In Ambica Industries case [Ambica Industries v. CCE, (2007) 6
SCC 769], the consideration in the appeal was with regard to the
determination of the situs of the High Court in which the appeal
would lie under Section 35-G of the Central Excise Act, 1944. The
issue therein was with regard to the maintainability or otherwise of
the writ petition before the High Court at New Delhi merely because
the Central Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (“Cestat”) is
situated at New Delhi. While considering the said question, this Court
has arrived at the conclusion that when such tribunals exercise its
jurisdiction in respect of the issues arising from the different parts of
the country, the territorial jurisdiction for filing the writ petition at the
place where the tribunal is situated would not be justified. It has
been held therein that the writ petition would be maintainable at the
13place where the original authority/court had exercised the
jurisdiction.
8. The relevant paras 13 and 17 read as follows : (Ambica Industries
case [Ambica Industries v. CCE, (2007) 6 SCC 769] , SCC pp. 775-76)
“13. The Tribunal, as noticed hereinbefore, exercises
jurisdiction over all the three States. In all the three States
there are High Courts. In the event, the aggrieved person is
treated to be the dominuslitis, as a result whereof, he elects to
file the appeal before one or the other High Court, the decision
of the High Court shall be binding only on the authorities which
are within its jurisdiction. It will only be of persuasive value on
the authorities functioning under a different jurisdiction. If the
binding authority of a High Court does not extend beyond its
territorial jurisdiction and the decision of one High Court would
not be a binding precedent for other High Courts or courts or
tribunals outside its territorial jurisdiction, some sort of judicial
anarchy shall come into play. An assessee, affected by an
order of assessment made at Bombay, may invoke the
jurisdiction of the Allahabad High Court to take advantage of
the law laid down by it and which might suit him and thus he
would be able to successfully evade the law laid down by the
High Court at Bombay.
17. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that in terms of
Article 227 of the Constitution of India as also clause (2) of
Article 226 thereof, the High Court would exercise its
discretionary jurisdiction as also power to issue writ of
certiorari in respect of the orders passed by the subordinate
courts within its territorial jurisdiction or if any cause of action
has arisen therewithin but the same tests cannot be applied
when the appellate court exercises a jurisdiction over a tribunal
situated in more than one State. In such a situation, in our
14opinion, the High Court situated in the State where the first
court is located should be considered to be the appropriate
appellate authority. The Code of Civil Procedure did not
contemplate such a situation. It provides for jurisdiction of each
court. Even a District Judge must exercise its jurisdiction only
within the territorial limits of a State. It is inconceivable under
the Code of Civil Procedure that the jurisdiction of the District
Court would be exercisable beyond the territorial jurisdiction of
the district, save and except in such matters where the law
specifically provides therefor.”
15. In view of the settled proposition of law as decided in the case of
Calcutta Gujrati Education Society (supra) this Court has got no
hesitation to hold that this High Court lacks territorial jurisdiction to
entertain the instant writ petition since the enquiry proceeding was
conducted against the writ petitioner in the State of Bihar.
16. On the point of maintainability Mr. Ray in his second limb of
submission draws attention of this Court to Rule 219 of the said Rules of
1987. The relevant portion of the said Rule 219 is quoted hereinbelow in
verbatim:-
“Revision :
219.1 An enrolled member of the Force whose appeal has been
rejected by a competent authority may prefer an application for
revision to the next superior authority. The powers of revision may be
exercised only when,-
(a) in consequence of some material irregularity, there has been
injustice of miscarriage of justice; or
15
(b) fresh evidence is disclosed which could not be produced or was
not available at the time of passing of the impugned order.”
17. Admittedly the writ petitioner did not prefer any revisional
application under Rule 219 of the said Rules of 1987 and therefore the
writ petitioner consciously did not avail the alternative remedy.
18. The effect of non-availing the alternative remedy prior to filing of
application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been
considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the reported decision of
Radha Krishan Industries vs. State of Maharashtra reported in
(2021) 6 SCC 771 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court expressed the
following view:-
“27. The principles of law which emerge are that:
27.1. The power under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue writs
can be exercised not only for the enforcement of fundamental rights,
but for any other purpose as well.
27.2. The High Court has the discretion not to entertain a writ petition.
One of the restrictions placed on the power of the High Court is where
an effective alternate remedy is available to the aggrieved person.
27.3. Exceptions to the rule of alternate remedy arise where:
(a)the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of a fundamental
right protected by Part III of the Constitution;
(b) there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice;
(c) the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction; or
(d) the vires of a legislation is challenged.
27.4. An alternate remedy by itself does not divest the High Court of
its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution in an appropriate case
16
though ordinarily, a writ petition should not be entertained when an
efficacious alternate remedy is provided by law.
27.5. When a right is created by a statute, which itself prescribes the
remedy or procedure for enforcing the right or liability, resort must be
had to that particular statutory remedy before invoking the
discretionary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution. This rule of
exhaustion of statutory remedies is a rule of policy, convenience and
discretion.
27.6. In cases where there are disputed questions of fact, the High
Court may decide to decline jurisdiction in a writ petition. However, if
the High Court is objectively of the view that the nature of the
controversy requires the exercise of its writ jurisdiction, such a view
would not readily be interfered with.
28. These principles have been consistently upheld by this Court in
Chand Ratan v. Durga Prasad reported in (2003) 5 SCC 399,
Babubhai Muljibhai Patel v. Nandlal Khodidas Barot reported in (1974)
2SCC 706 and Rajasthan SEB v. Union of India reported in (2008) 5
SCC 632 among other decisions.”
19. Keeping in mind the proposition of law as discussed in the case of
Radha Krishan Industries (supra) if I look to the factual aspects of this
case it appears to this Court that the writ petitioner has failed to give any
explanation as to what prevented him to avail him the alternative remedy
and/or he had also failed to make out a case that falls under the
categories of the exception as has been discussed in the reported
decisions of Radha Krishan Industries (supra).
20. This Court thus holds that the instant writ petitioner is not at all
maintainable.
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21. For the sake of argument even if it is accepted that the instant writ
petition is otherwise maintainable this Court considers that the instant
writ petition is devoid of any merit for the reasons discussed hereinbelow.
22. The writ petitioner has failed to make out a case that prior to
imposing a major punishment upon him the respondent/authorities have
not complied with Rule 153 of the said Rules of 1987.
23. Admittedly in the reported decision of Sanjoy Kumar Singh
(supra), Sri Ambarish Prasad Singh (supra) and Ramendra Kumar
Pandey (supra) it has been held that in the event no explanation has
been sought for from the delinquent with regard to his purported
misconduct prior to framing of charges, such acts tantamounts to denial
of principles of natural justice and the same had an effect to vitiate the
entire enquiry proceeding. In considered view of this Court the proposition
of law as discussed in the aforementioned three reported decisions are
distinguishable from the facts and circumstances of the present case
inasmuch as Rule 153 of the said Rules of 1987 does not prescribe for
seeking an explanation from the delinquent prior to framing of charges.
On the contrary Rule 153 (1) of the said Rules of 1987 clearly prescribes
that no order to dismissal, removal, compulsory retirement or reduction
in rank shall be passed on any enrolled member of the force without
holding an enquiry in the manner as prescribed in the said Rules and
without affording a reasonable opportunity of defending the delinquent.
24. From the materials as placed before this Court it reveals that the
respondent/authorities prior to imposition of a major punishment i.e.
18
removal from service had conducted an enquiry proceeding where the writ
petitioner being the delinquent participated and thus by no stretch of
imagination it can be said that the principles of natural justice has been
denied to him and/or the respondent/authority have not followed the
established procedure for conducting an enquiry proceeding.
25. In course of his argument Mr. Majumder while placing his reliance
upon the reported decision of Anandram Jiandrai Vaswani (supra) and
Utpal Kumar Biswas (supra) though contended that since in the said
enquiry proceeding the respondent no.3 adduced evidence as PW1 who is
much superior to the enquiry authority and thus the finding of the
enquiry authority is not free from biasness and not virtually legal and
correct. This Court however finds no force in such submission inasmuch
as immediately after receipt of the copy of the charge sheet and /or even
in course of participation in the enquiry proceeding the writ petitioner
being the delinquent had never raised his apprehension regarding alleged
biasness as well as chance of unfair conclusion of the said enquiry
proceeding. On the contrary it appears to this Court that the enquiry
officer after consideration of the entire materials as placed before him
came to a logical conclusion of the same and no materials have been
placed before this Court that on account of the deposition of respondent
no.3 the decision making process of the said enquiry authority was
vitiated.
26. On perusal of the Schedule III of the said Rules of 1987 it further
appears to this Court that the respondent no.6 being the disciplinary
19
authority is very much competent to impose punishment of removal from
service of the writ petitioner who was in the rank of the constable and it
further appears to this Court that prior to passing of the order of
punishment the said disciplinary authority had considered the
explanation as offered by the writ petitioner under cover of his letter dated
21.10.2010.
27. In course of his argument Mr. Majumder was very vocal over the
said punishment order as passed by the disciplinary authority since
according to him the order of disciplinary authority is not at all a
speaking order which clearly shows his non-application of mind. In this
regard he places reliance upon the reported decisions of Ram Chandra
(supra) and R.P Bhatt (supra).
28. In considered view of this Court the reported decisions of Ram
Chandra (supra) and R.P Bhatt (supra) are practically in favour of
respondents/authorities inasmuch as in the reported decision Ram
Chandra (supra) the Hon’ble Apex Court held thus:-
“8. Ordinarily, the appellate or revisional authority shall give its own
reasons succinctly; but in a case of affirmance where the original
tribunal gives adequate reasons, the Appellate Tribunal may dismiss
the appeal or the revision, as the case may be, agreeing with those
reasons.”
29. The same view was taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the
reported decision of R.P Bhatt (supra) where the Hon’ble Apex Court
expressed the following view:-
20
“6. It is not the requirement of Art.311(2) of the Constitution of India or
of the Rules of natural justice that in every case the appellate authority
should in its order state its own reasons except where the appellate
authority disagrees with the findings of the disciplinary authority.”
30. On careful consideration of the memo dated 31.10.2010 as issued
by respondent no.6 that is the order of punishment of the disciplinary
authority it does not transpire to this Court that the said order is in
anyway cryptic or unreasoned. In absence of any material that the said
order of the disciplinary authority is perverse, this Court finds no reason
to interfere with the same in judicial review.
31. In view of the discussion made in the foregoing paragraphs this
Court thus finds no merit in the instant writ petition.
32. Accordingly the instant writ petition is dismissed.
33. There shall be however no order as to costs.
34. Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgement, if applied for, be
given to the parties on completion of usual formalities.
(PARTHA SARATHI SEN, J.)
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