Uttarakhand High Court
Pramod Kumar Agarwal vs Uttarakhand State & Others on 20 March, 2025
2025:UHC:2328
I N TH E H I GH COURT OF UTTARAKH AN D
AT N AI N I TAL
Criminal Application No.1466 of 2018
Pramod Kumar Agarwal ......Applicant
Vs.
Uttarakhand State & others .....Respondents
With
Criminal Application No.1467 of 2018
Pramod Kumar Agarwal ……Applicant
Vs.
Uttarakhand State & others …..Respondents
Presence:
Mr. Ravi Bisht and Mr. Udit Bansal, learned counsels, for the applicant.
Mr. Shobhit Saharia, learned counsel, for the respondent.
H on’ble Ashish N a it ha ni, J ( Ora l)
The present criminal application under Section 482 CrPC
arises from a dispute concerning the removal of movable property from
a petrol pump operated by the applicant under the name M/s Ram
Mohan Agarwal, situated at Station Road, Kashipur, District Udham
Singh Nagar. The applicant, Pramod Kumar Agarwal, is a dealer in the
said business and has been running the petrol pump for several decades
pursuant to a dealership agreement with Hindustan Petroleum
Corporation Ltd. (HPCL), dated 01.06.1982.
2. On 04.05.2016, in the absence of the applicant, respondents
Ashish Kumar Sharma (Area Sales Manager, HPCL), Mukesh Prasad
(Deputy Manager, HPCL), Manoj Paul (Contractor, HPCL), along with
certain police officials and unidentified individuals, entered the
premises of the petrol pump. At that time, Udit Bansal, the applicant’s
son, was present and objected to their entry. Subsequently, dispensing
units were removed, the store room was broken open, and
approximately 1500 Liters of petrol, CVT, Mobil oil canisters, and
other movable property were taken away in a Tata Magic vehicle.
3. On 05.05.2016, the respondents allegedly entered the
premises again and removed approximately 1400 Liters of diesel from
1
the underground storage tanks. The applicant contends that when his
son attempted to resist, he was threatened with false legal action.
4. The applicant states that he approached the local police
station to file an FIR, but no complaint was registered. A representation
was also made before the Senior Superintendent of Police, Udham
Singh Nagar, but no action was taken. Consequently, the applicant filed
a private complaint before the court of the Learned ACJM, Kashipur,
which was registered as Complaint Nos. 1735/2016 and 2530 of 2016.
5. Proceedings were initiated and an investigation was
conducted by Sub-Inspector Sunil Bisht, who was also named as one of
the persons present during the incident. The investigation report dated
28.07.2016 stated that no such incident had taken place and that no
official complaint was registered at the local police station. Relying on
the investigation report, the Learned ACJM, Kashipur, dismissed the
complaint on 28.09.2016, observing that there was insufficient material
to proceed against the respondents.
6. The applicant thereafter filed Criminal Revision No.
273/2016 before the Learned ADJ, Kashipur under Section 397 CrPC.
The respondents filed written arguments, contending that their actions
were taken in accordance with the dealership agreement and that they
were reclaiming company property.
7. The Learned ADJ, Kashipur, vide order dated 21.05.2018,
dismissed the revision, holding that the dispute was primarily civil in
nature and that HPCL had ownership rights over the property in
question.
8. The applicant submits that the orders passed by the Learned
ACJM, Kashipur, on 28.09.2016, and the Learned ADJ, Kashipur, on
21.05.2018, suffer from legal and factual infirmities and warrant
interference by this Hon’ble Court. It is contended that the courts below
failed to properly consider the material evidence on record, including
photographic and video evidence purportedly showing the presence of
police personnel and other individuals at the petrol pump premises.
9. The applicant asserts that these materials were crucial in
establishing the sequence of events and the involvement of the
respondents. However, despite their evidentiary value, the courts below
dismissed the complaint primarily on the basis of the investigation
report dated 28.07.2016, which was prepared by Sub-Inspector Sunil
Bisht, who himself was named in the complaint as being present at the
scene.
10. The applicant argues that an investigation conducted by an
individual implicated in the allegations raises serious concerns of bias
and procedural irregularity, thereby vitiating the findings recorded in
the report. Despite this apparent conflict of interest, the Learned ACJM
dismissed the complaint without conducting an independent review of
the evidence presented by the applicant.
11. The applicant further submits that the Learned ADJ erred in
treating the matter as a purely civil dispute arising from the dealership
agreement between the applicant and HPCL. It is argued that while a
dealership agreement did exist, the actions of forced entry, removal of
property, and alleged intimidation fall within the domain of criminal
law, regardless of any contractual dispute between the parties.
12. The applicant contends that the courts below overlooked
the well-settled principle that the existence of a civil dispute does not
preclude criminal liability where the allegations prima facie disclose a
cognizable offense. The dismissal of the complaint and the revision on
the ground that the matter should be adjudicated in civil proceedings,
without examining the criminal implications of the alleged acts, has
resulted in a miscarriage of justice.
13. The applicant argues that prima facie material was available
to justify the issuance of process, and that the courts erred in treating
the matter as if it required proof beyond a reasonable doubt at the
preliminary stage.
14. The applicant also emphasizes that the respondents
themselves admitted in their written submissions before the Learned
ADJ that they removed the property from the petrol pump premises.
While the respondents assert that the removal was carried out in
accordance with the dealership agreement and with due authorisation,
the applicant submits that such actions, if taken without adherence to
due process of law, may still constitute criminal offenses.
15. The applicant states, the courts below failed to examine
whether the removal of property was conducted in compliance with
legal procedures and whether the manner in which it was executed
could attract criminal liability.
16. The applicant further contends that the refusal of the police
to register an FIR, coupled with the dismissal of the private complaint,
has resulted in a denial of his right to seek redress under criminal law. It
is submitted that where allegations involve serious offenses punishable
under Sections 147, 342, 347, 348, 380, 392, 447, 120B/34 IPC, the
courts ought to have exercised greater caution before dismissing the
matter outright. The applicant, therefore, prays that this Hon’ble Court
set aside the impugned orders and allow the complaint to proceed in
accordance with law.
17. Accordingly, the applicant prays for the quashing of the
orders dated 28.09.2016 and 21.05.2018 and for directions to proceed
with Complaint No. 1735/2016 in accordance with law.
18. Per Contra, the respondents submit that the present
application is liable to be dismissed, as both the Learned ACJM,
Kashipur, and the Learned ADJ, Kashipur, have already adjudicated the
matter and recorded concurrent findings that no prima facie offense is
made out.
19. It is contended that the actions undertaken on 04.05.2016
and 05.05.2016 were lawful and in compliance with the dealership
agreement executed between the applicant and Hindustan Petroleum
Corporation Ltd. (HPCL).
20. The Dealership Agreement (Annexure-6) between HPCL
and the applicant clearly establishes that the dispensing units, storage
tanks, and other installations belong to HPCL, and the company retains
the right to remove the same when required. Hence, HPCL was merely
reclaiming its property in accordance with its contractual rights.
21. The respondents argue that the applicant was well aware of
the removal process, as HPCL had already communicated its intention to
vacate the petrol pump premises. The Respondent refers to various
communications, including letters dated 02.04.2016 and 07.04.2016,
sent by HPCL to the District Magistrate, Superintendent of Police, and
other authorities, requesting police protection for vacating the site.
22. The respondents emphasize that law enforcement personnel
were not acting under HPCL’s instructions but were present solely to
ensure public order and prevent any untoward incident. No material has
been placed on record by the applicant to substantiate allegations of
wrongful restraint, intimidation, or use of force.
23. Hence, the respondents also refute any allegations of
criminal conspiracy under Section 120B IPC, as the coordinated
presence of HPCL officials, law enforcement, and administrative
authorities for an authorized removal process does not constitute a
conspiracy or criminal offense.
24. In this regard, the respondents rely on the investigation
report dated 28.07.2016, prepared by Sub-Inspector Sunil Bisht, which
concluded that no incident of criminal trespass, theft, or intimidation had
occurred.
25. The report noted that HPCL, being the rightful owner of the
installations, had lawfully retrieved its property after obtaining
necessary permissions. It further recorded that no independent witnesses
supported the applicant’s claims, and no complaints were registered by
third parties regarding any forceful acts.
26. In furtherance to the above it was also submitted by the
respondent that no independent complaints were registered by any third
party or local residents regarding the alleged forceful removal of
property, despite the petrol pump being located in a publicly visible
commercial area.
27. The respondents argue that criminal law cannot be used to
settle what is essentially a commercial dispute. The respondents,
therefore, submit that the present application under Section 482 CrPC is
misconceived and an abuse of process, as the issues raised by the
applicant have already been settled by concurrent findings of fact by the
lower courts. Accordingly, the respondents pray that the present
application be dismissed with costs.
28. Heard the learned Counsels for the parties and perused the
records.
29. The court takes note of the applicant’s contention that the
courts below overlooked the well-settled principle that the existence of a
civil dispute does not preclude criminal liability where the allegations
prima facie disclose a cognizable offense. However, in this regard, the
Hon’ble Supreme court has said in, Binod Kumar v. State of Bihar,
(2014) 10 SCC 663, “the fact that a civil remedy is available does not
mean that a person can be allowed to initiate criminal proceedings
‘maliciously’. Where the allegations do not disclose the essential
ingredients of a criminal offense, such proceedings should be quashed.”
30. Additionally, in Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd.,
(2006) 6 SCC 736 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has said that, “A given set
of facts may make out a civil wrong as well as a criminal offense.
Merely because a remedy exists in civil law does not mean that a
criminal complaint cannot be maintained. However, if the dispute is
purely civil and does not disclose the ingredients of a criminal offense,
then criminal law should not be used as a tool for arm-twisting or
settling personal scores.”
31. This Court observes that the material on record does not
disclose the commission of any cognizable offense under Sections 380,
392, or 447 IPC, as alleged by the applicant. The dispute pertains to the
removal of petrol pump installations, including dispensing units, storage
tanks, and other equipment, which, as per the dealership agreement,
were the property of Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd.
32. The documents on record establish that HPCL had already
suspended the applicant’s diesel selling license by letter dated
19.04.2016, and the removal of dispensing units was carried out in
compliance with corporate policies and after due intimation to the
authorities.
33. The court does not find merit in the applicants’ allegations
of theft and robbery. For an offense under Section 380 IPC (theft) or
Section 392 IPC (robbery) to be made out, there must be a clear
dishonest intention and wrongful loss to the complainant. The materials
in question were owned by HPCL, and their removal, being within the
company’s rights under the dealership agreement, does not satisfy the
legal ingredients of theft or robbery.
34. Similarly, for an offense under Section 447 IPC (criminal
trespass) to be established, there must be unlawful entry with the intent
to commit an offense. However, the records indicate that HPCL had an
existing tenancy over the premises and was exercising its contractual
rights established by the dealership agreement. The Hon’ble Supreme
Court in V.Y. Jose v. State of Gujarat, (2009) 3 SCC 78, has
categorically held that “criminal proceedings should not be used as an
instrument of coercion in disputes arising from contractual
relationships.”
35. And, the present allegations, even if taken at face value, do
not indicate any criminal intent, and allowing these proceedings to
continue would amount to an abuse of process, warranting interference
under Section 482 CrPC.
36. Additionally, allegations of criminal conspiracy under
Section 120B IPC require evidence of a meeting of minds to commit an
illegal act, and no such material has been placed on record. The
presence of multiple officials from HPCL and local authorities in an
administrative action does not constitute a criminal conspiracy unless
supported by substantive evidence, which is absent in this case.
37. In furtherance to the same, the records further indicate that
HPCL sought authorization from the relevant authorities before
removing its equipment. By way of letters dated 02.04.2016 and
07.04.2016, HPCL communicated with the District Magistrate,
Superintendent of Police, and other authorities, requesting police
assistance to ensure an orderly process. The fact that law enforcement
was involved pursuant to a formal request negates any suggestion of
force, intimidation, or unlawful dispossession.
38. Seeking police protection before undertaking an
administrative action is a precautionary measure, not an indication of
criminal intent. The applicant was duly notified of HPCL’s decision in
advance, and no material has been placed on record to suggest that he
was forcibly or unlawfully deprived of possession of his property.
39. Additionally, it is evident that the applicant had the option
to pursue civil remedies for his grievances. The Dealership Agreement
dated 01.06.1982 governing the dealership explicitly provides for
arbitration as a mode of dispute resolution. The nature of the dispute
suggests that appropriate legal forums were available under civil law to
address any alleged grievances. However, instead of availing or
exhausting such remedies, the applicant has attempted to invoke
criminal jurisdiction in a matter that primarily arises from contractual
obligations.
40. The Court finds that the present proceedings arise from a
contractual dispute between the applicant and HPCL concerning the
removal of petrol pump installations. The dealership agreement, (clause
57) establishes that the dispensing units, storage tanks, and other
equipment installed at the premises were the property of HPCL. And
the decision to remove these assets was taken due to the financial non-
viability of continuing operations at the site, in line with corporate
policies.
41. Furthermore, the applicant has not disputed HPCL’s
ownership over the installations, nor has any material been placed on
record to indicate that the removal was undertaken with dishonest intent
or in violation of any statutory provision. Mere dissatisfaction with the
manner in which contractual rights were exercised does not give rise to
criminal liability.
42. The Court further notes that, the absence of independent
corroborative evidence further weakens the applicant’s claims. Despite
the alleged incident occurring in a publicly visible commercial area, no
third-party complaints or witness statements support the applicant’s
version of events. Criminal liability cannot be imposed based on
unsubstantiated allegations, particularly where the act in question is
supported by documentary evidence indicating compliance with
contractual and administrative procedures.
43. In view of the foregoing, this Court finds that the present
proceedings are frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process,
warranting dismissal with costs. Allowing such cases to continue would
open the floodgates for commercial entities to initiate criminal cases in
purely business disputes, thereby defeating the very purpose of criminal
law.
44. Hence, this Court is of the opinion that the present
application is devoid of merit and does not warrant interference under
Section 482 CrPC. The orders passed by the Learned ACJM, Kashipur,
dated 28.09.2016, and the Learned ADJ, Kashipur, dated 21.05.2018,
have been passed after due consideration of the material on record and
do not suffer from any legal infirmity warranting interference by this
Court.
45. Accordingly, the prayer for quashing is rejected, and the
present application stands dismissed.
( Ashish N a it ha ni, J.)
20.03.2025
NR/
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