Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 25.03.2025 vs State Of H.P. And Others on 4 April, 2025
2025:HHC:9049
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MMO No. 860 of 2023
Reserved on: 25.03.2025
Date of Decision: 04.04.2025.
Jai Pal and others ...Petitioners
Versus
State of H.P. and others ...Respondents
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No.
For the Petitioners : Mr. Divya Raj Singh, Advocate.
For Respondent No.1 : Mr. Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate
General.
For respondent No.2 : Mr. Sunil Kumar Advocate.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioners have filed the present petition for
quashing FIR No. 32/2022, dated 07.06.2022, registered at Police
Station, Ram Shahar District, Solan HP, for the commission of
offences punishable under Sections 498A and 323, read with
section 34 of Indian Penal Code (IPC). The charge sheet titled
State versus Jai Pal pending before learned Additional Chief
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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Judicial Magistrate Nalagarh and all the consequential
proceedings arising out of the FIR. (The parties shall hereinafter
be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before
the learned Trial Court for convenience.)
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
petition are that the informant, Divya Kumari, made a complaint
to the police asserting that she was married to the petitioner,
Jaipal, on 3rd May 2022. The petitioners started harassing her
soon after her marriage. She made a complaint to the Police
Station Ram Shahar on 13th May, and the matter was referred to
the Child Development Project Officer (CDPO), who effected a
compromise between the parties on 18th May. However, the
petitioners continued to harass the informant and compelled her
to bring a dowry. Her father-in-law, Sohan Lal, her mother-in-
law, Jayati and her husband, Jaipal, beat her on the 3 rd of June.
Neighbours heard her cries and informed her father about the
beatings. He reported the matter to the police. The petitioners
threatened to kill the informant. Her husband took her to the
house of his relative at Solan. No food was provided to her, and
she was not allowed to talk to her parents. Her father went to her
matrimonial home to take her to her parental home on the 6 th of
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June, but she was not allowed to leave her matrimonial home.
When the informant went to her parental home with her father,
her money and ornaments were kept by the petitioner. She told
her parents about her harassment and beating. The police
registered the FIR and conducted the investigation. They found
that the informant’s name and her marriage were not registered
in the Panchayat. A copy of the compromise effected between
the parties was also taken into possession. It was found that the
petitioners had agreed to maintain the informant properly,
however, they failed to honour their promise. The police
recorded the statements of the witnesses and, after the
completion of the investigation, filed a chargesheet against the
petitioners for the commission of offences punishable under
Sections 498A abd 323 read with Section 34 of the IPC.
3. Being aggrieved from the registration of the FIR and
the filing of the charge sheet before the learned Trial Court, the
petitioners have filed the present petition for quashing the FIR
and consequential proceedings arising out of it. It has been
asserted that the informant started quarrelling with the
petitioners soon after her marriage on one pretext or another.
She proclaimed that her husband was not of her choice, and she
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wanted to marry someone else with whom she had friendly
relations. She asked her husband to divorce her and pay a
substantial amount to her so that she could marry her friend.
She threatened the petitioners that they would suffer if her
demands were not met. The petitioners disclosed the entire
episode to the informant’s father on 12th May 2022. He also tried
to convince the informant, however, she filed a false complaint
against the petitioners on 13th May 2022. The matter was
compromised on 18th May 2022. The informant remained calm
for 2-3 days but started hurling abuses at the petitioners and
causing embarrassment to them. Her husband took her to Solan
so that she could change herself but in vain. The informant made
a false story about the demand for a dowry. Mother-in-law of
the informant, her daughter and her maternal grandchildren
were kidnapped by the informant with the help of other persons.
They were given merciless beatings. An FIR was registered
against the informant and other persons. Petitioner No. 1 was
also beaten by his father-in-law, and another FIR was registered
regarding this matter. The FIR registered by the informant is an
abuse of the process of law to compel the petitioners to agree to
her illegal demands. Vague allegations have been made against
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the petitioners. This is also apparent from the subsequent events
for which separate FIRs were registered against the informant
and her father. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition
be allowed and the FIR and the consequential proceedings be
quashed.
4. I have heard Mr. Divya Raj Singh, learned Counsel for
the petitioners, Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate
General for the respondent No. 1/State and Mr Sunil Kumar.
learned Counsel for respondent No. 2/informant and have gone
through the records carefully.
5. The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC
OnLine SC 7 as under: –
“7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned,
it is now more or less well settled as regards the
principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one
may refer to the decision of this Court in State of
Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein
this Court has summarized some of the principles under
which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in
the following words:
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the
various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter
XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this
Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of
the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the
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2025:HHC:9049inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which
we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the
following categories of cases by way of illustration
wherein such power could be exercised either to
prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise
to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be
possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and
sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or
rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad
kinds of cases wherein such power should be
exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they
are taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence
or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first
information report and other materials, if any,
accompanying the FIR do not disclose a
cognizable offence, justifying an investigation
by police officers under Section 156(1) of the
Code except under an order of a Magistrate
within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made
in the FIR or complaint and the evidence
collected in support of the same do not disclose
the commission of any offence and make out a
case against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a
non-cognizable offence, no investigation is
permitted by a police officer without an order of a
Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of
the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently
improbable on the basis of which no prudent
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2025:HHC:9049person can ever reach a just conclusion that
there is sufficient ground for proceeding against
the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in
any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned
Act (under which a criminal proceeding is
instituted) to the institution and continuance of the
proceedings and/or where there is a specific
provision in the Code or the concerned Act,
providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the
aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the
accused and with a view to spite him due to a
private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added)
8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6)
would be of relevance to us in this case.
In clause (1) it has been mentioned that where the
allegations made in the first information report or the
complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute
any offence or make out a case against the accused, then
the FIR or the complaint can be quashed.
As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-
cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a
police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in
such a situation, the FIR can be quashed.
Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an
express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of
the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal
proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be
quashed.”
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6. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of
Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed:
“8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising
its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC,
may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes
or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are
neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory
provision. However, given the broad and profound
nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it
sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are
embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing
the High Court to act only in cases of clear
abuse of process or where intervention is essential to
uphold the ends of justice.
9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the
course of several decades, has laid down the principles
and guidelines that High Courts must follow before
quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby
pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case
before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter
alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the
criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the
FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima
facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature;
(v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus
allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and
compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v.
Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335)
7. The present petition is to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
8. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Neelu Chopra v. Bharti, (2009) 10 SCC 184: (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 286:
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2009 SCC OnLine SC 1693 that the Court has to see that
particulars of the offences committed by every accused and the
role played by the accused in committing the offence are given in
the complaint made to the police. It was observed: –
“9. To lodge a proper complaint, the mere mention of the
sections and the language of those sections is not the be-all
and end-all of the matter. What is required to be brought to
the notice of the court is the particulars of the offence
committed by each and every accused and the role played by
each and every accused in committing that offence.
10. When we see the complaint, the complaint is sadly
vague. It does not show as to which accused has
committed what offence, and what is the exact role
played by these appellants in the commission of the
offence. There could be said something against Rajesh, as
the allegations are made against him more precisely, but
he is no more and has already expired. Under such
circumstances, it would be an abuse of the process of law
to allow the prosecution to continue against the aged
parents of Rajesh, the present appellants herein, on the
basis of a vague and general complaint which is silent
about the precise acts of the appellants.” (Emphasis
supplied)
9. Similarly, it was held in Abhishek v. State of M.P., 2023
SCC OnLine SC 1083: 2023 INSC 779 that the tendency of false
implication by way of general omnibus allegations, if left
unchecked, would result in the misuse of the process of law. It
was observed:
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“13. Instances of a husband’s family members filing a
petition to quash criminal proceedings launched against
them by his wife in the midst of matrimonial disputes are
neither a rarity nor of recent origin. Precedents aplenty
abound on this score. We may now take note of some
decisions of particular relevance. Recently, in Kahkashan
Kausar alias Sonam v. State of Bihar [(2022) 6 SCC 599],
this Court had occasion to deal with a similar situation
where the High Court had refused to quash an FIR
registered for various offences, including
Section 498A IPC. Noting that the foremost issue that
required determination was whether allegations made
against the in-laws were general omnibus allegations which
would be liable to be quashed, this Court referred to earlier
decisions wherein concern was expressed over the misuse of
Section 498A IPC and the increased tendency to implicate
relatives of the husband in matrimonial disputes. This Court
observed that false implications by way of general omnibus
allegations made in the course of matrimonial disputes, if left
unchecked, would result in misuse of the process of law. On
the facts of that case, it was found that no specific
allegations were made against the in-laws by the wife,
and it was held that allowing their prosecution in the
absence of clear allegations against the in-laws would
result in an abuse of the process of law. It was also noted
that a criminal trial, leading to an eventual acquittal,
would inflict severe scars upon the accused, and such an
exercise ought to be discouraged.
14. In Preeti Gupta v. State of Jharkhand [(2010) 7 SCC 667],
this Court noted that the tendency to implicate the
husband and all his immediate relations is also not
uncommon in complaints filed under Section 498A IPC. It
was observed that the Courts have to be extremely careful and
cautious in dealing with these complaints and must take
pragmatic realities into consideration while dealing with
matrimonial cases, such as allegations of harassment by the
husband’s close relations, who were living in different cities
and never visited or rarely visited the place where the
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2025:HHC:9049complainant resided, would add an entirely different
complexion and such allegations would have to be scrutinised
with great care and circumspection.
15. Earlier, in Neelu Chopra v. Bharti [(2009) 10 SCC 184],
this Court observed that the mere mention of statutory
provisions and the language thereof for lodging a
complaint is not the ‘be all and end all’ of the matter, as
what is required to be brought to the notice of the Court is the
particulars of the offence committed by each and every
accused and the role played by each and every accused in the
commission of that offence. These observations were made
in the context of a matrimonial dispute involving
Section 498A IPC.” (Emphasis supplied)
10. It was held in Achin Gupta v. State of Haryana, 2024
SCC OnLine SC 759:2024 INSC 369 that asking a person to face
criminal allegations without any specific instance of criminal
misconduct amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court. It
was observed:
“18. The plain reading of the FIR and the chargesheet
papers indicate that the allegations levelled by the First
Informant are quite vague, general and sweeping,
specifying no instances of criminal conduct. It is also
pertinent to note that in the FIR, no specific date or time
of the alleged offence/offences has been disclosed. Even
the police thought fit to drop the proceedings against the
other members of the Appellant’s family. Thus, we are of
the view that the FIR lodged by Respondent No. 2 was
nothing but a counterblast to the divorce petition & also
the domestic violence case.
25. If a person is made to face a criminal trial on some
general and sweeping allegations without bringing on record
any specific instances of criminal conduct, it is nothing but
abuse of the process of the court. The court owes a duty to
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2025:HHC:9049subject the allegations levelled in the complaint to thorough
scrutiny to find out, prima facie, whether there is any grain of
truth in the allegations or whether they are made only with
the sole object of involving certain individuals in a criminal
charge, more particularly when a prosecution arises from a
matrimonial dispute.” (Emphasis supplied)
11. It was further held that in matrimonial disputes, the
parents, including the close relatives, make a mountain out of a
molehill, and every matrimonial conduct amounting to nuisance
does not constitute cruelty. It was observed: –
“32. Many times, the parents, including the close
relatives of the wife, make a mountain out of a mole.
Instead of salvaging the situation and making all possible
endeavours to save the marriage, their action, either due
to ignorance or on account of sheer hatred towards the
husband and his family members, brings about the
complete destruction of marriage on trivial issues. The
first thing that comes to mind of the wife, her parents and
her relatives is the Police as if the Police is the panacea of
all evil. No sooner the matter reaches up to the Police,
then even if there are fair chances of reconciliation
between the spouses, they would get destroyed. The
foundation of a sound marriage is tolerance, adjustment
and respecting one another. Tolerance of each other’s
fault, to a certain bearable extent, has to be inherent in
every marriage. Petty quibbles and trifling differences are
mundane matters and should not be exaggerated and
blown out of proportion to destroy what is said to have
been made in heaven. The Court must appreciate that all
quarrels must be weighed from that point of view in
determining what constitutes cruelty in each particular
case, always keeping in view the physical and mental
conditions of the parties, their character and social
status. A very technical and hyper-sensitive approach
would prove to be disastrous for the very institution of
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2025:HHC:9049the marriage. In matrimonial disputes, the main sufferers
are the children. The spouses fight with such venom in
their hearts that they do not think even for a second that
if the marriage would come to an end, then what will be
the effect on their children? Divorce plays a very dubious
role so far as the upbringing of the children is concerned.
The only reason why we are saying so is that instead of
handling the whole issue delicately, the initiation of
criminal proceedings would bring about nothing but
hatred for each other. There may be cases of genuine ill-
treatment and harassment by the husband and his family
members towards the wife. The degree of such ill-
treatment or harassment may vary. However, the Police
machinery should be resorted to as a measure of last
resort and that too in a very genuine case of cruelty and
harassment. The Police machinery cannot be utilised for
the purpose of holding the husband at ransom so that he
could be squeezed by the wife at the instigation of her
parents, relatives or friends. In all cases where the wife
complains of harassment or ill-treatment,
Section 498A of the IPC cannot be applied mechanically.
No FIR is complete without Sections 506(2) and 323 of
the IPC. Every matrimonial conduct, which may cause
annoyance to the other, may not amount to cruelty. Mere
trivial irritations, and quarrels between spouses, which
happen in day-to-day married life, may also not amount
to cruelty”
12. Similarly, it was held in Mamidi Anil Kumar Reddy v.
State of A.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 127: 2024 (2) SCR 252 that the
phenomena of false implication by general omnibus allegation
in the case of matrimonial dispute are not unknown to the Court.
When the allegations are general and omnibus, the prosecution
should not be continued. It was observed: –
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“14. In the considered opinion of this Court, there is
significant merit in the submissions of the Learned
Counsel for the Appellants. A bare perusal of the
complaint, statement of witnesses and the charge sheet
shows that the allegations against the Appellants are
wholly general and omnibus in nature; even if they are
taken in their entirety, they do not prima facie make out a
case against the Appellants. The material on record
neither discloses any particulars of the offences alleged
nor discloses the specific role/allegations assigned
to any of the Appellants in the commission of the
offences.
15. The phenomenon of false implication by way of
general omnibus allegations in the course of matrimonial
disputes is not unknown to this Court. In Kahkashan
Kausar alias Sonam v. State of Bihar (2022) 6 SCC 599, this
Court dealt with a similar case wherein the allegations
made by the complainant-wife against her in-laws u/s.
498A and others were vague and general, lacking any
specific role and particulars. The court proceeded to
quash the FIR against the accused persons and noted that
such a situation if left unchecked, would result in the
abuse of the process of law.
xxxx
17. Considering the dicta in Mahmood Ali (supra), we find
that the High Court, in this case, has failed to exercise due
care and has mechanically permitted the criminal
proceedings to continue despite specifically finding that
the allegations are general and omnibus in nature. The
Appellants herein approached the High Court on inter
alia grounds that the proceedings were re-initiated on
vexatious grounds and even highlighted the
commencement of divorce proceedings by Respondent
No. 2. In these peculiar circumstances, the High Court had
a duty to consider the allegations with great care and
circumspection so as to protect against the danger of
unjust prosecution.”
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13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Kailashben Mahendrabhai Patel v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 SCC
OnLine SC 2621 that general and vague allegations of cruelty
made against the husband and his relatives are not sufficient to
constitute cruelty. It was observed: –
“10.1 The tendency to make general, vague, and omnibus
allegations is noticed by this Court in many decisions.
In Usha Chakraborty v. State of W.B. 2023 SCC OnLine SC 90,
this court observed that:
“16… the respondent alleged commission of
offences under S tions 323, 384, 406, 423, 467, 468,
420 and 120B, IPC against the appellants. A bare
perusal of the said allegation and the ingredients to
attract them, as adverted to hereinbefore, would
reveal that the allegations are vague and they did
not carry the essential ingredients to constitute the
alleged offences…. The ingredients to attract the
alleged offence referred to hereinbefore and the
nature of the allegations contained in the
application filed by the respondent would
undoubtedly make it clear that the respondent had
failed to make specific allegations against the
appellants herein in respect of the aforesaid
offences. The factual position thus would reveal
that the genesis as also the purpose of criminal
proceedings are nothing but the aforesaid incident
and further that the dispute involved is essentially
of a civil nature. The appellants and the
respondents have given a cloak of a criminal
offence in the issue…”
10.2 Similarly, dealing with allegations lacking in
particulars and details, in Neelu Chopra v. Bharti (2009) 10
SCC 184, this court observed that:
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“7. …what strikes us is that there are no particulars
given as to the date on which the ornaments were
handed over, as to the exact number of ornaments
or their description and as to the date when the
ornaments were asked back and were refused. Even
the weight of the ornaments is not mentioned in
the complaint, and it is a general and vague
complaint that the ornaments were sometimes
given in the custody of the appellants, and they
were not returned. What strikes us more is that
even in Para 10 of the complaint, where the
complainant says that she asked for her clothes and
ornaments, which were given to the accused, and
they refused to give these back, the date is
significantly absent.”
xxxx
12. The complaint also refers to a small incident where
the complainant’s brother accompanied her to the
matrimonial house when appellants no. 1 and 3 are
alleged to have refused to take her back, but on
persuasion by her brother, she was allowed to stay. There
is also a vague allegation that, when the complainant
gave birth to a second child, appellants 1 and 2 came
and “quarrelled” with the complainant, her brother, and
her parents and threatened them. This Court had occasion
to examine the phenomenon of general and omnibus
allegations in the cases of matrimonial disputes.
In Mamidi Anil Kumar Reddy v. State of A.P. 2024 SCC
OnLine SC 127, this Court observed that:
“14. …A bare perusal of the complaint, statement of
witnesses and the charge sheet shows that the
allegations against the Appellants are wholly
general and omnibus in nature; even if they are
taken in their entirety, they do not prima facie
make out a case against the Appellants. The
material on record neither discloses any particulars
of the offences alleged nor discloses the specific
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2025:HHC:9049role/allegations assigned to any of the Appellants in
the commission of the offences.
15. The phenomenon of false implication by way of
general omnibus allegations in the course of
matrimonial disputes is not unknown to this Court.
In Kahkashan Kausar alias Sonam v. State of
Bihar, this Court dealt with a similar case wherein
the allegations made by the complainant-wife
against her in-laws u/s. 498A and others were
vague and general, lacking any specific role and
particulars. The court proceeded to quash the FIR
against the accused persons and noted that such a
situation, if left unchecked, would result in the
abuse of the process of law.”
xxxx
13.1 In Kahkashan Kausar v. State of Bihar (2022) 6 SCC 599,
this Court noticed the injustice that may be caused when
parties are forced to go through the tribulations of a trial
based on general and omnibus allegations. The relevant
portion of the observation is as under:
“11. … In recent times, matrimonial litigation in the
country has also increased significantly, and there
is greater disaffection and friction surrounding the
institution of marriage now more than ever. This
has resulted in an increased tendency to employ
provisions such as Section 498-A IPC as
instruments to settle personal scores against the
husband and his relatives.
18. … upon a perusal of the contents of the FIR dated
1-4-2019, it is revealed that general allegations are
levelled against the appellants. The complainant
alleged that “all accused harassed her mentally and
threatened her of terminating her pregnancy”.
Furthermore, no specific and distinct allegations
have been made against either of the appellants
herein, i.e. none of the appellants have been
attributed any specific role in furtherance of the
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general allegations made against them. This simply
leads to a situation wherein one fails to ascertain
the role played by each accused in furtherance of
the offence. The allegations are, therefore, general
and omnibus and can, at best, be said to have been
made out on account of small skirmishes…
However, as far as the appellants are concerned, the
allegations made against them, being general and
omnibus, do not warrant prosecution.
21. …it would be unjust if the appellants are forced
to go through the tribulations of a trial, i.e. general
and omnibus allegations cannot manifest in a
situation where the relatives of the complainant’s
husband are forced to undergo trial. It has been
highlighted by this Court in varied instances that a
criminal trial leading to an eventual acquittal also
inflicts severe scars upon the accused, and such an
exercise must, therefore, be discouraged.”
14. This position was reiterated in Dara Lakshmi
Narayana v. State of Telangana, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3682,
wherein it was observed:
18. A bare perusal of the FIR shows that the allegations
made by respondent No. 2 are vague and omnibus. Other
than claiming that appellant No. 1 harassed her and that
appellant Nos. 2 to 6 instigated him to do so, respondent
No. 2 has not provided any specific details or described
any particular instance of harassment. She has also not
mentioned the time, date, place, or manner in which the
alleged harassment occurred. Therefore, the FIR lacks
concrete and precise allegations.
15. This position was reiterated in Geddam Jhansi v. State
of Telangana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 263, wherein it was observed:
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“31. Invoking criminal process is a serious matter with
penal consequences involving coercive measures, which
can be permitted only when the specific act(s) which con-
stitute offences punishable under the Penal Code or any
other penal statute are alleged or attributed to the ac-
cused and a prima facie case is made out. It applies with
equal force when criminal laws are invoked in domestic
disputes. Criminalising domestic disputes without spe-
cific allegations and credible materials to support the
same may have disastrous consequences for the institu-
tion of family, which is built on the premise of love, af-
fection, cordiality and mutual trust. The institution of
family constitutes the core of human society. Domestic
relationships, such as those between family members, are
guided by deeply ingrained social values and cultural ex-
pectations. These relationships are often viewed as sa-
cred, demanding a higher level of respect, commitment,
and emotional investment compared to other social or
professional associations. For the aforesaid reason, the
preservation of family relationships has always been em-
phasised. Thus, when family relationships are sought to
be brought within the ambit of criminal proceedings,
rupturing the family bond, courts should be circumspect
and judicious and should allow invocation of the criminal
process only when there are specific allegations with sup-
porting materials which clearly constitute criminal of-
fences.
32. We have to keep in mind that in the context of matri-
monial disputes, emotions run high, and as such in the
complaints filed alleging harassment or domestic vio-
lence, there may be a tendency to implicate other mem-
bers of the family who do not come to the rescue of the
complainant or remain mute spectators to any alleged in-
cident of harassment, which in our view cannot by itself
constitute a criminal act without there being specific acts
attributed to them. Further, when tempers run high and
relationships turn bitter, there is also a propensity to ex-
aggerate the allegations, which does not necessarily
20
2025:HHC:9049
mean that such domestic disputes should be given the
colour of criminality.
33. It goes without saying that genuine cases of cruelty
and violence in the domestic sphere, which do happen,
ought to be handled with utmost sensitivity. Domestic vi-
olence typically happens within the four walls of the
house and not in the public gaze. Therefore, such violence
is not noticed by the public at large, except perhaps by the
immediate neighbours. Thus, providing visible evidence
by the victim of domestic violence may not be easily
forthcoming and producing direct evidence may be hard
and arduous, which does not necessarily mean that do-
mestic violence does not occur. In fact, to deal with this
pernicious phenomenon, stringent statutes like the Pro-
tection from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, have been en-
acted with a very expansive meaning and scope of what
amounts to domestic violence. Since violence perpetrated
within the domestic sphere by close relatives is now
criminalised, entailing serious consequences on the per-
petrators, the courts have to be careful while dealing with
such cases by examining whether there are specific alle-
gations with instances against the perpetrators and not
generalised allegations. The purpose and mandate of the
law to protect the victims of domestic violence is of para-
mount importance, and as such, a balance has to be
struck by ensuring that while perpetrators are brought to
book, all the family members or relatives are not indis-
criminately brought within the criminal net in a sweeping
manner.
34. For a matrimonial relationship which is founded on
the basis of cordiality and trust to turn sour to an extent
to make a partner hurl allegations of domestic violence
and harassment against the other partner, would nor-
mally not happen at the spur of the moment and such ac-
rimonious relationship would develop only in course of
time. Accordingly, such a situation would be the culmina-
tion of a series of acts which turn, otherwise, an amicable
relationship, into a fractured one. Thus, in such cases in-
21
2025:HHC:9049
volving allegations of domestic violence or harassment,
there would normally be a series of offending acts, which
would be required to be spelt out by the complainant
against the perpetrators in specific terms to rope such
perpetrators in the criminal proceedings sought to be ini-
tiated against them. Thus, mere general allegations of
harassment without pointing out the specifics against
such perpetrators would not suffice, as is the case in re-
spect of the present appellants.
35. We are, thus, of the view that in criminal cases relat-
ing to domestic violence, the complaints and charges
should be specific, as far as possible, as against each and
every member of the family who is accused of such of-
fences and sought to be prosecuted, as otherwise, it may
amount to misuse of the stringent criminal process by in-
discriminately dragging all the members of the family.
There may be situations where some of the family mem-
bers or relatives may turn a blind eye to the violence or
harassment perpetrated on the victim and may not ex-
tend any helping hand to the victim, which does not nec-
essarily mean that they are also perpetrators of domestic
violence unless the circumstances clearly indicate their
involvement and instigation. Hence, implicating all such
relatives without making specific allegations and at-
tributing offending acts to them and proceeding against
them without prima facie evidence that they were com-
plicit and had actively collaborated with the perpetrators
of domestic violence would amount to abuse of the
process of law.”
16. The present petition has to be considered as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
17. The allegations made in the FIR are quite specific. It
was specifically mentioned that the petitioners started beating
the informant soon after her marriage. They told her to bring a
22
2025:HHC:9049
dowry from her home, otherwise, she would be beaten. She was
not allowed to talk to her parents. She was beaten by the
petitioners on 3rd June. Ornaments and money were kept by the
petitioners. These allegations contain the names of the
petitioners and the roles played by them. Therefore, the
submission that the FIR is vague and does not contain specific
allegations is not acceptable.
18. It was submitted that false averments were made in
the FIR. This Court cannot go into the truthfulness or otherwise
of the allegations made in the complaint. This position was laid
down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643,
wherein it was held: –
“13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court
would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to
the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the
allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage
of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr.
P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint,
if taken at their face value, must disclose the commission
of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At
the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations
made in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at its face value,
do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out
a case against the accused. We are of the considered view
that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the
categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan
Lal (supra).
23
2025:HHC:9049
14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this
Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of
Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC
1060:
“14. First, we would like to deal with the
submission of the learned Senior Counsel for
Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the
petition for quashing of the FIR is untenable. We do
not see any merit in this submission, keeping in
mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj
A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of
Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23].
In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of
Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this
Court while deciding the question of whether the
High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition
for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was filed
by the police during the pendency of the Section 482
petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16)
“16. Thus, the general conspectus of the
various sections under which the appellant is
being charged and is to be prosecuted would
show that the same is not made out even prima
facie from the complainant’s FIR. Even if the
charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single
Judge [Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007
SCC OnLine Guj 365] could have still examined
whether the offences alleged to have been
committed by the appellant were prima facie
made out from the complainant’s FIR, charge-
sheet, documents, etc. or not.”
19. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2025) 1 SCC 392:
2024 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court, while exercising
24
2025:HHC:9049jurisdiction under section 482 of CrPC, cannot conduct a mini-
trial. It was observed at page 397:
“17. This Court, in a series of judgments, has held that
while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482
of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court is
not supposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable reference
can be made to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan
Singh [CBI v. Aryan Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399: 2023 SCC
OnLine SC 379]. The relevant paragraph from the
judgment is extracted hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7)
“6. … As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage
of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal
proceedings, while exercising the powers under
Section 482CrPC, the Court is not required to conduct
the mini-trial. …
7. … At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising
the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court has very
limited jurisdiction and is required to consider
‘whether any sufficient material is available to proceed
further against the accused for which the accused is
required to be tried or not’.”
20. Hence, it is not permissible for the Court to go into
the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR.
21. A charge sheet has been filed before the Court. The
learned Trial Court is seized of the matter. It was laid down by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P., (2023) 8 SCC
734: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge sheet has been
filed, the learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate the
same. It was observed:
25
2025:HHC:9049
“At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the
investigation has been completed and the charge sheet is
ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the
FIR do not inspire any confidence, particularly in the
absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged
offences, we are of the view that the appellants should
prefer a discharge application before the trial court under
Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We
say so because even according to the State, the
investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be
filed before the competent court. In such circumstances,
the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials
which the investigating officer might have collected
forming part of the charge sheet. If any such discharge
application is filed, the trial court shall look into the
materials and take a call whether any discharge case is
made out or not.”
22. The FIR discloses the commission of a cognizable
offence, and it cannot be quashed at this stage.
23. Consequently, the present petition fails and is
dismissed.
24. The observations made herein before shall remain
confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing
whatsoever on the merits of the case.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
4th April, 2025
(Chander)
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