Delhi High Court
Ani Media Pvt. Ltd. vs Wikimedia Foundation Inc & Ors. on 2 April, 2025
Author: Subramonium Prasad
Bench: Subramonium Prasad
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 2nd APRIL, 2025
IN THE MATTER OF:
+ CS(OS) 524/2024
ANI MEDIA PVT. LTD. .....Plaintiff
Through: Mr. Sidhant Kumar, Mr. Om Batra,
Mr. Akshit Mago and Ms. Anshika
Saxena, Advocates
versus
WIKIMEDIA FOUNDATION INC & ORS ......Defendants
Through: Mr. Jayant Mehta, Sr. Advocate with
Ms. Tine Abraham, Mr. Nikhil
Narendran, Mr. Vijayendra Pratap
Singh, Mr. Abhijnan Jha, Ms. Shivani
Rawat, Mr. Thomas J. Vallianeth, Mr.
Aayush Marwah, Ms. Shubhangni
Jain, Mr. Abhi Udai Singh Gautam,
Mr. Bakhshind Singh, Mr. Pranav
Tomar, Ms. Jasleen Virk, Ms. Diva
Saigal, Advocates for Defendant No.1
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD
JUDGMENT
I.A. 32611/2024
1. The present Application has been filed by the Plaintiff under Order
XXXIX Rule 1 & 2 against the Defendants seeking the following prayers –
a. Pass an order against the Defendants, restraining them
from posting, publishing, uploading, writing, speaking,
distributing and/ or republishing any false, misleading
and defamatory content against the Plaintiff on any
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platform, including the Platform maintained by
Defendant No. 1;
b. Pass an injunction against the Defendant No. 1 or its
agents or any person acting on its behalf of or under
its authority, directing it to remove all false,
misleading and defamatory content against the
Plaintiff available on its Platform which can tarnish
the reputation of the Plaintiff and further restrain its
users and administrators from publishing anything
defamatory against the Plaintiff on its Platform;
c. Pass an order directing the Defendant No. 1, or its
agents or any person acting on its behalf of or under
its authority, to remove the protection status imposed
on the ANI Page;
d. Pass an order directing the Defendant No. 1 to
disclose the identity of the Defendant Nos. 2 to 4, by
providing their name, contact and other relevant
details; and
e. Pass any such other and further orders as this Hon’ble
Court deems fit.
2. The Plaintiff is India’s leading multimedia news agency providing
syndicated news feed with over one hundred bureaus across the globe under
the name “Asian News International” and “ANI”. The Plaintiff has been
managing and operating this business for over five decades, since the year
1971.
3. The Defendant No. 1 is a non-profit and charitable organisation
incorporated under the laws of the United States of America. It is stated that
the Defendant No. 1 has been set up to provide the necessary infrastructure
to make knowledge available to the public free of charge. Defendant No. 1
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hosts the English Wikipedia (hereinafter referred to as “Platform”), stated to
be a free encyclopedia that currently contains over 6.8 million articles online
in the English language.
4. The Defendants No. 2 to 4 are stated to be administrators of
Defendant No. 1’s Platform. It is stated that the administrators are vested
with specialised rights and editing tools and can edit, block/unblock articles
and pages on Wikipedia.
5. Shorn of unnecessary details, the facts in brief leading to the present
application are as under:
i. In the year 2006, a page pertaining to the Plaintiff was created on
the Platform of Defendant No. 1. It is stated that the framework of
the Platform is as such that any user can edit the Plaintiff’s page.
ii. It is stated that when the page was launched, it contained
comments about the Plaintiff which was sourced through trusted
websites. It is stated that this position continued up till
26.02.2019, and according to the Plaintiff, the said page
encompassed neutral information about the Plaintiff. The
Plaintiff’s page as on 26.02.2019 is reproduced and reads as under-
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iii. It is stated that thereafter, the Defendants No. 2 to 4 edited the
page pertaining to the Plaintiff to include allegedly false,
misleading and defamatory remarks/content against the Plaintiff.
It is stated that the remarks and statements against the Plaintiff
forms a substantial portion of the Plaintiff’s Page, which is
accessible to users and non-users of the Platform. The Plaintiff’s
page as on 22.04.2024 is reproduced as under:-
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iv. It is stated that in April 2024, several edits were made on the page
pertaining to the Plaintiff to discredit the alleged defamatory
remarks on the Plaintiff’s page. According to the Plaintiff the edits
were made relying upon trusted sources like The BBC Network.
The edits made on the page pertaining to the Plaintiff are as
under:-
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v. It is alleged that May 2024, Defendants No. 2 to 4 reversed the
aforesaid edits and reinstated the alleged false and defamatory
remarks, which are stated to exist on the Plaintiff’s page till date.
The Plaintiff’s page as on 22.05.2024 is reproduced as under:-
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vi. It is stated that on 27.05.2024, Defendant No. 2 imposed
protection status on the Plaintiff’s page, thereby, restraining
ordinary users from editing, moving and creating any content on
that article for an indefinite period.
vii. On 13.06.2024, the Plaintiff issued a cease-and-desist notice to the
Defendants to refrain them from disseminating, publishing false,
misleading and defamatory content pertaining to the Plaintiff. The
notice also called upon the Defendants to perform its obligations
as an intermediary in accordance with the Information Technology
(Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules,
2021 and take down the alleged false and misleading information
available on the Plaintiff’s page.
viii. The imputations against the Plaintiff can be summarized as:-
a. Plaintiff consistently acts at the behest of the Government of
India and the Bhartiya Janta Party;
b. Plaintiff is a ‘propaganda tool’ and a ‘mouthpiece’ for the
Government of India and the Bhartiya Janta Party;
c. Plaintiff is engaged in ‘low quality journalism’ that led to news
organizations ceasing their subscription with the Plaintiff;
d. Plaintiff is engaged in the spread of fake news or false news;
and
e. Plaintiff mistreats its employees and staff.
ix. The Plaintiff’s Page on the date of filing of the instant application
is:-
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x. A perusal of the page discloses that the nature of allegations have
not changed.
xi. The present suit has therefore been filed seeking the following
reliefs:-
“a. Pass a Decree of Permanent and Mandatory
Injunction against the Defendants, restraining them
from posting, publishing, uploading, writing, speaking,
distributing and/ or republishing any false, misleading
and defamatory content against the Plaintiff on any
platform, including the Platform maintained by
Defendant No. 1;
b. Pass a Decree of Permanent and Mandatory
Injunction against the Defendant No. 1 or its agents or
any person acting on its behalf of or under its
authority, directing it to remove all false, misleading
and defamatory content against the Plaintiff available
on its Platform which can tarnish the reputation of the
Plaintiff and further restrain its users and
administrators from publishing anything defamatory
against the Plaintiff on its Platform;
c. Pass a Decree of Permanent and Mandatory
Injunction against the Defendant No. 1 or its agents or
any person acting on its behalf of or under its
authority, directing it to reinstate the ANI Page as it
was available as on 26 February
2019, which can be accessed at
https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Asian News
International&oldid= 885186405;
d. Direct Defendant No. 1, or its agents or any person
acting on its behalf of or under its authority, to comply
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false, misleading and defamatory content against the
Plaintiff on the ANI Page or the Platform;
e. Pass an order directing the Defendants to issue a
retraction and an apology to the Plaintiff for damaging
the reputation of the Plaintiff;
f. Pass a Decree for damages against the Defendants,
directing them to pay an amount of INR 2,10,00,000/-
(Rupees Two Crores and Ten Lakhs Only) to the
Plaintiff, however, the Plaintiff reserves its right to
enhance this amount in future;
g. Cost of this Suit and consequent litigation be
awarded to the Plaintiff; andh. Any other relief which this Hon’ble Court deems fit
and proper, against the Defendants and in favour of the
Plaintiff.”
6. The learned Counsel for the Plaintiff states that the impugned
statements are ex-facie defamatory. He contended that it is well settled that
the right to professional reputation is a right guaranteed under Article 21 of
the Constitution of India and that the allegations that the Plaintiff is acting as
a mouth piece of the government cannot be tolerated by any independent
news agency. For the allegations regarding the working of the Plaintiff,
treatment towards employees etc., are far from the truth and is based on
materials which have not been verified by the Defendants.
7. The Learned Counsel for the Plaintiff further contends that the onus to
prove that the impugned statements made are truthful and not defamatory is
on the makers of such statements i.e., Defendants No. 2 to 4. It is stated that
the Impugned statements have been published by Defendants No. 2 to 4.
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Vide Order dated 11.11.2024, Division Bench of this Court in FAO (OS)
146/2024 had directed the Defendant No. 1 to serve Defendants No. 2 to 4.
In Order dated 16.12.2024 it has been recorded that Defendants No. 2 to 4
have been served and an affidavit of service has been filed in this Court in a
sealed cover. It is stated that despite service, the Defendants No. 2 to 4 have
chosen not to appear and that they have not filed any pleading to justify their
stand either. It is stated that as there is no material on record to justify the
impugned statements, they must be presumed as defamatory. It is stated that
the Defendant No. 1 has no locus to resist the reliefs as prayed for by the
Plaintiff through this application as Defendant No. 1 has asserted its status
as an intermediary under the Information Technology Act, 2000.
8. The learned Counsel for the Plaintiff supplements his contentions by
stating that the test of defamation is that the impugned statements must bring
down the reputation of the Plaintiff in the eyes of a reasonable member of
the public. It is further stated that the Defendant No. 1 holds itself to be an
encyclopedia and a repository of facts which attracts around 979 million
unique device visitors each month. It is stated that a reasonable member of
the public will perceive the impugned statements as a verifiable fact
appearing in an encyclopedia.
9. It was stated by the learned Counsel for the Plaintiff that the Single
Publication Rule will not apply in this case. It is the contention of the
Plaintiff that the material on the page pertaining to the Plaintiff is not the
verbatim reproduction of the articles which have been cited as sources. The
submission was primarily made to rebut the preliminary contention that
since the Plaintiff has not challenged the articles which are the source
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articles and are available on the internet since 2019, the present challenge is
not maintainable.
10. Per contra, the learned Senior Counsel for Defendant No. 1 submits
that the Plaintiff has limited its submissions to the Removal Relief. It is
further stated the present application of the Plaintiff is based on an incorrect
understanding of the Defendant No. 1’s Platform. It is stated that the
Defendant No. 1 does not edit, create, upload or improve the encyclopedic
content on the Platform, including the Plaintiff’s page, rather, the content is
continually and collectively created, uploaded and reviewed by third-party
users of the Platform. It is further stated that the content on the Platform is
dynamic and continually edited and updated by the Platform’s members.
Therefore, any injunction against Defendants No. 2 to 4 will not be able to
ensure that the impugned statements on the Plaintiff’s page continues to
remain absent without reappearing on the Platform as long as relevant,
reliable and verifiable information is available in public domain. It is
submitted that other users of the Platform can always reference such
information to post/repost similar content on the Plaintiff’s page.
11. The learned Senior Counsel further contends that any injunction
granted to the Plaintiff will have the effect of censuring/punishing the model
on which the Platform operates. It is stated that the content published on the
Platform is based on secondary, reliable and verifiable sources and the
content is also verified by the Platform’s community in terms of the
Platform’s policies. It is contended that if any reliefs as prayed for by the
Plaintiff are granted by this Court, it will have the effect of
punishing/censuring the right to free speech and expression of the Platform’s
users and obstructing their access to the Platform. It is further stated that
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such reliefs will restrain the Platform’s users from freely publishing and
editing the content of the Platform and would further discourage the users
from posting content that may not align with the preferences of individuals
or entities like the Plaintiff.
12. Furthermore, the learned senior counsel states that there is no urgency
to grant any interim relief to the Plaintiff, which in any event are barred by
limitation as the impugned statements have been present on the Plaintiff’s
page since 2024 but have been present in various secondary sources since
2019. Therefore, the cause of action would not arise afresh from 2024 but
would have arisen when such statements were first published. It is submitted
that looking at the position that the impugned statements are present on
various domains since 2019, there is no irreparable injury or balance of
convenience in favour of the Plaintiff that necessitates any interim orders at
this stage. It is also stated that the inordinate delay in impugning the alleged
defamatory content has disentitled the Plaintiff from seeking Interim Reliefs
as evidently the Plaintiff has suffered no demonstrable prejudice or undue
hardship since 2019. It is further contended that this Court ought to consider
the issue of limitation before deciding to grant interim reliefs. It is stated that
the Plaintiff is trying to revive its cause of action and circumvent the
limitation period for filing the present suit by coalescing the deletion of
proposed edits and the rejection of the deletions on the Plaintiff’s page. It is
also contended that the mere act of maintaining or reverting edits does not
constitute a fresh publication nor a fresh cause of action.
13. The learned Senior Counsel also submits that the removal relief and
the restraint relief are identical to the final reliefs as sought for in the Suit
filed by the Plaintiff; the Plaintiff is seeking an Order from this Court to
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partly decree the suit at the interim stage itself, which is not maintainable. It
is also stated that if such interim reliefs are granted, it would impose
unreasonable obligations on the Defendant No. 1 to continually adjudicate
on the alleged defamatory content on the Plaintiff’s page on the Platform to
ensure that impugned statements or content similar to it remains absent from
the Plaintiff’s page and by doing so, the Defendant No. 1 will not be able to
perform its duties as an intermediary under the Information Technology Act,
2000.
14. Heard learned Counsels for the parties and perused the material on
record.
15. It is the case of the Defendant No. 1 that it is an intermediary under
the Information Technology Act, 2000 and therefore, has no role with
respect to the impugned statements made by Defendants No. 2 to 4 on the
Plaintiff’s page. Hence, this Court is of the opinion that Defendant No. 1,
being an intermediary has some fiduciary responsibilities and obligations to
prevent acts of defamation. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Google India
Private Limited v. Visaka Industries, (2020) 4 SCC 162 has held as under:-
“50. At this juncture, it is apposite that we take a
deeper look at what the Government of India has to say
about Section 79.
51. Section 79 is a safe harbour provision. Internet
intermediaries give access to host, disseminate and
index content, products and services originated by
third parties on the internet. There are different kinds
of intermediaries. They include:
(i) Internet Access and Service Provider (ISP).
Examples are given in this category of Airtel,
Vodafone, BSNL among others;
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(ii) Data Processing and Web Hosting Providers.
Examples include GoDaddy and BigRock;
(iii) Internet Search Engines and Portals like Google,
Yahoo and Binge;
(iv) Email hosts like Gmail (Google) and Yahoo!Mail;
(v) Then there are instant messaging platforms such as
WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, Skype, etc.;
(vi) E-commerce intermediaries where the platforms do
not take title to the goods being sold like Amazon
India, Flipkart, etc.;
(vii) Internet Payment Systems and Mobile Wallets like
Paytm, etc.;
(viii) There are also participative internet platforms.
This extract is taken from Google India (P) Ltd. v.
Visaka Industries, (2020) 4 SCC 162 : (2020) 2 SCC
(Cri) 502 : 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1587 at page 188
52. The 2008 Amendment introduced Chapter XII to
the Information Technology Act. The amendment was
in the background of the decision of the Delhi High
Court in Avnish Bajaj v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Avnish
Bajaj v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2004 SCC OnLine Del
1160 : (2005) 116 DLT 427] .
53. Intermediaries stand on a different footing being
only facilitators of exchanges of information or sales.
Prior to the amendment, the exemption provision under
Section 79 did not exist and, therefore, an intermediary
would have been liable for any third-party information
or data made available by him as seen in Baazee [Ed. :
The reference seems to be to Avnish Bajaj v. State, 2008
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SCC OnLine Del 688 which has been reversed in
Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels & Tours (P) Ltd.,
(2012) 5 SCC 661. Avnish Bajaj case involved an
action against the Directors of Bazee.com.] . After the
amendment, intermediary is not liable under any Act if
it satisfied certain requirements as detailed in Section
79.
54. After referring to the decision in Shreya Singhal
[Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1 :
(2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 449] , the Government of India has
understood the position at law to be that Section 79
stands read down to mean that an intermediary would
need to takedown information only upon receiving
actual knowledge that a court order has been passed to
remove or disable certain material and not otherwise.
The further stand of the Government of India is thus
there is a recognition that intermediaries and neutral
platforms are only facilitating information. It is further
pointed out on behalf of the Government of India that
the interpretation placed by this Court in Shreya
Singhal [Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5
SCC 1 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 449] was not available to
the High Court when it passed the impugned order in
this case. Shreya Singhal [Shreya Singhal v. Union of
India, (2015) 5 SCC 1 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 449]
makes it clear that an intermediary’s liability will not
arise unless it failed to takedown material upon there
being actual knowledge by court order or government
communication. This safeguard has been put in place
to avoid chilling effect on free speech. The
intermediaries would, if a contrary view is taken, stand
elevated to the status of super censors and denude the
internet of its unique feature of a democratic medium
for all to publish, access and read any and all kinds of
information.
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55. Owing to the special unique characteristic of the
internet, intermediaries are not in a position to know
about a content which is posted on its platforms by
itself and, therefore, the strict liability principle cannot
be made applicable to internet intermediaries. It is the
specific stand of the Government of India that even
pre-amendment, an intermediary could not know the
contents of what is posted on its website and, therefore,
be held liable in the absence of a takedown order by a
court or governmental agency.
56. The Government of India, it is also noticed, has
perceived a distinction between blocking under Section
69-A of the Information Technology Act and takedown
under Section 79 of the Information Technology Act.
Section 69-A reads as follows:
“69-A. Power to issue directions for blocking for
public access of any information through any computer
resource.–(1) Where the Central Government or any
of its officers specially authorised by it in this behalf is
satisfied that it is necessary or expedient so to do in the
interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, defence of
India, security of the State, friendly relations with
foreign States or public order or for preventing
incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence
relating to above, it may subject to the provisions of
sub-section (2), for reasons to be recorded in writing,
by order, direct any agency of the Government or
intermediary to block for access by the public or cause
to be blocked for access by the public any information
generated, transmitted, received, stored or hosted in
any computer resource.
(2) The procedure and safeguards subject to which
such blocking for access by the public may be carried
out, shall be such as may be prescribed.
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(3) The intermediary who fails to comply with the
direction issued under sub-section (1) shall be
punished with an imprisonment for a term which may
extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine.”
57. It is pointed out that the grounds under which the
Government issues directions for blocking information
are limited and confined to matters relating to national
security, public order and the like. The power does not
expand to blocking any case of defamation, contempt
of court, etc. A blocking order under Section 69-A
cannot be passed for criminal defamation as it does not
fall under the scope of Section 69-A. Therefore, if a
party is aggrieved by posting of a defamatory content
on website, he must seek recourse to the court process
for adjudication. The matter can be directed to be
removed or access disabled under Section 79(3) of the
Information Technology Act. Since, the court process
can be long drawn, the aggrieved party may seek an
interim order before a competent court.
58. In fact, the learned Senior Counsel for the
appellant did not, as such, canvass the matter on the
basis of Section 79 before it was substituted. However,
we deem it proper to delineate its scope in view of the
fact that if there is an express legal bar to attach
criminal liability upon the appellant under the Act, it
would become a matter of jurisdiction. It is also the
stand taken by the Government of India that there be
no liability on the intermediary under Section 79 of the
Act prior to the substitution as we have set out
hereinbefore.
59. It must be noted that stand of the appellant
primarily has been that the appellant is not the
intermediary in this case and the intermediary in this
case is Google LLC. The arguments have been
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otherwise addressed by the appellant on the basis
though that even proceeding on the basis that the
appellant is treated as an intermediary, the complaint
against the appellant, cannot be allowed to proceed.
60. On the question as to whether Section 79, as it
stood prior to the substitution, would provide a shield
to an intermediary, we would enter the following
findings.
61. In our view, Section 79, before its substitution,
exempted the network service provider, which is
defined as an intermediary, from liability under the
Act, Rules or Regulations made thereunder in regard to
any third-party information or data made available by
him provided the service provider:
1. Proves that the offence or contravention was
committed without his knowledge;
2. The service provider proves that he had exercised all
due diligence to prevent the commissioning of such
offences or contraventions.
62. This provision may be contrasted with the later
avtar of Section 79 of the Act consequent upon
substitution with effect from 27-10-2009. Sub-section
(1) of Section 79, in unambiguous words, declares by
way of a non obstante clause that in spite of anything
contained in any law which is in force, though subject
to the provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3), an
intermediary would not be liable for any third-party
information, data or communication link hosted by
him. The conditions are set out in sub-section (2).
63. As we have noticed, the scope of Section 79, before
its substitution, was confined to confer immunity from
liability in regard to an offence under the Act or the
Rules or Regulations qua third-party action or data
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made available. In this regard, it must be noticed that
Chapter XI of the Act deals with the offences. Sections
65 to 67-B deal with various offences under the Act.
This is besides Sections 71, 72-A, 73 and 74 of the Act.
Section 79 falls under Chapter XII. Therefore, the
scheme of the Act would also indicate that Section 79,
as it was prior to the substitution, was indeed confined
to the liability of the network service provider arising
out of the provisions of the Act besides, no doubt, Rules
and Regulations, and it was not, in short, a bar to the
complaint under Section 500 IPC being launched or
prosecuted.
64. The complaint relates, in short, to a period, much
prior to the substitution of Section 79 of the Act, which
ultimately took place only with effect from 27-10-2009.
The Court, in Shreya Singhal [Shreya Singhal v. Union
of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 449] ,
was not considering the provisions of Section 79 as it
stood before the substitution on 27-10-2009 which is
what the High Court has focussed on to find that it was
not open to the appellant to seek shelter under Section
79. No doubt, there are certain observations which
have been made by the High Court regarding notice to
the petitioner, which we will dwell upon.
65. We may, in fact, notice another aspect of the matter.
Even, proceeding on the basis that Section 79 should
engage us any further, we cannot be oblivious to an
integral feature of Section 79 prior to its substitution.
As we have noted, the lawgiver has given protection
from liability not unconditionally. It is for the service
provider to prove that the offence or contravention was
committed without his knowledge. He is also to prove
that he has exercised all due diligence to prevent the
commission of such offence or contravention. We will,
for the purpose of argument, assume that the offence or
contravention could relate to even Section 500 IPC.
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Even then, for the protection given by the provisions,
as it stood at the time when the offence alleged against
the appellant was allegedly committed by it, to apply, it
would become incumbent upon the appellant to prove
that the offence or the contravention was committed
without its knowledge and that it had taken all due
diligence to prevent the commission of such offence or
contravention. It may be at once noticed that in reality
the scope of Section 79 of the Act, prior to the
substitution, was limited to granting exemption to the
network service provider from any liability under the
Act, Rules or Regulations made thereunder, no doubt,
in regard to third-party information or data available
by him. The commission of an offence under Section
500 IPC, would not be a liability under the Act or
Rules, or Regulations made under the Act. However, it
is undoubtedly true that the scope of the protection
afforded to the intermediary stands remarkably
expanded with the substituted provisions of Section 79
coming into force, no doubt, subject to the conditions
attached thereunder and as explained by this Court in
Shreya Singhal [Shreya Singhal v. Union of India,
(2015) 5 SCC 1 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 449] .
66. The Government of India, no doubt, has contended
that the High Court did not have the benefit of
judgment of this Court in Shreya Singhal [Shreya
Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1 : (2015) 2
SCC (Cri) 449] . We may notice that what is considered
in Shreya Singhal [Shreya Singhal v. Union of India,
(2015) 5 SCC 1 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 449] was Section
79 after substitution. There was a challenge mounted to
the constitutionality of Section 79. This Court held as
follows, inter alia : (SCC pp. 180-81, paras 120-24)
“120. One of the petitioners’ counsel also assailed
Section 79(3)(b) to the extent that it makes the
intermediary exercise its own judgment upon receiving
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actual knowledge that any information is being used to
commit unlawful acts. Further, the expression
“unlawful acts” also goes way beyond the specified
subjects delineated in Article 19(2).
121. It must first be appreciated that Section 79 is an
exemption provision. Being an exemption provision, it
is closely related to provisions which provide for
offences including Section 69-A. We have seen how
under Section 69-A blocking can take place only by a
reasoned order after complying with several
procedural safeguards including a hearing to the
originator and intermediary. We have also seen how
there are only two ways in which a blocking order can
be passed– one by the Designated Officer after
complying with the 2009 Rules and the other by the
Designated Officer when he has to follow an order
passed by a competent court. The intermediary
applying its own mind to whether information should
or should not be blocked is noticeably absent in
Section 69-A read with the 2009 Rules.
122. Section 79(3)(b) has to be read down to mean that
the intermediary upon receiving actual knowledge that
a court order has been passed asking it to expeditiously
remove or disable access to certain material must then
fail to expeditiously remove or disable access to that
material. This is for the reason that otherwise it would
be very difficult for intermediaries like Google,
Facebook, etc. to act when millions of requests are
made and the intermediary is then to judge as to which
of such requests are legitimate and which are not. We
have been informed that in other countries worldwide
this view has gained acceptance, Argentina being in
the forefront. Also, the Court order and/or the
notification by the appropriate Government or its
agency must strictly conform to the subject-matters
laid down in Article 19(2). Unlawful acts beyond what
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is laid down in Article 19(2) obviously cannot form any
part of Section 79. With these two caveats, we refrain
from striking down Section 79(3)(b).
123. The learned Additional Solicitor General
informed us that it is a common practice worldwide for
intermediaries to have user agreements containing
what is stated in Rule 3(2). However, Rule 3(4) needs
to be read down in the same manner as Section
79(3)(b). The knowledge spoken of in the said sub-rule
must only be through the medium of a court order.
Subject to this, the Information Technology
(Intermediaries Guidelines) Rules, 2011 are valid.
***
124.3. Section 79 is valid subject to Section 79(3)(b)
being read down to mean that an intermediary upon
receiving actual knowledge from a court order or on
being notified by the appropriate Government or its
agency that unlawful acts relatable to Article 19(2) are
going to be committed then fails to expeditiously
remove or disable access to such material. Similarly,
the Information Technology (Intermediaries
Guidelines) Rules, 2011 are valid subject to Rule 3
sub-rule (4) being read down in the same manner as
indicated in the judgment.”
67. The Court also was considering the challenge to
the provisions of the Information Technology
(Intermediaries Guidelines) Rules, 2011 (hereinafter
referred to as “the Rules”, for short). The Rules were
brought into force after 2011. It was made under
Section 87 of the Act. Rule 3 provides for due diligence
to be observed by the intermediary. It is obliged to
publish the Rules and Regulations and the Privacy
Policy and User Agreement. The intermediary is to
intimate the user not to use certain matter which
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include defamatory matter. Rule 3(3) of the Rules
provided that the intermediary was not to knowingly
host or publish any information, inter alia, contained,
as specified in sub-rule (2). Thus, under the Rules, the
intermediary could not knowingly host or publish
information which was, inter alia, defamatory. Rule
3(4) of the Rules, read as follows:
“3. Due diligence to be observed by intermediary.–
The intermediary shall observe following due diligence
while discharging his duties, namely–
***
(4) The intermediary, on whose computer system the
information is stored or hosted or published, upon
obtaining knowledge by itself or been brought to actual
knowledge by an affected person in writing or through
email signed with electronic signature about any such
information as mentioned in sub-rule (2) above, shall
act within thirty-six hours and where applicable, work
with user or owner of such information to disable such
information that is in contravention of sub-rule (2).
Further the intermediary shall preserve such
information and associated records for at least ninety
days for investigation purposes.””
16. Defendant No.1, therefore, cannot completely wash its hands of the
contents of the article on the ground that it is only an intermediary and
cannot be held responsible for the statement that is published on its platform.
Defendant No.1 professes itself to be an encyclopedia and people at large
have a tendency to accept the statements made on the web pages of
Defendant No.1 as gospel truth. The responsibility, therefore, of Defendant
No.1 is higher. This Court is not dwelling further on this aspect while
considering the present application.
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17. Before dwelling into the issues in the present application, this Court is
inclined to reiterate the settled positions of law with regards to pre-trial ad
interim injunctions with respect to a defamation suit.
18. The Apex Court in Bloomberg Television Production Services India
Private Limited and Other v. Zee Entertainment Enterprises Limited, (2025)
1 SCC 741, has held as under:-
“4. The threefold test of establishing : (i) a prima facie
case, (ii) balance of convenience, and (iii) irreparable
loss or harm, for the grant of interim relief, is well-
established in the jurisprudence of this Court. This test
is equally applicable to the grant of interim injunctions
in defamation suits. However, this threefold test must
not be applied mechanically [DDA v. Skipper
Construction Co. (P) Ltd., (1996) 4 SCC 622, para 38 :
(1997) 89 Comp Cas 362.] , to the detriment of the
other party and in the case of injunctions against
journalistic pieces, often to the detriment of the public.
While granting interim relief, the court must provide
detailed reasons and analyse how the threefold test is
satisfied. A cursory reproduction of the submissions
and precedents before the court is not sufficient. The
court must explain how the test is satisfied and how the
precedents cited apply to the facts of the case.
5. In addition to this oft-repeated test, there are also
additional factors, which must weigh with courts while
granting an ex parte ad interim injunction. Some of
these factors were elucidated by a three-Judge Bench
of this Court in Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund v.
Kartick Das [Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund v. Kartick
Das, (1994) 4 SCC 225 : (1994) 81 Comp Cas 318] , in
the following terms : (SCC pp. 241-42, para 36)
“36. As a principle, ex parte injunction could be
granted only under exceptional circumstances. The
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factors which should weigh with the court in the grant
of ex parte injunction are–
(a) whether irreparable or serious mischief will ensue
to the plaintiff;
(b) whether the refusal of ex parte injunction would
involve greater injustice than the grant of it would
involve;
(c) the court will also consider the time at which the
plaintiff first had notice of the act complained so that
the making of improper order against a party in his
absence is prevented;
(d) the court will consider whether the plaintiff had
acquiesced for some time and in such circumstances it
will not grant ex parte injunction;
(e) the court would expect a party applying for ex parte
injunction to show utmost good faith in making the
application.
(f) even if granted, the ex parte injunction would be for
a limited period of time.
(g) General principles like prima facie case, balance of
convenience and irreparable loss would also be
considered by the court.”
6. Significantly, in suits concerning defamation by
media platforms and/or journalists, an additional
consideration of balancing the fundamental right to
free speech with the right to reputation and privacy
must be borne in mind [R. Rajagopal v. State of T.N.,
(1994) 6 SCC 632] . The constitutional mandate of
protecting journalistic expression cannot be
understated, and courts must tread cautiously while
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granting pre-trial interim injunctions. The standard to
be followed may be borrowed from the decision in
Bonnard v. Perryman [Bonnard v. Perryman, (1891) 2
Ch 269 (CA)] . This standard, christened the “Bonnard
standard”, laid down by the Court of Appeal (England
and Wales), has acquired the status of a common law
principle for the grant of interim injunctions in
defamation suits [Holley v. Smyth, 1998 QB 726 (CA)]
. The Court of Appeal in Bonnard [Bonnard v.
Perryman, (1891) 2 Ch 269 (CA)] held as follows : (Ch
p. 284)
“… But it is obvious that the subject-matter of an
action for defamation is so special as to require
exceptional caution in exercising the jurisdiction to
interfere by injunction before the trial of an action to
prevent an anticipated wrong. The right of free speech
is one which it is for the public interest that individuals
should possess, and, indeed, that they should exercise
without impediment, so long as no wrongful act is
done; and, unless an alleged libel is untrue, there is no
wrong committed; but, on the contrary, often a very
wholesome act is performed in the publication and
repetition of an alleged libel. Until it is clear that an
alleged libel is untrue, it is not clear that any right at
all has been infringed; and the importance of leaving
free speech unfettered is a strong reason in cases of
libel for dealing most cautiously and warily with the
granting of interim injunctions.”
(emphasis supplied)
7. In Fraser v. Evans [Fraser v. Evans, (1969) 1 QB
349 : (1968) 3 WLR 1172 (CA)] , the Court of Appeal
followed the Bonnard principle and held as follows :
(QB p. 360)
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“… insofar as the article will be defamatory of Mr
Fraser, it is clear he cannot get an injunction. The
Court will not restrain the publication of an article,
even though it is defamatory, when the defendant says
he intends to justify it or to make fair comment on a
matter of public interest. That has been established for
many years ever since (Bonnard v. Perryman [Bonnard
v. Perryman, (1891) 2 Ch 269 (CA)] ). The reason
some times given is that the defences of justification
and fair comment are for the jury, which is the
constitutional tribunal, and not for a Judge. But a
better reason is the importance in the public interest
that the truth should out. …”
(emphasis supplied)
8. In essence, the grant of a pre-trial injunction against
the publication of an article may have severe
ramifications on the right to freedom of speech of the
author and the public’s right to know. An injunction,
particularly ex parte, should not be granted without
establishing that the content sought to be restricted is
“malicious” or “palpably false”. Granting interim
injunctions, before the trial commences, in a cavalier
manner results in the stifling of public debate. In other
words, courts should not grant ex parte injunctions
except in exceptional cases where the defence
advanced by the respondent would undoubtedly fail at
trial. In all other cases, injunctions against the
publication of material should be granted only after a
full-fledged trial is conducted or in exceptional cases,
after the respondent is given a chance to make their
submissions.
9. Increasingly, across various jurisdictions, the
concept of “Slapp suits” has been recognised either by
statute or by courts. The term “Slapp” stands for
“Strategic Litigation against Public Participation” andSignature Not Verified
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is an umbrella term used to refer to litigation
predominantly initiated by entities that wield immense
economic power against members of the media or civil
society, to prevent the public from knowing about or
participating in important affairs in the public interest
[ Donson, F.J.L., Legal Intimidation : A Slapp in the
Face of Democracy (London, New York : Free
Association Books, 2000).] . We must be cognizant of
the realities of prolonged trials. The grant of an interim
injunction, before the trial commences, often acts as a
“death sentence” to the material sought to be
published, well before the allegations have been
proven. While granting ad interim injunctions in
defamation suits, the potential of using prolonged
litigation to prevent free speech and public
participation must also be kept in mind by courts.
XXX
11. Undoubtedly, the grant of an interim injunction is
an exercise of discretionary power and the appellate
court (in this case, the High Court) will usually not
interfere with the grant of interim relief. However, in a
line of precedent, this Court has held that appellate
courts must interfere with the grant of interim relief if
the discretion has been exercised “arbitrarily,
capriciously, perversely, or where the court has
ignored settled principles of law regulating the grant
or refusal of interlocutory injunctions”. [Ramdev Food
Products (P) Ltd. v. Arvindbhai Rambhai Patel, (2006)
8 SCC 726, paras 126 & 128; Shyam Sel & Power Ltd.
v. Shyam Steel Industries Ltd., (2023) 1 SCC 634, para
37 : (2023) 1 SCC (Civ) 301.] The grant of an ex parte
interim injunction by way of an unreasoned order,
definitely falls within the above formulation,
necessitating interference by the High Court. This
being a case of an injunction granted in defamation
proceedings against a media platform, the impact of
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the injunction on the constitutionally protected right of
free speech further warranted intervention.”
19. In view of the abovementioned judgment, this court must consider the
following for the grant of interim injunction in a defamation case – a Prima
facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable loss.
20. Material on record indicates that the Defendants No. 2 to 4 stand
served. Despite service, Defendants No. 2 to 4 have chosen not to appear, no
pleadings or reply have been filed by Defendants No. 2 to 4.
21. To adjudicate on the issue as to whether the impugned statements are
taken from the cited sources on which they have relied upon and whether the
impugned statements on the Plaintiff’s page are in terms of the publishing
policy of the Defendant No. 1’s Platform, this Court has gone through the
policy of Defendant No.1 and also the sources relied on by Defendants No.2
to 4. The policy as laid down by Defendant No. 1 is as under:-
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22. After going through the policy of the Defendant No. 1 regarding
neutral point of view which states that any encyclopedic content on
Wikipedia must be written from a neutral point of view, without any
editorial bias. On perusal of the page pertaining to the Plaintiff, it appears
that the statements on the page pertaining to the Plaintiff are all sourced
from articles which are nothing but editorials and opinionated pages.
Defendant No.1 which is following the policy to avoid stating opinions as
facts and also professing it to be an encyclopedia has to also see as to
whether the opinions are actually based on the source articles or not so that
neutral policy of Defendant No.1 is not violated.
23. To deal with the contentions of the learned Senior Counsel for
Defendant No.1 that the Single Publication Rule is applicable to the present
case or not, this Court finds it appropriate to reiterate the law as laid down
by this Court with regards to Single Publication Rule. This Court in Khawar
Butt v. Asif Nazir Mir, 2013 SCC OnLine Del 4474, has held as under:-
“14. I first proceed on to determine the legal issue :
Whether, the leaving of the allegedly defamatory
material on the internet/facebook page gives rise to a
fresh cause of action every moment the said offending
material is so left on the webpage-which can be viewed
by others at any time, or whether the cause of action
arises only when the offending material is first posted
on the webpage/internet.
15. Learned counsel for the plaintiff has not
substantiated his aforesaid submission with any case
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own. I have not come across any Indian case law on
the subject, vis-a-vis internet publications. I have,
therefore, proceeded to go beyond the Indian
boundaries to see as to how this issue has been dealt
with in other jurisdictions. In a nutshell, there are two
conflicting legal positions, one being followed in U.K.
till recently-and this is still followed in Australia,
Canada and Germany, and the other in U.S.A., France
and, now the U.K. The earlier U.K. view was based on
a long standing rule in defamation cases-that every
time an article or statement is published or
republished, it creates an individual, discrete,
actionable, defamatory statement upon which one can
sue, generally known as the “multiple publication
rule”.
16. The multiple publication rule was first developed in
England in the case of Duke of Brunswick v. Harmer,
(1849) 14 QB 185. In 1847, the Duke was given a copy
of the newspaper that contained material defamatory
of him which had been published 17 years earlier.
While upholding the claim for damages as being within
limitation, the Court held that the limitation period of 6
years re-started when Duke viewed the publication. In
Godfrey v. Demon Internet Limited, (2001) QB 201, the
same rule was applied to the internet. Moorland J
observed:
“In my judgment the defendants, whenever they
transmit and whenever there is transmitted from the
storage of their news server a defamatory posting,
publish that posting to any subscriber to their ISP who
accesses the newsgroup containing that posting.‟”
17. The U.K. Government in a consultation paper-(the
Multiple Publication Rule CP 20/09) describes the
multiple publication rule as follows:
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“The effect of the multiple publication rule in relation
to online material is that each “hit” on a webpage
creates a new publication, potentially giving rise to a
separate cause of action, should it contain defamatory
material. Each cause of action has its own limitation
period that runs from the time at which the material is
accessed. As a result, publishers are potentially liable
for any defamatory material published by them and
accessed via their online archive, however long after
the initial publication the material is accessed, and
whether or not proceedings have already been brought
in relation to the initial publication.”
18. The effect of the Multiple Publication Rule is that
the limitation period runs from the date of the last
publication of the defamatory statement, allowing the
affected party to sue many years after the statement
was first made. In the case of archived materials, an
action could follow decades after the original
publication of the material.
19. The Multiple Publication Rule has been followed
by the Australian Courts in Dow Jones & Co. Inc v.
Gutnick, (2002) HCA 56. The High Court of Australia
explicitly rejected calls to abolish the said rule in
favour of the Single Publication Rule. The court
rejected the argument that the Single Publication Rule
be adopted for policy reasons, as it would be
impossible for a publisher on the internet to protect
itself against all the laws in every jurisdiction of the
world. The High Court held that defamation
proceedings sought to strike a balance between both-
the rights of the publisher and the person who is the
subject of the publication and whose rights would be
severely constrained by the Single Publication Rule
advocated by the applicant Dow Jones & Co. Inc.
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20. There were several occasions when the English
courts rejected the call to abandon the Multiple
Publication Rule. Reference may be made to
Berezovsky v. Michaels, (2000) 1 WLR 1004 and
Loutchansky v. Times Newspapers Ltd., (2002) QB 783.
Lord Philips of Worth Matravers MR, while delivering
the court’s judgment observed:
“We do not accept that the rule in the Duke of
Brunswick imposes a restriction on the readiness to
maintain and provide access to archives that amounts
to a disproportionate restriction on freedom of
expression. We accept that the maintenance of
archives, whether in hard copy or on the Internet, has a
social utility, but consider that the maintenance of
archives is a comparatively insignificant aspect of
freedom of expression. Archive material is stale news
and its publication cannot rank in importance with the
dissemination of contemporary material. Nor do we
believe that the law of defamation need inhibit the
responsible maintenance of archives. Where it is known
that archive material is or may be defamatory, the
attachment of an appropriate notice warning against
treating it as the truth will normally remove any sting
from the material.”
Leave to appeal to the House of Lords was rejected.
21. An appeal was then preferred before the European
Court of Human Rights (ECHR), seeking to enforce the
newspapers right to freedom of expression under
Article 10 of the European Convention of Human
Rights (reported as Times Newspapers Ltd.-(Nos. 1 and
2) v. United Kingdom, (2009) EMLR 14). While
recognizing the importance of the press in
disseminating information and acting as a public
watchdog, the ECHR observed that the press also had
the responsibility to protect the rights and reputations
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of the private individuals about whom it wrote. It was
held that the interference with the rights of the press, in
the facts of that case, was not disproportionate. It was
held that the newspapers could have continued to
maintain its archive without fear of litigation, had they
placed a notice with the archived material thereby
indicating that it was the subject of litigation, or had
been found to contain defamatory comments-a solution
offered by the Court of Appeal in that case. Since the
action had been initiated within 18 months of the
publication taking place, it was held that the defendant
had not been required to defend an action many
decades after the first publication had been made.
Significantly, the court held:
“The Court would, however, emphasise that while an
aggrieved applicant must be afforded a real
opportunity to vindicate his right to reputation, libel
proceedings brought against a newspaper after a
significant lapse of time may well, in the absence of
exceptional circumstances, give rise to a
disproportionate interference with press freedom under
Article 70.”
22. Therefore, even though the ECHR did not interfere
with the decision of the English Court in the facts of
the case, it did indicate that if the action was brought
after a significant lapse of time, the situation could
well have been different.
23. The Canadian Courts have also followed the
earlier British Multiple Publication Rule. In Carter v.
B.C. Federation of Foster Parents Association, 2005
BCCA 398, the court of appeal for British Columbia
preferred to follow the then prevailing English legal
position over the American view by observing:
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“7… Although it is difficult to find an express
statement in the Canadian cases about the single
publication rule, the clear tendency of the authorities
in my view is in favour of the English and the
Australian position and not in favour of the American
position”.
Send Mail
24. I may also refer to the decision of the Court of
Appeal for Ontario in Shatif v. Toronto Life Publishing
Co. Ltd., (2013) ONCA 405. While considering the
issue, section 6 of the Libel and Slander Act, R.S.
01990 c.L. 12 was considered by the court, which reads
as follows:
„An action for a libel in a newspaper or in a broadcast
shall be commenced within three months after the libel
has come to the knowledge of the person defamed, but,
where such an action is brought within that period, the
action may include a claim for any other libel against
the plaintiff by the defendant in the same newspaper or
the same broadcasting station within a period of one
year before the commencement of the action”,(emphasis supplied)
25. The court rejected the Single Publication Rule-
applied by the American Courts, with the following
observation:
“[31] However, the single publication rule has been
rejected in England : see Berezovsky v. Michaels,
[2000] 2 All E.R. 986 (H.L.); Loutchansky v. Times
Newspapers Ltd., [2002] Q.B. 783 (C.A.); in Australia
: see Dow Jones and Co. Inc. v. Gutnick, [2002] H.CA
56, 2010 C.L.R. 575; and by the British Columbia
Court of Appeal : see Carter v. B.C. Federation ofSignature Not Verified
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Foster Parents Assn., 2005 BCCA 398(CanLII), 2005
BCCA 398, 257 D.L.R. (4th) 133. And the motion judge
refused to apply the rule in this case.
[32] I, too, would not apply the single publication rule
for three reasons. First, the rule does not fit
comfortably with the words of s. 6 of the Act. The
single publication rule is based on publication of an
alleged libel. Successive publications are considered a
single publication and the date of the first publication
triggers the running of the limitation period. Under s. 6
of Ontario’s Act, the date when the libel first came to
the plaintiffs’ knowledge, not the date of publication,
triggers the running of the limitation period.
[33] Moreover, the recapture provision in s. 6 is
inconsistent with a single publication rule. A simple
example will illustrate the inconsistency. Take a case
where the same libel is published and later
republished, and the plaintiff sues for damages for the
republished libel. Section 6 would allow the plaintiff to
recapture the earlier libel. In effect, s. 6 recognizes two
separate libels; the single publication rule recognizes
only one.
[34] Second, the jurisprudence of this court has,
implicitly at least, rejected the single publication rule.
In Weiss v. Sawyer, (2002) 61 O.R. (3d) 526 (C.A.), at
para. 28, Armstrong J.A. affirmed the traditional
English rule:”Every republication of a libel is a new
libel.
[35] Third, even if we were to consider a single
publication rule in Ontario, I would not apply it across
different mediums of communication. In my opinion, it
would be unfair to plaintiffs to apply the rule to
publications that are intended for different groups or
that may reach different audiences. Even in American-
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states that apply the single publication rule, at least
one state, California, has rejected its” application for
reprinting or republication in a different form : see
Kanarek v. Bugliosi, (1980) 108 Cal. App. 3d 327.
Also, the Restatement of the Law, Second : Torts
(American Law Institute, 1977) states that the single
publication rule does not include separate aggregate
productions on different occasions. If the publication
reaches a new group, the repetition justifies a new
cause of action. See s. 57 7A.
[36] Applying the single publication rule where, as in
this case, the original publication is in print and the
republication is on the internet could create a serious
injustice for persons whose reputations are damaged
by defamatory material. A plaintiff may not want to
expend the time and resources to sue for an alleged
libel in a magazine, which has a limited circulation
and a limited lifespan. The plaintiff may consider the
magazine’s circulation insufficient to warrant a
lawsuit.
[37] However, a plaintiff may well want to spend the
time and money to sue if the alleged libel is on the
magazine’s website and accessible on the internet.
Unless the article is removed from the website, its
circulation is vast, its lifespan is unlimited, and its
potential to damage a person’s reputation is enormous.
Yet, if a single publication rule is applied, the plaintiffs
claim may be statute barred before real damage to
reputation has occurred”.
26. At this stage, I may note that the decision in this
case was, inter alia, based on, firstly, the express
language of section 6 of the Libel and Slander Act, as
set out herein above, as also the fact that after the
original publication had been made in print, the same
was re-published on the internet. The re-publication of
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the same article on the internet would constitute a fresh
publication, as it was directed towards a different set of
people than those covered by the first publication in
print media.
27. In Ireland, the Multiple Publication Rule was
abolished by the introduction of the Defamation Act,
2009. The Government appointed legal advisory group
of defamation, 2003 advocated, inter alia, introduction
of the Single Publication Rule. Section 38(1)(b) of the
Defamation Act, after amendment, reads as follows:
“For the purposes of bringing a defamation action
within the meaning of the Defamation Act, 2009, the
date of accrual of the cause of action shall be the date
upon which the defamatory statement is first published
and, where the statement is published through the
medium of the internet, the date on which it is first
capable of being viewed or listened to through that
medium”.
28. Recently, in the United Kingdom, the law has
changed with the enactment of the Defamation Act,
2013. Section 8 has introduced the Single Publication
Rule, which reads as follows:
“8. Single publication rule
(1) This section applies if a person–
(a) publishes a statement to the public (“the first
publication”), and
(b) subsequently publishes (whether or not to the
public) that statement or a statement which is
substantially the same.
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(2) In subsection (1) “publication to the public”
includes publication to a section of the public.
(3) For the purposes of section 4A of the Limitation
Act, 1980 (time limit for actions for defamation etc)
any cause of action against the person for defamation
in respect of the subsequent publication is to be treated
as having accrued on the date of the first publication.
(4) This section does not apply in relation to the
subsequent publication if the manner of that
publication is materially different from the manner of
the first publication.
(5) In determining whether the manner of a subsequent
publication is materially different from the manner of
the first publication, the matters to which the court
may have regard include (amongst other matters)–
(a) the level of prominence that a statement is given;
(b) the extent of the subsequent publication.
(6) Where this section applies–
(a) it does not affect the court’s discretion under
section 32A of the Limitation Act, 1980 (discretionary
exclusion of time limit for actions for defamation etc),
and
(b) the reference in subsection (1)(a) of that section to
the operation of section 4A of that Act is a reference to
the operation of section 4A together with this section”.
29. Therefore, the Multiple Publication Rule followed
in the United Kingdom by the courts since Duke of
Brunswick (supra), has statutorily been overruled. It
would be interesting to observe the course of
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developments that may now take place in other
commonwealth jurisdictions like Australia and
Canada, post the aforesaid development in the United
Kingdom.
30. As noticed above, the second principle is what the
American Courts call the “Single Publication Rule”. It
states that the publication of a book, periodical or
newspaper containing defamatory material gives rise
to only one cause of action for defamation, which
implies, that the limitation period starts to run at the
time the first publication is made, even if copies
continue to be sold several years later. The rule has a
long history. It was first developed in 1938 in respect of
newspapers, in Wolfson v. Syracuse Newspapers, Inc,
(1939) 279 NY 716. Then it was applied to books in
1948 in the case of Gregoire v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons,
(1948) 298 NY 119. The facts of this case were that a
book was originally put on sale in 1941. It had been
reprinted seven times, and was still being sold from
stock in 1946. The New York Court of Appeals held that
the limitation period started to run in 1941, when the
book was first put on sale.
31. In Gregoire (supra), the New York Court did not
accept the rule as set out in Duke of Brunswick
(supra), as it had its origin in an era which long
antedated the modem process of mass publication. The
said rule, it was held, was no longer suited to modem
conditions. The court held that under such a rule, the
period of limitation would never expire so long as a
copy of the published material remained in stock and is
made by the publisher, the subject of a sale or
inspection by the public. Such a rule would thwart the
purpose of the legislature which is to bar completely
and forever all actions which overpass the prescribed
limitation period.
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32. The Single Publication Rule is encapsulated in the
American Law Institutes Uniform Single Publication
Act, 1952. It is set out in Article 577A of the 2nd
Restatement of Torts (197) as follows:
“(1) Except as stated in subsections (2) and (3), each
of several communications to a third person by the
same defamer is a separate publication.
„(2) A single communication heard at the same time by
two or more third persons is a single publication.
„(3) Any one edition of a book or newspaper, or any
one radio or television broadcast, exhibition of a
motion picture or similar aggregate communication is
a single publication.
„(4) As to any single publication, (a) only one action
for damages can be maintained; (b) all damages
suffered in all jurisdictions can be recovered in the one
action; and a judgment for or against the plaintiff upon
the merits of any action for damages bars any other
action for damages between the same parties in all
jurisdictions.”
33. In 2002, the New York Court of Appeals, applied
the single publication rule to a website publication in
Firth v. State of New York, (2002) NY int 88. This
appeal presented the first occasion for that court to
determine how the defamation jurisprudence,
developed in connection with traditional mass media
communications, applies to communications in a new
medium-cyberspace-in the modem information age. In
this case a report had been published at a press
conference on 16.12.1996, and placed on the internet
on the same day. The Claimant, however, did not file a
claim for over a year. The Court found that the
limitation period started when the information was first
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placed on the website, and not from each “hit”
received. Levine, J. observed that”/+ addition to
increasing the exposure of publishers to stale claims,
applying the multiple publication rule to a
communication distributed via mass media would
permit a multiplicity of actions, leading to potential
harassment and excessive liability, and draining of
judicial resources (see Keeton v. Hustler Mag., Inc.,
465 US 770, 777 [1984])”. The court further held that
the policies impelling the original adoption of the
single publication rule “are even more cogent when
considered in connection with the exponential growth
of the instantaneous, worldwide ability to communicate
through the internet.” The alternative would give
“even greater potential for endless retriggering of the
statute of limitations, multiplicity of suits and
harassment of defendants.” The court further observed
that if the single publication rule is. not upheld with
regard to internet publications, then “Inevitably, there
would be a serious inhibitory effect on the open,
pervasive dissemination of information and ideas over
the internet, which is, of course, its greatest beneficial
promise.”
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34. The court also rejected the argument that re-
publication re-triggered the period of limitation. The
court observed that re-publication occurs:
“upon a separate aggregate publication from the
original, on a different occasion, which is not merely
“a delayed circulation of the original edition” (Rinaldi
v. Viking Penguin, Inc., 52 NY2d at 435; Restatement
[Second] of Torts „577A, Comment d, at 210, supra).
The justification for this exception to the single
publication rule is that the subsequent publication is
intended to and actually reaches a new audience (seeSignature Not Verified
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Rinaldi, 52 NY2d at 433 [Citing Cook v. Conners, 215
NY 175 (1915)]; Restatement, Comment d). Thus, for
example, repeti tion of a defamatory statement in a
later edition of a book, magazine or newspaper may
give rise to a new cause of action (see Rinaldi, 52
NY2d at 433-435 [hard-cover and paperback editions
of the same book]; see also Cook v. Conners, 215 NY at
179 [morning and afternoon editions of newspapers
owned and published by the same individual]).
The mere addition of unrelated information to a Web
site cannot be equated with the repetition of
defamatory matter in a separately published edition of
a book or newspaper, as in Rinaldi and Cook. The
justification for the republication exception has no
application at all to the addition of unrelated material
on a Web site, for it is not reasonably inferable that the
addition was made either with the intent or the result of
communicating the earlier and separate defamatory
information to a new audience.”
24. According to the aforementioned decision of this Court, ‘Single
Publication Rule’ only applies when the second publication is a verbatim
reproduction of the first publication. After perusing the Articles which were
being cited by Defendants No. 2 to 4 while making the impugned
statements, this Court opines that the impugned statements on the Plaintiff’s
page are not verbatim reproduction of such articles, and these impugned
statements are written in such a way which is totally contradictory to the
intent with which these Articles were written and the impugned statements
on the page pertaining to the Plaintiff on the Platform of Defendant No. 1
are devoid of the context of the Articles. Therefore, in the opinion of this
Court, the impugned statements are ex-facie defamatory and tarnishes the
professional reputation of the Plaintiff.
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25. In view of the fact that Defendant No.2 to 4 have chosen not to appear
despite service and this Court having perused the articles which are the
source of this opinion, this Court finds that the opinion of Defendants No.2
to 4 do not represent the true picture of the articles and have been twisted by
Defendants No.2 to 4. Further, this Court finds merit in the allegation of the
Plaintiff that Defendant No.1 has ensured that the articles cannot be edited
by anybody else, thereby putting Plaintiff in a disadvantage to rebut what is
given in the page. Therefore, the present application is allowed in terms of
prayer (b) and (c) of the application.
26. The application is disposed of.
SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD, J
APRIL 02, 2025
RJ/y.chugh
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