Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Anusara Begum @ Ansura Begum @ Ansura … vs The State Of West Bengal & Anr on 4 April, 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Criminal Revisional Jurisdiction
APPELLATE SIDE
Present:
The Hon'ble Justice Shampa Dutt (Paul)
CRR 884 of 2023
Anusara Begum @ Ansura Begum @ Ansura Begam @ Baby
Vs.
The State of West Bengal & Anr.
WITH
CRR 5122 of 2024
Sheikh Sahajahan
Vs.
Union of India
For the Petitioner : Mr. Ayan Bhattacharjee, Sr. Adv.
In CRR 884 of 2023 Mr. Anand Kesari,
Mr. Joydeep Mishra,
Mr. Ranajit Roy,
Ms. Ritu Das.
For the NCB : Mr. Kallol Mondal, Sr. Adv.
In CRR 884 of 2023 Mr. Amajit De.
For the Petitioner : Mr. Y.J. Dastoor, Sr. Adv.
In CRR 5122 of 2024 Mr. Joydeep Mishra,
Mr. Ranajit Roy,
Ms. Ritu Das.
For the NCB : Mr. Arun Kr. Maity (Mohanty),
In CRR 5122 of 2024 Mr. Priyankar Ganguly.
Hearing concluded on : 05.03.2025
Judgment on : 04.04.2025
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Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.:
1. The petitioners in the two revisional applications are husband and
wife implicated in NDPS Case No. T.R. 53 of 2021 corresponding to
NCB Crime No. 77/2021 under Sections 8(c) read with Sections 20
b(ii)(C) and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances
Act, 1985, pending before the Court of the learned Additional
Sessions Judge, 3rd Court (NDPS Court), Howrah including the
order dated 04.04.2022 passed in connection therewith.
2. The said petitioners have prayed for quashing of the said
proceeding including the order dated 04.04.2022.
3. Vide the order dated 04.04.2022 cognizance has been taken by the
learned Judge (Special Court).
4. The petitioners’ case is that they have been falsely implicated in
the present case. One of the contentions being that they have been
implicated only on the basis of the statement of co-accused and
that there is a case of misidentification.
5. It is stated that the petitioner Anusara Begum @ Ansura Begum @
Ansura Begam @ Baby has been wrongly implicated in place of
Baby Begum, the daughter-in-law of another accused Sahanara
Begum.
6. It is further stated that there has been a confusion of identity and
the petitioner Anusara Begum @ Baby has been wrongly implicated
in the present case.
7. It is also submitted that the address of Baby Begum and the
address of Anusara Begum @ Baby are separate and the alleged
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incident of attacking the NCB team was in the area where Baby
Begum, daughter-in-law of Sahanara Begum resides and as such
Anusara Begum @ Baby being wrongly implicated is liable to be
discharged from the present case on the proceeding being
quashed.
8. The petitioners have filed written notes of argument.
Supplementary affidavit filed is also on record. Vide the
supplementary affidavit the petitioners have tried to show that the
address of Sahanara Begum and her daughter-in-law Baby Begum
and that of Anusara Begum are at a distance of eight hundred
meters, that is about 11 minutes walk.
9. It appears from the written complaint that accused James Nayak
was apprehended and arrested carrying substantial quantity of
‘ganja’. James Nayak on being arrested stated before the officers of
the NCB that he was to handover the said drug to Sheikh
Sahajahan @ Bada Bhai and Anusara Begum @ Baby who is the
wife of Sheikh Sahajahan residing near Chamrail Railway Station,
P.S. Uluberia, Dist. Howrah. The said incident led to the
registration of the present case.
10. From the case diary it is clear that the petitioner Anusara Begum
@ Baby has been clearly identified as the wife of Sheikh
Sahajahan. There is no doubt that she is the person who is an
accused in the present case. There is no discrepancy in the name
of the husband of the petitioner Anusara Begum @ Baby. As such,
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prima facie there is no reason to believe that it is Baby Begum,
daughter-in-law of Sahanara Begum who is the actual accused.
11. It appears that Baby Begum is not an accused in the present
case. Written notes by the petitioner has been filed stating that the
investigation in the present case is not being conducted in a proper
manner and there is a case of mis-identification and the case is
solely on the basis of the statement of co-accused.
12. The following judgments have been relied upon on behalf of the
petitioners:-
1. Tofan Singh vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2021) 4 SCC 1;
2. Tajmul Hosssain Shah @ Taju Shah & Anr. vs. State of
West Bengal & Anr., 2007 (1) AICLR;
3. Kamlesh & Anr. vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr., 2019 SCC
OnLine SC 1822;
4. Noor Aga vs. State of Punjab & Anr., (2008) 16 SCC 417;
5. Mahmood Ali & Ors. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.,
(2023) 15 SCC 488;
6. State of Orissa vs. Debendra Nath Padhi, (2005) 1 SCC
568;
13. On hearing the learned counsels for the parties and on considering
the materials on record including the written notes and the
judgments relied upon, it appears that the name of Anusara
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Begam @ Baby and her husband Sheikh Sahajahan was stated by
the apprehended accused James Nayak.
14. When the NCB team went to conduct search in the house of
Sahanara Begum, Anusara Begum @ Baby and Sheikh Sahajahan
they were allegedly attacked by them and physically assaulted.
15. Admittedly, accuseds Sahanara Begum, Anusara Begum @ Baby
and Sheikh Sahajahan are all related to each other and live in a
common area which is adjacent to each other. There is a prima
facie case that Sahanara Begum, Anusara Begum @ Baby and her
husband Sheikh Sahajahan are actively involved in the drug
business.
16. It is the case of the NCB that the role of Anusara Begum @ Baby
is clearly established through several collaborating evidence,
primarily on the basis of her CDR connection with co-accused
James Nayak (8457942947, 8280958978) and Kishore Lima
(8984743012) through mobile nos. (8420055189, 7003298642 &
8017509345) being used by her. It is stated that tower location of
these three mobile numbers (8420055189, 7003298642 &
8017509345) were exactly matching with the house location of
Anusara Begum @ Baby. Besides James Nayak has admitted
that the drug deal was arranged by Anusara Begum @ Baby,
Shahanara Begum & Sheikh Sahajahan and on their directions,
James Nayak used to collect Ganja from Odisha and deliver it
to house of Anusara Begum @ Baby & Sheikh Sahajahan.
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17. There are other evidence and materials to make out a prima facie
case against the petitioner’s herein including the CDR/call records.
As such, it appears that it is not only on the statement of co-
accused that the petitioners have been implicated. The case of mis-
identification as claimed has been already clearly discussed earlier
and has no substance.
18. In Sanjay Dutt vs The State of Maharashtra, through CBI
(STF), Bombay, Criminal Appeal No. 1060 of 2007, on 21
March, 2013, the Supreme Court held:-
“42) In Manjit Singh vs. CBI, (2011) 11 SCC 578, this
Court, while considering the question whether
retracted confessions of the co-accused could be relied
upon to convict the accused, held that the retracted
statements can be used against the accused as well as
the co-accused provided such statements were truthful
and voluntary when made. In the said case, two
accused persons made confessional statements and,
subsequently, they retracted from their statements.
This Court observed:
“87. A confessional statement given under Section 15
of TADA shall not be discarded merely for the reason
that the same has been retracted….” It is pointed out
that the confession in the present case was truthful
and voluntary and has been recorded after strictly
following the law and the prescribed procedure, the
subsequent retraction and denial of such confessional
statements in the statement of the accused
under Section 313 was only as a result of an
afterthought.
51) In Nazir Khan vs. State of Delhi, (2003) 8 SCC
461, this court held that the confessional
statements made by the co-accused can be used
to convict a person, and that it is only as a rule
of prudence that the Court should look for
corroboration elsewhere. It was held that:
“27. Applying the principles which can be culled out
from the principles set out above to the factual
7scenario, the inevitable conclusion is that the trial court
was justified in its conclusions by holding the accused-
appellants guilty. When an accused is a participant in
a big game planned, he cannot take the advantage of
being ignorant about the finer details applied to give
effect to the conspiracy hatched, for example, A-7 is
stated to be ignorant of the conspiracy and the
kidnapping. But the factual scenario described by the
co-accused in the statements recorded under Section
15 of the TADA Act shows his deep involvement in the
meticulous planning done by Umar Sheikh. He
organized all the activities for making arrangements for
the accused and other terrorists.”
19. The NCB has prayed that the petitioner should face trial in this
case relying upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Central
Bureau of Investigation vs. Aryan Singh Etc. in Criminal
Appeal Nos. 1025-1026 of 2023 reported in 2023 LiveLaw (SC)
292 dated April 10, 2023 wherein the Court held as follows:-
“High Court cannot quash criminal proceedings
at Section 482 Cr.P.C. stage by saying charges
aren’t proved – High Court cannot conduct a
“mini trial” while exercising powers under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. – At the stage of discharge
and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482
Cr.P.C., the Court has a very limited jurisdiction and is
required to consider “whether any sufficient material is
available to proceed further against the accused for
which the accused is required to be tried or not.” –
Whether the criminal proceedings was/were malicious
or not, is not required to be considered at this stage.
The same is required to be considered at the conclusion
of the trial – What is required to be considered is a
prima facie case and the material collected during the
course of the investigation, which warranted the
accused to be tried.”
20. In Surinder Kumar Khanna vs Intelligence Officer Directorate
of Revenue Intelligence, Criminal Appeal No. 949 of 2018, on
31 July, 2018, the Supreme Court held:-
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“12. The law laid down in Kashmira Singh (supra) was
approved by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Hari
Charan Kurmi and Jogia Hajam v. State of
Bihar11 wherein it was observed:
“As we have already indicated, this question has been
considered on several occasions by judicial decisions and
it has been consistently held that a confession cannot be
treated as evidence which is substantive evidence against
a co-accused person. In dealing with a criminal case where
the prosecution relies upon the confession of one accused
person against another accused person, [1911] I.L.R. 38
CAl. 559 at 588 [1931] I.L.R. 54 Mad. 75 at 77.
(1964) 6 SCR 623 at 631-633 the proper approach to
adopt is to consider the other evidence against such
an accused person, and if the said evidence appears
to be satisfactory and the court is inclined to hold
that the said evidence may sustain the charge
framed against the said accused person, the court
turns to the confession with a view to assure itself
that the conclusion which it is inclined to draw from
the other evidence is right. As was observed by Sir
Lawrence Jenkins in Emperor v. Lalit Mohan
Chuckerburty a confession can only be used to “lend
assurance to other evidence against a co-accused”. In
re Periyaswami Moopan Reilly. J., observed that the
provision of Section 30 goes not further than this: “where
there is evidence against the co-accused sufficient, if
believed, to support his conviction, then the kind of
confession described in Section 30 may be thrown into the
scale as an additional reason for believing that evidence”.
In Bhuboni Sahu v. King the Privy Council has expressed
the same view. Sir John Beaumont who spoke for the
Board, observed that “a confession of a co-accused is
obviously evidence of a very weak type. It does not indeed
come within the definition of “evidence” contained
in Section 3 of the Evidence Act. It is not required to be
given on oath, nor in the presence of the accused, and it
cannot be tested by cross-examination. It is a much
weaker type of evidence than the evidence of an approver,
which is not subject to any of those infirmities. Section 30,
however, provides that the court may take the confession
into consideration and thereby, no doubt, makes it
evidence on which the court may act; but the section does
not say that the confession is to amount to proof. Clearly
there must be other evidence. The confession is only one
element in the consideration of all the facts proved the
case; it can be put into the scale and weighed with the
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other evidence”. It would be noticed that as a result of the
provisions contained in Section 30, the confession has no
doubt to be regarded as amounting to evidence in a
general way, because whatever is considered by the court
is evidence; circumstances which are considered by the
court as well as probabilities do amount to evidence in that
generic sense. Thus, though confession may be regarded
as evidence in that generic sense because of the provisions
of Section 30, the fact remains that it is not evidence as
defined by Section 3 of the Act. The result, therefore, is
that in dealing with a case against an accused person, the
court cannot start with the confession of a co-accused
person; it must begin with other evidence adduced by the
prosecution and after it has formed its opinion with regard
to the quality and effect of the said evidence, then it is
permissible to turn to the confession in order to receive
assurance to the conclusion of guilt which the judicial mind
is about to reach on the said other evidence. That, briefly
stated, is the effect of the provisions contained in Section
30. The same view has been expressed by this Court
in Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh where the
decision of the Privy Council in Bhuboni Sahu case has
been cited with approval.”
21. In the present case, other than the statement of co-accused James
Nayak there are other satisfactory evidences on record being CDR
connections used, etc. which prima facie substantiates the
statement of the co-accused and the materials on record are prima
facie sufficient to sustain the charge against the petitioner herein.
22. CRR 884 of 2023 and CRR 5122 of 2024 are thus dismissed.
23. Trial court to proceed expeditiously with the trial.
24. All connected applications, if any, stands disposed of.
25. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.
26. Copy of this judgment be sent to the learned Trial Court for
necessary compliance.
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27. Urgent certified website copy of this judgment, if applied for, be
supplied expeditiously after complying with all, necessary legal
formalities.
(Shampa Dutt (Paul), J.)
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