Punjab-Haryana High Court
Aditya Kumar vs State Of Haryana on 3 April, 2025
Neutral Citation No:=2025:PHHC:046022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH
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CRR-43-2010
Reserved on: 26.03.2025
Pronounced on: 03.04.2025
ADITYA KUMAR
. . . . Petitioner
Vs.
STATE OF HARYANA
. . . . Respondent
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CORAM: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA
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Argued by: - Mr. Salil Bali, Advocate, for the petitioner.
Mr. R.K.S. Brar, Addl. A.G., Haryana.
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DEEPAK GUPTA, J.
Accused Aditya Kumar (petitioner herein) has been convicted by
the Court of Ld. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hisar under Section 7 read with
Section 16(1)(a)(i) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 [‘for
short ‘the PFA Act‘] vide judgment dated 20.10.2007 in a complaint lodged
by Government Food Inspector, Hisar. Vide a separate order dated
23.10.2007, he was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a
period for three months and further to pay a fine of ₹500/- with default
sentence of one month in case of non-payment of fine, for committing the
said offence. Fine was, however, paid. Appeal filed against the aforesaid
conviction and sentence was dismissed by ld. Additional Sessions Judge,
Hisar vide his judgment dated 07.01.2010.
2. Against the aforesaid conviction and sentence, petitioner has
approached this Court by way of the present revision. Revision was
admitted on 12.01.2010 and on the same day, the sentence of the petitioner
was directed to be suspended during the pendency of this petition.
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3. As per prosecution case, on 28.09.1999, Sh. Sham Lal Mahiwal,
Government Food Inspector, Hisar accompanied by Dr. Ashok Chaudhary
inspected the premises of the petitioner, who was found in possession of
20Kg of Dal Masur kept for public sale in a gunny bag. After completing
statutory requirements, 600 gms of Dal Masur was purchased for the
purpose of analysis. The purchased Dal Masur was divided in three parts and
converted into the sealed parcels. One of the parcels along with the slip of
LHA, Hisar was sent to Public Analyst, Haryana for the analysis. Other two
parcels along with the copies of memo of Form-VII were deposited with
Local Health Officer, Hisar. Report of the public analyst Haryana was
received, as per which the sample was coloured with sunset yellow synthetic
colour, whereas, it should be free from the same. Accused was alleged
found to have contravened the provisions of the PFA Act, 1954 and Rules,
1955 framed thereunder and as such, after complying statutory
requirements, the prosecution was launched.
4. After trial, the charge against the accused was held to be
proved and accordingly, he was convicted the sentenced as noted above.
5. Conviction has been assailed by ld. counsel for the petitioner on
various grounds to the effect that there was non-compliance of Rules 17 &
18 of the PFA Rules; violation of Rule 28 of the PFA Rules and non-
compliance of Rule 22 of the PFA Rules. It is also the contention that there is
non-compliance of Section 13(2) of the PFA Act.
6. It is contended by ld. counsel that though as per the
prosecution case, the copy of the report of Public Analyst along with the
forwarding memo Ex. PW2/A was sent to the petitioner-accused through
registered post and the said registered envelop was never received back,
but there is no evidence to show that accused was ever served with the said
letter and thus, there is a non-compliance of Section 13(2) of the PFA Act.
Learned counsel has relied upon Narayana Prasad Sahu Vs. The State of
Madhya Pradesh, 2021 (4) RCR (Criminal) 669, in which it was held by
Hon’ble Supreme Court that mere dispatch of the report to the accused is
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not sufficient compliance with the requirement of Sub Section (2) of Section
13 of the PFA Act and that report must be served on accused.
7. It is noticed that in the above case before Hon’ble Supreme
Court, the endorsement of the postman showed that number of attempts
were made to serve the letter upon the addressee i.e. the accused but he
was not available even after giving intimation and therefore, letter was
returned by the postman. However, the clerk who had dispatched the report
was though examined by the prosecution and it relied upon the remarks
made by the postman on the postal envelope, but the postman, who
allegedly made the remarks admittedly was not examined by the
prosecution. It was in these facts and circumstances that Hon’ble Supreme
Court held that examination of the postman was necessary so as to prove
that at any point of time, accused had refused to receive the letter. Hon’ble
Supreme Court also noted Rule 9B of the PFA Rules, so as to hold that more
than one mode is prescribed by the said Rule for serving the report of the
public analyst on the accused. After the postal packet was returned, not
even an attempt was made to personally serve the report upon the accused
and thus, there was non-compliance of the mandatory requirement of Sub
Section (2) of Section 13 of the Act and consequently, conviction and
sentence was set aside.
8. I am afraid that the aforesaid authority is of no advantage to
the petitioner in the present case, as it is distinguishable from the facts of
the present case. As the judgments of the Courts below would reveal that
copy of the report of the public analyst (Ex. PD) along with the forwarding
memo Ex.PW2/A was sent to the accused through registered post. Postal
receipt in this regard is Ex.PW2/B. Registered envelope containing the letter
was never returned back, raising presumption that it was served upon the
addressee i.e. the accused.
9. The petitioner-accused want to take benefit of the fact that on
the postal receipt, the only address mentioned is ‘Aditya Kumar resident of
Hisar’ and not the complete address. Ld. trial Court has rightly observed that
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in the forwarding Memo Ex.PW2/A, the complete address of the accused-
petitioner has been mentioned specifically giving details of his shop and that
it is quite usual that on the postal receipt handed over to the person, who
sends the envelope by registered post, only the small address is mentioned
thereon. In case the report along with the forwarding memo of the LHA was
not served upon the accused, obviously the same would have been returned
back as unserved. However, the registered envelope in this case was not
returned back to the complainant. Moreover, it has been observed by the
Courts below that in his statement under Section 313 CrPC, accused never
pleaded that he had not received the report of the Public Analyst along with
the forwarding memo. Said contention was raised only for the first time
during arguments and so, has been rightly rejected by the trial Court. As
such, this Court does not find any merit in this contention.
10. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner then pleaded non-compliance of
Rule 22 of the PFA Rules by submitting that at least 250 gm Masur Dal was
required to be sent for the purpose of analysis. However, in the present case
600 gm of sample of Dal Masur was purchased, which was divided into three
parts, which means that only 200 gm of Masur Dal was sent for the purpose
of analysis and so, there is non-compliance of Rule 22 of the PFA Rules.
There is no merit in the contention. It has been rightly observed by the trial
Court by relying upon judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of
State of Kerala Vs. Allasserv Mohammad, 1978 Criminal Law Journal 925
that Rule 22 of the PFA Rules is to be treated as directory. It is for the Public
Analyst to opine as to whether the quantity of the sample sent to him for
the purpose of analysis, was sufficient or not. In case the Public Analyst
found the sample to be sufficient for analysis and had given his report, no
prejudice could be caused to the accused.
11. In this case also, the report of the Public Analyst did not reveal
that quantity of sample sent to him was insufficient for the purpose of
analysis. As such, the contention is held to be devoid of any merit.
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12. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner also pleads violation of Rules 17 &
18 of the PFA Rules, which read as under: –
“17. Manner of despatching containers of samples :- The containers of the
sample shall be despatched in the following manner, namely:-
(a) The sealed container of one part of the sample for analysis and a
memorandum in Form VII shall be sent in a sealed packet to the
public analyst immediately but not later than the succeeding
working day by any suitable means.
(b) The sealed containers of the remaining two parts of the sample
and two copies of the memorandum in Form VII shall be sent in a
sealed packet to the Local (Health) Authority immediately but not
later than the succeeding working day by any suitable means;
(c) The sealed container of one of the remaining two parts of the
sample and a copy of the memorandum in form VII kept with the
Local (Health) Authority shall, within a period of 7 days, be sent to
the public analyst on requisition made by him to it by any suitable
means.”
Provided that in the case of a sample of food which has been taken from
container bearing Agmark seal, the memorandum in Form VII shall contain
the following additional information namely :-
(a) Grade;
(b) Agmark label No. /Batch No;
(c) Name of packing station,]
18. Memorandum and impression of seal to be sent separately:- A
copy of the memorandum and specimen impression of the seal used to seal
the packet shall be sent, in a sealed packet separately to the public analyst
by any suitable means immediately but not later than the succeeding
working day.”
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13. After going through the judgment passed by the trial Court,
specially the observations made in para No.19 and 20 of its judgement,
which is reproduced as under, this Court does not find merit in the
contention: –
“19. One other dispute raised on behalf of accused is as regards violation
of Rules 17 and 18. It is pertinent to mention here that Rule 17 prescribe
procedures of dispatching containers of samples as one sealed container is
required to be sent to Public Analyst in a sealed packet and other two parts
of the sample are required to be sent to Local Health authority alongwith
Memorandum in Form VII. This fact has been specifically detailed by the
then Food Inspector Shri Sham Lal PW1 who has specifically detailed that
one sealed sample alongwith copy of Form VII was sent to the Public
Analyst, Chandigarh and remaining two sealed sample alongwith Form VII
were sent to Local Health Authority. Manner of sampling and seizure at the
spot by the Food Inspector is corroborated on record from the testimony of
PW2 Dr. A.C.Chaudhary who has accompanied him at the spot. From such a
specific detail given in the statement of PW1, it is evident that there is no
violation of Rule 17 as alleged.
20. Rule 18 of PFA Rules, 1955 provides that copy of Memorandum and
specimen impression of the seal used to seal the packet shall be sent, in a
sealed packet separately to the Public Analyst by any suitable means
immediately but not later than the succeeding working day. From the
testimony of PW1 GFI Sham Lal, it is evident that he has not given a specific
detail of compliance of Rule 18. Though, he has detailed about sending of
sample in compliance of rule 17 to the Public Analyst, but has nowhere
deposed that copy of memorandum and specimen impression of the seal
used to seal the packet was separately sent to the Public Analyst. Though,
this fact was not specifically put to this witness in the cross-examination
and it has been raised for the first time during the course of arguments but
it is pertinent to mention here that from the report of Public Analyst Ex. PD,
it has come that specimen impression of seal used to seal the packet was
also sent separately to the Public Analyst. From the report Ex. PD, it is
clearly evident that seals affixed on the container and the outer cover ofPage 6 of 15
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the sample tallied with the specimen impression of the seal separately sent
by the Food Inspector and the sample was in a condition fit for analysis. In
such circumstances, wherein, there is a specific recital in the report of
Public Analyst that specimen impression of the seal was separately sent by
the Food Inspector, for the mere omission on the part of Food Inspector to
depose as such in his testimony, no benefit can be given to the accused. In
somewhat similar circumstances in a case before Hon’ble Apex Court in
case State Vs. Jai Narain 1984 FAJ Page 25, it was observed that when the
report contains a recital to the effect that the seal affixed on the container
of the sample tallied with the specimen impression separately sent by the
Food Inspector, said recital in the report of Public Analyst must be
presumed to be correct and in view of said presumption, it was not
necessary for the prosecution to adduce evidence to prove that the Food
Inspector had sent separately specimen impression of the seal used for
sealing container. The facts of this case are similar to the case titled State
Vs. Jai Narain cited supra and in such circumstances, wherein, there is a
specific recital in the report of Public Analyst, it cannot be held that there
was non-compliance of Rule 18 in this case.”
14. The last contention of ld. counsel is that there was no violation
of Rule 29 of the PFA Rules on the part of the accused, inasmuch the report
of the Public Analyst shows that sample was coloured with added permitted
sunset yellow synthetic colour. It is argued that there was no prohibited
added colour added to the sample and as such, there was no violation.
15. Rule 23 of the PFA Rules, which is relevant for this case, reads
as under: –
“23. Unauthorised addition of colouring matter prohibited :- The addition
of a colouring matter to any article of food except as specifically permitted
by these rules, is prohibited.”
16. It is clear from the aforesaid Rule that addition of any colouring
matter to any article of food, except as specifically permitted by the Rules of
the PFA Rules, is prohibited. Rule 28 of the PFA Rules provides about the
synthetic food colours, which may be used; whereas, Rule 29 of the PFA
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Rules provides about the use of permitted synthetic food colours in or upon
any food other than those enumerated in the said Rule. Meaning thereby,
except the food items, which are enumerated in Rule 29 of the PFA Rules,
use of permitted synthetic food colour is prohibited in any other food
article.
17 The perusal of the Rule 29 of the PFA Rules would reveal that
Dal Masur is not included therein and as such, use of synthetic food colour
in Dal Masur is strictly prohibited and therefore, the contention of Ld.
counsel for the petitioner that there was no violation of the Rules is without
any merit.
18. On account of the entire discussion as above, it is held that
there is no illegality or perversity in the judgment of conviction as recorded
by the trial Court, which has been correctly affirmed by the appellate Court.
As such, the present petition against the judgment of conviction is hereby
dismissed.
19. As far as the impugned order of sentence is concerned, the
accused-petitioner has been sentenced to undergo the minimum sentence
as provided under the Statute i.e. rigorous imprisonment for a period of
three months and fine of ₹500/- with default sentence of one month.
20. As per the custody certificate, petitioner has already undergone
the actual custody period of seven days and he is not involved in any other
offence. It is also noticed by this Court that offence in question was
committed in September, 1999 and after a protracted trial of more than 8
years, he was ultimately convicted in October 2007 and then his appeal was
dismissed by the Appellate Court in January 2010. The sentence of the
petitioner was suspended by this Court in January 2010 and this way, he is
out on bail for the last more than 15 years.
21. In the above circumstances, whether it will be justifiable to
send him behind bars to carry out the remaining sentence; or can he be
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released on probation; or whether sentence can be reduced for the period
already undergone by him?
22. As per Section 20AA of the PFA Act , the provisions of Probation
of Offenders Act 1958, or Section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are
not applicable to a person convicted of an offence under the provision of
the PFA Act, unless that person is under the 18 years of age.
23. In this case, at the time of recording conviction in 2007, the age
of the petitioner is mentioned to be 36 years as per the custody certificate,
which means that at the time of committing the offence, he was 27 years of
age and not less than 18 years of age. As such, he cannot be granted benefit
of probation in view of Section 20AA of the PFA Act.
24. Although, in Ishar Dass Vs. State of Punjab, 1972 PLR 475, it
was held by Hon’ble Supreme court that provisions of Probation of
Offenders Act, 1958 are not excluded in the case of person found guilty of
offence under the PFA Act, but it is important to notice that Section 20AA
was inserted in PFA Act, 1958 by way of an amendment in 1976 and
therefore, the case of Ishar Dass (supra) is not applicable in the present
case.
25.1 In yet another case titled State of Punjab Vs. Mithu Singh, 1988
(3) SCC 607, it was held by Hon’ble Supreme Court that Section 20AA of the
PFA Act applies also to the offences committed prior to its enactment.
25.2 In the present case, since the offence was committed in 1999;
whereas, the amendment by inserting Section 20AA was brought in 1976, as
such this authority is also of no help to the case of the petitioner so as to
give him the benefit of probation.
26. In Joginder Singh Vs. State of Punjab, 1980 PLR 585, a Full
bench of this Court held that benefit of provisions of the Probation of
Offenders Act, 1958 can be extended even in a case, where minimum
sentence is provided. However, in that case before this Court, the accused
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had been convicted for the offence under Section 61 of the Punjab Excise
Act, 1914. That was not a case committed under the provisions of the PFA
Act and so, not applicable to the facts of present case.
27. In Lakhvir Singh etc. Vs. The State of Punjab and another, 2021
AIR (Supreme Court) 555, benefit of probation was extended in a case,
where minimum sentence was provided. However, that was the case under
the provisions of Indian Penal Code. Similarly in Tarak Nath Keshari Vs.
State of West Bengal, 2023 SCC Online SC 605, the benefit of probation was
granted despite the fact that minimum sentence of imprisonment was
provided, but that was the case under the provisions of Essential
Commodities Act, 1955. Thus, in none of these cases, the provisions of the
PFA Act were applicable.
28. In State of Haryana Vs. Yad Ram 1987(1) RCR (Criminal) 264, a
Full Bench of this Court has held that when conviction is recorded under the
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, then the minimum sentence provided
in the provision cannot be further scaled down.
29. Thus, from the legal position as above, it emerges that when a
conviction is recorded under the provisions of PFA Act, neither the accused
can be granted the benefit of Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 nor he can
be sentenced to the period of imprisonment lesser than as provided in the
Act.
30. However, in the case of Yad Ram (Supra), the effect of Article
21 of the Constitution of India was not discussed, providing for speedy trial.
31. It cannot be disputed that right to speedy and expeditious trial
is one of the most valuable and cherished right guaranteed under the
Constitution. Article 21 of the Constitution of India takes in its sweep the
right to expeditious and fair trial. Even Article 39A of the Constitution of
India recognizes the right of citizens to equal justice and free legal aid. To
put it simply, it is the constitutional duty of the Government to provide the
citizens of the country with such judicial infrastructure and means of access
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of justice so that every person is able to receive an expeditious, inexpensive
and fair trial.
32. Though our Constitution does not expressly declare the right to
speedy trial as a fundamental right, but the said right was recognized in
Hussainara Khatoon & Ors. Vs. Home Secretary, State of Bihar (1980) 1 SCC
81, wherein it was held by Hon’ble Supreme Court that speedy trial is
implicit in the broad sweep and content of Article 21 of the Constitution of
India. Subsequently, in the serious of judgments, Hon’ble Supreme Court has
held that a reasonably expeditious trial is an integral and essential part of
the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21. Hon’ble
Supreme Court has gone to the extent that speedy trial is of the essence of
criminal justice and there can be no doubt that delay in trial by itself
constitute denial of justice.
33. Speaking about the need of speedy trial, the Constitutional
Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kartar Singh Vs. State of Punjab, (1994)
3 SCC 569 has observed as under: –
“The concept of speedy trial is read into Article 21 as an essential part of
the fundamental right to life and liberty guaranteed and preserved under
our Constitution. The right to speedy trial begins with the actual restraint
imposed by arrest and consequent incarceration and continues at all
stages, namely, the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal and revision
so that any possible prejudice that may result from impermissible and
avoidable delay from the time of the commission of the offence till it
consummates into a finality, can be averted. In this context, it may be
noted that the constitutional guarantee of speedy trial is properly reflected
in Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.”
34. As has been observed in the case of Hussainara Khatoon & Ors
(supra), no procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be
regarded as ‘reasonable, fair or just’ and it would fall foul of Article 21.
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35. It has been reiterated by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mahendra
Lal Dass Vs. State of Bihar (2002) 1 SCC 149 that right to speedy trial
encompasses all the stages, namely, stages of investigation, inquiry, trial,
appeal, revision and re-trial. Each case has to be decided on its own merits.
As has been held in P. Ramachandra Rao Vs. State of Karnataka, (2002) 4
SCC 578, it must be left to the judicious discretion of the Court seized of an
individual case to find out from the totality of the circumstances of the case,
if the time consumed up to a given point of time amounted to violation of
Article 21. In State vs. Narayan Waman Nerukar (2002) 7 SCC 6, Hon’ble
Supreme Court held that while considering the question of delay, the Court
has a duty to see whether the prolongation was on account of any delay in
tactics adopted by the accused and other relevant aspects, which
contributed to the delay. There cannot be any empirical formula of
universal application in such matters.
36. In Chander Bhan Vs. State of Haryana, (1996) 1 RCR (Crl) 125,
it has been observed by a Coordinate bench of this Court as under: –
“8. Now it cannot be disputed that the right to speedy and expeditious
trial is one of the most valuable and cherished rights guaranteed under the
Constitution. Fundamental rights were not a teasing illusions to be mocked
at. These were meant to be enforced and made a reality. Fair, just and
reasonable procedure implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution creates a
right in the accused to be tried speedily. Right to speedy trial is the right of
the accused. The fact that a speedy trial is also in public interest or that it
serves the social interest also, does not make it any-the-less the right of the
accused. Right to speedy trial flowing from Article 21 encompasses all the
stages, namely the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and
retrial. This is how the Court shall understand this right and have gone to
the extent of quashing the prosecution after such inordinate delay in
concluding the trial of an accused keeping in view the facts and
circumstances of the case. Keeping a person in suspended animation for 10
years or more without any case at all cannot be within the spirit of the
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to be imposed upon a convict is prescribed by the statute yet keeping in
view the provisions of Article 21 of the Constitution of India and the
interpretation thereof qua the right of an accused to a speedy trial, judicial
compassion can play a role and a convict can be compensated for the
mental agony, which he undergoes on account of protracted trial due to
the fault of the prosecution by this Court in the exercise of its extraordinary
jurisdiction.
9. An identical question had arisen before the apex Court in Braham
Dass v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1988) 2 FAC 13; wherein their
Lordships were pleased to observe as under:-
“Coming to the question of sentence, we find that the appellant had
been acquitted by the trial Court and High Court while reversing the
judgment of acquittal made by the appellate judge has not made
clear reference to Clause (f). The occurrence took place about more
than 8 years back. Records show that the appellant has already
suffered a part of the imprisonment. We do not find any useful
purpose would be served in sending the appellant to jail at this point
of time for undergoing the remaining period of the sentence, though
ordinarily in an anti-social offence punishable under the Prevention
of Food Adulteration Act, the Court should take strict view of such
matter.”
10. This view was followed by this Court in Nand Lal v. State of Haryana
(1992) 1 Rec. Cri R. 82 and Ishwar Singh v. State of Haryana 1994(1) RCR
160. The present case is fully covered by the view expressed by the Apex
Court and by this Court in the judgments cited above and I have no reason
to differ therewith.
11. For the reasons mentioned above, the conviction of the petitioner
for an offence under Section 16(1)(a)(i) read with Section 7 of the Act is
hereby maintained. However, keeping in view the facts and circumstances
of the case and the fact that the petitioner has already faced the agony of
the protracted prosecution and suffered mental harassment for a long
period of ten years, his sentence is reduced to the period of sentence
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already undergone. Sentence of fine is, however maintained along with its
default clause.”
37. Another Coordinate Bench of this Court has taken the similar
view in Vikas Mehta Vs. State of Haryana, Law Finder doc ID #2041916 by
placing reliance upon Des Raj Vs. State of Haryana, 1996(1) RCR (Criminal)
689.
38. Keeping in mind the abovesaid legal principles, when facts and
circumstance of the present case are examined, it is noted that petitioner
faced protracted trial from 1999 till 2007, when he was ultimately convicted
by the trial Court. There is nothing on record to indicate that there was any
attempt on the part of the accused-petitioner to delay the trial. His appeal
was dismissed in 2010. After the present Criminal Revision was admitted by
this Court in 2010, because of the huge pendency, the file could not be
listed for final hearing and when it has now been listed for final hearing in
2025, it is almost more than 15 years from the date of its admission.
39. Thus, the sword of conviction kept on hanging on the head of
the petitioner for the last 26 years. It is easy to say that for almost all the
time, the petitioner was on bail, but one cannot imagine the agony &
trauma, which is faced by such a person, whose conviction has been
recorded by the Court. The Court also cannot ignore the age factor,
inasmuch as at the time when the offence was committed in 1999,
petitioner was hardly 27 years of age. Now, after passing of the 26 years, he
is 53 years of age and so, sending him behind bars at this stage to undergo
the remainder of the sentence, will not be in the interest of justice.
40. Keeping in mind all the aforesaid circumstances, this Court is
not inclined to direct the petitioner to undergo remainder of the sentence.
Rather, the impugned order of sentence as passed by the trial Court and
affirmed by the Appellate Court, is hereby modified. The sentence of the
petitioner is reduced to the period already undergone by him. However, the
sentence of fine as imposed upon the petitioner is increased from ₹500/- to
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₹10000/-, which is required to be deposited by him before Ld. CJM, Hisar,
within a period of 4 weeks from the date of receipt of the certified copy of
the instant order. It is made clear that in case the enhanced fine is not
deposited within the aforesaid period of four weeks as per this order, the
present order reducing the sentence of the petitioner to the period already
undergone, shall automatically stand vacated and in that eventuality,
petitioner will have to undergo the actual sentence of 3 months apart from
the sentence of default imposed by Ld. Chief Judicial Magistrate, Hisar.
The present Criminal Revision stands disposed of accordingly.
(DEEPAK GUPTA)
03.04.2025 JUDGE
Vivek
Whether speaking/reasoned? Yes
Whether reportable? Yes
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