Telangana High Court
V. Surendra Babu, Hyderabad vs Managing Director And Others, Hyd And 4 … on 3 April, 2025
Author: Nagesh Bheemapaka
Bench: Nagesh Bheemapaka
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA
WRIT PETITION No. 11203 OF 2012
O R D E R:
Petitioner is stated to have joined the respondent –
State Bank of Hyderabad (now merged with State Bank of India)
as Clerk-cum-Typist in 1983; he got promotion as Deputy
Manager in Middle Management Cadre Scale:II on 01.12.2007.
He was transferred to Chennai, Tirupathi and Tarnaka Branch
of Hyderabad. While working thereat, during 09.06.2008 and
01.03.2010, on the ground that petitioner committed several
misconducts more particularly in respect of rent reimbursement
and making outside borrowings without permission of the bank,
he was suspended on 01.03.2010. The case of petitioner in this
connection is that while working at Chennai in 2001, he took
residential accommodation belonging to Dr. Vimal Joseph
Devadas after completing formalities and documentation
between landlord and the 1st respondent bank. While so, the
bank provided to its officers to retain the leased residential
accommodation at the last place of work or at place convenient
for the sake of family as the children’s education should not
suffer. As petitioner was transferred to Tarnaka Branch, his
children’s education was still continuing at Chennai, he
2
retained the leased accommodation by renewing it periodically
and as usual the bank was remitting rents to the landlord and
for more than eight years, there has been no issue.
Vide disciplinary proceedings, dated 18.12.2010,
the 4th respondent- disciplinary authority & Deputy General
Manager served a charge memo on petitioner framing as many
as eight charges, for which, on 08.04.2011, he is stated to have
submitted written statement, denying the charges. The 4th
respondent, not satisfying with the same, appointed the 5th
respondent as Inquiry Officer vide letter dated 11.02.2011. The
Enquiry Officer submitted his report on 14.05.2011 holding
charges 1 to 5 proved and 6 to 8 not proved. On 07.07.2011,
the 3rd respondent – Appointing Authority & Deputy General
Manager issued a show cause notice to petitioner indicating
punishment of ‘reduction to lower grade from MMGS-II to
JMGS-I and placing him at a starting basic pay of JMGS-I i.e.
Rs.14,500/- and further, the period of suspension was not
treated as duty. The increments in the suspension period was
cut and the period of suspension of duty has not been counted
as service. Petitioner submitted explanation on 18.07.2011
stating that enquiry was not conducted as per rules and
documents were not shown or given as required to submit the
3
explanation. Further, he had stated that landlord who is the
prime evidence was not examined and Sri K. Venugopal, whose
report was taken into consideration for establishing the charges
was not examined in the enquiry and petitioner was not given
opportunity to rebut the evidence of Sri Venugopal. However,
the 3rd respondent vide impugned proceedings dated
23.07.2011 imposed penalty of ‘reduction to lower grade from
MMGS-II to JMGS-I and placed petitioner at starting basic pay
of JMGS-I i.e.Rs.14,500/-. The petitioner will earn regular
increment after completion of every year from the date of such
placement. The period of suspension will be treated as off-duty
whereby he will not be eligible for any payment other than the
subsistence allowance already paid to him. He will not be
eligible for any increment during the period of suspension and
the period of suspension will not be counted for service.
Petitioner preferred Appeal on 08.09.2011 to the 2nd respondent
– Appellate Authority, which, after considering the entire
disciplinary proceedings, by order dated 24.01.2012, reduced
the punishment to that of ‘reduction to lower grade from MMGS-
II to JMGS-I and place him at the basic pay of Rs.17,500/- in
JMGS-I. He shall earn his regular increment after completion of
every year from the date of such placement. He will be eligible
4
for promotion after one year from the date of the order of
pendency. Other terms of the penalty shall remain unchanged’.
Aggrieved thereby, petitioner is before this Court.
2. Sri Y.V. Satyanarayana, learned counsel for
petitioner submits that charges levelled against petitioner are
vague, not specific and not in conformity with the disciplinary
regulations. He submits that crucial documents were not
supplied so as to enable his client to submit reply during the
course of enquiry nor principal witness was examined on whose
report, charges 1 to 3 were held proved in the enquiry as also
the defence witness Dr. Vinod Joseph Devadass who signed the
lease agreement as GPA of land owner which is fatal to the case
of respondents. According to learned counsel, enquiry report
was not supplied at the first instance before accepting the said
report by the disciplinary authority which is in clear violation of
Article 311(2) of the Constitution. Finally, it is urged that the 2nd
respondent – appellate authority passed non-speaking order,
impugned in this Writ Petition, without assigning any reasons.
In support of his submissions, learned counsel
placed reliance on the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
5
in Surat Chandra Chakrabarthy v. State of West Bengal 1,
Government of A.P. v. A. Venkata Raidu 2, State of
Uttaranchal v. Khark Singh 3, State of M.P. v. Chintaman
Sadashiva Vishampayan 4, Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner
of Police 5, State of Uttar Pradesh v. C.S. Sharma 6, Oryx
Fisheries Private Limited v. Union of India 7 and Roop Singh
Negi v. Punjab National Bank 8.
3. Sri Ch. Siva Reddy, learned Senior Counsel on
behalf of the respondent bank, based on the counter affidavit
filed by the Deputy General Manger, submits that as per the
bank rules, any officer, who is transferred in the middle of the
academic year would be provided with reimbursement of
accommodation at the place where from he has been
transferred. Accordingly, petitioner was permitted for rent
reimbursement at Chennai from where he was transferred. After
his transfer to Tarnaka, he misused the payment of rents to the
landlords at Chennai from 17.10.2008 to 02.02.2010. He made
the payment of rent in different methods which are unknown to
1
AIR 1971 SC 752
2
(2007) 1 SCC 338
3
(2008) 2 SCC L & S 698
4
AIR 1961 SC 1623
5
(1999) 2 SCC 10
6
AIR 1968 158
7
(2010) 13 SCC 427
8
(2009) 2 SCC 570
6
the bank. Most of the payment vouchers were not made
available in the bank. The misconduct committed by petitioner
was specified clearly in charge Nos. 1 to 5. It is submitted
further that during the departmental enquiry, petitioner was
given ample opportunities to defend his case and all the
documents relied upon by the management were served on
petitioner and there were no allegations with regard to holding
of enquiry and the findings of the Enquiry Authority. He
submits that the Appointing Authority / Disciplinary Authority
sent letter dated 07.07.2011 to petitioner along with the
findings of Enquiry Officer dated 14.05.2011 and the orders of
Disciplinary Authority dated 08.06.2011 proposing the
punishment and sought for his submissions, if any. If any
documents are not provided to petitioner which were not relied
by the bank, that cannot prejudice his interests. Learned
counsel submits that bank need not examine landlord during
the departmental enquiry but the burden to prove that house
taken for rent belongs to a particular landlord and the rent was
paid to him, was on petitioner who failed to establish the same.
It was not the issue whether he stayed in the rented
accommodation or not, but he misled the management in
utilizing the facility of the leased accommodation. Petitioner also
7
has not established that money transactions between the
landlord and the tenant on account of alleged repairs and also
the adjustment of monthly rents with the consent of landlord for
13 months as he alleged; in view of the misconduct committed
by petitioner there was loss to the bank to the tune of
Rs.2,27,700/- towards rent.
According to learned Senior Counsel, it is well-
settled that departmental enquiry is not a criminal proceeding
to establish the charges beyond all reasonable doubts. The
preponderance of possibilities is a guiding principle to establish
the misconduct in the departmental enquiries. When the
records clearly speak that payment of rent was made by
irregular methods and against the regular practice of the bank,
the question of examining the landlord does not arise. He
submits that in respect of departmental enquires, the principles
are well-settled more particularly with regard to intervention of
the Courts and Tribunals. In this regard, he relied on the
judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana
v. Rattan Singh 9, State of Karnataka v. M. Gangaraj 10, GM
9
AIR 1977 SC 1512
10
(2020) 3 SCC 423
8
Operations S.B.I. v. R. Periyaswami 11, Union of India v.
Dorai Swami (dated 19.04.2022), Boloram Bordoloi v.
Lakhimi Gaolia Bank 12, Chairman LIC of India v. A.
Masilamani 13. Finally, learned Senior Counsel submits that
departmental enquiry was conducted in accordance with the
provisions of law and the bank rules. The Enquiry Authority has
categorically held that charges 1 to 5 were established by the
management and by following the rules of the bank, the
competent authority awarded the punishment. The Appellate
Authority, after considering the material on record, reduced the
punishment awarded by the Appointing Authority, hence, the
same need no interference at the hands of this Court.
4. Having heard learned counsel on either side,
perused the record.
5. The first contention raised by learned counsel for
petitioner is that charges are vague and inconsistent. According
to petitioner, no evidence was led to show that he was not
staying in the leased accommodation during the disputed period
nor was there any evidence to show that rents were not received
11
(2015) 3 SCC 101
12
(2021) 1 SCR 858
13
AIR Online 2012 SC 426
9
by the landlord for the said period. He submits that charges 1 to
3 could be proved by examining the landlord Dr. Vimal Joseph
Devadas or his father Dr. Jamesh Joseph. However, learned
Senior Counsel submits that petitioner admitted that he
understood the charges mentioned in the charge sheet during
the enquiry; even though he is entitled for leased
accommodation, he failed to give the correct particulars of the
landlord and he entered into an agreement of lease with one
person and remitted the rent to some other person which fact
was established in the departmental enquiry. When the record
clearly shows that lease agreement was entered with Dr. Vimal
Joseph Devadas, the real owner was Dr. James Joseph and in
the application, the address of the house was mentioned as
Door No. 21, Old No. 131, Vanniar, 1st street, whereas he has
taken permission to take on lease H.No. 134, Vanniar Street,
Choolaimeda, Chennai-94 belonging to Dr. Vimal Joseph
Devadas, hence, the burden is on petitioner to prove that house
taken for rent belongs to particular landlord and rent was paid
to him. Further, petitioner failed to establish that the entire
amount received from the bank towards the leased
accommodation was paid to the correct landlord.
10
6. In view of the rival contentions, it is to be seen that
to substantiate charges 1 to 5, no documentary evidence was
produced by the respondent bank. The allegations were made
based on vouchers, but they failed to produce the same during
enquiry and no voucher was marked in the findings of the
Enquiry officer. The respondent bank except stating that
charges are clear and unambiguous and that petitioner also
stated in the enquiry that he understood the charges, have not
stated how charges are clear and distinct from each other, in
conformity with Regulation 68(2) (ii) of the State Bank of
Hyderabad (Officers) Disciplinary Regulations on which charges
were framed. In this connection, Regulation 68(2)(iii) gains
importance. It postulates that ‘where it is proposed to hold an
enquiry, the Disciplinary Authority shall frame definite and
distinct charges on the basis of the allegations against the officer
and the articles of charge, together with a statement of
allegations, list of documents relied on along with copy of such
documents and list of witnesses along with copy of Statement of
witnesses, if any on which they are based shall be communicated
in writing to the Officer, who shall be required to submit, within
such time as may be specified by the Disciplinary Authority.’ In
this case, admittedly, no list of witnesses and documents is
11
furnished. In the judgments relied on by the learned counsel
for petitioner in Surat Chandra Chakrabarthy‘s case (supra),
it is held that ‘in this connection, reference may be made to
Fundamental Rule 55 which provides, inter alia, that without
prejudice to the provisions of the Public Servants Enquiry Act,
1850, no order of dismissal removal or reduction shall be passed
on a member of service unless he is informed in writing of the
grounds on which it is proposed, to take action and has been
afforded an adequate opportunity of defending himself. The
grounds on which it is proposed to take action have to be reduced
to the form of a definite charge or charges which have to be
communicated to the person charged together with a statement of
the allegations on which each charge is based and any other
circumstance which it is proposed to be taken into consideration
in passing orders has also to be stated. This rule embodies a
principle which is one of the basic contents of a reasonable or
adequate opportunity for defending oneself. If a person is not told
clearly and definitely what the allegations are on which the
charges preferred against him are founded, he cannot possibly,
by projecting his own imagination, discover all the facts and
circumstances that may be in the contemplation of the authorities
to be established against him’. In the absence of such
12
particulars, this Court finds some force in the contention of
learned counsel that charges are vague.
7. As regards the other contention that crucial
documents were not supplied to petitioner for giving reply to the
charges during the course of enquiry and crucial witnesses were
not examined, is concerned, it is to be observed that petitioner
addressed the Enquiry Officer for supply of documents and his
defence witnesses to be called during the course of enquiry
dated 11.03.2011. According to petitioner, no document
including lease agreement was supplied to him; further,
vouchers and other documents, which were referred to in the
charge memo including lease agreement were not supplied.
Whereas learned Senior Counsel submits that documents
relevant and required to establish the charges were filed by the
bank and petitioner was given opportunity, however, he failed to
rebut the evidences, hence, he has no right to claim now that
the bank has not produced the documents sought by him. In
this regard, it is to be observed that when petitioner made a
specific request for supply of documents by the letter dated
11.03.2011, no documents were supplied but imputations were
read out and exhibits were marked. Though respondents
contend that they supplied documents, no proof in support of
13
the said contention was filed. Hence, the contention of learned
counsel for petitioner cannot be brushed aside.
8. Further, the charge memo was issued based on the
report of Sri K. Venugopal. The said report was also not
furnished to petitioner at the time of issuing the charge memo
nor before proceeding with the enquiry. However, it was placed
as MR 2/2 during the course of enquiry and marked as Ex.ME
1/1 and the author of the said document was also not examined
which is contrary to the procedure and Regulations of the bank.
Though respondents contend that in the departmental enquiry
strict rules of evidence are not applicable but preponderance of
probabilities is the guiding principle, the basic principle that
when a report is filed to establish the charge which was
produced behind the back of petitioner and which was only the
basis for establishing the charge, examining Sri K. Venugopal is
must and he has to be produced as evidence and an opportunity
ought to have been given to petitioner to cross-examine him. Not
only that, respondents failed to examine the defence witness
s Dr. Vimal Joseph Devadas, S/o Jamers Joseph, landlord who
is the signatory to the lease agreement and charges 1 to 4 are
based on the lease agreement signed by Dr. Vimal Joseph
Devadas. In the charge memo dated 18.12.2010, the original
14
owner of the house was shown as Dr. James Joseph but not Dr.
Vimal Joseph Devadas and a wrong lease agreement was
submitted and rents were paid through various methods to
Dr. Vimal Joseph Devadas and caused loss to the bank.
Petitioner therefore, requested through letter dated 11.03.2011
to examine Dr. Vimal Joseph Devadas as defence witness No.2,
but the Enquiry Officer did not consider the said request.
Failure to examine the material witness is fatal to the case of
respondents.
9. In this connection, it is relevant to notice the law
laid down on the subject. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Chintaman Sadashiva Waishampayan‘s case (supra) , held
as under:
” Then as to the file of the Razakars it is really surprising that
this file should be reported to have been lost. The respondent’s case was
that the Razakars in question for whose release he is alleged to have
accepted the bribe were released on the recommendation of the District
Superintendent of Police and under the orders of the Civil Administrator of
Adilabad. The file was therefore relevant and, according to the respondent,
the suggestion that the file had been lost was untrue and it was not
produced because it was apprehended that, if produced, it would support
his defence. It is true that the enquiry officer stated that he had made a
search in his office but it could not be traced and that he was enquiring
from the Collector and trying to find out whether the file could be found in
the Collector’s office. Apparently the respondent was given a letter
addressed to the Collector wherein he was requested to show the file to the
15respondent if available. He was, however, told that the file was not
traceable. It is in connection with the alleged loss of this file that the
criticism made by Mr Justice Sen about the indecent haste made in the
enquiry becomes relevant. If only more diligent efforts had been made to
discover the file the enquiry officer would have been able to see whether
the plea made by the respondent on the strength of the said file was
genuine or not. It is in the light of these facts that the High Court has held
that the enquiry was not satisfactory, and that in substance the
respondent had been denied a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges
framed against him. There is no dispute that under Article 311(2) the
respondent is entitled to have such a reasonable opportunity. A proper
opportunity must be afforded to him at the stage of the enquiry after the
charge is supplied to him as well as at the second stage when punishment
is about to be imposed on him. If the first enquiry was materially defective
and denied the respondent an opportunity to prove his case it is
impossible to hold that a reasonable opportunity guaranteed to a public
servant by Article 311(2) had been afforded to the respondent in the
present case.
10. In Khark Singh’s case (supra), it has been held by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court as under:
” A reading of the enquiry report also shows that the
respondent herein was not furnished with the required documents. The
Department’s witnesses were not examined in his presence. Though the
respondent who was the writ petitioner specifically stated so in the
affidavit before the High Court in the writ proceedings, those averments
were specifically controverted in the reply-affidavit filed by the
Department. Mere denial for the sake of denial is not an answer to the
specific allegations made in the affidavit. Likewise, there is no evidence
to show that after submission of the report by the enquiry officer to the
disciplinary authority, the respondent herein was furnished with the
copy of the said report along with all the relied upon documents. When
all these infirmities were specifically pleaded and brought to the notice
16of the appellate authority (i.e Forest Conservator), he rejected the same
but has not pointed out the relevant materials from the records of the
enquiry officer and disciplinary authority to support his decision. Hence,
the appellate authority has also committed an error in dismissing the
appeal of the respondent.
11. In Kuldeep Singh‘s case (supra), the Hon’ble
Supreme Court held as under:
” The original complaint was not placed on the record and it
was the statement, recorded by SHO D.D Sharma, which was produced
before the enquiry officer. The absence of the original complaint,
therefore, indicates that there was, in fact, no complaint in existence
which further supports the statement of the Department’s own witness,
Smt Meena Mishra that no payment was made by her on 22-2-1990.
The enquiry officer did not sit with an open mind to hold an
impartial domestic enquiry which is an essential component of the
principles of natural justice as also that of “reasonable opportunity”,
contemplated by Article 311(2) of the Constitution. The “bias” in favour
of the Department had so badly affected the enquiry officer’s whole
faculty of reasoning that even non-production of the complainants was
ascribed to the appellant which squarely was the fault of the
Department. Once the Department knew that the labourers were
employed somewhere in Devli Khanpur, their presence could have been
procured and they could have been produced before the enquiry officer
to prove the charge framed against the appellant. He has acted so
arbitrarily in the matter and has found the appellant guilty in such a
coarse manner that it becomes apparent that he was merely carrying
out the command from some superior officer who perhaps directed “fix
him up”.
12. In C.S. Sharma‘s case (supra), the Hon’ble Court
observed thus:
17
6. The first question is whether this inquiry was made
under sub-rule (1) or (3) of Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification,
Control and Appeal) Rules. It is an admitted fact that Sharma was a
temporary employee and therefore his case would fall to be governed by
sub-rule (3) of Rule 55 if it could be said that the enquiry which was
being made was for a specific fault or on account of his unsuitability for
service. Sub-Rule (1) of Rule 55 is a general rule for enquiries where the
conduct of a person is inquired into for misconduct but sub-rule (3) says
that that sub-rule shall not apply where it is proposed to terminate the
employment of a probationer, or to dismiss, remove or reduce in rank a
temporary government servant for any specific fault or on account of his
unsuitability for the service. Sub-rule (3) says that in such cases, the
probationer or temporary government servant concerned shall be
apprised of the grounds of such proposal, given an opportunity to show
cause against the action to be taken against him, and his explanation in
this behalf, if any, shall be duly considered before orders are passed by
the competent authority. If the third sub-rule applied, it is obvious that
the kind of enquiry made complied with its requirements. The first sub-
rule, however, provides for a full-blooded enquiry which is the
counterpart of a regular trial: witnesses have to be examined in support
of the allegations, opportunity has to be given to the delinquent officer to
cross-examine them and to lead evidence in his defence. In our
judgment the present case was governed by the first sub-rule and not
the third sub-rule. The third sub-rule deals with the unsuitability of an
officer for the service or with a charge for any specific fault. This fault
means a fault in the execution of his duties and not a misconduct such
as taking bribe etc. which are charges of a more serious nature,
affecting the character of the individual concerned. The collocation of
the words “any specific fault” or “on account of unsuitability for service”
give the clue of the distinction between the third sub-rule and the first
sub-rule. An officer who is, for example, habitually lazy or makes
mistakes frequently or is not polite or decorous may be considered
unsuitable for the service. Another officer who makes a grievous default
in the execution of his work may be charged for the specific individual
fault, that is a dereliction or defect in the execution of that duty. Where
18there is an allegation that an officer is guilty of a misconduct such as
accepting bribe or showing favours, the matter is not one of specific fault
in the execution of his work but something more. That matter will fall to
be governed by the first sub-rule because you cannot charge a man with
criminal conduct without affording him adequate opportunity to clear
his character. Mr Aggarwal fairly pointed out that the Government had
appointed the enquiring officer to take action under Rule 55(1) and it is
thus quite clear that the Government viewed the matter also in this
light.
It, therefore, follows that if the procedure under the first
sub-rule had to be followed, adequate opportunity had to be given to
Sharma to lead evidence on his own behalf to clear himself of serious
charges which were levelled against him and give evidence on his own
behalf. It is obvious that he has not been able to lead his defence or to
give evidence on his own behalf. The question is whether he has to
thank himself or the omission proceeded because of some action on the
part of the enquiring officer. Considering the whole matter we are
satisfied that the enquiring officer was to blame and we shall now show
why we think so.
Throughout the enquiry, as late as February 24, 1954,
Sharma had again and again given indication that he would lead
evidence in his defence. At first he had given a list of three witnesses
which he later amplified to four leaving out one from the original list and
adding two new names. He had also stated that he wanted to examine
himself in his defence. The learned Commissioner who was holding the
enquiry on more than one occasion stated that he would be afforded this
opportunity and also that a date would be fixed for the examination of
the defence witnesses. It is true that Sharma was playing for time and
on the 2nd of February (before the date of hearing came) he put in an
application that he would like an adjournment of 20 days before he
submitted a final list of witnesses with their addresses. This application
was rejected on February 6 but between February 6 and April 8, when
the report was made, two long months passed and it was possible for
the Commissioner to have fixed a date, on which, if he was so minded,
19Sharma could bring his witnesses in support of his case or tender
himself for examination. No action was taken between February 6, 1954
and April 8, 1954 to enable Sharma to lead his defence, if any, in
support of his part of the case. This omission in our judgment was
sufficient to vitiate the whole proceeding because no enquiry of this type
in which there are charges of a criminal nature can be said to be
properly conducted when the defence of the officer is either frustrated or
ruled out.
It was submitted by Mr Agarwal, that the witnesses were
being summoned by him to clear himself of the charge of owning a car
without having the visible means to afford it and this charge was not
accepted by the State Government. This is true enough, but the State
Government came on the scene much later. In so far as the enquiring
officer was concerned, he had accepted the allegation against Sharma
and even if the original list be considered, Sharma was entitled to lead
evidence with regard to the car itself. It is possible that if a date had
been fixed, he would, not only have led evidence with regard to the car,
but would have brought witnesses to clear himself of other charges, but
no such opportunity was clearly afforded to him. Further before the case
closed, the Commissioner had before him a list of four witnesses and
fair play demanded that he should have fixed a date and left it to
Sharma to procure attendance of his witnesses on that date, but if no
date was fixed, Sharma was not expected to bring his witnesses day
after day in the hope that the Commissioner would examine them any
day. The enquiry cannot be said to comply with the elementary
principles of natural justice and therefore we have no hesitation in
accepting the decision of the High Court that the enquiry was vitiated.
13. In view of the discussion supra, in particular, the
law extracted, this Court is in complete agreement with learned
counsel for petitioner that enquiry was conducted without
following the Regulations of the bank.
20
14. Learned counsel for petitioner also contends that
enquiry report was not supplied to his client at the first instance
before accepting the enquiry report. It is submitted that
wherever disciplinary authority is not the Enquiry Authority,
then the enquiry report has to be given at the first place before
accepting the same by the Disciplinary Authority to the
delinquent officer is the law declared by the Hon’ble Apex Court
in ECIL v. Karunakar 14. In the said judgment, it is held by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court as under:
” What are the duties of the enquiry officer appointed by the
disciplinary authority to conduct the inquiry, is the next question and
this Court in A. N. D’Silva v. The Union Of India . 1962 Supp (1) SCR
968, AIR 1962 SC 1130 has in terms held that the question of imposing
punishment can only arise after inquiry is made and the report of the
enquiry officer is received. It is for the punishing authority to propose
the punishment and not for the inquiring authority to do so. The latter
has, when so required, to appraise the evidence, to record its conclusion
and if it thinks proper to suggest the appropriate punishment. But
neither the conclusion on the evidence nor the punishment which the
inquiring authority may regard as appropriate, is binding upon the
punishing authority. In that case, the charge served upon the
delinquent officer by the enquiry officer itself incorporated the proposed
punishment. Hence it was also observed that in the communication
addressed by the enquiry officer the punishment proposed to be
imposed upon the appellant if he was found guilty of the charges, could
not properly be set out. Two things, therefore, emerge from this decision,
viz., that it is not the function of the enquiry officer to propose any14
(1005) 5 SCC 532
21punishment even after he records findings of guilt against the
delinquent employee. Much less can the enquiry officer do so at the
stage of serving the charges on the employee. Secondly, it is for the
disciplinary authority to propose the punishment after receipt of the
report of the enquiry officer which suggests that before the authority
proposes the punishment, it must have applied its mind to the evidence
and the findings recorded by the enquiry officer”.
15. In the present case, admittedly, the disciplinary
authority is not the Enquiry Officer and further, he has
accepted the enquiry report and held that charges are proved
and recommended major penalty without supplying the enquiry
report at the first instance, however, at the time of issuing show
cause notice proposing punishment, the report was supplied by
which time, enquiry report was already accepted and a decision
was taken to impose a major penalty. Added to this, as
contended by learned counsel, the 2nd respondent passed the
order impugned without assigning any reasons. The said
Authority simply reduced the punishment but it has not stated
on what ground, it arrived to such a conclusion. In this regard,
learned counsel relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Oryx Fisheries Pvt. Ltd. case (supra), wherein it is
held as under:
” It is of course true that the show-cause notice
cannot be read hypertechnically and it is well settled that it is to be read
22
reasonably. But one thing is clear that while reading a show-cause
notice the person who is subject to it must get an impression that he
will get an effective opportunity to rebut the allegations contained in the
show-cause notice and prove his innocence. If on a reasonable reading
of a show-cause notice a person of ordinary prudence gets the feeling
that his reply to the show-cause notice will be an empty ceremony and
he will merely knock his head against the impenetrable wall of
prejudged opinion, such a show-cause notice does not commence a fair
procedure especially when it is issued in a quasi-judicial proceeding
under a statutory regulation which promises to give the person
proceeded against a reasonable opportunity of defence.
41. In the instant case the appellate order contains reasons.
However, absence of reasons in the original order cannot be
compensated by disclosure of reason in the appellate order”.
16. In Roopsingh Negi‘s case (supra), it has been
observed as under:
” Furthermore, the order of the disciplinary authority as
also the appellate authority are not supported by any reason. As the orders
passed by them have severe civil consequences, appropriate reasons should
have been assigned. If the enquiry officer had relied upon the confession
made by the appellant, there was no reason as to why the order of discharge
passed by the criminal court on the basis of selfsame evidence should not
have been taken into consideration. The materials brought on record
pointing out the guilt are required to be proved. A decision must be arrived at
on some evidence, which is legally admissible. The provisions of the Evidence
Act may not be applicable in a departmental proceeding but the principles of
natural justice are. As the report of the enquiry officer was based on merely
ipse dixit as also surmises and conjectures, the same could not have been
sustained. The inferences drawn by the enquiry officer apparently were not
23supported by any evidence. Suspicion, as is well known, however high may
be, can under no circumstances be held to be a substitute for legal proof.
17. Taking into consideration the circumstances stated
supra and the law laid down, as extracted above, this Court is of
the opinion that petitioner is entitled to the relief sought and
Writ Petition deserves to be allowed.
18. The Writ Petition is accordingly, allowed, setting
aside the impugned orders dated 23.07.2011 of the 3rd
respondent and the one dated 24.01.2012 of the 2nd respondent.
Consequently, it is directed that respondents shall issue all
consequential benefits to petitioner, as is admissible, as per
Rules. No costs.
19. Consequently, miscellaneous Applications, if any
shall stand closed.
————————————-
NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA, J
03rd April 2025
ksld
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