Jharkhand High Court
Md. Mahmud Alam @ Mahmud @ Nepali vs State Of Jharkhand on 4 April, 2025
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad
2025:JHHC:10447-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Cr. Appeal (DB) No.940 of 2024
------
Md. Mahmud Alam @ Mahmud @ Nepali, aged about 33 years, Son
of Md. Siddque, at present Resident of Fatima Nagar, Near
Sadbhavna Maidan, Dhipatoli, P.O. & P.S. Pundag, District-Ranchi,
permanent residence of-Rai Bazar, P.O. & P.S.-Khelari, District-
Ranchi, Jharkhand
.... .... Appellant
Versus
State of Jharkhand .... .... Respondent
With
Cr. Appeal (DB) No.937 of 2024
------
Firoz Khan, aged about 46 years, Son of Hakim Khan, resident of
Village-Azad Nagar, Bazar tarn, PO-Khelari, PS-Mackluskiganj, Dist-
Ranchi. .... .... Appellant
Versus
The State of Jharkhand (Through ATS)
.... .... Respondent
With
Cr. Appeal (DB) No.938 of 2024
------
Mohammad Zahir Ansari @ Zahir Ansari, aged about 56 years, Son
of Ismail Ansari @ Ismail, resident of Muslim Mohalla, Mahavir
Nagar, PO-Khelari, PS-Mackluskiganj, Dist-Ranchi.
.... .... Appellant
Versus
The State of Jharkhand (Through ATS)
.... .... Respondent
With
Cr. Appeal (DB) No.941 of 2024
------
Minku Khan @ Shahriyar, aged about 33 years, Son of Haider Ali
Khan, resident of Rochap, PO+PS Patratu, Dist-Ramgarh.
1
2025:JHHC:10447-DB
.... .... Appellant
Versus
The State of Jharkhand (Through ATS)
.... .... Respondent
With
Cr. Appeal (DB) No.942 of 2024
------
Ezaj Ansari , aged about 41 years, Son of Shahid Ansari, resident of
G-Type Colony Madarsa, PO+PS Khelari, Dist-Ranchi.
.... .... Appellant
Versus
The State of Jharkhand (Through ATS)
.... .... Respondent
CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP KUMAR SRIVASTAVA
------
For the Appellants : Mr. Birendra Kumar, Advocate
Mr. Raj Kishore Sahu, Advocate
[In Cr. Appeal(DB) No.940/2024]
: Mr. Jitendra Shankar Singh, Adv.
Mr. Abhishek Prasad, Advocate
[In Cr. Appeal(DB) Nos.937, 938, 941, 942 of 2024
For the State : Mrs. Anuradha Sahay, APP
[In Cr. Appeal(DB) No.940/2024]
: Mr. Gautam Rakesh, APP
[In Cr. Appeal(DB) No.937/2024]
: Mr. Rakesh Ranjan, APP
[In Cr. Appeal(DB) Nos.938 & 941 of 2024
: Mr. Rajneesh Vardhan, APP
[In Cr. Appeal(DB) No.942/2024]
------
CAV on 25.02.2025 Pronounced on 04/04/2025
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.
Prayer
1. All the appeals preferred on behalf of the appellants under
Section 21(4) of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 for
2
2025:JHHC:10447-DB
setting aside the order dated 11.03.2024 passed in Misc. Cr.
Application No.801 of 2024 [In Cr. Appeal No. 940 of 2024],
order dated 07.03.2024 passed in Misc. Cr. Application No.706
of 2024 [In Cr. Appeal (DB) No.937 of 2024], order dated
07.03.2024 passed in Misc. Cr. Application No.708 of 2024 [In
Cr. Appeal (DB) No.938 of 2024], order dated 21.03.2024
passed in Misc. Cr. Application No.887 of 2024 [In Cr. Appeal
(DB) No.941 of 2024] and order dated 21.03.2024 passed in
Misc. Cr. Application No.882 of 2024 [In Cr. Appeal (DB)
No.942 of 2024] by the learned A.J.C. XVIII-cum-Spl. Judge,
ATS, Ranchi, in connection with ATS Court Case No.01 of
2024, arising out of ATS P.S. Case No.10 of 2023, whereby
and whereunder, the appellants’ prayer for regular bail have
been rejected.
2. Since all these appeals arise out of the common P.S. Case
being ATS P.S. Case No.10 of 2023, as such, with the consent
of learned counsel for the parties, these cases are being taken
up together and are being disposed of by this common order.
Prosecution case
3. The brief facts of the prosecution case as per the F.I.R. leading
to these Criminal Appeals is that on 20.07.2023, at 15:00
hours, the S.P., ATS, Jharkhand, Ranchi has received a secret
information that the criminals of Aman Srivastava gang had
extorted a huge amount of extortion money from the coal
3
2025:JHHC:10447-DB
businessmen and contractors by threatening to kill them and
they are coming to Ranchi through Bhurkunda-Patratu Road. A
raiding team was formed on this information and reached the
Ranchi Patratu Ring Road and checked the vehicles coming
from Patratu side. Meanwhile, a white Scorpio vehicle was
coming at a very speed from Patratu -Pithoria side which was
stopped by the raiding team and two persons travelling in the
vehicle got very scared after seeing the police party and on
being asked, they told their name as Ezaj (appellant in Cr.
Appeal (DB) No.942 of 2024) and Minku Khan(appellant in Cr.
Appeal (DB) No.941 of 2024) and it was stated that they were
working for Aman Srivastava gang and has already been sent
to jail in different cases related to Aman Srivastava Gang.
4. On search, two mobile phones were recovered from the
possession of Ezaj Ansari and Minku Khan, apart from that, a
white colour bag containing a sum of Rs. 49,83,000/ was
recovered from beneath the rear seat of the said vehicle. On
enquiry, the accused persons have stated that the said amount
was handed over to them by Surendra Bhuiyan, an associate
of Ravi Sardar, and the money has to hand over to Jahir Ansari
(appellant in Cr. Appeal (DB) No.938 of 2024), Firoj Khan
(appellant in Cr. Appeal (DB) No.937 of 2024) and Mahmud
Alam@ Nepali (appellant in Cr. Appeal (DB) No.941 of 2024)
near Alam Hospital, and the said money was collected as
4
2025:JHHC:10447-DB
Rangdari by Aman Srivastava gang from different traders.
5. Hence, the FIR being ATS P.S. Case No.10 of 2023 dated
20.07.2023 has been instituted against the 8 named accused
persons including all these appellants for the alleged offence
under Sections 385/386/34 of the Indian Penal Code, and also
for the offence under Sections 16/17/ 20/ 21 of UA (P) Act,
1967 for taking appropriate legal action. Accordingly, Ezaj
(appellant in Cr. Appeal (DB) No.942 of 2024) and Minku Khan
(appellant in Cr. Appeal (DB) No.941 of 2024) were arrested.
6. After institution of said FIR, the police took up the investigation
and consequently other co-accused/appellants namely Jahir
Ansari (appellant in Cr. Appeal (DB) No.938 of 2024), Firoj
Khan (appellant in Cr. Appeal (DB) No.937 of 2024)
surrendered on 29.08.2023 and 21.09.2023 respectively. The
other accused namely Mahmud Alam@ Nepali (appellant in Cr.
Appeal (DB) No.941 of 2024) were remanded in the instant
case on, 20.12.2023.
7. Police after investigation submitted the charge-sheet vide Final
Form No. 01 of 2024 dated 07.01.2024 against these
appellants for offence under Sections 385/386/34 of the Indian
Penal Code, and also for the offence under Sections
16/17/20/21 of UA (P) Act, 1967.
8. However, due to want of the requisite sanction as per the
mandate of UAP Act 1967, the court concerned has taken the
5
2025:JHHC:10447-DB
cognizance of the offence under section 385/386/34 of the
Indian Penal Code only.
9. Thereafter aforesaid appellants had preferred Misc. Cr.
Application No.801 of 2024 [In Cr. Appeal No. 940 of 2024],
Misc. Cr. Application No.706 of 2024 [In Cr. Appeal (DB)
No.937 of 2024], Misc. Cr. Application No.708 of 2024 [In Cr.
Appeal (DB) No.938 of 2024], Misc. Cr. Application No.887 of
2024 [In Cr. Appeal (DB) No.941 of 2024] and Misc. Cr.
Application No.882 of 2024 [In Cr. Appeal (DB) No.942 of 2024]
for bail before the learned A.J.C. XVIII-cum-Spl. Judge, ATS,
Ranchi, in connection with ATS Court Case No.01 of 2024
arising out of ATS P.S. Case No.10 of 2023 but the same have
been rejected, hence the present appeal have been preferred.
10. It needs to refer herein the requisite sanction for the offence
with respect to offence under section 16,17,20,21 of the Act,
1967 has been accorded on 24.04.2024 by the competent
authority i.e. Deputy Commissioner Ranchi, vide memo no.
2394 dated 29.04.2024 and the said letter of sanction has also
been appended with the supplementary affidavit.
11. Thereafter, the cognizance of the offences under sections
16/17/20/21 of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 has
also been taken by the Trial Court and accordingly, the matter
has been fixed for addition of charge which would be evident
from the order dated 08.05.2024 passed by A.J.C. XVIII cum
6
2025:JHHC:10447-DB
Spl. Judge ATS, Ranchi in ATS Court Case No.01/2024. The
order dated 08.05.2024 has been appended with the
supplementary affidavit.
Submission of the learned counsel for the appellants
12. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the
appellants that they have falsely been implicated in the present
case.
13. It has also been submitted that the charge has already been
framed against the appellants. Further, it has been submitted
that nothing specific has come against the appellants to show
the culpability said to have been commited by them.
14. From bare perusal of the FIR, it has come that no ingredients
of Section 385 and 386 of the IPC are made out against the
appellants. Further, in the entire FIR, no where it has been
come that who has demanded the extortion money. The entire
allegations as have been alleged in the FIR, are totally false
and fabricated.
15. The further submission is that the appellants have never ever
been associated with any terrorist gang or organization nor
have ever committed any terrorist activities and only on the
basis of confessional statement, they have been implicated.
16. It has been submitted that the appellants have remained in
custody about 1 ½ year and implicated in the present case due
to some ulterior motive.
7
2025:JHHC:10447-DB
17. The Learned Court has failed to appreciate that the case was
only supported by highly interested official witnesses and none
of the independent witnesses have supported the case.
18. No ingredient of the offence said to be committed under the
UA(P) Act is being attracted if the entire case diary will be
taken into consideration.
19. Learned counsel for the appellants, on the aforesaid premise,
have submitted that the learned court ought to have considered
that aspect of the matter, while considering the prayer for
regular bail, but having not been considered, therefore, the
impugned orders need to be interfered with.
Submission of the learned counsel for the Respondent-State.
20. While on the other hand, learned Addl. Public Prosecutors
appearing for the Respondent-State, have vehemently
opposed the prayer for bail by defending the orders passed by
the learned court.
21. It has been contended that it is incorrect on the part of the
appellants that the implication is not there as per the disclosure
made by the co-accused persons.
22. It has further been contended that the money collected through
extortion from different persons has been recovered from the
vehicle kept under the back seat in which the co-accused were
travelling and the said fact has been confessed by the co-
accused.
8
2025:JHHC:10447-DB
23. The material has been surfaced in course of investigation, as
would be evident from the various paragraphs of the case diary
that the money was extorted for the purpose of utilizing in the
terrorist activities.
24. As per the material come in course of investigation, the
appellants are members of Aman Srivastava Gang operating
for collecting of ransom/levy from different business people etc.
of the locality.
25. By responding to the argument on the issue of custody, it has
been submitted that the question of applicability of Article 21 of
the Constitution of India cannot be disputed but the balance is
to be maintained in maintaining law and order situation and if
the present appellants are found to be active member of Aman
Srivastava gang, then merely because they remained in
custody approximately for one and half year, that cannot be a
ground to release them on bail.
26. Further, the proviso as stipulated under Section 43D(5) of
UA(P) Act put a complete embargo against release of the
accused persons, if prima facie case is made out and
allegation against the appellant is serious in nature.
27. In this case, there is prima facie case made out against the
appellants and chargesheet has been submitted in which
cognizance has been taken, hence, considering the
9
2025:JHHC:10447-DB
seriousness of crime, it is not fit case to enlarge the appellants
on bail.
28. Learned State Counsel, based upon the aforesaid grounds,
has submitted that it is, therefore, not a fit case where the
interference is to be shown with the impugned orders.
Analysis
29. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone
across the finding recorded by the learned court while
considering the prayer for regular bail.
30. This Court, before proceeding to examine as to whether the
appellants have been able to make out a prima facie case for
enlarging them on bail, deems it fit and proper to discuss some
settled proposition of law and the relevant provisions of
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967(herein referred as Act
1967) which is required to be considered herein.
31. The main objective of the Act 1967 is to make powers available
for dealing with activities directed against the integrity and
sovereignty of India. As per Preamble, Act 1967 has been
enacted to provide for the more effective prevention of certain
unlawful activities of individuals and associations and dealing
with terrorist activities and for matters connected therewith.
Therefore, the aim and object of enactment of UAPA is also to
provide for more effective prevention of certain unlawful
activities.
10
2025:JHHC:10447-DB
32. To achieve the said object and purpose of effective prevention
of certain unlawful activities the Parliament in its wisdom has
provided that where an association is declared unlawful by a
notification issued under Section 3, a person, who is and
continues to be a member of such association shall be
punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 2
years, and shall also be liable to fine.
33. Clause (m) of Section 2 of the 1967 Act defines “terrorist
organization”. It is defined as an organization listed in the First
Schedule. CPI (Maoist) has been listed at Item no. 34 in the
First Schedule. Chapters III onwards of the 1967 Act
incorporate various offences. Chapter IV has the title
“punishment for terrorist act”. Clause (k) of Section 2 provides
that “terrorist act” has the meaning assigned to it under Section
15 and the terrorist act includes an act which constitutes an
offence within the scope of, and as defined in any of the
treaties specified in the Second Schedule.
34. Further, section 10(a)(i) of Act 1967 provides that where an
association is declared unlawful by a notification issued under
Section 3 which has become effective under sub-section (3) of
that Section, a person, who is continues to be a member of
such association shall be punishable with imprisonment for a
term which may extend to two years, and shall also be liable to
fine therefore, so long as Section 10(a)(i) stands a person who
11
2025:JHHC:10447-DB
is or continues to be a member of such association shall be
liable to be punished.
35. As per mandate of section 13 of the Act 1967 who takes part in
or commits, or advocates, abets, advises or incites the
commission of, any unlawful activity, shall be punishable with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, and
shall also be liable to fine.
36. The “terrorist act” has been defined under Section 2(k) has the
meaning assigned to it in Section 15. Section 15 contains the
activities which will be treated to be a “terrorist act”. Section 15
reads as under :
“15. Terrorist act.–4(1) Whoever does any act with intent
to threaten or likely to threaten the unity, integrity, security,
economic security, or sovereignty of India or with intent to
strike terror or likely to strike terror in the people or any
section of the people in India or in any foreign country,–
(a) by using bombs, dynamite or other explosive substances
or inflammable substances or firearms or other lethal
weapons or poisonous or noxious gases or other chemicals
or by any other substances (whether biological radioactive,
nuclear or otherwise) of a hazardous nature or by any other
means of whatever nature to cause or likely to cause–
(i) death of, or injuries to, any person or persons; or
(ii) loss of, or damage to, or destruction of, property; or
(iii) disruption of any supplies or services essential to the life
of the community in India or in any foreign country; or
(iiia) damage to, the monetary stability of India by way of
production or smuggling or circulation of high quality
counterfeit Indian paper currency, coin or of any other
material; or]12
2025:JHHC:10447-DB
(iv) damage or destruction of any property in India or in a
foreign country used or intended to be used for the defence
of India or in connection with any other purposes of the
Government of India, any State Government or any of their
agencies; or
(b) overawes by means of criminal force or the show of
criminal force or attempts to do so or causes death of any
public functionary or attempts to cause death of any public
functionary; or
(c) detains, kidnaps or abducts any person and threatens to
kill or injure such person or does any other act in order to
compel the Government of India, any State Government or
the Government of a foreign country or an international or
inter-governmental organisation or any other person to do or
abstain from doing any act; or commits a terrorist act.
[Explanation.–For the purpose of this sub-section,–
(a) “public functionary” means the constitutional authorities or
any other functionary notified in the Official Gazette by the
Central Government as public functionary;
(b) “high quality counterfeit Indian currency” means the
counterfeit currency as may be declared after examination by
an authorised or notified forensic authority that such currency
imitates or compromises with the key security features as
specified in the Third Schedule.]
(2) The terrorist act includes an act which constitutes an
offence within the scope of, and as defined in any of the
treaties specified in the Second Schedule.
37. As per the provision of Section 15, whoever has acted with
intent to threaten or likely to threaten the unity, integrity,
security, economic security, or sovereignty of India or with
intent to strike terror or likely to strike terror in the people or
any section of the people in India or in any foreign country
would be covered under the definition of “terrorist act”. This
13
2025:JHHC:10447-DB
provision, therefore, stipulates that any activity with an intent to
strike terror or likely to strike terror will come under the fold of
terrorist act if done to threaten the unity, integrity, security,
sovereignty of India or economic security, which has been
inserted by way of Act 3 of 2013 with effect from 01.02.2013.
38. Section 17 provides punishment for raising funds for terrorist
act which reads as under :
“17. Punishment for raising funds for terrorist act.–
Whoever, in India or in a foreign country, directly or indirectly,
raises or provides funds or collects funds, whether from a
legitimate or illegitimate source, from any person or persons
or attempts to provide to, or raises or collects funds for any
person or persons, knowing that such funds are likely to be
used, in full or in part by such person or persons or by a
terrorist organisation or by a terrorist gang or by an individual
terrorist to commit a terrorist act, notwithstanding whether
such funds were actually used or not for commission of such
act, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which
shall not be less than five years but which may extend to
imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation.–For the purpose of this section,–
(a) participating, organising or directing in any of the acts
stated therein shall constitute an offence;
(b) raising funds shall include raising or collecting or
providing funds through production or smuggling or
circulation of high quality counterfeit Indian currency; and
(c) raising or collecting or providing funds, in any manner for
the benefit of, or, to an individual terrorist, terrorist gang or
terrorist organisation for the purpose not specifically covered
under section 15 shall also be construed as an offence.
39. It is evident from the contents of Section 17 of the Act, 1967
that whoever, in India or in a foreign country, directly or
14
2025:JHHC:10447-DB
indirectly, raises or provides funds or collects funds, whether
from a legitimate or illegitimate source, from any person or
persons or attempts to provide to, or raises or collects funds
for any person or persons, knowing that such funds are likely
to be used, in full or in part by such person or persons or by a
terrorist organisation or by a terrorist gang or by an individual
terrorist to commit a terrorist act, notwithstanding whether such
funds were actually used or not for commission of such act,
the same would be covered under the aforesaid provision.
Meaning thereby, raising of funds directly or indirectly to
commit a terrorist act by a terrorist organization or by terrorist
gang or by an individual terrorist, irrespective of the fact
whether this was actually used for commission of such act,
would be punishable under Section 17.
40. Sub-section (c) of Section 17 of the Act, 1967 enlarges the
scope of the terrorist act since the same provides that any act
for the benefit of an individual terrorist, terrorist gang or
terrorist organisation even if not specifically covered under
Section 15 shall also be construed as an offence.
41. At this juncture, it will be purposeful to discuss the core of
Section 43D(5) of the Act 1967 which mandates that the person
shall not be released on bail if the court is of the opinion that
there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations
made are prima facie true apart from the other offences the
15
2025:JHHC:10447-DB
appellant is accused of committing offences under Sections 17,
18 and 21 of the UA(P) Act, 1967.
42. The reason of making reference of the provision of Section
43D(5) of the Act that in course of investigation, the
investigating agency has discovered the material against the
appellant attracting the offence under various Sections of
UA(P) Act. Since, this Court is considering the issue of bail
based upon now also under the various sections of UA(P) Act
and hence, the parameter which has been put under the
provision of Section 43D(5) of the Act is also required to be
considered.
43. The requirement as stipulated under Section 43D(5) of the
UA(P) Act, 1967 in the matter of grant of regular bail fell for
consideration before the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of
National Investigation Agency Vrs. Zahoor Ahmad Shah
Watali, reported in [(2019) 5 SCC 1] wherein at paragraph 23 it
has been held by interpreting the expression “prima facie true”
as stipulated under Section 43D(5) of the Act, 1967 which
would mean that the materials/evidence collated by the
investigation agency in reference to the accusation against the
accused concerned in the First Information Report, must
prevail until contradicted and overcome or disproved by other
evidence, and on the face of it, shows the complicity of such
accused in the commission of the stated offence. It has further
16
2025:JHHC:10447-DBbeen observed that it must be good and sufficient on its face to
establish a given fact or the chain of facts constituting the
stated offence, unless rebutted or contradicted. The degree of
satisfaction is lighter when the Court has to opine that the
accusation is “prima facie true”, as compared to the opinion of
the accused “not guilty” of such offence as required under the
other special enactments. For ready reference, paragraph 23 of
the aforesaid judgment is required to be quoted herein which
reads hereunder as :-
“23. By virtue of the proviso to sub-section (5), it is the duty
of the Court to be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds
for believing that the accusation against the accused is prima
facie true or otherwise. Our attention was invited to the
decisions of this Court, which has had an occasion to deal
with similar special provisions in TADA and MCOCA. The
principle underlying those decisions may have some bearing
while considering the prayer for bail in relation to the
offences under the 1967 Act as well. Notably, under the
special enactments such as TADA, MCOCA and the Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, the Court is
required to record its opinion that there are reasonable
grounds for believing that the accused is “not guilty” of the
alleged offence. There is a degree of difference between the
satisfaction to be recorded by the Court that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is “not
guilty” of such offence and the satisfaction to be recorded for
the purposes of the 1967 Act that there are reasonable 11
grounds for believing that the accusation against such
person is “prima facie” true. By its very nature, the
expression “prima facie true” would mean that the
materials/evidence collated by the investigating agency in
reference to the accusation against the accused concerned17
2025:JHHC:10447-DBin the first information report, must prevail until contradicted
and overcome or disproved by other evidence, and on the
face of it, shows the complicity of such accused in the
commission of the stated offence. It must be good and
sufficient on its face to establish a given fact or the chain of
facts constituting the stated offence, unless rebutted or
contradicted. In one sense, the degree of satisfaction is
lighter when the Court has to opine that the accusation is
“prima facie true”, as compared to the opinion of the accused
“not guilty” of such offence as required under the other
special enactments. In any case, the degree of satisfaction to
be recorded by the Court for opining that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against
the accused is prima facie true, is lighter than the degree of
satisfaction to be recorded for considering a discharge
application or framing of charges in relation to offences under
the 1967 Act….”
44. It is, thus, evident from the proposition laid down by the
Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of National Investigation
Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (Supra) that it is the
bounden duty of the Court to apply its mind to examine the
entire materials on record for the purpose of satisfying itself,
whether a prima facie case is made out against the accused or
not.
45. Further, it is settled proposition of law that at the stage of
granting or non-granting of the bail, the Court is merely
expected to record a finding on the basis of broad probabilities
regarding the involvement of the accused in the commission of
the stated offence or otherwise and the elaborate examination
18
2025:JHHC:10447-DB
or dissection of the evidence is not required to be done at this
stage.
46. It is the duty of the Court to record its opinion that the
accusation made against the accused concerned is prima
facie true or otherwise and such opinion must be reached by
the Court not only in reference to the accusation in the FIR but
also in reference to the contents of the case diary and
including the charge-sheet (report under Section 173 CrPC)
and other material gathered by the investigating agency during
investigation. Reference in this regard may be taken from the
Judgment as rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case
of Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma Vrs. State of
Maharashtra, reported in (2005) 5 SCC 294. For ready
reference the following paragraph of the aforesaid Judgment is
being quoted herein under:-
“46. The duty of the court at this stage is not to
weigh the evidence meticulously but to arrive at a
finding on the basis of broad probabilities.
However, while dealing with a special statute like
MCOCA having regard to the provisions contained in
sub-section (4) of Section 21 of the Act, the court
may have to probe into the matter deeper so as to
enable it to arrive at a finding that the materials
collected against the accused during the
investigation may not justify a judgment of conviction.
The findings recorded by the court while granting or
refusing bail undoubtedly would be tentative in19
2025:JHHC:10447-DBnature, which may not have any bearing on the merit
of the case and the trial court would, thus, be free to
decide the case on the basis of evidence adduced at
the trial, without in any manner being prejudiced
thereby.”
47. The Hon’ble Apex Court in a very recent judgment rendered in
Gurwinder Singh Vs State of Punjab and Another reported
in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 109 while taking in to consideration
of the judgment as rendered in the National Investigation
Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (supra) and Union of
India Vs. K.A. Najeeb (supra) has observed that, the proviso
to Sub-section (5) of Section 43D puts a complete embargo on
the powers of the Special Court to release an accused on bail
and lays down that if the Court, ‘on perusal of the case diary or
the report made under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure’, is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds
for believing that the accusation, against such person, as
regards commission of offence or offences under Chapter IV
and/or Chapter VI of the UAP Act is prima facie true, such
accused person shall not be released on bail or on his own
bond.
48. The Hon’ble Apex Court further observed that the conventional
idea in bail jurisprudence vis-à-vis ordinary penal offences that
the discretion of Courts must tilt in favour of the oft-quoted
phrase – ‘bail is the rule, jail is the exception’ – unless
20
2025:JHHC:10447-DB
circumstances justify otherwise – does not find any place while
dealing with bail applications under UAP Act and the ‘exercise’
of the general power to grant bail under the UAP Act is
severely restrictive in scope.
49. In the aforesaid context it has further been observed by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court that the courts are, therefore,
burdened with a sensitive task on hand and in dealing with bail
applications under UAP Act, the courts are merely examining if
there is justification to reject bail and the ‘justifications’ must be
searched from the case diary and the final report submitted
before the Special Court.
50. It has further been observed that it is only if the test for
rejection of bail is not satisfied – that the Courts would proceed
to decide the bail application in accordance with the ‘tripod
test’ (flight risk, influencing witnesses, tampering with
evidence).
51. For ready reference, following paragraphs of the aforesaid
Judgment are being quoted herein under:
“27. A bare reading of Sub-section (5) of Section
43D shows that apart from the fact that Sub-section
(5) bars a Special Court from releasing an accused
on bail without affording the Public Prosecutor an
opportunity of being heard on the application
seeking release of an accused on bail, the proviso
to Sub-section (5) of Section 43D puts a complete
embargo on the powers of the Special Court to21
2025:JHHC:10447-DBrelease an accused on bail. It lays down that if the
Court, ‘on perusal of the case diary or the report
made under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure’, is of the opinion that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that the
accusation, against such person, as regards
commission of offence or offences under Chapter
IV and/or Chapter VI of the UAP Act is prima facie
true, such accused person shall not be released
on bail or on his own bond. It is interesting to note
that there is no analogous provision traceable in
any other statute to the one found in Section 43D(5)
of the UAP Act. In that sense, the language of bail
limitation adopted therein remains unique to the
UAP Act.
28. The conventional idea in bail jurisprudence vis-
à-vis ordinary penal offences that the discretion of
Courts must tilt in favour of the oft-quoted phrase –
‘bail is the rule, jail is the exception’ – unless
circumstances justify otherwise – does not find any
place while dealing with bail applications under
UAP Act. The ‘exercise’ of the general power to
grant bail under the UAP Act is severely restrictive
in scope. The form of the words used in proviso to
Section 43D (5)– ‘shall not be released’ in contrast
with the form of the words as found in
Section 437(1) CrPC – ‘may be released’ – suggests
the intention of the Legislature to make bail, the
exception and jail, the rule.
29. The courts are, therefore, burdened with a
sensitive task on hand. In dealing with bail
applications under UAP Act, the courts are merely
examining if there is justification to reject bail. The
‘justifications’ must be searched from the case diary
and the final report submitted before the Special
22
2025:JHHC:10447-DB
Court. The legislature has prescribed a low, ‘prima
facie’ standard, as a measure of the degree of
satisfaction, to be recorded by Court when
scrutinising the justifications [materials on record].
This standard can be contrasted with the standard
of ‘strong suspicion’, which is used by Courts while
hearing applications for ‘discharge–”
52. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment after textual
reading of Section 43D(5) UAP Act, has formulated the
guideline which was summarized in the form of a twin-prong
test. For ready reference, the relevant paragraph is being
quoted herein under:
“31. On a textual reading of Section 43 D(5) UAP
Act, the inquiry that a bail court must undertake while
deciding bail applications under the UAP Act can be
summarised in the form of a twin-prong test:
1) Whether the test for rejection of the bail is
satisfied?
1.1 Examine if, prima facie, the alleged ‘accusations’
make out an offence under Chapter IV or VI of the
UAP Act
1.2 Such examination should be limited to case diary
and final report submitted under Section 173 CrPC;
2) Whether the accused deserves to be enlarged on
bail in light of the general principles relating to grant
of bail under Section 439 CrPC (‘tripod test’)?”
53. Further, it is settled proposition of law that at the stage of
granting or non-granting of the bail, the Court is merely
expected to record a finding on the basis of broad probabilities
regarding the involvement of the accused in the commission of
the stated offence or otherwise and the elaborate examination
23
2025:JHHC:10447-DBor dissection of the evidence is not required to be done at this
stage.
54. Further, it is the duty of the Court to record its opinion that the
accusation made against the accused concerned is prima facie
true or otherwise and such opinion must be reached by the
Court not only in reference to the accusation in the FIR but
also in reference to the contents of the charge-sheet and other
material gathered by the investigating agency during
investigation.
55. This Court, on the basis of the aforesaid position of law and
the factual aspect as has been gathered against the appellants
is proceeding to examine as to whether the accusation against
the appellants is prima facie true as compared to the opinion of
accused not guilty by taking into consideration the material
collected in course of investigation.
56. Counter affidavit has been filed by the respondent state. It is
evident from the counter affidavit that the appellants have
been charge-sheeted accused of the instant case.
57. It is evident from record that instant matter relates to a
multidimensional organised crime by gang of Aman Srivastava,
and FIR was instituted under Sections 385/386/34 of the Indian
Penal Code, and also for the offence under Sections 16/17/ 20/
21 of UA (P) Act, 1967 and after investigation charge-sheet
dated 07.01.2024 has been submitted against these appellants
24
2025:JHHC:10447-DBfor offence under Sections 385/386/34 of the Indian Penal
Code, and also for the offence under Sections 16/17/20/21 of
UA (P) Act, 1967.
58. Admittedly herein due to want of the requisite sanction as per the
mandate of UAP Act 1967, initially the court concerned has taken
the cognizance of the offence under section 385/386/34 of the
Indian Penal Code only and thereafter the aforesaid appellants
have preferred their prayer for bail before the special Judge but
even then, the same has been rejected.
59. Thereafter, requisite sanction for the offence with respect to
offence under section 16,17,20,21 of the Act, 1967 has been
accorded on 24.04.2024 by the competent authority i.e. Deputy
Commissioner Ranchi, vide memo no. 2394 dated 29.04.2024
and accordingly, the cognizance of the offences under sections
16/17/20/21 of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 has also
been taken by the learned Trial Court and consequently, the
matter has been fixed for addition of charge which would be
evident from the order dated 08.05.2024 passed by A.J.C. XVIII
cum Spl. Judge ATS, Ranchi in ATS Court Case No.01/2024.
60. Now, we are adverting to various paragraphs of the case diary
in order to find out the culpability of these appellants in the
alleged crime.
61. It is evident from record that the name of the appellants
Mahmud Alam @ Nepali, Firoz Khan and Mohammad Zahir
25
2025:JHHC:10447-DBAnsari @ Zahir Ansari has come in the confessional statement
of Ezaj Ansari and Minku Khan, wherein, they have stated that
the extorted money which had been recovered from them was
to hand over to aforesaid appellants near Alam Hospital, and
the said money was collected as Rangdari by Aman Srivastava
gang from different traders.
62. It is evident from various paragraph of the case diary that these
appellants are member of a notorious gang of the area, which
is operating for collection of ransom/levy from different traders
etc. of the locality. Further, co-accused Ezaj Ansari and Minku
Khan (appellant herein) were going to handover the money
collected as ransom to the appellants, namely, Mahmud Alam
@ Nepali, Firoz Khan and Mohammad Zahir Ansari @ Zahir
Ansari and this fact was surfaced during investigation based on
the statements of the co-accused. This fact is prima facie
sufficient to show the complicity of these appellants in the
crime of serious nature.
63. In para-2 of the case diary, the seizure-list is referred which
fully supported the prosecution case and further, the name of
the appellants, namely, Ezaj Ansari and Minku Khan is
mentioned in the seizure-list having the possession of the
white Scorpio Car from which the cash amount of Rs.
49,83,000/- was recovered.
64. Further, at paragraphs-9,10,11, 12 and 115 of the case diary
26
2025:JHHC:10447-DBwherein the statement of witnesses has been referred as also
paragraphs-23 and 25 of the case diary, the statement of the
witness of seizure recorded, by which, the case of the
prosecution has fully been corroborated.
65. The appellants, namely, Minku Khan and the co-accused Ezaj
Ansari have confessed their involvement in the instant case in
their statements mentioned at Paragraphs-16 and 17 of the
case diary. The alleged ransom money, i.e., Rs.49,83,000/-
was also recovered from a vehicle through which these
accused/appellants were traveling.
66. Further, at paragraph-109 of the case diary, the connectivity
chart of mobile numbers of accused persons were recorded
which shows that they were connected to each other to carry
out the conspiracy and alleged offence.
67. Thus, from the aforesaid fact prima facie, it is evident that
these appellants are associates of Aman Srivastava gang who
are involved in various criminal cases.
68. Thus, it appears that there is sufficient prima facie evidence
which indicates the complicity of the appellants to the
organized crime syndicate which suggests that the appellants
were facilitating the alleged crime.
69. Further, in the counter affidavit, it has been mentioned that if
the relief as prayed by the appellants is granted, there is every
chance of disruption of evidence, because supplementary
27
2025:JHHC:10447-DBinvestigation is still going on.
70. Learned counsel for the appellants has taken the ground of
custody of the appellants as they have been languishing in the
custody from one and half year approximately.
71. While, on the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the
respondent-State has seriously disputed the aforesaid fact
apart from the merit that the present appellants are having
close association with the Aman Srivastava Gang.
72. Considering the above facts and circumstances and after
going through the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, case
diary, and other documentary evidence, it is evident that there
is direct and serious allegation against the appellants which
shows the nexus with the member of Aman Srivastava Gang.
73. In the context of aforesaid, this Court, is of view that there is
no quarrel about the settled position of law that Article 21 of
the Constitution of India provides for protecting the
fundamental right of liberty but that is to be assessed by
carving out the balance in enforcing the law and order.
74. It has been contended on behalf of the learned counsel for the
appellants that the instant case was only supported by highly
interested official witnesses(police) and none of the
independent witnesses have supported the case.
75. In the aforesaid context, it needs to refer herein that the
Hon’ble Apex Court in Girja Prasad vs. State of M.P, [(2007)
28
2025:JHHC:10447-DB7 SCC 625], has held that the presumption that every person
acts honestly applies as much in favour of a Police Official as
any other person. No infirmity attaches to the testimony of
Police Officials merely because they belong to Police Force.
There is no rule of law which lays down that no conviction can
be recorded on the testimony of Police Officials even if such
evidence is otherwise reliable and trustworthy. The rule of
prudence may require more careful scrutiny of their evidence.
But, if the Court is convinced that what was stated by a
witness has a ring of truth, conviction can be based on such
evidence.
76. Thus, in the light of the aforesaid settled proposition of law the
contention of the learned counsel is that the case of
prosecution is doubtful because the instant case is only
supported by highly interested official witnesses and none of
the independent witnesses have supported the case, is not
tenable herein.
77. Accordingly, this Court, on the basis of the aforesaid facts as
referred hereinabove as also the judgment rendered by the
Hon’ble Apex Court, is of the view that it cannot be said that
the allegation levelled against the appellants is prima facie
untrue.
29
2025:JHHC:10447-DB
78. In view of the foregoing discussions, we find no illegality in the
impugned orders passed by A.J.C. XVIII-cum-Spl. Judge, ATS,
Ranchi, in connection with ATS Court Case No.01 of 2024
arising out of ATS P.S. Case No.10 of 2023, whereby and
whereunder, the bail petitions of the appellants were rejected
and as such, the orders impugned require no interference by
this Court.
79. In the result, we find no merit in instant appeals, hence, the
same are, hereby, dismissed.
80. Pending Interlocutory Application(s), if any, also stands
dismissed.
81. It is made clear that any observation made herein will not
prejudice the case of the appellants in course of trial and view
as expressed by this Court is only limited to the instant
appeals.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
I Agree
(Pradeep Kumar Srivastava, J.)
(Pradeep Kumar Srivastava, J.)
Rohit/-A.F.R.
30
[ad_1]
Source link